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In the end we all have the same tendency, that is, 
to see ourselves in the different stages of our lives 
as the result or the summary of all that has happened to us, 
of what we have achieved and what we have done, 
as if our existence amounts to only this. 
And we almost always forget that people’s lives are not just that: 
each trajectory is compounded too by our loses and our vestiges, 
by our omissions and our unfulfilled wishes, 
by that which we once left aside or we did not choose or did not achieve, 
by the numerous possibilities that were never explored (...)
by our vacillations and our dreams, 
by the frustrated projects and the warm and false wishes,
by the fears that paralysed us, 
by that which we abandoned or that which abandoned us. 
People, in sum, perhaps consist as much of what they have not been
as of what they are
(Javier Marfas, speech of acceptance at Romulo Gallegos Award Ceremony 1995).
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ABSTRACT
This research investigates how people do the self in narrative form. It also studies 
changes and continuities in self-conceptions over time. Following Charles Taylor, I 
claim that self-understanding happens within a “space of questions” about the good 
(what is worthy, right, what dignity involves, and so forth) and, consequently, I 
associate the study of selfhood with an examination of morality. As a complement to 
this, and drawing on Michel Foucault’s later work, I propose that this relationship 
between ideas of the good and self-conceptions can be analytically unbounded in the 
interaction between “ethics” and “technologies of the self’.
I follow a narrative approach to study the ways the self is assembled through the 
interpretative practice of the biographical account. I conducted life stories and in- 
depth interviews with 10 families living in Chile’s capital city, Santiago. In each 
case, I interviewed family members of three generations: a grandparent, a son or 
daughter and a grandchild.
The thesis is structured in four parts: part one includes the introduction, the 
conceptual framework and the methodology; part two examines the changing 
relationship between ideas of the good, ethics and technologies of the self over the 
three generations under study; part three applies the arguments developed in part two 
to different practices of everyday life, and part four presents the conclusions.
The key argument the research advances is that the way the idea of the good becomes 
redefined through time delineates a process of interiorisation of the moral sources of 
the self. From the grandparents to the grandchildren, moral authority is gradually and 
unevenly displaced from an external source to the interior of the self.
In the light of the research findings, I conclude with a reassessment of contemporary 
sociological scholarship on selfhood and theories of generation and historical change. 
I also reflect on the connections between moral and narrative theories for the study of 
selfhood, and I consider some implications of this work for Chilean sociology.
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INTRODUCTION
This research investigates how people do the self in narrative form. It also examines 
changes and continuities in self-conceptions over time. Following the philosopher 
Charles Taylor (1989), I claim that self-understanding happens within a “space of 
questions” about the good (what is worthy, right, what dignity involves, and so forth) 
and, consequently, I associate the study of selfhood with an examination of morality. 
As a complement to this, drawing on Michel Foucault’s later work (1986), I also 
propose that this relationship between ideas of the good and self-conceptions can be 
analytically unbundled at the level of the interaction between “ethics” and 
“technologies of the self’.
What the study explores is how first-person self-interpretation assembles the self 
through the available “vocabulary of motives” (Mills 1963) or “regimes of 
justification” (Thevenot 2002), how the self is inscribed, put together, articulated, 
and what human beings are capable of saying, imagining, renouncing and holding 
through time with such a self. So, unlike those perspectives that concentrate on the 
social forces and cultural dilemmas now shaping personal identity, this thesis 
examines the complexity —nowadays and two generations back— of living through 
and narrating the self.
I follow a narrative approach to study the ways the self is done through the 
interpretative practice of the biographical account. I conducted life stories and in- 
depth interviews with 10 families living in Chile’s capital city, Santiago. In each 
case, I interviewed three generations of family members: a grandparent, a son or 
daughter and a grandchild.
By importing the moral philosophy of Charles Taylor into a sociological enquiry and 
complementing it with Foucauldian analytical tools, the thesis contributes to the 
discipline by reinscribing issues of morality at the centre of sociological thought. The 
narrative approach to which I am committed articulates this relationship fruitfully.
We will be examining the appropriation of moral discourses in the narrativisation of 
the self by successive generations. A number of analytical lines of inquiry address
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this, including: which regimes of justification do people deploy? What happens to 
people’s experiences and to them as interpreters when they use discourses that incite 
them to be or behave in a certain way? How are these discourses used, that is, 
interpreted, manipulated or justified in storying the self? What happens when these 
prevailing ways of thinking about the self take part, as they do, in intimate 
relationships with significant others?
The personal narratives we will be exploring will tell us about prevailing ways of 
speaking, learning, inhabiting, loving, suffering, failing, regretting; forms of 
parenting, befriending, gendering, and so on. And they will also tell us about the 
consequences of these ways of assembling the self for the storytellers’ sense of 
being: what they could not learn, relate to, think, do, aspire or change; what they 
have had to reclaim, fight for, negotiate, give up, forget or endure.
This research concerns my culture and some of my country’s people. I do not claim 
any “representativeness”. Nor do I wish to generalise anything of what I say about 
my interviews to encompass Chilean society at large. I would consider myself richly 
rewarded if the reader can conclude that I have done justice to the complexity of the 
stories told and the many angles of the topic at hand, and if he or she finds I have 
traced careful and interesting connections among them.
Interviews were carried out in my mother tongue. Neither my grandparents or parents 
(or myself) belong to any of the generations being researched; our time runs between 
theirs. (This did not preclude discussion of many of the issues of this research with 
my own family; I encouraged my father to share our family’s story and my mother 
transcribed much of the interview material).
At a general level, this research aims to make an empirical contribution to the study 
of selfhood regarding its connection with morality and from a narrative approach. It 
also aspires to stimulate the debate on the domestic front, where issues of selfhood 
have been neglected by a Chilean sociology largely dominated by debates on 
modernity and by a realist approach to the sociology of selfhood that reduces the 
subject to the issue of “subjectivity”.
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The thesis contains four parts: part one includes this introduction, the conceptual 
framework and the methodology; part two examines the changing relationship 
between ideas of the good, ethics of the self and forms of self-understanding over the 
three generations under study; part three applies the arguments developed in part two 
to different practices of everyday life and part four presents the conclusions.
Following this introduction, chapter one sets forth some of the conceptual basis of 
this research. Following Charles Taylor (1989), I define the self as a mode of self­
interpretation within a moral space and I argue that continuities and changes in forms 
of moral reasoning over time can be studied as the “supersession” of moral 
frameworks in the “pursuing of moral and epistemic gain”. Next, I turn to sociology 
to review contemporary scholarship on selfhood. In particular, I engage with authors 
of reflexive modernity and govermentality theories. Then, I draw on Michel 
Foucault’s (1979, 1985, 1986) work to stress the role of institutions in the production 
of historically specific discursive practices concerning the self and to argue that the 
relation between selfhood and morality can be analytically examined through the 
interplay of “ethics” and “technologies of the self’. I also explain my divergences 
with Foucault’s later work on the ethics of the self.
In chapter two I address the other two elements at the base of this research — 
narratives and time— and I present the methodological procedures of this 
investigation. First, I introduce my view of the narrative approach within the context 
of personal stories. Then, I develop arguments for biographical narratives as a 
suitable method for the study of selfhood and morality and I propose that an analysis 
of the interplay between ethics and technologies of the self can be carried out at two 
levels: the content and the organization of the narrative. Because I use the category 
of time to study change and, methodologically, I work with interviewees from three 
generations within ten families, in the second section I address the literature on 
generation. I argue for the need to broaden the notion of generation to encompass 
how the experience of generation is lived over time. Lastly, I present the methods of 
inquiry, the interviewee selection criteria and the analytical procedures followed in 
the research.
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In part two, chapters three, four and five study the relationship between ideas of the 
good, ethics of the self and forms of self-understanding in each generation. That 
examination serves to advance the central argument of the research: that the way the 
idea of the good is redefined through time delineates an interiorisation o f the moral 
sources o f the self Whereas those chapters are based on a thematic analysis of the 
content of the personal narrative, chapter six focuses on the changing form of 
organisation of the personal story and traces further connections between 
redefinitions of the good and reconceptualisation of the self. In particular, I compare 
the underlying master motif of the biographical account, the predominant narrative 
genre organising the tales and the interviewees’ approach to the narrative work.
In the third part I translate the discussion into the practices of living with respect to 
the good, to explore the embeddedness in people’s way of life of the goods that they 
articulate in “qualitative distinctions” (Taylor 1989). The aim is to illustrate how the 
thesis of the interiorisation of the moral sources of the self operates in both private 
and public realms and to develop other elements of the shifting relationship between 
selfhood and morality over time.
Chapter seven addresses the changing meaning of work, the relationship between the 
morality of the self and work ethics and between working and spare times. Through 
the analysis of childhood narratives, the first part of chapter eight discusses how the 
idea of the normal child and methods of ethical discipline in child-rearing have been 
redefined over the generations. The second part of chapter eight examines how the 
idea of moral interiority is expressed in the rise of intimacy as a particular way of 
being “close” in personal relationships.
Chapter nine examines selfhood in terms of the normative redefinitions of sexuality 
and gender and develops the argument about the emergence of the sense of 
inwardness and the reformulation of the ethics of care of the self.
To conclude, I embark on a brief inquiry into the 'ageing of generations’ as it relates 
to the intergenerational transformations of the moral outlook of the self, which forms 
the basis for an appraisal of the literature on generations, time and change. Then I
12
reflect on the connections between moral and narrative theories for the study of 
selfhood, and I reassess some elements of contemporary sociological scholarship on 
the self. Finally, I consider some implications of this research for Chilean 
contemporary sociology.
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CHAPTER ONE— ON SELF AND CHANGE
This chapter sets out the conceptual framework of the investigation, particularly 
regarding the notion of selfhood and how it changes over time. I begin with the 
philosopher Charles Taylor, upon whom I draw to organize this as a study of 
selfhood and morality. Contrary to views that tend to reduce the self to its self- 
awareness, dissociating personal identity from morality, I approach the study of the 
self from the point of view of the moral ontologies that articulate human beings’ 
“qualitative distinctions” in the making of their lives. In examining the self over time 
as a mode of self-interpretation within a moral space, I favour a cultural account of 
social change that expounds the significances around which everyday life and 
personal identity are assembled.
Contemporary sociological scholarship has devoted little attention to the self and its 
moral sources. In the second section I address two main strands of contemporary 
sociological thought to exemplify this. On the one hand, reflexive modernity theories 
have focused descriptively on the precarious structural conditions of moral 
judgement, rather than on examining its actual assemblage in common people’s 
everyday lives. Moreover, the use of such a restrictive notion of self-identity as self- 
reflexivity proves problematic for analysing how individuals use qualitative 
distinctions to assess themselves and others. On the other hand, in post-structuralist 
approaches —and particularly in govermentality theories— the question of how the 
person is constructed by prevailing discourses has taken precedence over the 
question of “who I am to myself’, leaving little ground for the study of how people 
“make themselves up” in relation to available modes of judgment.
In the third section I continue to counterpose reflexive modernity theories and 
theories of govemmentality, now addressing the issue of change. While theories of 
reflexive modernity derive changes in self-conceptions from macro-social 
transformations, those of govemmentality argue that changes in ideas of selfhood do 
not need to be explained at that level. Instead, they propose, we can examine the 
changing “regimes of the self’, through which human beings come to think of and 
act upon themselves in particular ways. This is what I attempt to do in this 
intergenerational study, although I do not follow a textual analysis nor do I see the
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succession of prevailing discourses over time as an “unrelated series of epistemes”. 
Instead, I examine social change through the transformation of the discursive means 
of moral reasoning that are available to people of successive generations to 
understand, recount and justify their existence. Drawing again on Taylor, I also 
propose viewing continuities and changes in forms of moral reasoning as the 
supersession of moral frameworks in the “pursuing of moral and epistemic gain”.
In the fourth and fifth sections I engage with the oeuvre of Michel Foucault. Whereas 
with regard to Taylor I suggest that we are selves only insofar as we move in a space 
of moral questions, regarding Foucault I stress the role of institutions in the 
production of discourses and, particularly, of self-knowledge. I also argue that the 
use of prevailing moral discourses to inform ordinary people’s biographical 
narratives can be analytically examined through his concepts of the “ethics” and 
“technologies of the self’. But instead of analysing the making up of oneself as an 
ethical subject in the tension between subjection and subjectivation, I examine the 
interviewees’ own reservations about their moral standards. As I develop in section 
sixth, this implies looking at the compromises, commitments, negotiations and costs 
that upholding certain moral positions entails. It also involves examining the process 
of “living through subjectifiers” in order to explore what a person’s make-up allows 
him or her to do, to know and to envisage. It finally implies looking at the notion of 
self-coherence as an effort of articulation, to make different orders of worth 
compatible with what one knows, is able to do, to endure and to transform. In the last 
section I turn briefly to Chilean sociology to explain how the topic under research 
and the approach I develop relate to domestic literature in the field. Basically, I 
argue, what little Chilean sociological scholarship on selfhood has arisen since the 
1990’s remains restricted to the study of “subjectivity” partly because the 
problematization of the self is entangled in the relationship between agency and 
structure.
I discuss the other two elements on which this research is based —narratives and 
generations— in the second chapter, where I present the methodological procedures 
of the investigation.
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1.1 Self and morality
I did not work with an a priori theory of the subject in this research, if by this we 
mean an explanatory set of related arguments about the different configurations of 
the self. Instead, I borrowed a series of analytical tools and points of reference from 
different authors to guide my inquiries and organise the presentation of my work. 
Within sociology, the self is a highly contested term and its distinction from the 
concepts of personal identity, subjectivity or subjectivation is often unclear. 
Acknowledging this complexity, I set myself the task of working out a precise notion 
of what self would mean in this study. I found a wealth of guidelines in the 
philosophy of Charles Taylor. Methodologically, his approach provided a point of 
departure for my inquiries, yet enabled me to remain grounded in the actual research. 
Politically, I opted for studying society and culture “from the individual ‘upwards’, 
rather than from the social structure downwards” (Rustin 2000:45) and Taylor’s 
anthropocentric approach is consistent with that option. At a theoretical level, his 
notion of selfhood is not intrinsic to any particular modem configuration of the 
person and, thus, it is appropriate for examining changes in self-conception over 
time. Conceptually, I initially sought to focus on the relationship between people’s 
notions of selfhood and prevailing discourses of the self. Taylor’s claim that selfhood 
is intrinsically linked to ideas of the good seemed a fruitful and fascinating form of 
liaison between those two levels. Biographical narratives, the methodological 
technique I chose to examine culture from the individual upwards, are basically 
moral tales.
By self, we usually mean the particular being a person is, our individuality and, thus, 
what makes us different from others. Borrowing from Racevskis, the self can be seen 
as a “metaphysical refuge”, as “the gap between our history and History, between our 
self-conscious and purposeful use of language and the Logos that makes our speech 
possible. We reside in this gap by covering it up with an explanatory system that 
reconciles our self-image with our being.” (1988:21) But Taylor adds something 
more; he maintains that we are selves insofar as “we matter to ourselves” in basic 
ways.
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In Sources o f the Self (1989) Taylor argues against “naturalist” philosophies such as 
classic utilitarianism, because they provide no means for self-understanding: they 
tend to deny the existence of worthy or desirable ends or goods which operate as 
standards against which people judge their choices and inclinations, and thus 
proclaim that it is possible to do without moral frameworks and evaluative 
distinctions. Taylor claims that the self cannot be understood only as an object to be 
known, that is, as a matter of mere self-awareness, as if the self were defined in a 
neutral space of no significance to her or himself. “To be a person on Taylor’s 
account is more than doing certain things; it is more than mere agency, in the sense 
of having purposes, desires, aversions and so forth” (Calhoun 1991:233). To be a 
person implies that “you have to be an agent with a sense of yourself as agent” 
(Taylor 1989:257). There are no “punctual or neutral selves”, Taylor maintains. The 
self exists only in a space of questions and through constitutive or substantive 
concerns. Personal identity, or “what I am as a self’, is essentially defined “by the 
way things have significance for me” (34). Self-interpretation cannot be separated 
from the notion that the individual holds about the good. Personal identity and moral 
subjectivity are intrinsically related. This is not to say that morality precedes the self, 
but rather “that the self is constituted in and through the taking of moral stances” 
(Calhoun 1991:233).
This view is different from “Mead’s (1934) account —probably the one most 
familiar to sociologists— because Mead takes a basically cognitive approach to the 
self’ (op.cit. 233). In Taylor’s perspective we are concerned with something more 
than subjectivity, if subjectivity means “human lived experience and the physical, 
political and historical context of that experience”, as defined by Ellis and Flaherty 
(1992:1) in Investigating subjectivity, a publication that followed the 1990 
symposium entitled “The Sociology of Subjectivity”. It follows from Taylor’s 
approach that the relationship between ideas of the good and forms of self- 
understanding has to be placed at centre stage and that a close linkage has to be 
established between the notions of selfhood and personal identity. As Taylor says, 
having an idea of who I am as a self allows me to recognize and say what my 
personal identity is.
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Taylor’s argument is that human beings act according to certain moral commitments 
and make qualitative distinctions between goods. They commit themselves to certain 
“hypergoods” which allow them to make “strong evaluations” of different “life 
goods”. This means that hypergoods offer standards by which actions can be judged, 
allowing people “to discriminate what is right and wrong, better or worse, higher or 
lower” (1989:4). This is not to suggest that people are constantly checking their 
behaviour or feelings against their moral frameworks. On the contrary, the moral 
ontology of the self remains largely implicit, as people generally do not need to 
resort to it for their daily business. It usually comes to the fore when people are 
challenged on what they think or stand for, and more often than not the articulation 
of this background proves quite problematic. These hypergoods stand independently 
of personal inclinations, may confront each other and may vary from time to time 
and from society to society.
Within moral philosophies, Taylor also opposes restricted approaches that equate 
morality with what is right to do, that is, a matter of obligation, leaving no 
conceptual space for ideas about the good and thus, what kind of life is worth living. 
Contrary to these views, Taylor composes a notion of morality around three axes: i) a 
notion of respect for and obligations to others (like the modem right of human 
integrity); ii) an idea about the nature of the good life (what life is worth living); iii) 
the idea of attitudinal dignity, that is, people’s perceptions about their ability to 
command respect from others (such as the dignity associated with people’s capacity 
to provide for themselves without harming others).
Taylor’s three-dimensional notion of morality thus allows for an examination of the 
moral self not only in negative terms (what one should not infringe or trespass upon) 
but also in propositional terms (what one should seek, aspire or defend). In Taylor’s 
schemata the idea of the good gives a sense of orientation in a moral space. In 
designating what is valuable, worthy or admirable, the good gives direction to the 
right and respect. Additionally, with the idea of dignity and the requirement for 
external recognition or reaffirmation it conveys, Taylor opens up a space for looking 
at the self as a construction that is played out both in the relationship one establishes 
with oneself and in those one establishes with others.
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But Taylor’s claim that “we are selves only among others” has another major 
connotation. A defined community also provides and maintains the language through 
which the self is spoken. Human beings are always embedded in “webs of 
interlocutors” whereby “the very language through which we articulate our moral 
frameworks and identities is always simultaneously relating us to others” (Calhoun 
1991:235). Within this framework, what answers the question, Who am I? is:
an understanding of what is of crucial importance to us (...) a species of 
knowing where I stand. My identity is defined by the commitments and 
identifications which provide the frame or horizon within which I can try to 
determine from case to case what is good, or valuable, or what ought to be 
done, or what I endorse or oppose. In other words, it is the horizon within 
which I am capable of taking a stand (Taylor 1989:27).
Taylor calls this attempt to study the self through its moral sources an exercise in 
“articulation”. Articulation is problematic. It does not assume a natural fit between 
people’s beliefs, actions and choices and the way they account for them. All these 
usually have a rather controversial relationship. Articulation can produce tension, 
foster critical self-reflexivity and stimulate change. Modernity, Taylor warns us, 
makes this exercise especially challenging. “All positions are problematized by the 
fact that they exist in a field of alternatives” (op.c/r.317), none of which can be taken 
at face value. But the difficulties should not overshadow the effort. As long as people 
build up their life trajectories based upon certain intuitions of what that good life 
may be like, any hesitation in their responses is no reason to discard thinking of the 
self in these moral terms altogether; quite on the contrary, it may be considered a 
fruitful perspective from which to examine the substantive concerns around which 
life is given meaning and a certain idea of the self is articulated. The account, then, 
must be “anthropocentric”; it must keep close track of the ways things have meaning 
for people. We will strive for “the best account possible”, always a “provisional” 
one. Given these characteristics and borrowing from MacIntyre, Taylor calls this 
exercise in articulation a “quest”, that is, a project that “creates its goal” 
(Czamiawska 2004:13).
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Despite Taylor’s anthropocentric claim, his Sources o f the Self is based upon a 
critical review of the thoughts of different (male) philosophers —from Plato to 
Nietzsche— and not upon the moral philosophy of ordinary people dealing with the 
daily circumstances of life, as this study does. And here I part company with Taylor, 
mainly because of the different nature of our data and of the endeavour of our 
disciplines: his, the oeuvre of different philosophers; mine, the biographical 
narratives of ordinary people. His, a philosophical work, mine a sociological one. 
Thus, in my study ideas about what the good, the right and self-respect mean are 
embedded in the many mundane events and activities of everyday life, in the grid of 
significant relationships that accompanies a person’s life, and in the depth of his or 
her existence through time. In these narratives, then, moral articulation operates as a 
situated practice.
Furthermore, in these narratives, human beings’ qualitative orientations not only 
articulate their notions of the good but are also resources for self-presentation. Erving 
Goffman’s (1959) perspective on life as a theatrical performance has shown that in 
everyday contexts individuals choose roles to present themselves in a favourable 
light. They guide and control the impressions they produce on others, and they 
evaluate what to say or do while sustaining their performances. Thus, in practice, 
conventional qualifications operate as languages intentionally tailored by people 
presenting themselves to one another; they give reasons that make sense in particular 
contexts.
Thus, following Taylor’s propositions I set up my research as a sociological 
interrogation of changes in self-conceptions over time by examining how three 
generations negotiate their understanding of who they are through the “frameworks 
that articulate their sense of orientation” (Taylor 1989:41) in situated spaces of 
questions about the good.
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1.2 Sociologies of Selfhood
In his critical examination of Taylor’s Sources o f the Self, Craig Calhoun points out 
that sociology “suffers from and fails to live up to its potential” because of its 
disconnection from large parts of philosophical thought and interdisciplinary work. 
Despite Durkheim’s concern with the development of a sociology of morality, 
sociologists’ “aversion to moral discourse (in the name of science) has greatly 
impoverished our understandings of identity and human agency” (1991:232). This is 
not because there is no scholarship on the self. On the contrary, in the last two or 
three decades the influence of psychoanalysis, the oeuvre of Michel Foucault, the 
consolidation of feminist, cultural and critical theories, and new research in the field 
of neuroscience have released the category of the self from the reified status 
accorded to it by sociological thought. The self has been questioned, killed and re­
christened; has been the cause of sorrow and of hope. The self has become topical 
and its meaning thorny and contentious. And thus, nowadays, the debate about how 
we come to interpret and act towards ourselves in particular ways traverses different 
schools of thought: history, anthropology, feminist and cultural studies, psychology, 
philosophy, psychoanalysis and sociology. Within these fields, conceptualisations of 
the self are in their turn associated with other configurations, such as gender, class, 
race and ethnicity, the body, lifestyle, consumption, globalization, social movements 
or capitalism.
I do not intend to deliver a detailed or comprehensive review of the vast literature 
that has arisen about the self. Such an enterprise deserves a dissertation in its own 
right and often demands expertise in areas that surpass my own. My aim is to 
illustrate Calhoun’s remark by showing how two main strands of contemporary 
sociological scholarship have left unattended the study of the forms of moral 
reasoning with which men and women proceed in the practical attempt to explain 
themselves and their social worlds.
On the one hand, the line of thought of reflexive modernity has favoured the 
description of the precarious structural conditions of moral judgement using a 
restrictive notion of self-identity. On the other hand, in post-structuralism, the study 
of how the person is constructed by prevailing institutional discourse has taken
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precedence over the question of who I am to myself, leaving no ground for the study 
of how people “make themselves up” according to available modes of judgment.
I have left discussions of post-modern theorizing aside because they typically 
postulate the impossibility of thinking of the self as a moral subject since the post­
modern society leaves no firm ground from which to make qualitative distinctions. 
For example in Baudrillard’s thinking (1983), the self is the result of fragmented, 
multiple, shifting and ambivalent discursive positionings legitimised by different 
“performative” criteria in a current “order of simulation” that eclipses the reality of 
experience and conceals its “truth”. Moreover, in this study I question the common 
assertion that it was non-problematic for past generations to make and sustain their 
qualitative distinctions. I show here how complex and often ambivalent it is in 
practice to orient oneself in a moral space, not only in the current social order but 
also for older generations.
I have also excluded from my perspective psychoanalytical insights into the study of 
selfhood. This scholarship has made important contributions to social sciences’ 
ability to explain society and generate knowledge about our lives, such as their 
attempts to bring the field of emotions closer to our stubbornly over-rationalist 
accounts of society, as in the work of Carolyn Ellis (1992); their emphasis on the role 
of individuals’ imaginary capacity to institute new meanings, as in the work of 
Cornelius Castoriadis (1998, 2002); their conceptual advancement on the embodied 
and performative character of identity, which is central, for example, to Judith 
Butler’s oeuvre (1999); or the introduction of therapeutic strategies, such as free 
association, in interview schemes, as in Holloway’s work (2000). I excluded 
psychoanalytical insights because my interest was in the constitution of selfhood in 
—narratively constructed— relation to moral discourses, and not chiefly in how 
desire is shaped by the interaction between the individual and society or how the 
form that society takes penetrates and reflects on individuals’ psychic substratum.
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1.2.1 Reflexive self
In social theory, the work of Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck stands among the 
most influential reflections about self and modernity in late modem times. A person 
with a reasonably stable sense of self-identity, Giddens writes, has a “feeling of 
biographical continuity which she is able to grasp reflexively and to communicate to 
other people” (1991:24). She has also the capacity to counteract those influences that 
endanger her sense of personal integrity while she has learnt to accept this integrity 
as worthwhile. She is further capable of maintaining a particular narrative of herself 
through which to organize the different events of her life in a reliable way. Self- 
identity for Giddens “is not something that is just given, as a result of the continuities 
of the individual’s actions, but something that has to be routinely created and 
sustained in the reflexive activities of the individual” (op.cit.52).
For these authors, the backdrop of high modernity posits new existential questions to 
the construction of self-identity. According to Giddens’ social theory, in late 
modernity, expert systems —financial, medical or communication systems— come 
to guarantee coordination among agents who, in global conditions, are distant in time 
and space. These experts have usurped “the authority of more traditional institutions 
to set up the standards of right and wrong” (Gross 1995:289) and have turned second 
modernity into an “expert culture”. In turn, Beck and Beck-Gemsheim (1995, 2001) 
draw on the consequences for the subjects of the particular form that the process of 
individualization takes in current times. For them, the subjects of late modem times 
are cut off from the traditional ties, customs, beliefs and social relationships around 
which biographies used to be organised in the past, while at the same time, they are 
compelled to make their own decisions and structure their sense of self at their own 
risk. Individuals become builders responsible for their own social links and networks, 
their own achievements and failures, their “do-it-yourself biographies” and elective 
identities (2001:23).
As a consequence of the diversification of life worlds, these authors argue that choice 
among a plurality of cultural patterns (none of which has any indisputable value over 
others) has become a modem fate, and personal meaninglessness an existential dread. 
When no identities are unquestionably handed down to us, when “truth is contextual
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and authority and expertise provisional” (Slater 1997:84) “we have no choice but to 
choose” (Giddens 1991:81). In Bauman’s reading, “reflexive modernity replaces 
determination of social standings with compulsive and obligatory self-determination” 
(2001 :xv). The problem is that the order of reflexive modernity is “non-foundational 
both cognitively (through methodological doubt and relativism) and socio-culturally 
(its values are not perceived to be anchored in an organic social world)” (Slater 
1997:86), and thus, it fails to give any direction regarding which goals individuals 
should pursue. This lack of social conditions for the moral self extends beyond 
reflexive modernity theories to be endorsed by other contemporary thinkers such as 
Richard Sennett. Like Taylor, Sennett connects self and morality with his notion of 
“character” which conveys “the ethical value we place on our own desires and on our 
relations to others” (1998:10). In particular, Sennett puts forwards the argument that 
modem capitalism corrodes character. The short-term flexibility, flux and everyday 
uncertainty of the new economy threaten the maintenance of a sustainable self by 
distancing people’s experiences from their values.
Yet, contrasting with those pessimistic readings that blame late modem society for 
the destruction of the self —apart from the “corroded character” of the self in 
modem capitalism (Sennett 1998), there is the “saturated self’ (Gergen 1991), the 
“narcissistic self’ (Lasch 1980) and the “hedonist self’ (Bell 1977) instigated by 
consumer culture— Giddens believes that late modem times open up new 
possibilities for freedom. The expert systems that Foucault describes as a menace for 
the autonomy of the individual provide, in Giddens’ view, new opportunities for self- 
realization. For example, Giddens considers the influence of the mental health 
system and of psychotherapeutic ideologies in the fostering of a culture where 
individual self-fulfilment and growth become central standards by which to judge the 
achievements of the self (Gross 2005). More generally, the commodification of 
lifestyles and of a prolific range of paths for inner exploration, whose efficiency is 
further guaranteed by these new “experts” (on psychology, spirituality, fashion, diet, 
body-building, development of social skills, and so on) allows for a certain 
organisation of referents as long as they provide a “cluster of habits and orientations” 
that reduces the plurality of choice and provides a certain “ontological security” 
(Giddens 1991:81).
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However, as Slater points out, the replacement of traditions by the consumption of 
lifestyles offers only technical means for that enterprise:
Lifestyle is different from both the traditional status orders it replaces as well 
as from modem structural divisions (like class, gender and ethnicity) in at least 
two crucial respects. Firstly, lifestyle tends to indicate a purely ’cultural' 
pattern: it is made of signs, representations, media, and is as mutable and 
unstable as they are. Secondly, one can - in theory - switch from one lifestyle 
to another in the move from one shop-window, TV channel, supermarket-shelf 
and so on to another (1997:87).
Hence, the problem that Giddens, Beck, Sennett or Gergen describe lies not so much 
in choosing an identity but, as Bauman observes, in “holding it” (1996:50). In this 
free choosing world, choices lack weight and solidity, and can be revoked and 
changed without leaving any “lasting trace” or responsibilities. The problem is that 
“freedom rebounds as contingency” (op.cit.51).
For reflexive modernity authors, self-coherence ultimately relies on the imperative of 
“authenticity” or on the slogan “I am I” with which Beck synthesises the basis of the 
ethics of the self under individualised conditions. Authenticity presupposes self- 
knowledge and involves continuous self-monitoring so as to achieve self­
development through the “liberation” of hitherto entangled inner experiences, the 
discovery of our true self and the attainment of long-lasting fulfilment by rejoicing in 
self-worth (Giddens 1991:79). Fulfilment is, then, secured somehow by the notion 
that I am an integral, honest, compassionate and loving creature. Thus, in late 
modem times, Giddens argues:
The line of development of the self is internally referential; the only significant 
connecting thread is the life trajectory as such. Personal integrity, as the 
achievement of an authentic self, comes from integrating life experiences 
within the narrative of self-development: the creation of a personal belief 
system by means of which the individual acknowledges that his first loyalty is 
to himself (62).
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Many objections have been made to the reflexive self, as it depicts a realistic, over- 
cognitive and over-individualised subject (Lash 1996, Adkins 2003). At one level, 
this theory reduces a person’s self-identity to what he or she reflexively says about 
him or herself. It postulates that the person can examine him or herself as an object 
and furthermore can institute a programme of refashioning of this object according to 
choice, detached from any kind of embodiment or customised practice and within a 
neutral order. Moreover, this definition is not sufficient to support the point the 
theory is trying to make. Let us take the example of authenticity, the pre-eminent 
value of the reflexive self. To spell it out, we need to start asking about the points of 
reference of this value, i.e., upon which parameters authenticity is evaluated, claimed 
and sustained. The impossibility of answering this question with a notion of identity 
as mere pragmatic consciousness shows how deeply flawed any account that 
separates morality from the self is. Self-consciousness does not offer us a 
representation of the significances we live by. We are not merely aware of ourselves; 
we matter to ourselves in particular ways. It follows that reflexivity cannot be taken 
as an individual process of choice among values as Giddens maintains. On the 
contrary, we assess ourselves against others all the time. There is no isolated, 
autopoietic, unpolluted, a-historical voice that can respond to the question of who I 
am.
At another level, reflexive modernity’s view of current times as imposing equally 
arbitrary moral orders is, as Taylor maintains, “just not available for us humans” 
(1989:99). Our moral orientations cannot be turned on and off according to the 
season; values are not simply optional choices, unless we agree to all be 
schizophrenics. Additionally, these approaches tend to exaggerate differences with 
earlier epochs as if sustaining an identity were not a problematic activity before and 
as if nowadays there were no fundamental moral questions framed in universal terms 
(e.g., the preservation of life, the relief of suffering, collective self-rule, etc.).
The “sociologies of context”, as Latour (2005) calls these perspectives, do not have 
the categories to explain selfhood. They are forced to reconcile ambivalences that 
cannot easily be combined. These views tend to imply that the problem is a matter of 
structural adjustment between an entity called “society” and the individuals that 
belong to it. Dwelling too much upon the social conditions of a modem subject
26
somehow disconnected from society, these perspectives contribute very little to the 
study of how the self is actually assembled.
1.2.2 Governed self
For writers in the Foucauldian tradition, on the other hand, this language of 
reflexivity, individualization and self-assertion is no more than the action of modem 
technologies of governance “obscured by the screen of individualisation” (McNay 
1992: 86). British sociologist Nikolas Rose, for instance, argues that:
The reflexive self searching for self-fulfilment of Giddens’ and Beck’s 
reflections, is not a consequence of macro social transformations, but a result 
of a certain discursive practice about what to be human beings means in a 
specific time and place. It is the very enactment of a prevailing discourse 
governing the relation we have to establish with others and ourselves that 
emerges as a novel way of reflecting upon our experience, as a new ontology 
through which we think ourselves (1999[1989]: xviii).
Back in 1982, Foucault described the logic of this new regime of personhood:
This form of power applies itself to immediate everyday life which categorizes 
the individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own 
identity, imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognise and which 
others have to recognize in him (212 quoted in McNay 1992:86).
The notion of detraditionalization created by reflexive modernity has opened up an 
intersubjective ethical void. The referents that used to orientate the life of previous 
generations are no longer useful to explain the experiences of today’s individual and 
no other “sources of authority” have taken their place. There is just the subject him 
or herself, who has not only to trace a biography but also to find the meaning of the 
experiences that compose him or her. But human beings do not live in a cultural, 
political or economic void. What Rose stresses is how this individualised discourse is
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but the expression of govemmentality or “rationalized programmes, strategies and 
tactics... for acting upon the actions of other” (1996:12) deployed by liberal society.
To unpack this regime of the self, Rose postulates, analyses need to operate at the 
level of “the languages, techniques, procedures and forms of judgment through 
which human beings have come to understand and act upon themselves as ‘selves’ 
of a certain type.” (1999[1989]:296) For example, in Inventing Our Selves, Rose 
explores how a new form of knowledge of the self (with its concomitant set of 
language and procedures) such as that stemming from “psy” disciplines (psychology, 
psychiatry, psychotherapy, psychoanalysis) has come to take part, by virtue of its 
capacity to penetrate the “interiority” of human beings, in the invention of 
“technologies for governing individuals in terms of freedom” (op.cit. 16).
Although these approaches establish a basis for studying how different conceptions 
of the self relate to various ideas of the good, their ontological assumption precludes 
the analysis of common people’s narratives as pragmatic moral thinking upon the 
self. Instead of trying to answer the question of who I am for me, they respond to the 
question of how we are constructed. As developed in the next chapter through the 
discussion of narratives and self, this is largely due to the Foucauldian view of 
experience as a non-problematic object of govemmentality. In this account, the 
subject is nothing more than the effects (or formulation) of external practices for the 
government of his or her conduct. Discourses “produce experience, they are not 
produced by experience” (Rose 1996:305); consequently, the relation between 
discourses and experience is unidirectional—discourses discipline actors as docile 
bodies. Because there is no distance between “the space from which the subject 
speaks and the discursive means available to him or her with which to speak” 
(Couldry 2000:86) except for the researcher’s own lucidity, these perspectives cannot 
inform us about individuals’ relationship with those discourses designed to govern 
them. This is what I attempt to reverse in the fourth section, reframing some of 
Foucault’s analytical tools for the ethics of the self.
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1.3 Self and change
Both reflexive modernity theories and theories of govemmentality conceptualise the 
self as an effect of society. While for the former the individualised, reflexive self is a 
result of the modernisation process, for the latter, the way in which we come to 
understand ourselves as subjects is not derived from macro social processes, but from 
the discourses and practices directed towards us for the enactment of specific 
regimes of personhood. In what follows, I develop these two positions on self and 
change and define my own perspective supported, again, by Taylor.
Reflexive modernity theorists (i.e., Giddens, Beck and Bauman) distinguish three 
stages in the modernisation of society: a point of departure (traditional society), an 
intermediate stage (simple modernity) and the current configuration of social order in 
Western developed societies (reflexive modernity). Reflexive modernity entails a 
detraditionalisation, whereby individuals have been released from the guidance 
imposed by the univocal voice of traditions and customs. This does not mean that 
traditions no longer play any role or have completely disappeared, but that, as a 
result of new social processes such as the technology revolution, the expansion of 
expert systems, the speeding up of communications or the mass consumer culture, 
they have lost their status as unquestioned truths. For instance, according to Giddens, 
the expansion of expert systems entails detraditionalisation in two ways: “the content 
and moral force of particular traditions become eroded as they are subject to expert 
scrutiny, and, in general, it becomes less important that life be led in accordance with 
the dictates of tradition” (Gross 2005:192).
Consequently, individuals are increasingly obliged to fall back on their own 
resources to decide what they value, to prioritise and make sense of their existence in 
a “world of bewildering complexity [...] in which our capacity to understand is 
constantly outstripped by the unintended and far-reaching consequences of our 
actions” (Thompson 1996:90). Thus, detraditionalisation presupposes a shift in the 
sources of authority from outside to within the subject. “Voice is displaced from 
established sources coming to rest with the self’ (Heelas 1996:2)
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This order is radically different from traditional societies which used to be informed 
by belief in established, timeless orders rooted in past events, where a highly 
authoritative voice existing over and above individuals left little room for 
autonomous decisions. This order of the self was, by definition, collectivistic or 
communal, other-informed or socio-centric rather than self-informed and 
individualistic and it fostered ascribed rather than acquired identities (<op.cit. 3-4).
Several criticisms have been levelled at the idea of detraditionalization (Heelas, Lash 
and Morris 1996, Alexander 1996, McNay 2000, Elliot 2001, Gross 2005). The first 
is directed at the linearity of the process —from traditional to simple to late 
modernity— and at its dualistic analysis: “tradition or reflexivity”, “pre-given or 
self-constructed orders”. This ultimately offers a static account of “processes and 
relationships that are specific, embodied and embedded” (Adam 1996:136-141). This 
kind of perspective does not enable us to handle temporal complexity: the 
coexistence of different times, the past permeating the present or the present 
illuminating the past. Considering the aims of my study, this is a key weakness: 
dualism precludes the examination of the conflicts, ambivalence and contradictions 
that arise when different ideas of the good are negotiated through time.
A second objection concerns the understanding of detraditionalisation as the 
complete replacement of a traditional order (the closed, repetitive, ritualised, pre­
ordained, certain, secure, de-differentiated and embedded) by a post-traditional 
society (the open, experimental, revisable, reflexive, contingent, uncertain, risky, 
differentiated and disembedded); arguing that i) the traditional order is not as 
tradition-dominated as might be supposed; ii) the post-traditional order is not as 
detraditionalised as might be claimed; iii) detraditionalisation occurs alongside the 
constitution of new traditions (Heelas 1996:7). In opposition to this view, we might 
need to consider that all social orders are constructed, including those driven by 
tradition, and that “irrespective of the strictness of the rules that regulate social life” 
(Adam 1996:139), traditions are always open to human agency as they are created 
afresh at each re-enactment (Luke 1996:8, Adam 1996:137). Thus, the collapse of 
traditional sources of authority cannot simply be equated with the absence of taken- 
for-granted patterns of conduct (Campbell 1996). Looking at people’s daily routines
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may suffice to realise that, “despite the language of autonomy and choice”, current 
generations are also governed by “rules, procedures, regulations, laws, duties, 
schedules, diaries, timetables and customs” (Heelas 1996:9).
A third criticism argues that reflexive modernity authors fail to address the 
consequences of declining traditions on the interpretation of people’s experiences 
and to acknowledge the limits that established practices, specific emotional past and 
prior generations’ histories place on detraditionalisation, overstating the extent to 
which individuals are able to reshape their identities (Elliot 2001, McNay 2000). 
Although Giddens talks about “ontological security” and Beck about “risk 
biographies” —recognising the difficulties that people face in giving meaning to 
experiences that, they argue, no longer come with a “suitable interpretation”— they 
close the issue suggesting that the subject eventually succeeds or is compelled to 
succeed in developing the capacity to define who he or she is. Supposing that the 
breakdown of hegemonic norms is emancipatory per se, the uneven and non- 
synchronous effects of detraditionalisation cannot be elucidated as well as the more 
enduring aspects of identity (McNay 1999).
A last criticism of the detraditionalisation thesis has to do with its meaning. Again, in 
reflexive modernity theory, detraditionalisation means a collapse of authoritative 
cultural voices and a transfer of authority from an external source to the interior of 
the self. Nikolas Rose rejects the very idea that detraditionalisation has put an end to 
traditions as forms of authority. For him, there have always been and always will be 
forms of authority, and nowadays as much as in the past, we can experience 
modifications both in the complex of authorities governing the relation we establish 
with ourselves and in our relation with the “authorities of subjectification”. Instead of 
talking about a “decline” in authority, Rose speaks of “changes in the complex of 
authority” (1999[1989j). Instead of seeing a transfer of authority from outside to 
within the subject, Rose always conceptualizes authority as an external force, even if, 
under present conditions, the subject is compelled to reflect and act as an 
autonomous person.
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For Rose, the way in which human beings understand themselves and act upon 
themselves and others does not fit into linear accounts deriving from a prior domain 
of reality, nor can it be disclosed by interpreting other “more fundamental” cultural 
or social forms, whose answers usually depend on the “conceptions of human beings 
prevailing at the time”. Subjectivity “has its own history” (1996:295). A history of 
the practices by which human beings “have been made up as subjects” (Hacking 
1986).
With Rose we might concede that the prevailing ways of thinking about the self do 
not depend primarily on macro-social processes but on transformations of the ideas 
and practices of the self. Thus, being compelled to be an individualised person is the 
logical result not first and foremost of detraditionalisation but of a new discourse 
about how to be a human being. In this view, cultural voices do not lose their 
authority to mould self-interpretations; what changes are the sources of authority and 
the authoritative discourses about the self.
However, there are a number of differences between Foucault’s orientation of his 
work and my orientation of mine. Documenting shifting discursive practices through 
time (Holstein and Gubrium 2000:93), Foucault contended that each regime 
constructed its own subjectivity separate and distinct from the one that came before. 
Because in this study I worked with successive generations and family lineages, both 
continuities and discontinuities emerged as people used the regimes of justification 
available at different times to interpret their lives. As developed in chapter two and in 
the conclusions, this allowed me to look at change (and time) as a dynamic category. 
Additionally, an understanding of continuity and discontinuity in terms of epistemic 
sequences, such as that offered by Foucault, fails to acknowledge how change is not 
only in institutional hands, but is also crafted intergenerationally in, for example, the 
grandparents’ attempts to move time closer and keep themselves up-to-date with this 
‘modem world’, for the sake of both their place in society and their relationship with 
their descendants. In sum, “working historically, Foucault had little access to the 
everyday operations of discourse” (Holstein and Gubrium 2000:96). A further 
difference with Foucault’s perspective on change is that, as Taylor contends (1985), 
the transition from one episteme to another remains incommensurable, since
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Foucault’s “undifferentiated theory of truth” does not attribute any gain or loss in the 
superposition of one regime upon another.
Alternatively, instead of speaking of “truth and error”, Taylor proposes an analysis of 
change in moral sources in terms of the supersession of moral frameworks in 
pursuing “moral and epistemic gain” (which also entails losses). In this argument, 
transitions between moral frameworks occur when, in the light of particular moral 
problems, a new good is invoked and endowed with a more constitutive and basic 
status than that of the existing good. The position of this new idea can become 
predominant if it is applied successfully to solve other concerns. Previous moral 
horizons may remain in the background, providing that they were not directly 
reviewed by the new moral proposition. In this way, the new hypergood becomes the 
measure by which other, ordinary goods, are appraised. From such perspective, the 
understanding of the forms of our contemporary morality is largely the result “of the 
path by which we came to hold them” (Calhoun 1991:242). Thus, it requires 
uncovering the story of our moral sources, identifying the goods that have made their 
way to the forefront and those that have been left in the background.
In Taylor’s account, the modem self is the result of several thematic shifts and moral 
reformulations. According to the Western historical mode of self-understanding, 
Taylor detects three main threads through which to trace the rise and development of 
the modem self: i) a sense of inwardness as a mode of self-interpretation, ii) the 
affirmation of the value of ordinary life, and iii) the demands of reason, disengaged 
freedom, equality and universality on the one hand, and the demands of nature for 
fulfilment, expressiveness, intimacy and particularity, on the other. These 
transformations are accompanied by a process of secularisation, understood as the 
incremental turn away from theistic foundations towards other moral sources.
The modem notion of self is related to a certain sense of inwardness, that is, of 
having interior or inner depths. Taylor traces the genesis of this idea to Plato’s claim 
that human beings should take responsibility for their lives, seeking self-mastery to 
tune their desires and bring their lives into harmony with the cosmic order, given that 
the human mind is no longer infused by God. He then looks at how Augustine 
reworks Plato’s opposition between the eternal and the temporal in terms of
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inner/outer, arguing that contemplation, inwardness and reflexivity are necessary 
operations for understanding the world in one’s experiential relationship to it. 
Descartes locates moral sources within human beings rather than within God (as in 
Augustine) and reshapes the ideas of self responsibility, independence and dignity; 
while Locke radicalises the disengaged individual. Montaigne places the idea of self­
inwardness as a requirement for self-knowledge and for the recognition of one’s 
particularity, and the idea of personal commitment is associated with the rise of 
Protestantism. But to fully understand the modem sense of inner depth, Taylor 
argues, we need to look at the second aspect of modem identity: the affirmation of 
the value of ordinary life; that is, those aspects of life concerned with production and 
reproduction. For Aristotle, ordinary life played an infrastructural role in the 
attainment of the good life. The good life was pursued through political participation 
and contemplation rather than through domesticity, crafting and material activities. 
With the Protestant Reformation this idea is reversed and the objects of value shifted. 
What was previously considered low is now exalted as higher: ordinary life becomes 
a matter of constitutive moral concern. This reversal also affirms equal access to the 
moral, challenging the political and social hierarchies. During the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries the affirmation of ordinary life broke free from the idea of 
providential order while moral frameworks developed away from theism. This set up 
the basis of Enlightenment in two directions. One direction developed further the 
idea of disengaged reason and scientific rationality and pursued freedom, ordinary 
fulfilment and the affirmation of universal benevolence (i.e., Utilitarianism). The 
other stressed the idea that the good in the form of freedom can be found in an inner 
voice (i.e., Rousseau). Romanticists further developed this strand, highlighting the 
role of sentiments as moral sources, and the ideas of expressivism, originality and 
unity. Thus, Taylor argues,
The modem subject is no longer defined just by the power of disengaged 
rational control but by this new power of expressive self-articulation as 
well the power which has been ascribed since the Romantic period to the 
creative imagination [...] A modem who recognizes both these powers is 
constitutionally in tension (1989:390).
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Because of its philosophical character, Taylor’s account is largely a history of ideas 
and has little to say about how these ideas work out in practice. However, his notion 
of change does offer valuable guidelines for a study of how common people 
experience and represent the self through the qualitative distinctions that articulate 
their everyday lives and for arguing the necessity of including what ordinary people 
mean by change in a sociology of selfhood. By contrast with reflexive modernity 
theories and in agreement with Foucault or Rose, Taylor develops his analysis at the 
level of the relationship between ideas of the good and notions of the self. Unlike 
Foucault, Taylor’s framework regards individuals as subjects of moral worth who 
can evaluate the adequacy of their moral sources. Moreover, Taylor’s focus on the 
supersession of moral frameworks as a matter of gain and loss paves the way for an 
examination of how people explain themselves by drawing on competing discourses 
of selfhood. My interviewees referred to the tensions and conflicts that commitment 
to one good has implied in terms of sacrificing others. They also made use of what 
they regarded as previous or subsequent generation’s moral frameworks. For 
example, changing ideas of the ‘normal’ were endorsed or opposed for narrative 
purposes as they provided content for qualitative distinctions. Previous generations’ 
ideas of the good were downplayed by younger generations using the arguments 
based on what they saw as a better order of worth; while members of the older 
generations continued to argue the worth of goods that had largely been superseded 
with time. In comparing themselves with other generations or in reconciling an 
unusual trajectory within the space of social time, interviewees also explored the 
“sense of possibility beyond the normal order of significance” (Pickering 2004:280); 
that is, how far the normal could have been stretched and with what consequences. 
Finally, the retrospective character of biographical narratives promoted a 
reassessment of those goods that had been kept in the background before because 
contemporary conventions deemed them inappropriate or “inconvenient” (the 
concept used by Thevenot 2002).
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1.4 Regulated forms of morality
Michel Foucault is a major contemporary thinker in the historical study of the 
relationship between selfhood and prevailing discourses about the self. He 
investigated this in terms of a series of external social forces that come to mould 
what is thinkable or sayable at a certain point in time. He analysed the structures of 
discourse and how their use forms and rearranges the codes of knowledge through 
which the world is perceived. Some of my concerns in this study have to do with 
how people inhabit social discourses (e.g., religious ones) which circulate through 
particular practices (such as education). Foucault’s emphasis on the institutional 
regulation of life and on the role of institutional discourse in the organization of 
knowledge allowed me to examine the relationship between self and good at the level 
of the discursive practices arising from the institutions that have taken part in 
people’s lives. This research, however, is not oriented towards unbundling the games 
of truth by which individuals organize their conduct as suggested in the documents of 
their epoch. It aims to study first person self-interpretations and how changing 
parameters of the good, the right and dignity are used to make sense of life when 
narrating identity.
Sketching out a history of the diverse ways in which we have developed different 
forms of knowledge (savoirs) of ourselves (insanity, deviance, criminality, sexuality) 
in our culture and set up certain techniques to regulate our practices (psychological, 
medical, penitential, educational), Foucault showed that we do not need to resort to 
macro-social transformations in the economic, political, or cultural field or to 
construct grand theories to study the self. Rather we need to trace the variable or 
historically specific discursive formations that have led human beings to construe 
themselves over time as, say, citizens, householders, consumers, lovers, mad people,
criminals or moral agents. This is not to say  as I have already pointed out with
Rose— that transformations in those other fields do not impact on the 
conceptualisation of the self, but that if the aim is to study the self through time, it 
has to be considered the centre of the analysis, not a variable category dependent on 
macro-social tendencies. In line with Foucault, I did not aim to theorize about the 
social conditioning of the different notions of selfhood people deploy over time. This
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is one of the reasons I could not use reflexive modernity theories to support my 
study. Unlike the proposals of Beck or Giddens, Taylor’s claim regarding the relation 
between self and morality is not intrinsic to modernity. It therefore allowed me both 
to attribute the same level of agency, so to speak, to each generation and to thematize 
the relation between prevailing conceptions of the self and self-interpretation around 
the concerns of each epoch, rather than assuming that, for example, this relationship 
would become problematic only for the younger generation living in a 
detraditionalised world. The point on which Foucault and Taylor converge is the 
claim that any epistemology of the self is embedded in “moral sources”, in Taylor’s 
terminology or in “regimes of truth”, in Foucault’s. In short, Taylor’s notion of the 
self, complemented with a Foucauldian perspective, allowed me to temporarily 
suspend a priori versions of changing social structures to concentrate instead on the 
way common people account for change through practical reasoning around 
constitutive concerns.
In orienting his efforts to de-routinise the various reifications that had led human 
beings to become subjects of a certain sort, Foucault pointed out the social character 
of processes of self-understanding and their reinforcement through the 
institutionalisation of regimes of truth. Foucault’s notion of the subject calls attention 
to the institutional regulation of life. Contrary to Enlightenment propositions of the 
autonomy of the modem self to exercise critical judgement free from the influence of 
prevailing beliefs (the disengaged reason Taylor criticises), Foucault stressed a non- 
essentialist category of the self, as the individual finds the meaning of his or her 
identity in the systems of social regulation that define what is sayable, knowlable, 
and doable. By exhibiting the contingency of our ways of knowing, saying and 
doing; Foucault historicised the relationship between self and morality, stressing the 
simultaneously creative and prescriptive character of culture.
Foucault is also known for having argued that institutions regulate life by producing 
knowledge. One of Foucault’s legacies is that knowledge is not purely a cognitive 
process happening in one’s mind but is enacted in a series of signs, procedures, 
apparatuses, techniques of regulation, demarcation, exclusion and inclusion “through 
which humans can ‘ethicalize’ and ‘agent-ize’ themselves in particular ways” (Rose 
1998:173). Inspired by Foucault, I systematically interrogated my interviewees about
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the different ideas of the self that were embedded in the discourses and practices of 
the different institutions they had related to in life (families, schools, working 
environment, groups of friends, among others). We reviewed the kinds of aspirations, 
exigencies and expectations towards which these institutions oriented them. Also, the 
type of conduct they were encouraged to have, what was forbidden, and the values 
they were instigated to hold. Finally, the thought, manners, vocabularies and actions 
made available for them to speak of themselves. From this viewpoint, when we say 
that being a moral self is a matter of orientation in a moral space we are saying that 
being a moral self is a matter of knowledge —that is, of vocabulary, grammar, 
associations and modalities of enunciation—and finally, an ontological issue, a 
matter of the kind of person we can be.
However, I also asked the interviewees (and examined the data) about the main 
traces institutions left in their identities, and in so doing I diverge from a Foucauldian 
analysis in several ways. First, mine is not an epistemological enquiry on how 
knowledge “makes up” reality (e.g., how psy disciplines know their subject —the 
self— as in Rose’s Inventing our selves). Instead, I explored what knowledge does to 
relations of self to self and how morality affects the distribution of knowledge 
through an examination of the interviewees’ narratives. Unlike Foucault, I believe 
that human beings can reflect on how their self-understanding has been permeated by 
certain regimes of knowledge, as systems of knowledge, in my opinion, are much 
more porous and elastic than Foucault allowed. Second, I did not reconstruct 
knowledge of the self through time from within an official discourse (criminology, 
psychology, etc.). Such a perspective would have occluded my attempts to study the 
character of processes of self-formation, which is usually conflictual. Instead of 
describing a single, more or less closed and coherent discourse, I have dealt with 
overflows, overlaps, contradictions and complexities between pluralities of 
discourses that cross over one another in the making of the self (family, education, 
work, partnership, friendship, gender, sexuality, and so forth). Third, institutional 
analyses do not leave room to examine how life is informed by competing and 
temporally overlapping discourses which are not only reinforced by the anonymous 
forces of power, but embedded in the emotional and personal bonds that hold 
significant relationships together. This was one of the most fruitful areas of this 
study; tracing the presence of the others, not as hygienic marks upon the self, but —
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as usually happens if one revisits one’s own life— as presences in our trajectory that 
are problematic, contested and resisted yet also inspiring of gratitude. This is the way 
in which I aimed to reconstruct the self, with all the flesh that makes its story far 
more powerful as it brings to the fore contradictions, uncertainty and ambivalence. 
Fourth, in focusing my research on common people’s narratives, I not only sought to 
study changing conceptions of the self; I also examined the effectiveness of the 
prevailing discourses as they were used in interpretive practices to inform people’s 
experiences. Foucault saw knowledge as order. Instead, I studied how knowledge is 
enacted, spoken, interpreted and contested as an “ordering attempt” (Mol and Law 
2002). Fifth, as explained in the previous section, unlike paradigmatic approaches, by 
working with successive generations and family lineages, my approach dealt with 
interfaces, metamorphoses and inheritances of conceptions of the self through time.
Bearing these divergences in mind, what I retain from Foucault’s perspective is the 
acknowledgement of the institutional regulation of life and of the role of institutional 
discourse in the organization of knowledge. Like Foucault, I do not argue for the 
existence of an inner human nature that has to be discovered, and I share his view of 
the self as a conception of our individuality shaped through discourse and practice. 
But I disagree with him, and share Taylor’s stance, insofar as I do believe that the 
self is a construct that allows human beings to orient their existence and interpret 
their experiences while living with others.
At an analytical level, there are some concepts and lines of inquiry in my work that 
further echo Foucault’s schemata. They relate to the analysis of the relationship 
between selfhood and the good through “technologies” and “ethics” of the self.
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1.5 Assembling the self: the interface between ethics and technologies of the self
I have defined the domain of my inquiries (the moral subject), what I understand as 
moral orientations (the right, the good and the idea of self-respect), and the level at 
which to place the research (the relation between different ideas of the good and 
different conceptions of the self as they are institutionally organised). I now want to 
address a further concern: how to examine analytically the relationship between 
moral sources and processes of self-formation. For this I turned again to Foucault. As 
Taylor did in Sources o f the Self, Foucault attempted, in volumes two and three of 
History o f Sexuality to problematise the constitution of the modem self in relation to 
morality through a “hermeneutical” process. However, whereas Taylor’s approach 
leads us to centre this process in the subject as an “interpretive animal” (since human 
beings cannot be separated from their interpretation of experience), Foucault, as 
already noted, understood the “active” process of self-formation as a contingent 
requirement of certain historical configurations through which discourses constitute 
the subject. He left some doubt about the role of the subject in this hermeneutical 
enterprise, as he concentrated on unravelling the historical “games of truth” that 
define the scope of our self-interpretation capabilities.
For Foucault, the making up of an individual —what he calls subjectivation— occur 
in a dialectic relation between liberty and constraints. In his works up to History o f 
Sexuality, he examined individuals’ different modes of “subjection” to certain 
regimes of truth, through the all-encompassing action of “technologies of power” or 
institutionalised tendencies towards the “normalisation” of individuals. In Discipline 
and Punish, for example, Foucault described how the criminal was disciplined by an 
external authority that provided the normative criteria by which to judge the success 
of the criminal’s daily activities in prison. In volumes two and three of History o f 
Sexuality Foucault developed the concept of “technologies of the self’. As an ethical 
alternative employed by the individual to resist normalisation, this concept came to 
counterbalance previous Foucauldian notions of the subject as an entity completely 
caught by the objectivising forces of the technologies of power (McNay 1992 and 
1994, Merke 2003).
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Technologies or practices of self refer to “exercises of self upon self’ by which “one 
tries to work out, to transform one’s self to attain a certain mode of being or ethos” 
according to what is “suggested or imposed by his culture” (Foucault 1990:25). An 
analytics of technologies of the self describes the processes and procedures through 
which the subject is produced. These processes allow individuals:
to effect, by their own means, a certain number of operations on their own 
bodies on their own souls, on their own thoughts [...] so as to transform 
themselves, modify themselves, to attain a certain state of perfection, of 
happiness, of purity, of supernatural power, and so on (Foucault 1993: 203).
In contrast to disciplinary practices, through technologies of the self individuals 
become their own sources of authority, prescribing to themselves to orient their 
activity towards an end of their choice. Thus, they do not have to provide “a model 
of behaviour for everyone” (Foucault 1984:266). Self-direction does not refer to 
performing a practice well but to leading a good life. It is not an external authority 
governing the self from outside, but a certain ethics as the deliberate form assumed 
by freedom that sets up an idea of the good (and evil) and certain practices of the self 
through which to aspire to constitute oneself as a moral subject.
This, however, does not mean that technologies of the self refer to the “autonomous” 
field of human action, if by autonomy we understand self-determination. 
Technologies of the self relate to agency as the creative capacity of individuals to 
trace —and thus personalise— the form of their existence, within the context of the 
conventions available to them. In comparing the Greek and Christian sexual systems, 
for example, Foucault pointed out that the former allowed more autonomy for 
individual behaviour as it left the individual relatively free to interpret the spirit of 
the law rather than having to conform to the exact letter of it (McNay 1992:53). For 
Foucault, disciplinary and aesthetic practices stand in a constant tension. On the one 
hand, normalisation means that the disciplinary conception of the subject has taken 
over the aesthetic dimension. In this model, there is no difference between the 
disciplinary subject and the aesthetic-existential one. The “ethical self’, on the other 
hand, constitutes certain practices with which one can negotiate one’s relation to 
such requirements and restrictions giving one’s life a certain form. Ethics thus refer
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to a relationship with a set of rules, not to the rules as such (Merke 2003). In this 
space Foucault placed the agentic capability of human beings to resist normalising 
pressures by questioning the rules they inherit, not in a pre-defined and essentialist 
way, but as in a work of art. Hence the reference to aesthetics, since human beings 
“overcome” and “transform” existing forms. To prevent technologies of the self from 
becoming another form of disciplinary practices, Foucault stressed that, unlike 
technologies of power, those of the self do not obey any teleological order. But 
denying them a normative value leaves the idea of an aesthetic of existence at the 
level of superficial self-conscious stylisation for the sake of resistance. Moreover, as 
Taylor observes, Foucault’s undifferentiated theory of truth and the 
incommensurability he attributed to the successive normative frameworks are 
incompatible with the subject’s need for self-interpretation, since there is nothing to 
claim as better or worse than the other. There is nothing upon which to stand, nothing 
upon which to claim defence or resistance.
Additionally, in locating processes of subjectivation in a permanent struggle between 
disciplinary (objective) and individualising (subjective) forces (subjectification and 
subjectivation, respectively), Foucault paradoxically failed to explain, at an 
analytical level, the different degrees of influence that moral commands have upon 
individuals’ self-formation. He failed, in other words, to account for the disciplinary 
dimension of subjectivation and to distinguish clearly between practices that are 
“suggested” and those that are “imposed”, for example by the force of social sanction 
(McNay 1992:74). He also left underdeveloped the extent to which one performs 
self-imposed practices upon oneself (Deleuze’s “self-affection” or “auto­
affectation”) and, despite his insistence on the importance of others in the adoption 
of discursive positions, he overlooked this influence. Therefore, and notwithstanding 
Foucault’s explicit intention not to fall into modem types of analysis (and their 
normatively rooted character), this dichotomous self-constitution ends up being 
based on the modem presupposition that there is more subjectivation when 
individuals are granted space for decision making, and more objectification when 
they are subject to the authority of external sources, as if decision-making processes 
were not based on shared and situated backgrounds, or as if personhood could be 
built by turning one’s back on the socio-historical (Lash 1994, Adkins 2003) to attain 
“unconstrained freedom” (Taylor 1989:489).
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This position renders Foucauldian perspectives on the ethics and technologies of the 
self similar to those of reflexive modernity theory with its claim that reflexivity goes 
hand-in-hand with individualisation in the pursuit of the modem slogan ‘I am I’ 
(Beck 2001). By taking this line of reasoning, Foucauldian analysis loses its potential 
to question individualised discourse as the contemporary “discursive practice”, 
“regime of the self’ or “habitus of late modernity” (Adkins 2003). It also fails, as 
does reflexive modernity theory, to explain how this modem regime is experienced 
by concrete human beings in daily life (after all, discursive formations exist to 
organize people’s experiences). It also seems to imply, contradicting Foucault’s own 
explicit avoidance of linear accounts, a previous time in which normalising 
tendencies suited everybody’s existence perfectly. Furthermore, it assumes —as does 
reflexive modernity theory— that individuals always succeed in putting the 
prevailing regime’s “suggestions” into practice.
In Foucault’s dialectic, agency is seen as a residual act of transgression of the norm, 
disregarding the capacity of individuals to respond in a more creative fashion, that is, 
with an attitude that is more than merely defensive, to the process of normalisation. 
As Lois McNay (2000) contends, this approach, although rightly acknowledging the 
force of power relations and the institutional constraints in processes of 
subjectivation, needs to be complemented with a more generative theoretical 
framework with which to see the formation of subjectivity (6). To borrow from 
Holstein and Gubrium:
in practice the technology of self construction extends beyond the institutional 
apparatuses that designate subjectivities into the integral everyday interpretive 
work done to locally construct who and what we are (2000:104).
Rather than seeing the processes of self-interpretation in the tension between 
subjectification and subjectivation forces and according to my own criteria regarding 
which activities lead towards autonomy and which towards subjection, I wanted to 
find out how the interviewees’ qualified against their own standards. I wanted to 
know what the experience of being discursively constituted as a self of a certain sort
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was like.1 I also wanted to examine the implications of taking and sustaining moral 
stances—such as tensions, compromises, commitments, costs and conflicts. For 
example, upholding certain values may carry a cost (which has to do with the others 
that are renounced). For instance, for some third-generation women, upholding the 
value of living their sexual lives carried the cost of lying to their parents. Moreover, 
as Mary Douglas (1982) has shown, being good or living the upright life may prove 
“uncomfortable” or, as Carolyn Steedman (1987) argues, it may become a “burden”.
1.6 Subjectifiers
In stressing the sedimentation of disciplinary regimes, the concept of technologies of 
the self leaves underdeveloped the analysis of the “living through subjectifiers” in 
the making of a person as an ethical subject. Although the Foucauldian conception of 
the subject is purposely anti-Sartrean, inasmuch as it rejects the idea that subjectivity 
is the product of voluntarism or free will, proposing instead that a person can orient 
him or herself only towards what he or she can do, it leaves pending the analysis of 
the consequences of the inscription of subjectifiers upon the individual. 
“Subjectifiers” is a concept from Latour’s vocabulary. It is similar to 
“personnalisers” and “individualisers”, as well as to “plug-ins”, the one he chooses to 
work with. They all allude to those “vehicles that transport individuality, subjectivity 
or personhood” (2005:207). Subjectifiers are, then, the vehicles through which the 
self is accomplished. They refer to the “furniture” or “equipment” of humanity 
(Thevenot 2002:53). I have extended this notion to “living through subjectifiers”, 
with which I try to encompass the shifting ways of thinking, relating, imagining, 
making, expecting, judging, accounting, renouncing, holding or assessing the self 
through time. That is, the relationship between subjectifiers, the consequences of 
subscribing to them and the traces they leave upon the self. The acquisition of 
“know-hows” is one of the consequences of living through subjectifiers. Knows 
hows are ways of doing and relating that have been customised through practice and
1 In her work on female teachers’ biographies, social psychologist Tamboukou takes a similar 
perspective, “I wanted to concentrate on their own processes of subjectification, using the 
genealogical device of the technologies of the se lf’ (2003:12).
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that shape future activities beyond those initially intended. For example, in order to 
uphold the value of decency, or to “produce decency”, grandmothers had to 
disengage with their sexual bodies, by not naming or looking at sexual organs. 
Having embodied these practices for eighty years, one grandmother cannot, even 
now, look at her vagina even if she thinks it is important for health reasons; her know 
how tells her to do the opposite. Developing Mauss’s notion of the “habitus” 
(1973[ 1935]), Pierre Bourdieu addressed this issue. As a “system of lasting, 
transposable dispositions which, integrating past experiences, functions at every 
moment as a matrix of perceptions, appreciations and actions” (1977:83), the habitus 
expresses the inscription of dominant social norms or the “cultural arbitrary” upon 
the self while it also refers to the practice of living through these conventions. It 
encompasses those ordinary, familiar, certain, habitual practices and understandings 
that people retain for life in a more or less similar fashion, that have become 
institutionalised over time in the context of human relations and forms of 
organisation and which are not necessarily reflected upon. However, unlike Mauss, 
who associated the habitus with practices and rituals, Bourdieu sees the habitus as 
ultimately a structural feature of a social class operating at an unconscious level. 
These factors render Bourdesian readings of the habitus temporally too static and 
spatially too homogeneous, while their unconscious character precludes any analysis 
of people’s reflections upon the dispositions that have made them subjects of certain 
sort.
Subjectifiers are used to justify conduct and opinions and to counterpose other orders 
of worth. They are, moreover, reflected upon: interviewees manifested their 
discomfort with the way they had been brought up, educated, taught or asked to 
behave; and they also pointed out their incompetences, areas that were never 
explored, opened up or thought about. Moreover, in the narratives I collected, 
different “dispositions” overlap at several levels. With the passing of time, members 
of older generations have not only witnessed how younger people do things 
differently, thought and worried about other issues and been confronted by other 
challenges, but they have also been questioned in their equipped humanity by these 
different vehicles of personhood. On the way, they have endorsed some new ideas, 
either intellectually or by adopting new practices, but have also firmly opposed
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others. In this sense, living through subjectifiers is a much more dynamic and 
reflective endeavour than a Bourdesian notion of the habitus may imply.
As I said while discussing Foucault’s notion of change as a series of unrelated 
epistemes against Taylor’s moral and epistemic gain, I also found throughout these 
generational narratives a constant re-interpretation of subjectifiers that had been 
inherited from one generation to the next. For example, the association of female 
sexuality with the word “sin” traverses (at least) eight decades of women’s history. 
Its value and weight have been redefined over time, but its persistence gives an 
indication of the long-lasting effect of certain subjectifiers. Bourdieu described this 
property through his notion of the “inertia” or “hysteresis” of the habitus, by which 
dispositions continue to affect embodied practices long after the conditions of their 
emergence have been dislodged. Nevertheless, this notion fails to grasp the conflicts, 
negotiations, resistance and metamorphosis that such subjectifiers carry along their 
extensive trajectories. The inertia of subjectifiers is a much more live property than 
Bourdieu seems to have thought.
All these operations must be included in the discussion of how the self is assembled 
in narrative form. It should be evident by now that by this assemblage I do not mean 
a logical, rational, impeccable and clear (usually causal) order; rather, I refer to the 
articulating efforts, to the criteria of compatibility that connect one justification to 
another as well as to the cost of justifying oneself in certain forms. This means 
considering all the vestiges that have fallen by the wayside in the operation (and, 
wherever possible, examining the reasons that make a possible criterion 
“inconvenient”). From my perspective, assembling the self in narrative form is not an 
illusory effect of externally imposed forces a la Foucault, nor an almost autopoietic 
reflexive activity of a subject lacking substantive paradigms upon which to base his 
or her cognitive and isolated reflections a la Giddens, but an attempt at articulation 
by “making different orders of qualification compatible” (Thevenot 2002) according 
to what one knows, what one is able to do, to endure and to transform.
In sum, a study of selfhood can be placed in the intersection of different ideas of the 
good and their relationship to different concepts of the self. Analytically, this 
relationship can be unbundled by examining the interplay between ethics and
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technologies of the self (including costs, compromises, negotiations, compatibilities 
and, in general, the living through subjectifiers).
In the relationship the individuals establish with themselves as ethical beings, we 
may seek to examine the extent to which the rules and values that they recognise 
(from their own or previous or later times) help to explain themselves to themselves 
and what consequences the adoption (or not) of these normative frameworks has for 
that relationship (practices of the self). In particular, As Foucault (1993) argued, we 
may attempt to reconstruct the “ethical substance”, or the part of themselves that 
individuals have to constitute as the primary material of their ethical attitude, which 
kind of “ethical work” they have to put into practice to comply with the given rules, 
and what “telos” or constitutive goods inspire their general conduct. We may also 
engage in an examination of changes in the sources of authority people recognise as 
mediating their self-conceptions and we may further attempt to describe living 
through subjectifiers, i.e., what different equipped humanities allow people to say, 
think, name, do, understand, figure or know. Finally, we may compare people’s 
modalities of self-presentation with the conventions available for self-description.
1.7 Chilean sociology and the issue of “subjectivity”
Lastly, I would like to turn briefly to Chilean sociology to explain how the research 
topic and the approach I develop relate to domestic literature in the field.2
In Chile, as in most of Latin-America, sociology’s emergence (late 1960’s) is closely 
linked to the question of modernity. From the 1970’s to the early 1990’s, much of 
Chilean sociological scholarship was devoted to the question of whether Chile was 
modem or not, and to the specificities of our type of modernity (Morande 1987, 
Brunner 1994, Veliz 1994, Cousino and Valenzuela 1994).3 As in Durkheim, in these
2 Quotations from the work o f Chilean sociologists in this section are the author’s translation.
3 Scholars who write about the particularities of Latin America’s modernity and locate the analysis in 
the origins of the modernisation process include Veliz (1994), who describes the points of divergence
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accounts the question about Chilean culture is normative in nature, asking to what 
extent our “culture favours or thwarts processes of modernization” (Larram 
2005:112). Consequently, in this period, “cultural analyses going beyond this 
normative horizon were scarce and weak” (op.cit. 112).
At a methodological level, most of these scholars make use of the essay and 
theoretical analysis. Only a few ground their propositions in empirical research, but 
commonly ‘data’ —often secondary and quantitative— is used to illustrate their 
arguments. Thus, these readings contain much of the authors’ personal opinions 
about the benefits and costs of modernisation as a development strategy and about 
the nature of our cultural identity insofar as it lays the normative foundations of our 
society. Additionally, they make little effort to make “explicit the moral and political 
commitments” informing their own work (Carey in Denzin 2000:8) and to reflect on 
the empirical limits of their analytical claims.
Since the 1990’s, after the return of democracy and the re-opening of sociology 
faculties at the universities, Chilean sociology has tangled little with the question of 
whether our form of organisation is modem, delving more into the impact of free- 
market ideology on social and political issues, within the context of a neoliberal 
economic model. This shift is also characterised by a reorientation towards the study 
of everyday life culture, a shift associated, in turn, with the crisis of many of the 
paradigms that used to inform social sciences’ work and with dissatisfaction with 
positivist frameworks. It is in this context that the study of “subjectivity” —as issues
that signal the qualitative differences between Latin American and European modernity, such as the 
absence of feudalism, religious dissidence, industrial revolution and anything resembling the French 
Revolution. In a more nostalgic vein, there is Morandd’s interpretation (1987) that the idea of 
modernity in Latin America is basically a promise of development that has failed, owing to the 
incapacity to take into account the real cultural “ethos” o f Latin-American societies, based on its 
religious and aesthetic substratum, which stands in opposition to the rational and Enlightened model 
of European societies. Similarly, Cousino and Valenzuela (1994) argue against theoretical views that 
tend to reduce human experience either to mere rationality and argumentation (Habermas), or to the 
function of social systems (Luhmann). In Cousino’s and Valenzuela’s view, these lines of sociological 
thought disregard a prior and equally foundational dimension of the social relationship: that 
constitutive realm of experience that stems from face-to-face interactions; the form of sociability, so 
widespread in Latin American societies, based on the “co-presence” that makes up personal 
relationships in the fields of love, family, religion or friendship.
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of selfhood are domestically labelled— begins to be addressed. Up to this point, as 
Lechner observed:
In Chile, as in the rest of Latin America, there was no major concern with 
subjectivity. The analyses of structural adjustment and changes in the means of 
production make references only to expectations confined to economic 
calculus. Neither did research into political transition, which was focused on 
rational-choice-type strategic actions by the stakeholders, or public opinion 
polls, which investigated preferences and attitudes, offer a sustained reflection 
about the subjective dimension (1999:1).
In this story, the 1998 UNDP-Chile Human Development Report stands as a 
landmark. One of the merits of this research, as Lechner, one of its authors, argues, is 
that it opens up a new perspective: “that subjectivity matters”. Based on a 
combination of survey and life-story data, the report finds that the lack of 
complementarity between subjectivity and the process of modernisation in our 
society underpins the insecurity and uneasiness so widespread among our population, 
despite all the economic, social and political achievements of the 1990’s. 
Notwithstanding economic growth, the massification of consumption and the winner 
discourse, “many Chileans feel insecure and unhappy, owing to high levels of stress, 
indebtedness, urban congestion and pollution and rising crime levels” (Larram 
2001:254).
In a similar vein, the work of Salvat (1999) speaks of an uneasiness with processes of 
modernisation, processes that
real people see as a kind of social machinery that dispenses with their 
attendance, will or deliberate involvement, in other words, with important 
dimensions of their subjectivity (Larram 2001:254).
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Thus, Chilean sociology begins to pay attention to the configuration of new 
discourses that act as cultural referents for individuals. “There is a new concept of 
culture that prizes drive, dynamism, success, profit and consumption as new values 
central to Chilean society, and which has led Chileans to conceive themselves more 
positively. This discourse of the ‘triumphant nation’ upholds the figure of the 
innovative and successful businessperson as its typical agent.” (op. cit. p.253) This is 
the discourse of the Latin American ‘jaguar’ (akin to the Asian one) that was 
introduced into the public grammar in the early 1990’s, a discourse that, in the 
critical view of sociologist Moulian, gives prevalence to:
individual strategies of living, the retreat into the private, the positioning of the 
individual as the spectator, the detachment from public affairs, the compulsion 
for competition and material success and the rise of consumption as a source of 
prestige irrespective of any rationale of need (1994:44).
The central argument is that new social discourses emerge as a result of the 
institutionalisation of the neoliberal model of development and that, through them, 
the figure of the citizen of the political and social strategies of integration and 
development that was a referent for self-constitution decades ago is replaced by the 
figure of the consumer and choice-maker.
In sum, when analyses of culture were restricted to the normative sphere, there was 
little preoccupation for the “subjective dimension”, about which reflections arise 
once sociology opens itself up to the study of everyday life. Yet, the self is 
contextualised either with respect to structures (market economy, democracy, class) 
or discourses (jaguar, winner, entrepreneur) and, thus, issues of selfhood remain 
entangled in the agency-structure dichotomy (therein the use of the concept 
“subjectivity” to speak of matters pertaining to the individual’s voice). Those authors 
who are optimistic about our modernisation processes (Brunner 1998) “resolutely 
defend it, taking the uneasiness it, provokes in the people as an inevitable cost” 
(Lechner 1999:3). Those who are pessimistic (Moulian 1994, 1997) emphasise the
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identities that are demolished, without acknowledging the opportunities the process 
offers. Both Lechner says, are unilateral views:
The structuralist approach of the first sheds light on the “logic of the system” 
and the requirements for it to work. But it leaves subjectivity in the dark, 
reduced to a problem of governance (Brunner 1998). The second, however, are 
unable to link their defence of subjectivity with the new structural context 
(Moulian 1997) (Lechner 1999:3).
As in the thesis of individualisation, in these approaches the central concern is on the 
impact of historical and social processes over the definition of the person’s 
experiences. The study of how those discourses work for self-interpreting purposes is 
still a matter of research, particularly if we agree that people’s personal narratives do 
not simply mirror official story lines, but artfully work with them to accomplish the 
task at hand.
At an epistemological level, the relationship between contemporary Chilean 
sociology and interpretative research remains, unfortunately, weak. Ramos’s (2005) 
analysis of the main characteristics of 105 research studies conducted by Chilean 
sociologists between 2000 and 2004 illustrates this. Ramos detected the prevalence 
of survey-based research and of studies that combine a variety of techniques and 
reflect little on the implications that such sociological work might have for the reality 
under study. A line of life-story-based research has developed since the 1990’s but 
has been conducted primarily by oral historians and anthropologists (Bengoa 1999, 
Marquez 1999, Montecino 1999) with little bearing upon mainstream sociology.
The manner of research to which I am committed is regarded as an “exploratory, 
“experimental” and probably as a less reliable version than “hard core” sociological 
research. Rather than establishing certain “scientific” truth, I am interested in a 
sociology that “recollects texts of the world” and provides “interesting 
reconceptualizations” (Czamiawska 2004) of them so as to promote dialogue in
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society. Rather than connecting the subject matter at hand to the structural factors 
that allegedly explain it, I seek to make the social as “flat” (Latour 2005) as possible 
in order to travel its full complexity. Rather than validating my field material against 
some other source to verify its correspondence to the world, I proceed by checking 
texts against other texts of the same sort (biographical narratives) to see how the self 
is accomplished in narrative form (and I leave aside concerns of validity as regards 
an “external reality”).
Hence, both the topic of my research and the theoretical and methodological 
approaches I develop are innovative within Chilean sociology. To my knowledge, 
there is no previous work on the uses of prevailing discourses about the self as 
“material for an interpretive practice” (Denzin 2000:8), less so from the point of 
view of the moral ideas at work to delimit the very field of description —the self— 
and considering an intergenerational temporal scope, as this study does.
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CHAPTER TWO— NARRATIVES, SELF AND TEMPORALITIES
This chapter presents the narrative approach framing this dissertation, in the context 
of a discussion about temporality and change in everyday life. This rounds off the 
conceptualisation of the four main concepts underlying this research —self, change, 
time and narratives.
The first section expounds my understanding of a narrative approach within the 
context of personal narratives, argues for biographical narratives as a suitable method 
of inquiry into the self and its moral sources, and distinguishes the narrative 
approach from the concepts of ideology and discourse. The second section addresses 
the issue of time. Time is used as a category to study change and, methodologically, 
it is spatialised by working with people from three generations. The narratives 
collected overarch this discrete spatialisation of time with temporal accounts of lived 
experiences. I argue, then, that the notion of generation must be broadened to 
encompass the lived experience of time. The third section presents the methods of 
inquiry employed in this study (life stories and in-depth interviews), explains the 
criteria guiding interviewee selection and the data analysis procedures followed. The 
last section provides basic information about the people who told their stories.
In chapter one, I explain that this research has taken theory and empirical 
investigation as two related dimensions of the same endeavour. Throughout the 
research, theory and methodology have been in continuous dialogue. Consequently, 
some of the concepts addressed in chapter one also come into this account, albeit 
from a methodological perspective.
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2.1 The narrative approach
Since the 1970’s, narrative approaches, and biographical studies in particular, have 
gained importance as a field of qualitative research across numerous disciplinary 
settings, due to their multiple uses for register and for understanding people’s 
experiences in everyday contexts.4 Different movements and schools of thought have 
contributed to this. Among them, Polkinghome (1988) recognises four national 
traditions in the origins and further extensions of the narrative approach: Russian 
formalism, US new criticism, French structuralism, and German hermeneutics.5 
From a wider perspective, current interest in narrative studies is associated with 
larger processes: within academia, social sciences have begun to examine their 
relations with their subjects and the political implications of their work (for example, 
anthropology’s role in the reproduction of colonial power or sociology’s in the 
maintenance of a patriarchal system). Concomitantly, many scholars in these 
disciplines have shifted away from positivist and universalist epistemologies and 
from master theories for the explanation of social life (e.g., Marxism). In parallel, 
there is the rise of feminist and cultural studies, the adoption of Foucauldian 
perspectives and an embracing of what became known as critical theory. Also, the 
study of ordinary people’s everyday lives gained currency, while the exploration of 
personal life developed in a Western world increasingly characterised by a 
“therapeutic culture” (Riesman 2002). Within civil society, these tendencies found 
reinforcement in the organisation of international movements seeking the 
emancipation of subordinate groups (e.g., gays and lesbians, ethnic minorities or 
third world immigrants in global cities).
4 From the analysis of children’s tales and oral stories in literary and folklore studies, the study of 
narratives has expanded to incorporate the stories ordinary people make about their lives. This for the 
analysis of a variety of phenomena such as illness and health, ageing, family life and gender, work 
cultures and migration and urban life, among others. Today we find narrative research, for example, in 
literature and sociolinguistics (Barthes 1977, Labov 1982, Ricoeur 1984, Ochs and Capps 1996), 
history (White 1987), anthropology (Young 1987, Holland 1997), psychology (Polkinghome 1988, 
Rosenwald and Ochberg 1992, Gergen 1991, Squire 2004) and sociology (Riessman 1993, 2002 and 
2004, Czamiawska 1998 and 2004, Holstein and Gubrium 2000, Day Sclater 2001, Roberts 2002, 
Andrews et.al 2004). For a review of the different applications of narrative studies see Bertaux and 
Kohli 1984, Polkinghome 1987, Riessman 1993, Atkinson 1998, Czamiawska 1998 and 2004, 
Holstein and Gubrium 2000, Miller 2000 and Plummer 2001.
5 For a brief history of narrative research see Czamiawska 2004.
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Narrative studies are not confined to a set of methods of inquiry, a number of 
techniques of analysis or a group of procedures to verify their results. They are 
primarily a way of reconstructing knowledge as it is used by people in everyday life. 
The approach is built essentially on two facts of ordinary life. Firstly, a basic way for 
human beings to organise and make sense of their experiences is to think of them as 
a story in which events, intentions and actors are put together in a meaningful way. 
Secondly, narrativisation or storytelling is a fundamental form of human 
communication (Riessman 1993, Atkinson 1998, Czamiawska 2004). Therefore, 
what a narrative approach does is to apply this ordinary form of interpretation and 
communication to research practices and purposes for the study of everyday life from 
the point of view of the story-maker. Thus, the usual anonymity of historical 
accounts, predominantly based on social groups and organised around the timescale 
of institutions and social processes, is complemented through narrative research with 
individual characters and timescales, and the taken-for-granted conventions that 
organise everyday life.
The extensive use of narrative analysis has made it difficult to arrive at a standard 
definition of what narrative actually is. For some, like Barthes (1977), everything can 
amount to a narrative, while others (Riessman 1993, Czamiawska 2004) favour a 
narrower definition, usually circumscribing the concept to emplotment.6 Here, I limit 
my discussion to personal narratives, that is, first-person accounts of lived 
experience.
Following Polkinghome (1988), I consider personal narratives as composed of two 
kinds of referents: a first order of referent organised by the lived experience that 
makes up the account, and a second order organised by the “plot” or the “figuration” 
(White 1987) that endows the lived experience with meaning. The “organization of 
lived experience into plots is the operation of the narrative itself’ (Polkinghome 
1988:61). This emplotment usually takes the form of a story which, in turn, is, in the 
simplest sense, a narrative of a past event that makes a point, usually a moral one.
6 According to Czarniawska the term emplotment or plotting “was coined by Hegel in his ‘theory of 
historical emplotment’, [and later on] popularized by Hayden White (1973). Originally used in the 
context of historical work, it meant an introduction of a literary structure into a chronological account” 
(2004:138), thus turning it into a story.
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The plot, then, confers significance upon the events. This does not mean that a ready­
made plot structure is imposed upon an independent set of events; instead, 
emplotment happens in a “dialectic process [between the] events themselves in their 
context of occurrence and a theme which discloses their significance and allows 
them to be grasped together to compound a whole story” (op. cit. 19-20).
In first-person interviews, story-type narratives often alternate with other discursive 
devices like reflections or argumentation. Through these, tellers “step out of their 
stories” (Riessman 1993) to provide a perspective. Therefore, the central 
interpretative devices of personal narratives include stories, argumentation and 
retrospective evaluation.
2.1.1 Self, discourses and biographical narratives
If narrativising is a way of endowing lived experience with meaning and a primary 
form of communication, I want to explain why and how biographical narratives are a 
suitable method of inquiry for the study of the self and its moral sources.
Heidegger, Ricoeur and also Taylor have made the case for taking narratives not as 
an accessory to the self but as a basic condition of its existence. As Polkinghome 
puts it, based on Ricouer, who we are is not a “static thing” or a “substance” but the 
expression of our existence whose form is a narrative (1988:151). To have a sense of 
who we are, Taylor argues, “we have to have a notion of who we have become and 
of where we are going”, for a person’s “self-understanding necessarily has temporal 
depth” (1989:50). In grasping our lives in a narrative we give what Heidegger 
(1996[1953]) called “temporal structure” to our self-reflections. In moving forwards 
and backwards along our life, the narrative form allows us to assess who we are 
“through the history of our maturations and regressions, overcomings and defeats” 
(Taylor 1989:50). A narrated self is, then, the “linguistic, hermeneutically reasoned 
expression of a person’s existence through time” (Polkinghome 1988:134).
Although self-interpretation “can never be fully explicit” (Taylor 1989:34), stories 
are not “merely information storage devices” (Young 1987 in Riessman 1993). As
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phenomenology put it, stories make phenomena real for our stream of consciousness, 
structure “perceptual experience and organize memory” (Riessman 1993:2). 
Narratives, then, “contribute to the constitution of our perceptions of the world” 
(op.cit.5). Consequently, “the stories people tell are not only about their lives but 
also part of their lives” (Rosenwald and Ochberg 1992:8). Human beings know 
themselves and communicate with others through the stories they (and others) 
construct and enact. A simple review of our own speech would elicit a repertoire of 
personal stories that we rehearse according to circumstance. Through them we 
“claim identities and construct lives” (Riessman 1993:2). Life and biographical 
accounts sustain one another. What is more, personal stories play a role in 
maintaining a sense of self-integrity. As Ellis (1992) observes, narratives are made 
not only “to tell” one’s life but, crucially, “to cope with” it.
In chapter one, I claimed, along with Taylor, that we cannot make sense of ourselves 
without saying where we stand in relation to the good. There are no neutral selves. I 
say who I am when I say where I stand. And language, as Taylor maintains, is a 
primary site for the formulation of shared normative horizons. The practice of story­
telling is made out of associations, articulations, prioritisations, contrapositions and 
evaluations; it is a practice that traces and is traceable through substantive concerns.
In a biographical narrative, a person constructs a discursive knowledge about him or 
herself which is not a reproduction of the past as it was, but an interpretation of that 
past through a story which imposes a structure upon the events recalled. Moreover, 
the story is articulated according to what looks plausible within the cultural 
coordinates of a given time and place (Rosenwald and Ochberg 1993). “When people 
tell life stories, they do so in accordance with models of intelligibility specific to the 
culture. Without such models narration is impossible.” (Rosenwald 1992:265) When 
stories make sense it is because they comply with prevailing discourses. In recalling 
lives and explaining themselves, people support their statements on certain ideas of 
the good and, generally, justify their lives according to moral criteria they think are 
generally praised. Biographical accounts, then, cannot be taken solely as descriptive 
exercises, for they are foremost practices of self-legitimation. The articulation of a 
biographical narrative is an ethical practice (Rasmussen 1996).
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The social sciences take diverse theoretical stands on established conventions in the 
moulding of narratives of the self and, consequently, in the kind of self being storied. 
Based on realist epistemologies, some theorists discuss narratives “as portraying an 
objective reality or even a private psychic state of affairs” (Rosenwald 1992:266). 
But today most scholars subscribe to post-realist positions. Some, such as 
psychologist Davies and Harre (2000), follow constructivist approaches in which the 
self is reduced to his or her story and stories are taken as circumstantial constructions 
governed by prevailing conventions. This perspective is right to point out the role of 
discourses in delineating narratives and in stressing that meaning cannot be located 
outside storytellers in their concrete social context. However, it provides no ground 
from where to analyse deviations, alternative accounts and social dissent and, more 
broadly, narrators’ reflections about their life situations or their problematisation of 
prevailing cultural predicaments, such as the constraints moral standards place on 
self-understanding and thematisation.
Because narratives do not simply mirror an external world and because “parameters 
do not determine the storylines” (Holstein and Gubrium 2000:107), other scholars 
attribute a lesser role to prevailing conventions in defining personal narratives. On 
the one hand, they start from the assumption that, as ethnomethodologist Harold 
Garfinkel (1967) put it, human beings are not “judgmental dopes”; rather, they can 
account for their actions and reflect on their identity and its determinants. In telling 
their lives, narrators use their narrative capacity to objectivate themselves. In fact, the 
introspective character of biographical interviews often triggers epiphanic 
realisations, new and more comprehensive self-interpretations (e.g., ‘You see I’ve 
never thought about it like that but now I see the cause of this is ... ’).
On the other hand, because the grip of norms is “firm but not tight” (Rosenwald 
1992:270), these scholars assume that prevailing discourses are, as Dorothy Holland 
calls them, “living tools” for self-construction (1997:181); that is, conventions 
subject to malleability and change, but also of a polysemous and indeterminate 
nature. For example, in positioning themselves in relation to what they define as 
legitimate stories, narrators may reveal “slippages from the official narrative” 
(Rosenwald and Ochberg 1992), may “push against prevailing systems of discourse”
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(Denzin 2006:xii) or may intentionally develop a certain argument to find a “state 
that mitigates or at least makes comprehensible a deviation from a canonical cultural 
pattern” (Bruner 1990:49-50 in Czamiawska 1998) (e.g., ‘Being a single mother I 
broke with convention, I was ahead of my generation’). Indeed, deviations from a 
“normal” biography demand explanations that would otherwise look self-evident and 
redundant. Narrators might also construct what Molly Andrews (2004) calls 
“counter-narratives”: stories in tension with those we are socialised to expect, 
revealing alternative versions of those narratives we know best. Story-makers can 
also purposely align themselves with the norm in an attempt to remove any 
questionability from their life accounts (e.g., ‘This was what everybody used to do at 
that time’) or they might dwell on the problematic nature of conventions in order to 
substantiate alternative identity claims (Rosenwald 1992). Tellers might mythologise 
legitimate stories (eg., ‘I never saw anything deviant’) and they might reflect upon 
the ways conventions have marked their lives and coloured their understanding of 
themselves (e.g., ‘I was brought up so demurely that I’ve got a trauma about my 
body’).
“Public stories” are “schematic and partial, offering stereotypes and ideals rather than 
the details and contradictory complexity of real lives” (Jamieson 1988:159). Narrative 
analyses, in contrast, not only help to discover how people make their worlds 
intelligible —how they “frame, remember and report their experiences”; they are “a 
way of generating knowledge, that disrupts old certainties and allows us to glimpse 
something of the complexities of human lives, selves and endeavours” (Day Sclater 
2003:21).
Biographical narratives thus inform about both the sources of interpretation and the 
storyteller’s relationship with them or, in Bjorklund’s terms, they “reflect as well as 
respond” (1998) to the discourses of the self that prevail in a given culture and 
epoch. They provide “an intermediate or transitional area of experience in which the 
self continually negotiates its position in the world, inscribes itself in relation to the 
available cultural scripts [and] integrates past, present and future through acts of 
remembering and telling” (Day Sclater 2001:8). The narrative is precisely what lies 
between life and story-maker; therein the importance of not conflating but keeping
59
separate the concepts of narrator, narrative and narrative situation for analytical 
purposes (Rosenwald 1992). In this reading, selfhood is what is activated by 
successive narrative practices; what oscillates “between telling and living” but 
cannot be reduced to either as it is always “ready to repudiate” what it has asserted 
(op.cit.286). In this line, and drawing on the therapeutic role of personal narratives, 
Rosenwald along with psychologists Ochberg and Wiersma, has further advocated 
the emancipatory power of biographical methods, exploring how placing the me in 
story form can “open up a life” and, eventually, “lead to action and change” 
(Wiersma 1992:211). Likewise, exponents of cultural studies focus on the repressive 
or liberating potential that predominant discourse exercises upon subjectivity 
(Holland 1997:169) while other scholars, based on psychoanalytical insight, attribute 
to the unconscious the power to resist dominant discourses (Hollway 1984).
It is my view that predominant moral frameworks are embedded in biographical 
narratives as “vocabularies of motives” (Mills 1963:441) or “regimes of 
justification” (Thevenot 2002), that, acting as an “inventory of experience” 
(Mannheim 1952), come to articulate each personal story. In explaining the 
relationship between self-identity and moral sources, Taylor points out that in 
everyday contexts, moral frameworks remain largely implicit in the background of 
people’s choices and actions (see chapter one). Bjorklund, who has analysed 
autobiographical narratives published in the last two centuries in the United States, 
makes a similar claim regarding personal stories: they “usually do not explicitly and 
systematically lay out a coherent theory of the self but they reveal our assumptions 
about human nature and selfhood” (1998:xi). More specifically, I want to argue, 
these moral criteria remain implicit in what people take to be “normal” (and 
extraordinary). Normality (the ordinary, the usual) draws the parameters within 
which a given conduct, decision or representation of reality becomes “comparable 
and commensurable” (Latour 2005:230). In Taylor’s terminology, this is equivalent 
to saying that it is in relation to what are perceived as hypergoods that qualitative 
distinctions are not only possible but endowed with significance. Narratives unfold in 
relation to these parameters and contribute to their definition. In consonance with 
narrative analysts like Rosenwald and Ochberg (1992), Day Sclater (2001), Andrews
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(2004), or Riessman (1993, 2002, 2004), I assume that there may be some conflict 
between the individual and the forms of interpretation his or her culture provides.
Acknowledging constructivist insights and following in the steps of symbolic 
interactionist Herbert Blumer, I do not consider processes of meaning-making as 
automatic and absolute responses, but as intentional manoeuvres agents use and 
accommodate according to their immediate and concrete social contexts. In Asylums 
Erving Goffman summarises these points:
Given the stage that any person has reached in a career, one typically finds that 
he [sic] constructs an image of his life course —past, present, and future— 
which selects, abstracts, and distorts in such a way as to provide him with a 
view of himself that he can usefully expound in current situations. Quite 
generally, the person’s line concerning the self defensively brings him into 
appropriate alignment with the basic values of his society, and so may be called 
an apologia ([1961] 1976: 139).
Because “what is or is not properly tellable in a particular locale is never completely 
distinct from the ongoing construction of narratives” (Holstein and Gubrium 
2000:106) and thus from the self being storied, I devote special attention to the 
occasioned character of narratives. Yet, to “emphasize the performative element is 
not to suggest that identities are inauthentic, but only that they are situated and 
accomplished in social interaction” (Riessman 2002:701). Often, the person is 
confronted with multiple and even contradictory sites of self-constitution and, thus, 
there can be differences and even tension and conflict between the person’s wishes, 
dreams or expectations and the roles granted to him or her by the community.
To sum up, the narrative approach aims to exhibit the explanations, that is, the sense- 
making process (Weick 1995 in Polkinghome 1987) through which protagonists in 
concrete social contexts integrate new experiences into an ongoing story to render 
them meaningful. I take the constitution of a narrated self as a procedural endeavour: 
narrators have the ability to objectify themselves in reflecting about their lives and 
identities, and I assume that personal narration will be triggered by different and 
even contradictory sites of self-making. I see the process of telling a biographical
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narrative as a situated, intentional and creative act of meaning-making with which to 
confer sense and justify oneself by using the available qualitative distinctions as 
vocabulary of motives. I also assume that as a discursive form the biographical 
narrative imposes a certain structure upon the events recalled.
During the study I was frequently asked how I meant to validate the information 
collected through personal narratives to ensure its reliability. However, I do not 
consider it my duty to investigate the truth or falsehood of what I was told. In any 
case, that line of reasoning leads to a dead end: access to experience is always 
mediated by some type of interpretation (Atkinson 1998), so who is to judge what a 
person’s real story may be? (Cottle 2002:538). My interest was not the relationship 
between narrative and lived life; my efforts were not directed at demonstrating a 
truth (or falsity) external to the narrative told. Rather, I focused on the analysis of the 
“storyable items” (Holstein and Gubrium 2000) used to compose a certain account, 
on the overall narrative behind this composition and on the self narrators create 
through the stories they tell about themselves. Unlike realist descriptions, from a 
narrative perspective “realities” do not acquire degrees of truth from proof or 
evidence. As a text of experience, the truth of a narrative depends on interpretive 
needs and lasts as long as it satisfies those needs.
2.1.2 Narratives, ideology and discourse
In the development of social thinking, the term narrative is related first to the term 
ideology and then to the term discourse. A narrative in the broadest sense refers to 
“representations by which we construct and accept values and institutions” 
(DuPlessis 1985 in Gergen 1991:130) and, in this sense, it has obvious links to the 
concept of ideology. “Authors in the Durkheimian and Weberian tradition discuss 
ideology as the collection of knowledge and beliefs necessary for the cohesion of 
social life” (Rosenwald 1992:281), but probably the most popular connotation of the 
term derives from Marxist political philosophy. Within a theory that regards society 
as moving through a history of conflict and crisis, ideology alludes either to a false or 
alienated consciousness shared by a particular social class or group (Marx) or to the 
system of representations and institutionalised practices that constitute the subject
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through the many rituals of everyday life (Althusser). These perspectives were much 
used by Western scholars during the 1970’s and early 1980’s to unravel the 
predominant ideas and institutionalised practices that precluded a subordinate 
group’s capacity to change the social order.
The term discourse, in turn, has a range of significations “depending upon the 
theoretical and methodological framework in which it is employed” yet, at a general 
level, it refers to “frameworks of understanding that organise the social world and 
make a difference to it” (Day Sclater 2001:131). In a narrower sense, the term is 
usually associated with Michel Foucault’s work where discourses encompass “both 
what is said and written in public stories about a particular topic and associated set of 
practices around the topic” (Jamieson 1988:13). In contrast to ideology, Foucault 
argued that discourse, as the practical form of the relationship between social control 
and subjectivity, “makes and shapes reality rather than conceals it and if the powerful 
are the dominant voices there are always reactions, resistances and unintended 
consequences” (op.cit.13). This line of thinking has allowed scholars to explain why 
subordinated groups, such as women or ethnic communities, do subvert the 
established order by instituting particular ideas and practices.
In Foucault’s view, a given discourse does not belong to anyone in particular but is 
“played out through language at work, put into effect by all concerned wherever and 
whenever usage is in order” (Holstein and Gubrium 2000:96). By understanding 
subjectivity in terms of a discursive practice and by focusing on textual analysis, 
Foucauldian approaches decentre discourses from the experiences they name, failing 
to explain how subjectivity is experienced in relation to them. Foucauldian 
perspectives cannot, therefore, provide the methodological basis to study the 
appropriation of moral discourses for self-interpretation. They cannot respond fully 
to questions of what happens to our experiences and to us as interpreters when we 
use discourses that incite us to be or behave in a certain way. What happens when the 
prevailing conceptions of the self take part, as they do, in intimate relationships with 
our significant others? How are they used, that is, brought to the fore, read and linked 
to, when one narrates one’s life and self?
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Unlike discourse or ideology analyses, my work is not concerned with the coercive 
forces of knowledge or the obscuration of a certain truth. Rather, I am using a 
narrative perspective to examine how protagonists interpret discourses when they 
report on their life experiences. Taking language as performative, not as a transparent 
vehicle of an existing world, a narrative approach studies what language does and 
does not do in a specific context. Foucauldian-inspired works, such as Rose’s, are 
suspicious of the outcome of narrative studies, arguing that this type of approach 
affords too much importance to what language “means” and none to what it “does”. 
Rose puts it bluntly:
subjectification as a matter of the stories we tell ourselves about 
ourselves is, at best, partial, at worst misguided. Subjectification is not to 
be understood by locating it in a universe of meaning or an interactional 
context of narratives, but in a complex of apparatuses, practices, 
machinations, and assemblages within which human being has been 
fabricated (1996:10).
Yet the use of a narrative approach does not preclude the study of discursive 
practices. As discussed in chapter one, inspired by Foucault, one of my lines of 
inquiry was the sort of person —in terms of manners, conducts, vocabularies, 
knowledge, and so on— that my interviewees had been instigated to be or become by 
the institutions with which they had dealt (the family, school, labour market, and so 
forth) and with what consequences.
Much has been written about the social forces that construct the self, but less about 
the self that is composed or about people’s relations with their selves. In Hollway 
and Jefferson’s terms:
the Foucauldian idea that subjectivity is a product of positioning in 
discourses is now a sociological commonplace. However, the increasing 
tendency to read subjectivity only through the discourses that subject it, 
has resulted in a discourse determinism....If we are to understand 
subjectivity in other than a socially determinist fashion of discourses
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producing subjects, we have to address the issue of how discursive 
positions are occupied by subjects (2000:136).
Instead of considering experience as the product of discourse, I take it as “that which 
we want to explain, that upon which knowledge is produced” (Scott 1992:25-26). As 
Scott argues, to think of experience in this way is to historise both it and the identities 
it produces and thus the possibilities for representing the self. In this sense, as 
Andrew et al. maintain, because of the connection between personal stories and 
questions of existence, narrative research is able to incorporate important dimensions 
of human experience, like “historical time and subjectivity”, which “were in danger 
of being left out in discourse-based research” (2004:2).
Whereas emphasising discourses Foucault deconstructed the social forces that 
assemble the ethical self, I use biographical narratives as a form of “interpretative 
practice” (Holstein and Gubrium 2000) to examine the available moral sources of 
self-construction and how these ideas of the self are worked out in practice, that is, 
how they inform people’s subjective experiences, what kind of relations people 
establish with themselves through them and what the consequences of this operation 
are for people’s sense of self.
2.1.3 The ‘hows’ and the ‘whats’ of biographical narratives
Inspired by ethnomethodology, Holstein and Gubrium argue that in the meaning- 
making of biographical narratives “stories take shape on the occasions of their use as 
parts of the very identity project for which they serve as resources” (2000:116). 
Methodologically, this means that the practice of storying the self comprises two 
interrelated activities: the whats and the hows of interpretation, that is, what narrators 
say the self is, and how they narrate it; its content and its mode of production. 
Therefore, an analysis of biographical narratives can be conducted at the level of the 
interplay between “discursive practices” and “discourses-in-practices”. Applying this 
analytical distinction to my aims and translating it into the terminology I have been 
using here, I examined biographical narratives as technologies of the self, at the 
levels both of the self that is eventually constructed and of the self-construction
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process. Chapters three, four, five, seven, eight and nine are based mainly on the 
whats of narrative construction: what the available vocabularies of motives actually 
accomplish in narrating the self across the three generations. In order to study what 
the storytellers’ narrative strategies tell us about the self being storied, in chapter six 
I look at the story itself. I take the biographical narrative as a “topic in its own right” 
(Plummer 2001) and temporally suspend the whats of the biographical account to 
concentrate on the hows of narrative construction. Due to the amount of transcribed 
material, the number of cases and the comparative character of this work, this 
analytical distinction helped me to organise the presentation of the material. Cross- 
references between these two levels were included as needed.
To recapitulate, it is not possible to fully grasp the appropriation of moral discourses 
in self-interpretation practices when selfhood is conceived as the result of the 
discourses that subject it or as the product of a false or alienated collective 
consciousness. Nor can it be adequately illuminated using an approach to unveil the 
coercive forces of knowledge and the obscuration of a certain truth. The narrative 
approach, however, does provide a basis for inquiry into how storytellers negotiate 
their understanding of who they are through the frameworks that articulate their 
sense of orientation in situated spaces of questions about the good. The narrative 
approach is based upon the recognition that narrativisation is an ordinary form of 
interpretation and communication and, in general, it aims to exhibit the meaning- 
making process through which storytellers organize their life experiences. Personal 
narratives, in particular, are situated, intentional and creative practices of meaning- 
making, through which storytellers use available qualitative distinctions as 
vocabulary of motives to confer sense and justify themselves. Ideas of the good 
establish the parameters against which experience is given significance. Analytically 
speaking, the interplay between ethics and practices of the self as developed through 
personal accounts may be studied both at the level of the organization of the 
narrative and at that of the self who is composed through the tale.
To understand a society, Czamiawska suggests, “it is important to discover its 
repertoires of legitimate stories and find out how it evolved” (2004:5). This is what 
she calls a “history of narratives”. This research aims to trace some threads of the
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recent history of the self in Chilean society by analysing biographical narratives as 
they evolve through the pragmatic moral thinking of three generations of Chileans.
2.2 Temporalities and generations
In order to calibrate the particularity of current conceptions and concerns of the self 
in Chilean society, I needed a point of comparison. The category of time provided 
me with this reference. To talk about change is to talk about tracing modifications 
within commensurable units. The unit of commensurability in a comparative study is 
a matter of choice and adequacy. I could have chosen to trace differences in the 
moral constitution of the self by studying diverse spaces of self-occurrence such as 
class (low, middle or upper class) or location (the urban versus the rural). Although 
any of these units of commensurability would have worked (and I used some of 
them), considering the research context it was more appropriate to prefer that of time.
Sociological thought is inescapably temporal. As reviewed in chapter one, 
contemporary debates within the discipline are tied up with the issue of the “nature” 
of current Western modes of association (modernity, late modernity, post- 
modernity). Our way of living, it is argued, has a direct bearing on the type of self we 
are (the self of solidarity and citizenship, the individualised, saturated, fractured, 
narcissistic self lacking in character, a fetish, or a simulacrum). In this context, a 
reflection on selfhood based on a historical study of Chilean people could contribute 
to the debate, especially considering Chile’s portrayal in the international scene as a 
kind of iconic laboratory of social change. The abrupt, profound and contradictory 
“revolutions” that mark our recent past are unparalleled. In the context of the Cold 
War a democratically elected socialist president led a socialist revolution (1970- 
1973) with the popular power of the people. Subsequently, both private and public 
destinies were overtaken by a 17-year authoritarian regime (1973-1990), that set 
itself the goal of “re-founding” Chilean society through a “Silent Revolution” 
executed by institutionalising violence, fear, mistrust and a neoliberal ideology in the 
administration of political and economic affairs.
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2.2.1 Historical and family generations
Methodologically, I use time as a dimension of change by working with three 
generations. Although the concept of generation and subsidiaries such as 
“generational conflict”, the “60’s generation”, the “baby-boomer generation” (or the 
“1980’s generation” in Chile), are in popular use in everyday language, social 
research has not made use of this tool for the analysis of selfhood. In research, the 
generation variable has been used mainly for investigating the consequences of 
trauma and profound breaks. A number of studies concentrate on the 
intergenerational transmission of historical memory of the holocaust (Burchardt 
1993, Inowlocki 1993, Bar 1995), colonialism (Monaco and De Paula 1993), the 
Second World War (Tschuggnall and Welzer 2002, Kazmierska 2002) and Latin 
American military dictatorships (Kaiser 2000 on Argentina’s). Research on social 
mobility and changes in attitudinal patterns —towards reproductive regimes (Irwin 
2000) or marriage, youth and gender (Nielsen and Rudberg 2000) — have also made 
use of the generation variable. Generation is also typically used in migration studies 
(Kazmierska 2003). Following the ageing of European populations, in the last few 
decades the Welfare system has begun to be researched in terms of the 
“intergenerational exchange” of limited resources between economically active and 
retired populations (Arber and Attias-Donfut 1999). Other important groups of 
studies concentrate on one generation in particular (Wattenberg 1986 on the baby- 
boomers, for example).
At a conceptual level, the literature refers to Karl Mannheim’s seminal article The 
Problem o f Generations (1952) and its subsequent revisions by different European 
and North American scholars (Kertzen 1983, Pilcher 1994, Kohli 1996, Corsten 
1999, Edmunds and Turner 2002). In The Problem o f Generations, Mannheim takes 
issue with the hitherto overemphasised quantitative notion of time as time-intervals 
separating generations, arguing for a complementary qualitative or inter-subjective 
understanding of time. The “epoch” as a unit, he wrote, “has no homogeneous 
driving impulse, no homogeneous principle of form, no entelechy” (1952:284); 
“mere chronological contemporaneity cannot in itself produce a common generation 
location” (op.cit.295). Inspired by Pilder’s notion of entelechy as an “inborn way of 
experiencing life and the world”, Mannheim defined a generation as a group of
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people in the same social location —that is, in the position to experience the same 
events and data— and who can thus develop a shared framework for understanding 
those experiences. Based on human development research, he argued that human 
beings are more likely to be influenced by those shared interpretive frameworks 
during their youth, when conceptualisations tend to stabilise in the consciousness as 
the natural view of the world. Ultimately, in this definition, the psychosocial aspects 
of generational identification take precedence over the time-interval criterion. Even if 
people bom at a similar time are more likely to construct their “historical oldest 
stratum of consciousness” at a similar stage and, therefore, are more likely to share 
interpretive frameworks, what is crucial is whether or not they are in a position to 
experience certain events and whether or not they adhere to a generational world 
view.
A generation’s “formative principles” sustain it in time as long as they bind the 
group together. Bude (1997) has developed further this strand of Mannheim’s 
thought, calling these formative principles the “we sense” of a generation, stressing 
the identity cleavage provided by a generation after it has been formed. Corsten also 
develops Mannheim’s definition along similar lines, emphasising that a generation 
provides “criteria of belonging” through which members “do not simply share 
assumptions of a background of experience; they also share a sense that other 
members of the same generation share similar background assumptions” (1999:258).
In these readings then, a historical generation refers to a group of people sharing an 
identity as a result of having been exposed to events that have moulded a common 
interpretative framework for understanding themselves, which they subsequently use 
to locate themselves within the larger social group to which they belong (society). In 
sharing a common history, members of a generation share a temporality or a way of 
being through time. With all these components, the definition of generation in the 
Mannheimian tradition supersedes the cohort.
Regarding interview subjects, I decided to complement my work on historical 
generations by choosing individuals who also belonged to a kinship lineage and, 
therefore, work at the same time with what is called “family generations”. I thought
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this might provide insight into transmissions, interruptions, discrepancies, re­
figurations and negotiations of ideas of the good through time. Putting together these 
two criteria, and according to Chile’s recent political and economic history, I defined 
three generations to work with. The first generation was composed of grandparents 
bom in the 1920’s and early 1930’s (aged around 80 now); the middle generation 
comprised parents bom in the early 1950’s (now in their mid-50’s) and the third 
generation consisted of grandchildren bom in the early 1980’s (now in their mid- 
20’s). Members of the second generation were in their youth at the time of Allende’s 
government and the military coup. This generation is preceded by that of their 
parents, who had reached adulthood long before this historical watershed, and 
followed by that of their children, a post-political and economic transition 
generation.
However, these historical locations have to be taken merely as methodological 
references, as I do not aim to reconstruct a political or economic history of Chile. 
What I can offer is an account of changes in ways of telling intimate stories and of 
the transmissions and re-figurations of notions of the good in everyday life. In order 
to do this, however, the theory of generations has to be problematised. In the 
narratives I collected, the discrete spatialisation of time in generations is overarched 
by temporal accounts of lived experiences. Just as Foucault’s thought is useful to 
describe the discourses that construct the self, but contributes little to understanding 
how subjectivity is experienced; the sociology of generations has concentrated on 
defining the factors that form a generation more than on developing analytical tools 
for grasping how the experience of generation is lived through over time.
Biographical narratives of people of different generations within families inform 
processes of change in terms of the lived experience of time. Interviewees used time 
planes as an interpretive tool to justify themselves. For example, they contracted time 
by putting themselves ahead of their generation or enlarged it by identifying with the 
past. Or superseded it by using a different time framework to reassess their own, or 
fixed it by firmly adhering to a time framework. In this sense, they made time part of 
the “repertoires of histories” upon which to establish their stories. When we begin 
looking at the temporality of a generation according to the time scale not only of
70
institutions and social processes but also of individual biographies, we realise that 
what “my times” or “we” as a generation are is often controversial. As long as time is 
a basic category of self-understanding, its story becomes dependent on “my” 
biography and its moral references. Moreover, what I mean by my generation and my 
we sense is used as a reference for self-justification.
Additionally, throughout their narratives, interviewees are dealing not only with the 
moral frameworks of their own times, but also with the moral stances to which 
members of previous and later generations adhere. For example, narratives give 
testimony of the understanding between extemporaneous ontologies (‘my 
grandmother was the worst affected by my refusal to marry in Church, she cannot 
view herself without faith as I do’) and also of the conflict between different 
evaluations, especially when they are intermeshed with identity claims (‘I cannot 
understand why girls nowadays cannot control themselves [regarding pre-marital 
sex]; we managed it perfectly well when we were young’). This is because, on the 
one hand, generations do not follow one another in a continuum of discretely defined 
intervals. On the contrary, the temporal actuality of a generation is overlapped and 
overflowed by elements coming “from some other time, some other place, and 
generated by some other agency” (Latour 2005:166). Generations do not speak 
afresh; they are generated by and propel other times. My time is not only that of my 
contemporaries, but also that of my predecessors and successors. This is exemplified 
by the oldest generation in this study. The grandparents’ narratives are an assemblage 
of the temporalities that frame their, their children’s and their grandchildren’s times. 
For them, the world of today is not theirs, in the sense that they no longer can make a 
difference to it in the light of a foreseeable future; they have passed this effort on to 
the young. Their time has receded into the past, back to those days whose flow they 
can manage and understand well. Current times run too fast for them to fully grasp; 
however, they strive to catch up with bits of it in order to remain in the present.
In the practice of recalling one’s life, we are dealing with the temporal trajectories of 
different generations and with frameworks-in-use; with the amenability but also the 
inflexibility of temporal existence, not with once-and-for-all sealed in blood 
“testaments” (Arendt 1954). For an adequate understanding of these processes, the 
concept of generation should be broadened from a relationship with the world that
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framed my time (once-and-for-all and in the past) as opposed to that which framed 
that of other generations, to include an idea of how the past is apprehended through 
time and of how positions are taken regarding the future. A number of authors have 
mapped out some avenues to examine these questions. Bergson (1913) first 
developed the idea of “lived time”, arguing that possibilities do not precede their 
realization but come into being alongside the activities that instantiate them. But it 
was Heidegger (1962) who made the lived experience of time central to his work. 
Lived time organises a sense of the past as the source of a given situation and a sense 
of the future as the orientation of action. Koselleck (2004 [1983]) also addressed this 
issue with the notions of “spaces of experience” and “horizon of expectations”, 
claiming that the present of the past is different from the present of the future. 
Ricoeur (1984) made the link between time, self and narratives, investigating how 
narratives provide access to an understanding of the way individuals articulate their 
experiences of time.
Therefore, I employed the concept of generation as a methodological tool for 
selecting interviewees and as a temporal reference for the trajectory of a life, the 
lived experiences of time and the signifiers of an identity. As an analytical category, 
what I offer is an understanding of how people use the concept of generation in 
narrating their lives. This perspective makes it a complex, mobile and controversial 
concept that traverses temporalities to signal other people’s times and to define the 
relationship with those people.
2.3 Research procedures
We do not have direct access to experiences; we study their representations in the 
form of stories, body speech or interaction. A research process contains several 
stages of “re-presentation”. Riessman (1993) identifies five such levels: “attending” 
(the mind of the interviewee selecting what to make conscious among a variegate 
number of stimulus), “telling” (the interviewee organising the events), “transcribing” 
(the researcher transferring speech to text), “analysing” (the researcher applying 
certain “tricks” (Czamiawska 2004) to interpret the text —usually with a chorus of
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scholars whispering at his or her side) and “reading” (the representation that readers 
of the final/printed text will make). Beyond the number of stages, Riessman’s 
perspective is useful for reflecting upon the research process (thus adding another 
stage —“translating”).
2.3.1 Attending and telling
The attending process is a mental procedure of selection among alternatives. 
Interviews are one of the techniques available for prompting attending processes. But 
in telling a story there is an obvious gap between the experience as lived or 
remembered and the experience as communicated. In telling, a new level of 
representation is brought to life.
There is no obvious connection between the narrative approach and specific methods 
of social enquiry (Czamiawska 1998). However, because these studies centre on how 
protagonists interpret things, in-depth interviews are among the most popular 
resources and life stories are probably the most efficient method of inquiry for 
prompting stories about the self. I used both techniques successively and 
complementarily.
I chose to work with life stories because they offer a subjective account of the 
biographical particulars through which a life trajectory unfolds: from the “important 
events, experiences and feelings of a lifetime” (Atkinson 1998:8) and the “specific 
times and spaces of biographical construction” (Holstein and Gubrium 2000) to the 
material, social and cultural resources available. Thus, they provide a basis for 
examining the embeddedness of the languages of the self in people’s life itineraries, 
daily chores, relationships, choices and reflections. Since life-stories are time 
sensitive, they may also be the most effective means for gaining an understanding of 
how the self evolves over time, both through his or her life span and in relation to the 
society to which that self and that story relate. Additionally, in studies where 
interviewees belong to family groups, this technique offers the possibility of 
investigating intergenerational continuities, conflicts, and breaks within families. 
Lastly, life stories offer access to narrative structures and specific linguistic resources 
—the hows as well as the whats of story-making.
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I worked with a life story interview guide that was organised temporally. Largely, the 
interviewees touched on most of its topics without the need to probe. Generally, my 
questions aimed to encourage them to comment on how life’s different experiences, 
events, and situations had affected their trajectory and their sense of who they are.
I wanted to delve deeper into various topics in the study of selfhood. Although many 
of them were addressed in the life story, their development was subsumed to the 
main task at hand: the narration of a complete life trajectory. Therefore, I designed a 
semi-structured in-depth interview, in which the centre of the conversation was no 
longer the evolving thematisation of a self through time, but a number of lines of 
inquiry into practices and conceptions of the self, such as lifestyle, self-presentation 
and the body, self-perception and life stages, turning points in life, aspirations and 
ethics, self and emotions, and discourses of selfhood that predominate in their 
immediate social circuits. On the one hand, these topics provided information for 
thematic chapters. For instance, the section on the body and the narratives of sex life 
and gender were analysed together to form chapter nine. On the other hand, they 
complemented certain areas of analysis. With the section on aspirations and morals, 
for instance, I intended to address the “who I ought to be” —a question of morality— 
and the “who I would like to be” —a matter of aspiration. Conversations around 
these issues shed light on different projected selves and their resources, drawing the 
space and the boundaries of a person’s possibilities of being. In my view, six of the 
questions in the second session interview guide required some preparation (for 
example, what their obituary would say if they were able to write it). These questions 
are marked with the symbol ► in the interview guide. I provided these questions in 
written format at the end of the first session and asked the interviewees to think about 
their answers before we met again.
I also asked the interviewees to compare the three generations under study using their 
own families as examples. I prepared a list of questions about differences and 
continuities across generations regarding values, gender roles, family life and work, 
obstacles and resources to progress in life, and life meaning. And I requested them to 
ground their answers on the lives of their predecessors and descendants. This 
comparative exercise on “intergenerational situated knowledge” constituted the 
second and last part of the second session and served to close the interview process, 
moving from the very intimate and subjective personal life story towards a more
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mediated conversation in which the subject of our dialogue was no longer the “I” but 
the self and the society of the interviewee’s family members. Thus, a temporally 
organised first session was followed by a thematically structured second interview 
(see interview guides in appendix).
Procedurally speaking, the second session was usually conducted a few days after the 
first, to avoid losing the rhythm and disposition created. On average, the two 
interviews took 5:28 hours; with 3:05 hours the shortest and 7:25 hours the longest.
The life story and in-depth interviews were designed to complement one another in 
eliciting narratives of the self along a life trajectory. Moreover, the information 
gathered in each was considered together to carry out a narrative analysis. Yet, I was 
aware that as interview techniques, life stories and in-depth interviews differed at 
least in terms of structure, interviewee’s and interviewer’s role, pace, temporality and 
personal engagement. But having used both techniques in succession, I found them 
less distant than I had first thought. I was expecting the structure of the in-depth 
interview to be more static than the life story. Because it is thematically organised, 
the move from one topic to another introduces a closure that is less evident in a life 
story interview. I also imagined that the conversation would be present-times-based, 
and the responses more disengaged from experiences than in the case of the life 
story. Nonetheless, the interviewees continued to be driven by the narrative flow 
during the second session. Two factors certainly contributed to this. Firstly, we 
opened the second interview either with those elements the interviewees wanted to 
add to their biographical accounts or with my inquiries about areas we had touched 
only superficially. This review recovered the narrative flow. Secondly, the first 
session helped to build up a background of the interview’s life to which we could 
refer. This shared intimate knowledge was to play a role during the second interview 
in generating an atmosphere of respect and confidence where sensitive issues or 
more personal experiences could be disclosed and approached more readily. In this 
sense, the second-session questions and topics became an opportunity to complete 
their life stories, add nuances, make points clearer and basically reflect on 
themselves as subjects within the context of a life story already told and fresh in our 
minds. Consequently, in the second session we again moved backwards and forwards 
through their life trajectories and the life story’s characters came back on stage.
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Photographs, poems, letters, personal diaries, family celebration speeches, movies, 
trophies, gifts, neighbours and places of residence were devices for scanning and 
telling. Also sensorial experiences —smells, tastes, sounds, lights, landscapes— 
brought to mind memories and prompted narratives. In some cases interviewees 
prepared themselves in advance for the storytelling process. Carmen is a highly 
organised second-generation woman who, in her own words, does not like to 
improvise and is unused to the ‘inwardness type of exercise’ a life story involves. 
Thus, she wrote a chronological list of the most important events with which to 
compose her story.
The pre and post “interview mode” moments also drew attention to other storyable 
items. I had lunch or tea with the interviewees and other family members, who 
shared their own memories and accounts of the interviewee or family in question. I 
picked interviewees up from their office or dropped them at university after a 
session, or they walked me to the bus stop. In walking through their neighbourhoods 
or visiting their places of work and study, some stories were pictured in their place of 
occurrence and others were incorporated.
Each interviewee’s perception of me, their interviewer, certainly played a part in 
what they decided to include or skip. I was prepared for some of these 
categorisations, for others I was not —and I had some concerns myself. For example, 
I expected the grandparents to be reluctant to discuss their sex lives with a young 
female scholar and it was an issue for me too to ask octogenarians about that topic. 
Probably in my own imagery the elderly do not have sex. But I eventually developed 
techniques, such as starting with indirect questions like: How did men in your 
generation start their sex lives? Then I would wait until the interviewee moved 
through his or her responses to the first person and only then introduce direct 
questions.
The generational factor was another concern. I had little idea about the way 
grandparents speak or the historical reference they may use, largely because I had 
little time with my own grandparents. So I investigated and read about the 
organisation of everyday life and the history of important events —such as the 
Ibanez dictatorship, the rise and decline of nitrate mining or natural disasters like the
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1936 earthquake, a childhood landmark to this generation. Still, I learnt a great deal 
during the interviewing process. Whereas the grandparents had to make an effort to 
explain a world I had not witnessed (an extra-ordinary world from my perspective), 
with the third-generation interviewees I had to make an effort to rebut the tendency 
to assume I shared their times, stands, vocabulary and world-views, unpacking their 
frequent “you know” with, for example, “I’m not sure I do know, what do you mean 
by that?”
Because I asked them to tell their stories, I felt it was my responsibility to be 
supportive and sympathetic and make the interviewees feel I was fully there, 
concentrated, active, listening, comprehending, connecting, probing and open to 
receive/hear what they wanted to share. It was also my responsibility to respect their 
limits regarding what they wanted and did not want to disclose. I did not push further 
when they drew the line and I explicitly mentioned this in discussing the interview 
procedures: they could stop at any time and during any topic if they wanted.
My role was not to judge their lives, but to understand. I do not think interviewees 
need approval, even if they ask for it. I do not think that researchers are in a position 
to approve of “their” lives. It is not our business. Yet, in the discussion of intimate 
issues the parties —friends, partners, interviewee/interviewer, therapist/patient— 
tend to seek each other’s support. Taking sides is a way of judging, and I thought that 
it was important, both for the research purposes and for a healthy interview 
experience, not to encroach on the interview with my own stances. This might also 
have affected my relationship with the family, as there were two other members 
being interviewed. I do not claim the ability to block out critical thought during an 
interaction, but whenever possible I choose not to introduce my own views, even if 
asked to do so. Instead, I tried to turn the issue back to the interviewee, with 
questions that could help unpack it. I particularly tried to be empathetic on issues that 
I might not approve of. Regarding topics on which I am sensitive, like domestic 
violence or theories about the biological roots of the macho culture, I tried to 
maintain the position that it was not my view that mattered but the interviewee’s. 
Occasionally, I used my divergent view to develop questions to enrich the 
discussion, such as, “Some might see it another way, or may feel this and that, what 
do you think?” At the same time, I also tried to avoid being taken for a fool by
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requesting clarification over and again: “Sorry, I don’t understand that, could you 
explain it further”, “Could you give an example?” I think Bourdieu (1999) is right in 
seeing the interviewer’s role as one who “induces” and “accompanies self-analysis”. 
I am glad that many interviewees saw it this way. I am deeply thankful for all I learnt 
with each of them, both about sociology and life.
In the light of the arguments I wish to advance, in chapter six I examine in more 
detail the role the interviewees attributed to me and their overall approach to 
biographical work. Suffice to say here that, in general, they took this opportunity to 
make themselves heard. Evaluating the interview process, many of them said that the 
interviews provided what Bourdieu described as “an exceptional situation for 
communication, freed from the usual constraints (particularly of time) that weigh on 
most of everyday interchanges, and opening up alternatives which prompt or 
authorize the articulation of worries, needs or wishes” (1999:614). For many, this 
was the first time they had spoken about themselves so extensively. Some also 
described a feeling of personal accomplishment: ‘it was worth it’, telling their stories 
‘was useful’.
Due to the research design, two circumstances had a particular bearing on the way the 
stories collected were constructed: each interviewee’s current life stage as a platform 
for reviewing life and the generational factor as an anchor of the social time of each 
biographical construction. Interviewees were well aware of the comparative character 
of my research. Additionally, as explained above, one interview section was devoted 
to tracing their perceptions of intergenerational change. In my view, their 
commitment to this study and the internal conversations this unusual exercise 
provoked within each family made them purposely concentrate on these two temporal 
frameworks for the narrativisation of their lives.
Life stages —youth, maturity and old age— coloured the narrative’s existential 
mood. When reflecting upon the future, the grandparents’ expectations were limited 
by the biological clock. They were looking back and reviewing their lives in the light 
of death, and certainly the way they pondered on themselves was influenced by this 
awareness. In narrative terms and compared with the second and third generations,
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the grandparents were generally more reluctant to enter ‘deep reflections at this point 
in life’. However, I must say that I was often moved by the sense of detachment they 
imprinted on their stories and by the humour with which they faced their past, as if at 
this stage nothing is too serious, neither life nor its story. In contrast, members of the 
second generation were starting to prepare for the last part of their lives, checking 
pensions and savings, thinking about retirement and their future activities. With their 
children grown up and self-sufficient, the parents had recently found some space for 
‘self-inwardness’, often for the first time. They are looking back and evaluating how 
things have been done while, at the same time, envisaging a certain amount of time 
ahead. Finally, the youngest generation is pure future. The majority has finished 
undergraduate studies, and is looking for a way of balancing a career, personal 
projects and a future family. They are setting priorities and choosing how they would 
like to live; they have yet to make up their minds on many issues, they are still trying 
to come to terms with existential and moral topics and have so much unpredictable 
time ahead that they are cautious of planning too far in advance. Contrasting with the 
grandparents’ detachment, most grandchildren transmitted a feeling of urgency for 
self-definition and for crafting a clear narrative (see chapter six).
Because of the nature of this study, life stages were also kin positions — 
grandchildren, parents, grandparents. The status of these kin positions within society, 
within each family and for each member influenced the way the interviewees 
reflected upon the self in the light of intergenerational changes. When grandmother 
Margarita, for example, comments that, ‘before I thought the behaviour of my 
granddaughters was unacceptable, and I argued with them, now one simply has to get 
used to it,’ she is not only referring to changes over time in the meaning of female 
youth, but also exemplifying how for grandparents the voice of the elderly has lost 
moral authority (or what they call respect) in orienting their descendants’ conduct. 
When first-generation Clara comments before starting the interviews, ‘I don’t have 
anything to tell, my life has been quite flat,’ she is implicitly comparing the 
meaningless of her ordinary life with what she sees as the more extraordinary (and 
therefore more interesting) life of her granddaughters.
Furthermore, in terms of disposition towards narrativisation, in this study the 
combination of historical and family generations coalesced in the crafting of a larger
79
endeavour: the family story. Albeit in different hands, the fact that there would be 
transcripts of the life stories of three generations within each family was often 
important to gain the interviewees’ consent. At another level, comments such as, ‘My 
daughter would surely recall this episode differently’, ‘My grandmother has 
completely different views on this issue’, ‘These were barely issues in my father’s 
times’, reveal each family member’s awareness of the fact that his or her personal 
story was feeding into a larger collective narrative in which he or she held a shared 
responsibility and partial authority. The family story behind each personal narrative 
helped to confer an open-ended nature upon each individual recollection, probably 
unlike biographical narratives gathered in other forms. There was a sense that ‘my 
story’ had a beginning and end that surpassed my existence and my account.
2.3.2 Transcribing
Another level of re-presentation comes with the transcription process. Interviews 
were fully recorded and literally transcribed —including paralinguistic utterances 
(‘uhms’), interruptions, and other subtle features of interaction but, inevitably, the 
passage of talk to text is always “incomplete, partial and selective” (Riessman 
1993:11).
To protect the identity of the interviewees, their full names, those of their families, 
friends and colleagues as well as addresses and workplace names were changed. As a 
gesture of gratitude for their collaboration and as a form of giving personal closure to 
the life story exercise, I offered each interviewee a (sealed) copy of the life story’s 
transcript. Those interviewees who spontaneously called me to comment on their 
transcripts experienced what Ricoeur called “distantiation”; they barely recognised 
themselves in their words. Those that refused their copy gave two types of reasons, 
which further illustrate the impact of giving a personal account and the power of the 
transcribed format. Some interviewees disclosed secrets during the interviews; 
therefore, having a transcript around was a threat. For others the existence of a text 
meant fixing what they say they are in form, content and time. To some it was a 
replica not worth keeping, to others a memory device they did not need ‘for 
reminding myself who I am and what my life has been like’.
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2.3.3 Translating
Submitting a dissertation on Chileans to an English university meant translating into 
and writing in what, to me, was a foreign language. In an intergenerational narrative 
study, the subtleties of language are precious information. It was not easy to come up 
with a method to avoid meaning being lost in translation. Surprisingly, there is little 
reflection on this among Anglo-Saxon social scientists. This, apart from confirming 
the hegemony of the English language in academia, left me resourceless. This was 
extremely worrying, especially as I was living in a multicultural city in a globalised 
era and attending a university that prizes itself on its international composition (the 
year I entered LSE, Director Giddens opened his welcome address with an in-situ 
experiment, in which he asked students to raise their hands as the name of the 
continent they came from was mentioned). By the time I finished this thesis, happily, 
a number of opportunities for discussing translation issues had opened up, especially 
among students, both within LSE and in other UK universities.
My intention was to preserve linguistic features, both for literary and analytical 
purposes, but without jeopardising the readability of the text with too many semantic 
notes. This was not a linguistic study. I opted to write footnotes for those expressions 
I considered semantically significant, explaining their meaning in Chilean culture 
and usually adding reference to the time, social group, and context of use. Sometimes 
the words of other members of the same generation provided synonymous and 
related meanings. On other occasions I drew on my own understanding (with the 
help of dictionaries, native speakers and other Chileans’ comments).7 In the main 
text I tried to connect the meaning of the expression concerned with the main topic 
and argument developed. I often worked with the translated word, but in many cases 
I offer both the original and the English version.
Perhaps an author with more proficient English might have produced better results. 
In any case, the need for translation forced me to reflect on my native language and 
how interviewees used it more than I would have had I written this report in Spanish.
7 It helped in this process that a number of interviews were translated into English for supervision 
purposes. Cultural specificities in need of unpacking were discovered in supervision sessions.
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2.3.4 Analysing
The language in which a narrative is communicated is not a transparent vehicle of 
meaning; it requires interpretation. Narrators often indicate through the style of their 
telling how they expect to be interpreted. The interview situation offers space to 
further clarify a story, reflect deeper on its meaning or discuss its implications. 
Moreover, the analysis of the complete transcribed story and its comparison to others 
elicits other interpretations.
Within narrative studies, there are different approaches to analysing personal stories: 
hermeneutic, psychoanalytic, feminist, semiotic or structuralist, to name a few (see 
Riessman 1993, Plummer 2001, Miller 2000). But most practitioners today do not 
follow a single procedure but combine a number of theories and analytical 
dimensions according to their research agenda. “Fashion, authority, aesthetic 
responses all play a role in the choice of approach, and so do logical arguments” 
(Czamiawska 2004:89). Overall, I acknowledge a hermeneutic inspiration in my 
work, in the sense that, as noted in chapter one, my general concern was to produce 
what Taylor calls an “anthropocentric” account, keeping close track of the ways 
things have significance for people. I borrowed from literary studies and 
poststructuralism to examine the hows of narrative construction and to bring the 
conflicting logics of sense-making to the surface. As Czamiawska says, one of the 
contributions structuralism and postructuralism make to traditional hermeneutics is to 
have changed “the central question from what does a text say? to How does a text 
say it?” (2004:47).
In a preliminary phase of the analysis I chose two interviewees per generation, a man 
and a woman, to build up an initial overview of the emerging themes and plots in the 
data and their construction throughout the entire interview material. In conducting 
this preliminary case study, I focused on the story as such, on the interpretive needs 
at work in the process of story-making (a re-reading of the structure of the text in 
phenomenological terms) and on the circumstances of the story’s production. 
Particularly, I was seeking to answer questions such as: How does the interviewee 
present and position him/herself in the different stages of life? How does he/she 
legitimise his/her actions? How does he/she see him/herself and think he/she is seen
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by others? How do all of these relate to the life story told? How has the story been 
framed? What does the story tell us about him or her? To build up initial 
interpretations I contrasted the analysis of these case studies with the rest of the 
generation to see how peers framed the same issues. I also looked at the ways the 
other two generations perceived the topics in question so as to supply points of 
contrast (contrapunti) for my analysis. In this way, I deconstructed each of these 
biographical narratives to put together my own version. At this preliminary stage, it 
was important, however, to remain contextualised in the person’s narrative lines, and 
to unpack the often ambivalent and contradictory ways in which personhood is given 
meaning. In a second stage, I compared these drafts with each other to delineate main 
themes and arguments. I subsequently analysed the transcripts of the other 24 
interviews against these themes, searching for variability and commonalities within 
each generation, to further differentiate and add density to each topic and to seek 
other thematic threads.
Going through each interviewee’s material again and again, I gained proximity to 
each story. This knowledge, together with the previous case study work, allowed me 
to select a limited number of examples per generation with which to illustrate in 
chapter six continuities and changes in the way of organising the biographical 
account.
This data analysis procedure, as well as the exposition in the second and third part of 
the work, is organized around a central thesis and subsidiary arguments and thus 
obviously imposes some narrative structure on the information collected. As Geertz 
(1973) put it, as cultural analysts, our job is to build up interpretations over people’s 
interpretations. In this research I am telling a story too. But in doing so I am not 
attempting macro explanations or general meta-narratives about what is constitutive 
of the self in different generations of Chilean people. I do not aim to generalise 
anything of what I say about my interviews to encompass Chilean society at large. 
Still, I wanted to be able to summarise commonalities and differences within and 
across generations and, to do so, I follow an argumentative line throughout the 
following substantive chapters. One of the dangers of doing this, I am aware, is of 
subordinating my narrative to that of the interviewees, or vice versa. I have therefore
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taken the precaution of being as reflective as possible in the different stages of 
analysis and in tracing associations between themes, cases or generations.
Finally, I would like to explain how I selected the story-tellers and to introduce them 
briefly.
2.4 Cases
I interviewed 10 families —30 people— in Santiago, Chile. I followed a selective 
sampling procedure (Schatzman and Strauss 1973) to choose respondents, with 
the intention of collecting and analysing as many narratives as possible within the 
margins of certain leading variables that I detected as crucial for the topic under 
research and of a manageable number for a study of this kind. My aim, then, was 
to contrast people’s conceptions of the self according to some variables, not to 
determine to what extent their narratives represented a larger population. Those 
variables were:
• Historical and family generation
o Members of the first generation bom between 1925 and 1935 (aged around 
80 now), physically and mentally fit to carry on a conversation involving 
reflections and recollections; 
o Members of the middle generation bom between 1948 and 1955 (now in 
their mid-50’s ); and 
o Members of the youngest generation bom between 1976 and 1985 (now in 
their mid-20’s), having had some adulthood experience (e.g., living on their 
own, parenthood, marriage or cohabitation, working experience or tertiary 
education).
• Gender: Five women and five men per generation.
• Socio-economic situation: Five upper-middle-class and five lower-middle-class 
members of the middle generation.
• Political position: Five middle-generation members adhering to right-wing 
political ideologies and five to left-wing ideas.
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Boxes 1, 2 and 3 provide an overview of the life of the people I worked with. Further 
information is given in the tables at the end of this chapter.
Box 1: First generation
First-generation interviewees (1G) are on average 82 years of age (2004). Six of them were bom in 
Santiago, while the others arrived in the capital with their parents or alone looking for a better 
future. They grew up in families composed, on average, o f 7.2 siblings. 1G interviewees have an 
average of nine years of schooling and only one has a university degree, while two did not attend 
school at all. Four attended state schools and four private schools. Half o f them spent some years in 
a boarding school, and three of them had a governess at home for a period. All the grandparents 
were married “under the two laws” — as we say in Chile—  that is, under the civil and the Catholic 
Church laws. On average they got married at the age of 25 and had six children. The five 1G women 
are widows, one grandfather is a widower and the rest are still married and living with their wives. 
One grandmother annulled her first marriage and remarried after cohabiting with her second partner, 
while another two cohabited and had their first children before marriage. Although all the 
grandparents started work in their youth or even childhood, two grandmothers gave up their jobs 
once they were married to be housewives. Another worked all her life in the business she started 
with her husband, another had intermittent jobs, and another went back to work to support her 
family after her husband died. Three grandfathers are still working, although retired. The other 1G 
members are retired and living on pensions and savings. Six grandparents define themselves as 
practising Catholics (attending mass and saying prayers), two as Catholics, and the other two as 
Christians. Five of them support the governing coalition, while the other five are right-wing 
sympathisers.
Considering the different variables that characterised the people I interviewed, it is 
important to mention that, in general terms, there is some intergenerational social 
mobility. In relative terms, lower-middle class interviewees are much more common 
in the first than in the third generation while, in absolute terms, as the country’s 
socioeconomic situation has improved over the decades, the poorer grandparents’ 
living conditions were much more restricted than those of the poorer grandchildren. 
Among the second generation, women probably have a higher sociocultural capital 
than men, although there is one case in each group that runs counter to that tendency. 
This difference may explain the extensive presence of new-age, esoteric and spiritual 
discourses among women. Women with lower social and cultural capital would 
probably not be attending self-discovery courses but, as I argue in chapter four, they
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would be thinking about themselves and talking about their inner troubles with their 
friends in a way their mothers did not. Among the grandchildren, my perception is 
that access to higher education contributes to labelling the distance produced by 
different social, cultural and economic conditions of upbringing. In a classist society 
such as Chile’s, a simple example is the little variability I noticed in the way the 
grandchildren talk. Another example is their lifestyle options. Today a young 
university-educated daughter of a labourer could be driving a car and travelling 
abroad for her next holiday (both purchased on credit).
The most successful strategy for finding interviewees was to ask people I knew to 
look around their networks and introduce me to relatives or acquaintances that met 
the conditions mentioned above. Additionally, some interviewees themselves 
introduced me to other possible families. They played a mediator’s role, telling me 
briefly about the potential interviewee family and explaining to them who I was and 
what I was doing. Only one of the 30 people I interviewed knew me in advance.8
When I received permission to contact the family, I called each interviewee and 
explained the purpose of the research and the type of interviews I proposed to 
conduct. I also double-checked that the family composition met the conditions I 
needed. I gave them a copy of the written interview-consent form to read carefully 
and make an informed decision. First, I explained the purpose of the research, the 
uses of the information gathered in terms of analysis and publication, and the ground 
rules. Then, I secured commitments. I gave a clear idea of the amount of time to be 
devoted to the interviews and explained the need to record them. I also gave 
reassurances about the confidentiality of the information gathered, in terms of a) 
anonymity —use of pseudonyms and the obscuration or alteration of other personal 
details that could allow the person to be identified, and b) confidentiality— no one 
else would ever hear what the informants had said in a way that could be attributed to 
them.
8 At the beginning of fieldwork I held pilot interviews with a family I knew. They also assessed the 
experience in terms of interview’s structure, elicitation of questions and issues worth including or 
excluding.
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Box 2: Second Generation 
Interviewees of the second generation (2G) were on average 52 years of age (2004). All were born 
in Santiago, Chile’s capital, except one who was bom in the north. They have, on average, five 
siblings and 14 years of schooling. Seven of them attended tertiary education. Three earned a 
professional degree, two left university before finishing and another dropped out of technical 
studies. The other three did not finish secondary school. They have all worked in paid occupations 
throughout their lives. Those with university degrees started their career after graduation and are 
still working in their fields except for one woman who dropped her career to be a mother and 
housewife. The school drop-outs started work immediately except for one woman, who only 
began to work after her marriage when the husband’s salary became insufficient. Among those 
with incomplete professional or technical studies, two started to work after leaving tertiary 
education while another had only intermittent home-based jobs until she was separated and started 
to work full-time. On average, 2G interviewees were married at the age of 22. All but one had 
both civil and Church (Catholic) weddings. Six of them are still married. One woman was forced 
by her parents to marry due to pregnancy, but after some years she annulled that marriage and 
never married again. Three men married because their partner was pregnant. One man separated 
after 16 years of marriage and now cohabits with the mother of his 4-year-old child. One woman 
separated from her husband after 20 years of marriage and now has a boyfriend. On average, 2G 
interviewees have 3.5 children. Four of them declared themselves practicing Catholics, another 
four non-active Catholics, one a Christian and the last one has another religion. Five support right- 
wing political ideologies, four left-wing ideas and one has no political opinion.
As part of my ethical responsibility, I tried to preclude possible emotional damage by 
stressing the interviewees’ right to refuse to answer any question to which they 
would prefer not to respond. I also sought a healthy closure of each session and 
asked for their feelings and thoughts about the interview, the interviewer and, in 
general, the experience of doing narrative work.
The interviews were held between October 2003 and December 2004, with some 
interruptions. Most of them were conducted at the interviewees’ homes, a few at their 
places of work
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Box 3: Third Generation
Third generation (3G) interviewees are between 19 and 29 years old, with an average age of 25. All 
were born in Santiago, except for one who was bom abroad. On average they have 2.4 siblings. Five 
attended state schools and the other five private ones. They all finished secondary school and went on 
to tertiary education, eight to university and the other two to technical institutes. Three were full-time 
university students at the time of the interviews; one man was studying and working in the same field 
while the other six were working in their respective professions following graduation. Considering 
that four of them are still studying, the grandchildren have an average of 16 years of schooling. Six of 
them have a boyfriend or girlfriend, only one woman is married and only one is a mother, and all 
except for one girl are sexually active. Eight are living with their families of origin; the married 
woman lives with her husband and one man shares a flat with a friend. Three of them have no political 
tendency towards a political party, alliance or ideology. In fact, they dislike politics and have no 
interest in keeping up with political developments in Chile. Among the others, one woman identifies 
with right-wing parties and the other six with the governing alliance. Three men have no religious 
affiliation, one woman defines herself as agnostic, four declare themselves Catholics although not 
Church-goers, and two define themselves as Catholic ‘in their own way’.
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Table 1: Interviewee’s Basic Characterization A (base year 2004)9
Name (Family- 
generation)
Hours recorded Sex Year of 
Birth
Age Place of Birth
Jose (1-1) 5:00 M 1919 85 North
Pilar (1-2) 5:15 F 1952 54 North
Francisco (1-3) 6:00 M 1981 23 Santiago
Margarita (2-1) 5:50 F 1907 97 North
Alvaro (2-2) 6:00 M 1948 56 Santiago
Sofia (2-3) 4:45 F 1976 28 Santiago
Ana (3-1) 3:05 F 1924 80 Santiago
Paz (3-2) 5:10 F 1948 56 Santiago
Federico (3-3) 4:40 M 1978 26 Santiago
Rosa (4-1) 3:20 F 1919 85 Santiago
Carlos (4-2) 4:25 M 1957 47 Santiago
Alejandro (4-3) 5.15 M 1985 19 Santiago
Laura(5-1) 4:20 F 1922 82 Santiago
Carmen (5-2) 5:00 F 1948 55 Santiago
Matilde (5-3) 6:05 F 1977 26 Santiago
Joaquin (6-1) 4:20 M 1924 80 Santiago
Pedro (6-2) 5:40 M 1951 53 Santiago
Crist6bal (6-3) 6:25 M 1979 25 Abroad
Clara (7-1) 4:30 F 1925 79 Central zone
Elena (7-2) 7:25 F 1954 50 Santiago
Javiera (7-3) 7:15 F 1980 24 Santiago
Ricardo (8-1) 4:15 M 1925 79 Santiago
Miguel (8-2) 5:20 M 1948 56 Santiago
Julia (8-3) 6:00 F 1983 21 Santiago
Anselmo (9-1) 4:50 M 1930 74 Santiago
Juan (9-2) 4:25 M 1955 49 Santiago
Andrds (9-3) 5:05 M 1975 29 Santiago
G uillerm o (10-1) 5:35 M 1928 76 Central zone
X im ena (10-2) 6:05 F 1956 48 Santiago
Paula (10-3) 6:05 F 1978 26 Santiago
9 Personal information has been obscured to protect the interviewees’ identities.
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Table 2: Interviewee’s Basic Characterization B (base year 2004)
Name (Family- 
generation)
Socioeconomic 
level 
(area of 
residence)
Political position Religion#
Jose (1-1) Middle Concertacidn Alliance P. Catholic
Pilar (1-2) Middle Concertaci6n Alliance Other religion
Francisco (1-3) Middle Concertacidn Alliance None
Margarita (2-1) Lower-middle Concertacidn Alliance P. Catholic
Alvaro (2-2) Upper-middle Concertaci6n Alliance Catholic
Sofia (2-3) Upper-middle Concertacidn Alliance Catholic
Ana (3-1) Upper-middle Right-wing Catholic
Paz (3-2) Middle Right-wing, hates politics N.P. Catholic
Federico (3-3) Middle None, doesn’t vote for conviction None, Catholic upbringing
Rosa (4-1) Middle Right-wing P. Catholic
Carlos (4-2) Middle Right-wing P. Catholic
Alejandro (4-3) Middle None: dislikes politics not 
registered10
N.P. Catholic
Laura (5-1) Upper-middle Right-wing P. Catholic
Carmen (5-2) Upper-middle Centre-right wing P. Catholic
Matilde (5-3) Upper-middle Concertaci6n Alliance Agnostic
Joaquin (6-1) Upper-middle Concertaci6n Alliance P. Catholic
Pedro (6-2) Upper-middle Concertaci6n Alliance Catholic upbringing
Crist6bal (6-3) Upper-middle Concertacidn Alliance None
Clara (7-1) Upper-middle Right-wing P. Catholic
Elena (7-2) Upper-middle Right-wing P. Catholic
Javiera (7-3) Upper-middle Right-wing N.P. Catholic
Ricardo (8-1) Lower-middle Right-wing Christian
Miguel (8-2) Lower-middle Right-wing Christian
Julia (8-3) Lower-middle Concertaci6n Alliance Catholic
Anselmo (9-1) Lower-middle Communist Christian
Juan (9-2) Lower-middle Communist N.P. Catholic
Andrds (9-3) Lower-middle Concertaci6n Alliance Catholic in his own way
G uillerm o (10-1) Lower-middle Concertaci6n Alliance Catholic
X im ena (10-2) Lower-middle None Catholic
Paula (10-3) Lower-middle None Catholic in her own way
# P.Catholic: practising catholic (daily prayer and weekly mass attendance), N.P. Catholic (non-practising 
Catholic)
10 In order to exercise their right to vote in political elections, Chileans over 18 years old must be 
entered in the electoral register.
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Table 3: Interviewee’s Family
Name (Family- 
generation)
Num ber of 
siblings#
M arital status Type of 
union
Number of 
children#
Jose (1-1) -1 5 -1 6 Married (1943) Civil and religious 6
Pilar (1-2) 5 Annulled (1972); married (1971) Civil and religious 2
Francisco (1-3) 1 Single N/A 0
Margarita (2-1) 19 Widow (1981); married (1939) Civil and religious 5
Alvaro (2-2) 4 Married (1966) Civil and religious (1)4
Sofia (2-3) 3(1) Single N/A 0
Ana (3-1) 6 Widow; married (1946) Civil and religious 6
Paz (3-2) 5 Separated (1990); married (1969) Civil and religious 5
Federico (3-3) 4 Single N/A 0
Rosa (4-1) 9(3) Widow; married after cohabiting 
(~ 1961), 1 st marriage (1942), 
annulled (1943)
Civil and religious-civil 1-9
Carlos (4-2) 8(1) Married (1982) Civil and religious 4
Alejandro (4-3) 3 Single N/A 0
Laura (5-1) 4 Widow (married 1943) Civil and religious 3
Carmen (5-2) 2 Married (1970) Civil and religious 4
Matilde (5-3) 3 Married (2002) Civil, didn’t want religious 0
Joaquin (6-1) 7 Married (1950) Civil and religious 8
Pedro (6-2) 7 Married (1973) Civil and religious 3
Crist6bal (6-3) 2 Single N/A 0
Clara (7-1) 2 Widow (1972); married (1952) Civil and religious 8
Elena (7-2) 7 Married (1975) Civil and religious 3
Javiera (7-3) 2 Single N/A 0
Ricardo (8-1) (1) Married (1947) Civil and religious 3
Miguel (8-2) 2 Cohabiting (1992); 1st marriage 
(1977)
Civil 4
Julia (8-3) 2(1) Single N/A 0
Anselmo (9-1) 3 Married (1954) following 
cohabitation
Civil and religious 6
Juan (9-2) 5 Married (1975) Civil and religious 3
Andrds (9-3) 2 Single N/A 0
G uillerm o
(10-1)
6 Widower (1999); Married 
following cohabitation (1949)
Civil and religious 7(2)
X im ena (10-2) 6(2) Married (1976) Civil and religious 2
Paula (10-3) 1 Single N/A 1
# the number shown in brackets () denotes the number of step-siblings among total siblings, or the number of 
stepchildren among the total number of children, or the number of children bom out of wedlock.
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Table 4: Family’s education and working trajectory A
Name
(Family-
generation)
F ather’s
education/
occupation
M other’s
education/
occupation
Schooling# Type of 
School
Higher
education
Place of
higher
education
Jose (1-1) Secondary/
Technical
profession
Almost illiterate/ 
housewife
Completed State None n/a
Pilar (1-2) Secondary/
Technical
profession
Secondary /white 
collar (single)- 
housewife
Completed Private Professional 
degree 
(5 years)
State
University
Francisco
d -3 )
University/
professional
University/
professional
Completed State Technical 
degree 
(4 years)
Private
institute
Margarita
(2-1)
University/
professional
Incomplete
primary/
housewife
Barely
attended
elementary
school
State None n/a
Alvaro (2-2) White collar/ 
Medium business 
owner
Incomplete 
primary/ white 
collar, medium 
business owner
Completed Private Professional 
studies 
(5 years)
State
University
Sofia (2-3) Incomplete 
university/ 
Medium business 
owner
Secondary/
housewife
Completed Private Studying 5th 
(final) year of 
professional 
degree
Private
University
Ana (3-1) Medium business 
owner
Secondary/
housewife
Completed Private Technical 
diploma 
(2 years)
State
University
Paz (3-2) Technical
studies/
Associate
professional
Technical 
studies/ white 
collar-housewife
Completed Private Incomplete (4 
years
professional
degree)
State
University
Federico (3- 
3)
University/
professional
Incomplete 
university/ 
Housewife, self- 
employed, white 
collar
Completed Private Professional 
degree 
(5 years)
State
University
Rosa (4-1) Technical 
studies/ technical 
profession
Housewife Incomplete 
secondary (2 
years left) 
dropped out to 
work
State None n/a
Carlos (4-2) Secondary/ 
medium business 
owner
Incomplete 
secondary/ white 
collar (single)- 
housewife
Completed State Incomplete (1 
year technical 
degree)
Private
Institute
Alejandro
(4-3)
Incomplete 
technical studies/ 
sales employee
University/
professional
Completed State Studying 2nd 
year
professional
degree
State
University
Laura(5-1) Secondary/ small 
business owner
White collar - 
housewife
Incomplete 
secondary (4 
years left)
State None n/a
Carmen (5-2) Small business 
owner, medium 
business owner
Incomplete
secondary
/housewife
Completed Private Professional 
degree 
(4 years)
State
University
Matilde (5-3) Univers
ity/
professi
onal
University/
professional
(single)-
housewife
Completed Private Professional 
degree 
(5 years)
State
University
Joaquin (6-1) Large business 
owner
Housewife Completed Private Professional 
degree 
(5 years)
State
University
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Pedro (6-2) University/
professional
Secondary/
housewife-
volunteer
Completed Private Professional 
degree (5 
years)
State
University
Cristdbal
(6-3)
University/
professional
University/
professional
Completed Private Professional 
degree 
(5 years)
Private
University
Clara (7-1) University
degree/
professional
Secondary/
housewife
Completed Private Incomplete (1 
year technical 
degree)
Private
Institute
Elena (7-2) Saleswoman Incomplete 
technical studies 
/  white collar
Completed Private Technical 
diploma 
(3 years)
University
Javiera (7-3) Technical
studies/
Technical
profession
Technical 
studies/ medium 
business owner
Completed Private Professional 
degree 
(5 years)
Private
University
Ricardo (8-1) Medium business 
owner
Incomplete 
elementary / 
blue collar
Completed State None n/a
Miguel (8-2) Secondary/
Technical
profession
Incomplete 
elementary / 
housewife
Incomplete 
secondary (4 
years left)
State None n/a
Julia (8-3) Incomplete 
secondary / blue 
collar
Secondary/ blue 
collar
Completed State Technical 
degree (4 
years)
Private
Institute
Ansel mo 
(9-1)
Incomplete 
elementary / blue 
collar
Incomplete 
elementary / 
housewife
Elementary
completed
State None n/a
Juan (9-2) Incomplete 
elementary / blue 
collar
Elementary
/housewife
Incomplete 
secondary (1 
year left)
State None n/a
Andrds (9-3) Incomplete 
secondary / blue 
collar
Incomplete 
elementary / 
housewife
Completed State Studying 5th 
(final) year 
professional 
degree
Private
University
Guillermo
(10-1)
No education/ 
blue collar
Illiterate/ peasant Never attended N/A None n/a
Ximena
(10-2)
Never attended/ 
blue collar, small 
business owner
Incomplete 
elementary / 
housewife, small 
business owner
Incomplete 
secondary 
(failed last 
year)
State None n/a
Paula (10-3) Incomplete 
technical / 
Technical 
profession
Incomplete 
secondary / blue 
collar
Completed State Studying 4th 
year (of 5) 
professional 
degree
State
University
# both levels of education together (primary and secondary) take 12 years
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Table 4: Family’s education and working trajectory B
Name
(Family-
generation)
Occupational 
trajectory / 
Occupation 2004
P a rtn e rs  schooling/ occupation Children’s
Schooling
Jose (1-1) Technical
profession/retired
-12/ Housewife All university degrees
Pilar (1-2) Professional Some Technical studies/ associate 
professional
All Technical degrees
Francisco
(1-3)
Student/ technical 
profession
16 technical degree/ graduated n/a
Margarita
(2-1)
Housewife- medium 
business owner / 
Retired
Elementary school/ white collar, 
medium business owner (+).
1 completed university, 2 
university uncompleted, 2 barely 
finished school
Alvaro (2-2) Medium business 
owner
12/housewife 2 completed university, 2 with 
university studies
Sofia (2-3) Student 17 professional/ graduated n/a
Ana (3-1) White collar, 
housewife. Small 
business owner
-12/ associate professional 1 postgraduate degree, 1 university 
uncompleted, the others technical 
degrees
Paz (3-2) Housewife, self 
employed, white 
collar
17/professional 2 completed university, 1 
completed school and working, 2 
at university
Federico (3-3) Small business 
owner, professional
17/ professional n/a
Rosa (4-1) White collar 
(single)/housewife
Secondary school incomplete 
/medium business owner (+)
All but 1 finished secondary school
Carlos (4-2) Small business 
owner/ employee
17/ professional 1 at university, 3 at school
Alejandro (4-3) Student 14 (studying at university) n/a
Laura (5-1) White collar 
(single) -  housewife
Secondary school/ medium 
business owner (+)
1 completed university, 1 
completed technical studies
Carmen (5-2) Professional
(single)/housewife,
volunteer
17/professional 3 completed university, 1 
university student
Matilde (5-3) Professional 17/professional n/a
Joaquin (6-1) Professional Secondary school/ housewife and 
volunteer
All university degrees
Pedro (6-2) Professional 17/ professional 2 completed university, 1 
university student
Crist6bal (6-3) Professional 15/ studying technical degree n/a
Clara (7-1) White collar/ retired Secondary school/ salesman (+) All finished school, some have 
technical studies
Elena (7-2) Medium business 
owner
Technical profession 2 completed university, completed 
technical studies
Javiera (7-3) Professional 17/ professional n/a
Ricardo (8-1) Blue collar, white 
collar/ Retired
Elementary school/ housewife 1 secondary uncompleted (10 
years), 1 secondary uncompleted 
(11 years), 1 secondary completed
Miguel (8-2) Blue collar Technical school completed/ blue 
collar
1 completed university, 1 technical 
degree, 1 school student
Julia (8-3) White collar n/a n/a
Anselmo
(9-1)
Blue collar Elementary school/ blue collar 
(single)- housewife
None completed secondary school, 
some have done courses
Juan (9-2) Blue collar/retired Elementary school incomplete/ 
blue collar (single)- self employed
1 technical degree, 1 completed 
school, 1 university student
Andrds (9-3) Professional n/a n/a
Guillermo (10- 
1)
Blue collar, small 
business owner/ 
retired blue collar
Completed school/ housewife and 
small business owner (+)
All but one finished secondary 
school
Ximena (10-2) Blue collar Technical studies/technical degree 1 completed school, 1 university 
student
Paula (10-3) Student Completed school /blue collar n/a
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PART II
IDEAS OF THE GOOD, NOTIONS OF THE SELF
Following Charles Taylor I have claimed that human beings make sense of 
themselves by saying where they stand in relation to the good. Therefore, from a 
temporal perspective, and as a result of changes in forms of moral reasoning, we can 
expect reformulations in the prevailing conceptions of selfhood and transformations 
in the kind of practices people have to perform in relation to themselves in order to 
attain a prevailing modality of being. At an analytical plane and adapting Foucault, I 
have also argued that the relationship between morality and selfhood can be studied 
at the level of the intersection of ethics and technologies of the self (or the ways of 
thinking, judging and acting upon oneself). Finally, I have maintained that 
biographical narratives are an appropriate method for a study of selfhood and 
morality —personal stories are among the most powerful methods to access people’s 
self-conceptions and, essentially, personal accounts are moral tales in which 
available conventions work as vocabulary of motives for the purpose of self­
description.
Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 study the changing relationship between ideas of the good and 
forms of self-understanding. No claims are made about the causes of the 
transformation described. Rather, the focus is on the interaction between prevailing 
discourses about what provides fundamental orientations in life and forms of storying 
the self. In these chapters, ideas of the good and the ethics and practices of the self 
and their modifications through time are reconstructed retrospectively, according to 
my interviewees’ comments on the past. From such a perspective we cannot expect 
to “recover the past” or to “understand it as it was experienced and understood by the 
people who actually lived it” (Stanley 1992:7). In the narratives I collected the past 
“is the result of competing negotiated version of what happened, why it happened, 
and with what consequences” (ibid.). The three generational groups, especially those 
who have lived longer —parents and grandparents— storied the past knowing the 
conditions of the future; with specific explanations of how their lives and the overall 
outlook of Chilean society evolved. The past we will be studying in these chapters is, 
then, the kind of past that emerges under the light of a changing present.
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In chapter 2 I also maintain that the self is constructed ‘in’ and ‘through’ personal 
stories. Whereas chapters 3, 4, and 5 deal with biographical content, are structured 
thematically and, for the most part, use short interview extracts, chapter 6 studies the 
organization of the personal narrative, works with larger tracts of interview material 
and takes the complete narrative as its object of analysis.
Chapter 3 is devoted to the analysis of grandparents’ narratives, chapter 4 to those of 
the middle generation and chapter 5 to grandchildren’s stories. Each chapter first 
reconstructs the predominant ideas of the good, then the different ethics of the self, 
followed by the technologies of selfhood and, finally, the way interviewees place 
themselves in relation to the discursive means available, by comparing their 
modalities of self-presentation with the available conventions for self-description. In 
these three chapters I trace the gradual supersession of the idea that the good is 
accomplished by following the ‘deber ser’ (what ought to be done in the eyes of 
others), which prevailed in the grandparents’ times, to the grandchildren’s belief in 
the good as an experience to be realized by ‘being yourself’. The second generation’s 
fundamental orientation in life reflects its intermediate position between those two 
contrasting orders of worth. In their narratives the idea of interiority as the primordial 
moral locus of the self begins to arise, linked to the emergence of the hypergoods of 
self-determination and moral autonomy. Yet, in this generation interiority means, 
above all, family life.
Regarding the different models of the ethical person that follow from the 
predominant conceptions of the good, I argue that the idea of the good prevalent in 
the grandparents’ time encourages an ‘ethics of respectability’ and an attitude of 
outward ‘conformity’ to the rules of an order that transcend them, whereas an ‘ethics 
of commitment’ characterizes the relationship of self upon self of the middle 
generation and an ‘ethics of authenticity’ organizes the grandchildren’s moral 
framework. I use the notion of ‘character7 to convey the ideas of selfhood present in 
the grandparents’ narratives, ‘divided se lf to discuss the forms that the self takes in 
the middle generation, and ‘experiential being ’ to address the meaning that selfhood 
has for the grandchildren. Notwithstanding the entrenchment of the prevailing norms, 
narrators produce alternative versions to the master tales and develops different ways
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of appropriating the predominant discourses for their practices of self-interpretation. 
I close each of these chapters addressing this theme.
Bringing together narrative and ethical theories, Chapter 6 explores the changing 
forms of assembling the self in moral terms as they manifest in the organization of 
the biographical narrative. In particular, I examine the master motif underlying the 
biographical account, the predominant narrative genre and the storyteller’s approach 
to the narrative work. At this level from the grandparents to the grandchildren I 
describe the transit from social stories of material progress to inner narratives of 
personal growth and from descriptive and over-realistic accounts to more 
impressionistic and experimental narrative styles. A shift is also apparent in the 
increasing reflexivity added to the personal story, which is exemplified in the 
declining preponderance of the anecdote, the rise of the soliloquy and more 
provisional and speculative narrative styles —which I label “perspectivism”. Finally, 
I identify a modification in the understanding of the narrative work —from the 
confessional, to the therapeutic, to the peer conversation— and from the belief that it 
is not necessarily good to thematise life to the belief that discursive analysis of life 
and self is valuable.
I conclude part two suggesting that we can interpret the redefinition of the 
relationship between ideas of good and notions of the self over the three generations 
as delineating a process of interiorisation o f the moral sources o f the self This is the 
proposition that pervades all this work. Much in line with Taylor’s argument, by 
interiorisation I mean a shift in the location o f the authoritative power in moral 
issues from a moral ontology in which the voice of others prevails to one in which 
the interior voice is prevalent. Therefore, interiorisation is a notion that describes the 
relation between self and moral sources mainly in terms of the relationship between 
self and others.
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CHAPTER THREE— CONFORMITY
In the stories of the first generation, moral truth appears as the property of a 
community that sets the rules of the good life, sanctions defiance and rewards 
adherence. This is epitomized in the association between the idea of the good and the 
observance of what Chileans call ‘el deber ser9 (what ought to be done in the eyes of 
others). When the good is linked to the deber ser, external figures define individuals’ 
moral framework and oversee their moral virtue; what their actions should be, which 
activities they should devote their time to, which options they should take and, in 
general, the kind of life they should lead. Rosa and Ana refer to their moral 
orientations as codes of conduct imposed by a general and all-pervasive social voice 
—the good is not primarily defined by what I  want but what they say is right:
[You have to] do what you must and not what you like (1G Rosa).
The deber ser comes first, what must and must not be done, not lying,
following the norms prescribed by parents ... I never thought of doing anything
else (1G Ana).
Ana’s statement connects the idea of the good with an attitude of conformity towards 
the will of authoritative voices and the criteria they have established as the measure 
of the good. In particular, in the grandparents’ rendering, conformity means that one 
‘ought to do what is customary’ Chacer lo que se usa’), disregarding personal 
thought, feelings or aspirations. One’s actions must show ‘correctness’. As they put 
it, ‘one has to keep one’s forehead clean’11 and to ensure that ‘nobody could point to 
any stain’. Moral scrutiny is ultimately a public activity. The use of visual references 
such as ‘stainless’, ‘clean’ and ‘forehead’ illustrates the authority attributed to the 
public gaze.
Below grandmother Laura explains how ‘correctness’ was exercised at home. As 
well as saying that in the sphere of domestic economics, conformity is linked to self- 
control and moderation rather than to risk-taking, she indicates how public opinion is 
used to demonstrate a person’s moral worth:
11 A kin to the English expression “to keep one’s nose clean” .
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The values of being correct ... I always heard my mother say that my father’s 
forehead was clean, that nobody could ever say a word against him. And I saw 
how my father preferred to have less rather than get into debt, money was spent 
up to what was possible, never more (1G Laura).
This attitude of conformity is reinforced by the perception that life is a factual reality, 
to which people must adapt:
I’ve never thought or indulged in philosophy [about myself and my life], that’s 
not for me, what would I gain? Life was as it was. Full stop. And I’m thankful 
to God (1G Laura).
My life, that old life, has passed, it’s already passed, how can I fix it now? How 
can I analyse it now? It’s been a quiet life and nothing more (1G Rosa).
In the grandparents’ view, life is not interpretable, nor is it subject to reflexive 
analysis or evaluative claims. When life is as it is, a factual reality and ‘full stop’, 
there is no perceived gain in questioning one’s trajectory:
If there’s been a misfortune in the family I’ve accepted it as natural (1G Laura).
Life should be faced without ‘rebelliousness or opposition’ (Jose). One ought not to 
ask for ‘other things’ or demand ‘more’ than life gives — ‘this is it and nothing else’. 
The narrative of a life of conformity is that of an ‘ordinary person without much 
pretensions’, a ‘flat’ story. In fact, it is through the experiences of suffering, sacrifice 
and self-renunciation that the good life is accomplished (see chapter 6).
Life does not call for a meaning to be discovered but demands an adaptable and 
receptive attitude. The grandparents do not manifest any idea of emotional damage, 
frustration or existential rebellion, even in relation to events we may consider great 
losses or painful occurrences, like the death of an immediate relative. The views of 
their children and grandchildren support this interpretation:
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In my mother’s case, I think that everything had meaning... Being the way she 
was, my mother never doubted or felt a lack of meaning, no.... I think that 
back then roles used to repeat themselves, she did what her mother did; there 
was a continuity that didn’t leave room for questioning... I don’t think she had 
frustrations, on the contrary, my mother thinks she was able to do lots of things 
(2G Carmen).
God is the creator of everything... I have the impression that they 
[grandparents] lived life as it came and didn’t get worried themselves about the 
meaning of living.... It was God that wanted it that way and that was that. Full 
stop (3G Sofia).
Ultimately, when life is supported upon theistic foundations, as in the majority of 
these cases, questioning life means questioning the will of God.
O: What is your God like?
It is not MY God, there is only one God. He that moves the universe (1G Jose).
Within a providential order, it is God who ‘tells’, and it is the son —his 
‘instrument’— who ‘accepts’ and ‘obeys’ the mission ‘entrusted by God’.
I’m a God-fearing person, I’m afraid of offending him because of who he is... 
the Supreme Being. It is not about fear, but about owing him respect, knowing 
how to obey him and how to fulfil the mission he’s set for me (1G Rosa).
An attitude of conformity means hiding imperfections or deviations from the norm. 
In the interviews, family circumstances such as illegitimate births, cohabitation 
before marriage or the existence of homosexual relatives were disclosed only by 
second and third generation interviewees who had, themselves, learned about these 
episodes in their family history long afterwards. Grandparents excluded those events 
from their narratives, so as to preserve the respectable identity they claimed, acting 
within the boundaries of the norm. In a morally correct story, these “irregularities”
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were not deemed tellable. In a deber ser morality there cannot be any distance 
between the image of a respectable person —externally established and evaluated— 
and the image projected in self-presentation.
For the grandparents, ‘happiness’ and ‘satisfaction’ depend upon ‘knowing how to 
act in life,’ this is, upon knowing how ‘to accomplish one’s duties’. Laura, for 
example, is happy with her life because:
I have always tried to do my best in what ought to be done (1G Laura).
Below is Rosa’s explanation of how she has lived her life. It tells of her suffering at 
finding herself increasingly incapable of fulfilling her duties, owing to age and 
illness:
Fulfilling one’s responsibilities, complying with one’s obligations at home: I 
used to start doing the housework very early in the morning, the habit of doing 
my duties has always stayed with me. Now that I’m old and sick I cannot do 
anything. That’s the reason for my suffering (1G Rosa).
The widespread use of the word ‘duty’ reflects the external character of this 
generation’s moral activities. “Duties are necessarily social in character and adjust 
the individual to the whole” (Beck and Beck-Gemsheim 2002:38). Rosa describes 
her dealings with the family as a matter of ‘obligation’ rather than as a freely chosen 
commitment, as will be the case in subsequent generations. But the sense of 
obligation does not retract from the value of her family involvement. On the 
contrary, the family is her main source of satisfaction and her duties represent a core 
aspect of her identity. As will become clearer in the next section, through the 
grammar of obligations and duties she attributes the highest worth to her roles as 
mother and housewife.
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3.1 Ethics of respectability
An ethics of respectability regulates the relation the subject establishes with him or 
herself when the successful production of a good person presupposes visible 
compliance with external valuations, requirements and standards and the idea of the 
good is concerned with what is right to do. This type of ethics is concerned with 
social position and treats public conventions, traditions and laws as the point of 
reference for moral behaviour.
In the grandparents’ society, respectability was conveyed primarily by ‘being decent’ 
and ‘helping others’. The value of decency pervaded all aspects of a person’s 
existence, from financial administration, personal outlook, manners and management 
of social relationships to the uses of time and space and types of personal 
relationship. For example, in an epoch when the main attributes of womanhood were 
associated with being a wife, mother and housekeeper, a respectable woman should 
be ‘casera ’ (of ‘her home’ or ‘casa ’) and not ‘callejera * (one who likes to be in the 
street or ‘calle’) or worse, ‘suelta’ (literally ‘loose’ -sexually approachable).12 
Synonymous with being callejera in the grandparents’ vocabulary is ‘being a bad 
mother’ or a ‘woman who doesn’t like the responsibility of her home’, but instead 
prefers to be ‘amiguera’ (friendly, but in a negative sense) and spend her time 
‘gossiping’. These activities publicly divert women from their core responsibilities, 
and must be prevented on pain of public sanction and family shame:
Because you would hear comments like “look, that one’s a callejera, she 
doesn’t look after her children, they are neglected”
O: What kind o f woman was admired then?
Well, one who was correct, who did her duty ... They all say that I’m a good 
woman because I’ve hurt nobody; I don’t go around gossiping ... Well, I think 
I did things right, I devoted myself to my children and my home... I was good, 
attentive, caring, pleasing... quiet, without friends; I haven’t gone out or 
travelled (1G Rosa).
12 Chilean anthropologist Montecino (2007) argues that in Latin America the dichotomy casa/calle is 
akin to the private/public distinction typical o f European cultures.
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There were the ones we used to call the ‘loose’, those who would go out, 
smoking, and doing lots of things we didn’t... they were dimly viewed (1G 
Clara).
Clara explains that being casera also denotes female chastity, an indicator of 
women’s sexual respectability. The pejorative adjective ‘loose’ literally denotes a 
relaxation of the moral power needed to attain decency. Female decency is earned 
not only by being at home and maintaining a chaste body, but also by having a neat 
style of dress, ‘soft physical features13 and kind manners’, ‘polite’ social 
engagements, a ‘spotless’ home and impeccable presentation of the children. Below 
Jose summarizes the qualities of a good woman, through the example of his mother:
She was a saint, self-sacrificing, long-suffering, devoted only and exclusively 
to her home. She was a housewife, she wasn’t amiguera, she used to exchange 
some conversation with the ladies around the neighbourhood but nothing more 
than that, a pious person, always visiting the Church (1G Jose).
The good woman renounces herself for others, and ultimately, for the will of God. 
Rosa uses these same subjectifiers throughout her story in order to convey herself as 
a moral agent. In the first and second quotes below, she uses them to affirm her 
worth; in the third they provide the means of reproving her mother for her way of 
life:
Doing the household duties and nothing else, I don’t have anything else, 
because I’m not one for going out... I don’t have friends, I’m not one for 
talking... no, I’m more the quiet type (1G Rosa).
I believe I did things right, I devoted my life to them, because I didn’t go out 
partying, or anywhere, none of that, it was me and my children, my home, it 
was the house that always attracted me and nothing else (1G Rosa).
13 Prevalent among those Chileans with European ascendancy rather than those with indigenous blood. 
A racist commentary.
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The one who did nothing was my mother.
O: Really? So how did she spend her time?
Giving orders, going around from one place to another ...
O: What was your mother like?
She was callejera, she didn’t like household responsibilities, she liked going 
out, coming to Santiago where her friends were, or going into town to visit my 
grandfather, she would spend the whole day with him, we would be left alone 
at home (1G Rosa).
As a little girl, probably what worried Rosa was not her mother’s decency —being 
callejera rather than casera— but her presence at home. As she says at the end of the 
extract, the point is that her mother left the children alone. But the qualities of a good 
woman provide the most effective means to criticize a mother who wounded little 
Rosa not only with her emotional distance but also by delegating household 
responsibilities to a little girl.
In men’s case, honourableness is shown through compliance with public law. As 
grandfathers — especially those of lower-middle class background— put it, a 
respectable man ‘has never been inside a police station, let alone a jail’. Nor has he 
any vices (alcohol, gambling, womanizing) that could divert him from his core 
responsibilities as the ‘father of a household’. A ‘man of his home’ puts his salary at 
the disposal of the family budget and does not spend money on ‘unwarranted items’.
A tidy public image reflects a person’s moral order. Another way of projecting 
decency was through dress and personal presentation, especially for those whose 
birth and lineage did not guarantee social respect. Guillermo was bom out of 
wedlock and brought up in isolation by a relative in the southern Chilean 
countryside. He recounts that he learnt early in life that those ‘well dressed are well 
received’ and thus he always goes around neatly and formally turned out. Similarly, 
second generation Ximena recalls how her mother consciously invested in her 
family’s respectability. With money short, the children were short of clothes. 
Ximena’s mother’s strategy was to make them to take a nap while she washed and 
dried their clothes. After their nap, the children could go out to play duly clean and 
tidy.
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Also, family arrangements or structures that deviate from the norm (e.g., cohabitation 
or children bom out of wedlock —natural or orphan children or huachos in Chilean 
culture74) revealed moral fault and were therefore blamed for poor family 
relationships and a flawed upbringing:
A good family atmosphere also helps a lot. I only knew the cases of one or two 
natural children among my high school classmates, all the rest were part of a 
household (1G Jose).
Respectability has all those external subjectifiers such as impeccable dress, polite 
manners, clean houses, and no public displays of eroticism, but at the same time, it 
also requires circumspection regarding one’s merits, one’s goodness, what one has 
done for others. Unlike the other grandparents, Jose refused to write his own 
obituary. According to his Catholic precepts death is a moment of judgment. But not 
for self-judgment, it is for fellow beings to judge, and ultimately, for the word of 
God. Death is the time:
To subject yourself to the judgment of fellow men. They should write it [the 
obituary] not I. (1G Jose)
Respectability also has to do with authorising others to tell of one’s merits. Jose has 
tried to do things the right way, that is, ‘conscientiously’. But he will not boast about 
his merits. Margarita devoted much of her interviews to recounting how she and her 
husband Alberto approached different authorities and institutions to help their 
neighbourhood progress. It was because of their ‘painstaking’ work that the area got 
electricity and water supply. But when the community wanted to acknowledge their 
merit by naming the local square after Alberto, Margarita refused. By including these 
events, Margarita is recounting her worth, not directly, but through the appreciation 
and gratitude she inspired in her neighbours.
A second dimension of respectability has to do with helping others without expecting 
anything in return. Evaluating his life, Jose comments: ‘I’ve lived serving my fellows
14 “The word huacho comes from the Quechua tHuachuy'\ to commit adultery. It designates the 
illegitimate son as much as the orphan. It is also a term for a stray sheep” (Montecino 2007:48).
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so I’m at peace’. Those who benefit must reciprocate by helping a relative in need or 
the poor and needy. A decent person must be ‘humanitarian’.
Also relatives who are in need, I have a handicapped cousin, one goes to help... 
and I foresee my daughters doing the same thing after I’m gone. For instance, 
my mother was the one who originally cared for this cousin and [the 
responsibility] was passed from one generation to another (1G Laura).
They [the relatives] say that I live for others and not for myself, but I feel 
fulfilled this way. I like how my life has been. I feel happy. I give to those in 
need (1G Margarita).
We discharge our Church obligations. We pay the Church offering religiously, 
1% every month15 and we help the Church in every way we can ... we might be 
lacking bread at home but we do that religiously (1G Jose).
Within a providential order, ‘one has no merit’: without God ‘one cannot do 
anything’. ‘Everything that happens, Josd explains, is owed to God: life, health or 
daily sustenance’. In this sense, the need to reciprocate vis-a-vis other human beings 
is grounded in the immense sense of debt to God.
Many members of this generation migrated to Santiago from the countryside, from 
the declining nitrate mines of the north, from European cities devastated by war or 
from Arab countries. As newcomers, this ethics of solidarity and communality was 
also an efficient mechanism ‘to establish themselves’ socially by gaining a good 
reputation (a ‘good name’) within the host community. Reciprocating, then, is not 
only a matter of charity, but of gaining ‘respect by contributing and teaching what we 
know’ (1G Anselmo) for example by ‘orienting the new colleague’ on how to do the 
job (1G Jose), by accommodating yourself to the needs of a neighbour (being 
‘complaciente’) or by subordinating one’s interests to those of the community, as 
Laura and her Italian-born husband did by devoting their time, money and energy
15 The Catholic Church in Chile has a long-running campaign to raise donations of 1% of people’s 
monthly wages or income.
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first to the construction of the Italian school in Santiago and only thereafter, to the 
building of their own residence.
But this generation’s acts of solidarity also show the most moving expressions of 
love and empathy for fellow human beings. Below Guillermo tells how shortly after 
the military coup he helped a communist family, getting them leftovers from the 
mine’s dining hall. This placed his life in great danger, especially in a small town 
where people knew each other well:
There was a union leader from the communist party, he had like seven kids... 
so as there were leftovers from the dining hall —bread, food— I brought 
them food ... And so someone saw me and said “who are you taking this 
to?”[I saild] “I’m taking a bit of food to Roja’s kids”, “Why are you taking 
anything to that communist!”
O: Who said that?
My colleagues who were members of another party, so I told them that the 
kids weren’t to blame for being starving-hungry (1G Guillermo).
In the context of respectability, interpretations that propose personal benefit as the 
only value of mutual obligation, fail to explain how reciprocity also works as a 
vehicle of solidarity and fraternity.
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3.2 Character
The idea of the good prevalent in the grandparents’ time fostered the development of 
a transituational, lasting, consistent and stable sense of self; what we might call a 
‘character’, that is, an internalised moral attitude that complies with an externally 
defined and accredited code of conduct.16 Margarita and Jose explain:
Everyone is bom with their way of being (1G Margarita).
One acquires one’s way of being in youth, a conduct that one tries to maintain 
throughout life looking at the way my parents had behaved...
O: Do you see any change in the way you are now compared to when you 
where young?
No, because it is a conduct, you see? ... I’ve always defended my ideas; for 
example I’ve made up my mind about marriage; I’m in favour of marriage and 
not of divorce in any circumstance (1G Jose).
A strong character is what permits grandparents ‘not to deviate’ and keep their 
personal integrity while traversing the ‘hardships’ of life. In Rosa’s words, ‘living 
life with dignity’ amounts to ‘behaving well’, with good behaviour linked to a 
person’s capacity to fulfil obligations in spite of circumstances and personal cost. 
This means that grandparents saw nothing wrong in going against their feelings or 
repressing their thoughts when there were moral responsibilities to meet. In fact, the 
capacity to control emotions or sudden reactions shows ‘strength of character’ and 
moral virtue. This technique of emotional management is epitomised by the figure of 
the ‘serious’, ‘self-controlled’, ‘self-restrained’, ‘self-contained’ and prudent 
character, who ‘never complains’, always ‘adapts’, does not lose balance —or 
dignity— and can reserve ‘inner’ emotions and thoughts for ‘him or herself.
16 Influenced by psychological thought, sociological literature often uses the term character to describe 
the part of personality shaped by experience (as opposed to heredity). However, in his classic research 
The Lonely Crowd, David Riesman approaches character in a similar way as I do. Through social 
character he writes, “each society ensures some degree of conformity from the individuals who make 
it up” (1969[1950]:5). In contemporary society the transituational character has been superseded by 
‘personality’, a self that has to respond to unpredictable circumstances and diverse settings. In another 
reading, sociologist Richard Sennett (1998, 2005) uses the term character to allude to a person’s 
ethical make up, consisting of traits that are substantive but which, in the current world of flux and 
short term, are difficult to sustain for long.
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In this configuration, being an ethical person is apart from the feelings grandparents 
may have. Morals and emotions are dissociated. Emotions belong to the ‘soul’, a 
component of their beings that is held back and does not take part in their public 
persona. A character lacks what Taylor (1989) calls “expressive freedom”, but 
requires at the same time what Hochschild (1983) labelled “emotional management”. 
There is a passage in Laura’s story that is moving in its stoicism. Despite the 
profound and contradictory emotional state she was experiencing, she managed her 
feelings to prevent them from influencing her behaviour:
My sister married, my mother died and my granddaughter bom all within a 
month, so you don’t have the time to analyse anything, you have to concentrate 
on what you have to do, don’t cry, don’t laugh, nothing, keep going... when the 
time comes you just take the rifle in your hands and shoot (1G Laura).
Margarita recalls how her sociable husband had a habit of coming home for lunch 
with unexpected guests. The lack of notice upset Margarita as she could not prepare 
for serving the guests properly. ‘Privately I was very cross with him’, she explains. 
But nobody noticed. In public, in a masterful performance of her housewifely role, 
she showed a collected attitude and improvised a nice lunch on the spot. Margarita 
acknowledges that there were two selves operating at the same time: ‘I really had 
double personality,’ she comments. But she did not dwell on the contradictions this 
involved or on the need to reconcile her public and private ‘personalities’.
This lack of self-expressiveness, Laura clarifies, does not turn grandparents into 
‘martyrs’. On the contrary, the grandparents were perfectly aware of what they were 
leaving aside in order to pursue more important goals. Laura sees little use in 
stopping to express and analyse her emotions. It is much more important to be ready 
to do what ought to be done -  like in war, alone, holding tightly onto your weapon, 
never losing sight of your position. For Margarita, rather than her emotions, it was 
much more important ‘not to contradict your husband in public’. Those kinds of 
attitudes made a good ‘lady’. Thus, it is wrong to think that the prevailing structure 
of feelings prevented grandparents from ‘being themselves’. When I asked Laura 
what she liked the most about her way of being she replied ‘that I’m spontaneous, 
that I’m myself.
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Nor is there a need to disclose inner feelings, worries and thoughts in personal 
relationships. In the following exchange, Rosa equates having friends with being 
amiguera (‘being friendly with friends’). The location of friendship among the 
activities that divert life from the good helps to underscore the worth of her ‘casern ’ 
life, which is a key interpretive device in Rosa’s narrative. Moreover, she concludes 
by discarding the need for interpersonal intimacy, defining friendship as a pointless 
practice of ‘complaining’:
O: Have you got friends? Have you ever had friends?
No I don’t have friends; I’m not much of a one for friends.
O: Why is that?
I don’t know. I’m not a friend of having friends.
O: Who do you talk to about the things in your life, your worries, your
feelings?
Nobody, I don’t talk to anybody.
O: When your husband was alive, did you share your feelings with him, the
things that were going on with you?
No.
O: You used to talk more about the family, the management o f the household?
Yes, we did, and I never complained about a thing (1G Rosa).
Likewise, many stories point to the lack of agency and autonomous and critical 
thinking that characterised behaviour -especially women’s -  under a morality 
concerned with the deber ser. Expressions such as ‘don’t you see that we were so 
domesticated’, ‘we didn’t think for ourselves, we never thought of rebelling’, ‘we 
couldn’t say what we were thinking’, and ‘we never dared transgress the norm’ 
illustrate the fact that these women were not brought up to believe that the right to be 
a person is associated with making independent moral choices. Even when they 
embark on critical appraisals, for example of other people, they do not elaborate on 
them, especially regarding relatives. Eventually, at the end of her story, Margarita 
identifies her mother as ‘the main obstacle in my life’. But she does not elaborate on 
this. Instead, she recursively resorts to ambiguous formulations such as ‘I don’t know 
why she behaved that way’ or ‘I don’t know if this was good or bad’ (for example 
when recounting that the mother ‘kept me shut inside the house when all the other
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kids were playing outside’ or later ‘didn’t allow me to do the things I wanted like 
visiting the ill and poor’ and forced Margarita, until the age of 18, to wear a kind of 
chastity underwear that she could not take off even to urinate and that delayed the 
development of her adult body).
Grandmothers say that they hardly made moral decisions at all. Moral authority 
rested in the hands of fathers, brothers, husbands or priests, while moral regulation 
was exercised by the anonymous and all-pervasive voice of the community. In the 
grandmothers’ reluctance to make moral judgments “by claiming only to meet the 
needs of others” (Gilligan 1982: 71), there is an element of evasion of personal 
responsibility, similar to that observed by Gilligan in the narratives of abortion 
among women. When I asked middle-class Laura why she had not pursued graduate 
studies or an independent career she replied, ‘I wasn’t prepared for other things 
[apart from being a housewife], anyway my husband wouldn’t have liked it’. In 
another passage, Laura explains that one of the things she would have liked to do in 
life was
To learn how to drive, but my husband used to say ‘why do you want to learn 
to drive? You are going to complicate your life, I’ll drive you wherever you 
want to go’. A bit lazy on my part, I wasn’t much good at standing up for 
myself, that’s what I’ve lacked (1G Laura).
Similarly, Clara related how she wanted to find a job after finishing her secretarial 
studies and asked her father for help: ‘some of his friends could hire me’. But as the 
father did not deem it necessary for her to work, the plan failed. ‘And I didn’t rebel’, 
she comments. By abandoning their aspirations to a career, Laura and Clara handed 
responsibility for their life trajectories to their husband and father, respectively. 
Moreover, in retrospect, grandmothers justify what they now see as an 
‘embarrassing’ lack of agency by arguing that they were educated (‘tamed’) to have 
‘submissive’ and ‘innocent’ types of psyche and ‘never ever thought of rebelling’. 
They are saying that the lack of moral power is not a personal responsibility but a 
consequence of socialization.
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3.3 Care for others
The lack of self-expressiveness and moral autonomy is connected with an ethics of 
care o f the self which is, in fact, based on self-renunciation and self-sacrifice, with 
the conviction that goodness is enhanced by caring for others. Below Laura identifies 
the benefits of being confronted with suffering, such as developing an adaptable and 
flexible character, and Clara explains why care of others runs contrary to care of the 
self:
A sister of mine says that boarding school was a horrible thing for her, to this 
very day she disowns it. I understand today that boarding school was like 
national service for me, but I have accepted it in a good light, I sometimes say 
that everybody should go through boarding school because it makes you more 
accepting of suffering, someone who eats whatever is put in from of them... 
suffering in life is good, it prepares you for everything (1G Laura).
I don’t see how could I feel love for myself, no, no, because I’m always ready 
to help others... frankly, I don’t have much love for myself ... I put myself 
aside (1G Clara).
Through the following organization of priorities Rosa complements the description 
of this morality of care. She chooses to sacrifice herself to the extent that she suffers 
if she does not help other, especially if it is her family in need. To her, personal 
suffering is less painful that the suffering of a relative:
Even if it is at the cost of my own sacrifice, if they [relatives] have to come 
before me, I don’t say no. It hurts me to say no (1G Rosa).
One can connect the image of the mujer sufrida with the figure of Mary the Virgin 
mother (the figure of the wounded woman per se), whose image Rosa has, in 
different shapes and forms, all over her bedroom. In fact, Rosa says that in her life 
she has aspired to emulate Mother Theresa in her devotion to the poor and needy.
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In the case of men, especially of the lower-middle class, the idea of self-sacrifice is 
epitomised by the capacity to endure hard and painstaking work. To the question of 
how they take care of themselves, the grandfathers tend to give responses at the level 
of bodily care, particularly, physiology. I eat well, I sleep enough and I look after my 
health:
O: You were telling me that you feel love fo r  yourself?
Of course, I feel love for myself, and when I say that I feel love for myself it 
means that if I feel sick (which is the main thing don’t you think?) I go to the 
doctor and take his advice (1G Anselmo).
These men talk of the body at the physiological level because it constitutes a manual 
or industrial worker’s main capital with which to provide for his family’s well being 
(I develop this point in chapter 6).
Along side that and according to the grandparents’ rendering of the Catholic faith — 
to which the majority of them adhere— love of the self is morally wrong. Morality 
and self-love are opposites. When asked whether there is any part of his body he 
specially likes, grandfather Jose replies ‘of course not, I’m not a hedonist’. Equally, 
Margarita hesitates as to how to evaluate her tendency to give of herself to others, 
because it could be regarded as a display of arrogance and, therefore, a ‘sinful’ 
practice:
Sometimes they criticise me because I live for others and not for myself, but I 
feel fulfilled that way... I don’t know whether that’s good or bad ... if it is that 
I love myself too much, for which I ask God’s forgiveness... or if it is a sin or 
not (1G Margarita).
‘I feel fulfilled that way,’ says Margarita. This is a key point. Caring for others even 
at the cost of her own welfare is a way of accomplishing the right life and being true 
to herself. For the grandparents, care of others is a hypergood that provides a point of 
reference for moral discrimination.
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3.4 The maker
When moral sources are externally defined, there is nothing to learn from oneself. 
The subject needs to know the norms, not the self. As I discuss in greater detail in the 
section on sexuality, self-knowledge is especially discouraged regarding those 
aspects of life that are more strictly regulated. For instance, grandmothers describe 
themselves as ‘completely ignorant’ in matters such as romance, sexuality and the 
body.
Although they present themselves as ‘ignorant’ and ‘submissive’, grandmothers and 
grandfathers also portray themselves as ‘doers’ by nature. What prevails in this 
generation is an idea of the human being as a ‘maker’ (Sennett 1998:263). Life is 
about ‘fixing things’ not about ‘philosophy’. When moral worth is expected to be 
visible in one’s way of acting, personal achievements and life satisfaction are tied to 
what one has ‘done’ in life. Indeed, when assessing how their sense of self has 
changed over time, grandmothers measure by the comparative number of activities 
they can take on:
When I was 20 I could do forty thousand things, now I cannot. That’s when I 
feel bad ... I’m 96 and I shower by myself, I dress myself, even if sometimes 
it’s hard, but ... I give myself alcohol rubs for aching bones ... And I like to 
make my breakfast and do the washing up without bothering anyone... I really 
take it seriously because I find that I’m no longer useful for anything... 
Afterwards, I like to sort my bedroom out, but sometimes someone else does it, 
and that upsets me ... Then I help ... minding the shop, or sweeping, or 
cleaning the counter, anything, even though she says not to, but I do it because 
I makes me feel like a person ... it makes me feel good... because, really, if I 
stayed sitting down, I would stay like that forever, so I do whatever comes up 
(1G Margarita).
Doing things for others —including not bothering others with one’s own needs— 
gives Margarita a sense of personhood. Even when thinking about her auto-obituary, 
Laura presents herself in terms of her ability to do things for others:
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The time for leaving has come, I’m sorry to leave my dear ones, but let’s hope 
that from where I’ll be maybe I’ll be able to do something, help them more than 
from here (1G Laura).
Similarly, Ana chooses her piece of land as the thing that best identifies her because 
there she ‘can do some work’ and she ‘take care of people’.
Domestic activities are so ingrained in grandmothers’ lives that they have become 
their way of being in the world. In their eighties and experiencing the natural 
weakening of muscle and bone, feeling less mobile and flexible (‘I can’t get around 
the way I used to’), they warn: ‘the day I can’t do something, I die’ (1G Clara). That 
day, after decades, they would have to give up their own way of arranging the house 
and, crucially, their own lives, and ‘let their children do it’ (1G Ana):
Now that I’m old and sick I cannot do anything and that’s the reason 
for my suffering... I used to be in charge of my whole household, and 
now, I cannot do a thing... I have to eat what they give me, I have to 
wear what they give me, I have to sleep in a bed that is done their 
way, not mine, I have to mould myself to everything (1G Rosa).
The domestic affairs of a housewife and mother were Rosa’s responsibility. Above 
all, Rosa let us know that ‘doing things for others’ provided her with a space to 
arrange things the way she liked. Paradoxically, then, in ‘accommodating’ and 
‘moulding’ themselves to the needs of others, grandmothers also exercised their will.
Despite having retired after forty or fifty years and even if most of them could live 
on their savings, all the grandfathers go out to work every day, except for Ricardo, 
who has a physical condition that prevents him from doing so. Housebound, Ricardo 
feels ‘useless’ and is constantly on the verge of a nervous breakdown:
I start working at 1 ,1 leave at 5 ...come home, take a shower, and start cleaning
and doing things around the house... washing clothes, ironing. [After I was
widowed] I learnt [these cores] on my own, by watching how my daughter does
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the housework. Then I have once17 ...And I sit here watching the telly but 
sometimes I feel ashamed that passers-by would say, “look at that old man 
sitting there!” So, I move to my bedroom and watch telly there... I like 
working, I don’t like sitting around. Whenever I sit down I remember 
something to do... working cheers me up (1G Guillermo).
The grandfathers’ notion of the good is so tightly linked to their productive activity 
that they have chosen to work until they are visibly no longer fit enough. In order to 
maintain their sense of self-integrity, this fundamental source of identity must never 
be allowed to become a source of shame:
I’ll keep working as long as I’m still able. I’ve particularly asked my children 
to let me know straight away the day they see me gabbling away, or that my 
head stops working properly, because I don’t want to make a real fool of 
myself in the street, less so at work, that’ll be the end of it (1G Anselmo).
Rather than feelings or thoughts, labour, whether domestic or paid, has been central 
to the pursuit of the good life for members of the first generation.
3.5 The deber ser and the right way of reporting life
In the previous pages we have learnt that for the first generation, the right way of 
reporting experience was through a self portrayal as a person who fulfils his or her 
duties. Rosa commented that this imperative has been the pillar of her life. Although 
grandparents make every effort to align their stories with the prevailing idea of the 
good, subverting or contesting strands occasionally make their way into the 
narratives, to form a much more complex self-portrait. They tell for example, that in 
a woman’s case life it is not solely about submission and self-renunciation but also 
about commanding and having your say. However, they do not integrate this second
17 ‘Once’ is the last meal of the day for working and low-middle class families. As opposed to a proper 
dinner, it is cheaper and quicker to prepare with bread, something to put on it and tea. The word ‘once’ 
(literally ‘eleven’) originated in Colonial times.
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referent of their stories into their self-images, as if dissent were forbidden from their 
narratives, and as if inconsistencies did not need a discursive solution, as if 
contradictory regulations were not an impediment to a coherent sense of self. Thus, 
their stories present a series of paradoxes. For example, grandparents frequently 
present themselves in narratives of their childhood as both ‘precocious’ and 
‘innocent’. The level of awareness and self-control needed to obey strict rules and to 
perform domestic responsibilities and tasks from a precocious age is at odds with 
their self-portrayal as innocent children, who did not think for themselves and were 
always told what to do. Throughout their stories these two lines of self-description 
run in parallel. Grandparents hardly ever express any need to reconcile them and 
complaints about having to deal with contradictory discourses are very rare.
Margarita’s story is a case in point; it challenges the master tale of the ‘submissive 
woman’ with a ‘flat life’. Margarita tells the story of the woman who ‘without 
knowing how to add or subtract’ successfully ‘fought’ to gain the social position she 
thought her family deserved. Hers is a story of ‘triumph’ over the fierce opposition 
from many. However, Margarita never explicitly presents herself in those terms, as if 
she were unwilling to claim this version of her story. As the elder daughter of a 
lower-middle class family she received almost no formal education. From early 
childhood, her mother never allowed her ‘to do the things I wanted’ and as Margarita 
grew older her mother created every possible obstacle to her independence. But 
Margarita managed to find a job and built her life ‘without owing anything to 
anybody’. In her job, it was not permitted to have a baby, yet she wanted to be a 
mother and loved her occupation. In order to fulfil both aspirations, Margarita wore a 
sash to hide her pregnancy. Despite the trauma that the early experience of tight 
chastity underwear might have caused (though she does not refer to it in these terms), 
years later she wore a sash again, this time around her belly, to keep the job she 
cherished. Moreover, she deceived her boss, faced down her husband’s disapproval 
and paid the cost of leaving her sons with a nanny who ‘never looks after them as 
well as you do’. With all she learnt as an employee, she started her own family 
business, which under her direction as general manager, became the biggest retailer 
in the sector. She stepped down at the age of 83, after being interviewed on Chile’s 
most popular television show as representing the extraordinary case of a 
grandmother-manager. When she starts on her life story, Margarita recalls with
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humour how, as a small child, she had wanted to be ‘President of the Republic’. That 
was a high aspiration for a lower-middle class Chilean woman bom in 1907. She did 
not make it to La Moneda Palace, but through her business she enjoyed the authority, 
respect and responsibility of a position of power. But she never presents herself as a 
powerful woman, despite the exceptionality of her case for the epoch.
Then there is the case of Rosa, who decided to leave her husband, after an 
unsuccessful pre-arranged marriage. She left him because of his cold character and 
because he never ceded the administration of domestic affairs to her, dashing her 
expectations of being finally ‘myself’ by being in command of her household:
He was too much into women’s things, house things, he wanted to stay the
boss, and I wanted to command and be myself in my own house (1G Rosa).
Rosa left him and moved back to her parents’ house. Some time later she met another 
man, started a relationship and finally moved in with him. She did not let her father 
know about this decision beforehand. She knew he would strongly disagree. Rosa 
married her second partner only after ten years of cohabitation. For the times, as they 
are depicted by grandparents, Rosa’s adventurous decisions contravened again and 
again the predominant expectations regarding female sexuality and family life. 
Indeed, her father did not talk to her for years. She had shamed the family. But Rosa 
never acknowledged her defiance nor did she recognise that this display of agency 
was at odds with the discourse of the submissive wife. She kept resorting to images 
pertaining to the ideal of female respectability, repeating throughout her interviews 
how obedience to duties had been her life’s central reference.
The lives of the first generation women have fluctuated between those two poles: 
submission and self-assertion. Both types of practices are present in their stories and 
are constitutive of the significance of their doer or maker character. It is probably 
through performing expected roles and following a standard life, but also through 
having been ‘herself’ by being in charge of her household that Rosa is able to affirm 
that she ‘has lived the life she wanted to’.
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However, the cases of Margarita and Rosa show that the image of self-renunciation 
prevails over that of self-assertion. This is consistent with an epoch in which the 
motives of the self-sacrificing woman were deemed superior to those of female 
independence. By stressing the figure of sacrifice, these women were using the right 
vocabulary for storying the self. That is the appropriate ground upon which to justify 
their conduct. Margarita’s and Rosa’s cases show that part of the abiding power of 
the deber ser morality relies in its capacity to determine ‘correct’ narrative lines. In 
these accounts, elements of constraint are ‘self-imposed’ (MacNay 2000).
In general, the grandparents stick to the story of the person that ‘complied with’ the 
norm, ‘adapting oneself’, ‘always trying my best’ and ‘never aspiring to anything 
else’. The entrenchment of the norm is one reason for not having challenged 
mainstream discourses (which itself would have been a disreputable attitude from the 
point of view of the predominant values). Laura, for instance, justifies her conformity 
with the prevailing moral outlook by explaining that:
In those times it didn’t occur to anybody to do anything different, because 
nobody had done it any other way before, afterwards, in time, with the movies, 
the TV, the theatre, everything [alternative courses of action] became very 
normal and then one had to comply (1G Laura).
It was not part of the repertoire of the self to challenge, rebel or ask for something 
different. ‘I didn’t lack anything,’ Laura reflects. Her way of handling the self, the 
family, the household or the couple relationship was the ‘most natural thing in life, 
we were brought up that way, and we were made that way’, she contends. Alternative 
ways of being or doing were not part of her horizon of expectations, so she ‘did not 
miss them’.
This is especially the case with the grandfathers. They tend to conceive of the 
external moral order as ‘natural’ or unproblematic. There seems to be no dissonance 
between the way these men were expected to be and the image they have of 
themselves. First generation men do not step outside the prevailing discourse to 
engage in a critical appraisal of the moral framework of their times. Not even in the 
light of present values do they recognise the social character of their moral outlook.
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For example, when I asked Anselmo whether he had felt any pressure to be a person 
of certain sort, he replied ‘no, I haven’t had that problem’. What is more, he added, ‘I 
wouldn’t have accepted’ any external ‘imposition’. However this same grandfather 
maintains that ‘it’s a man’s duty to provide for his household’ and therefore he is of 
the opinion that men should marry only once they have the resources to perform this 
role. Anselmo does not see the figure of the provider man as a culturally variable and 
historically specific construct as subsequent generations do, but as the natural order 
of things. ‘Men are bom with this responsibility,’ as are women regarding their 
domestic imperatives, he adds. However, neither the discourse nor the naturalization 
of the norm prevented Anselmo from doing things differently. Like two other cases 
in this generation, he married his partner only after the birth of their second child. 
Moreover, after hearing the unexpected news of the first pregnancy he thought of 
relinquishing his responsibilities. Decades later, when his son was confronted with 
the same situation Anselmo offered to cover for Juan so he could run away on the 
very day of the weeding. Although these events violate the ideal of moral strength 
and rectitude, Anselmo did not provide any justification for his fault. He also avoided 
personal accountability for his womanizing proclivities, by transferring the blame to 
his gender: ‘I did things that I shouldn’t have, but don’t come here to throw the first 
stone, all men have the same weakness.’ Instead, he attempts to strike an empathetic 
chord with the interviewer by adding ‘maybe it is a problem me being so frank and 
clear, but I think this is what you are looking for.’
Against the backdrop of the predominant discourse, timid counter-narratives appear 
scattered in only a few feminine stories. Clara’s is one of these. She explicitly uses 
the signifiers of autonomy and independence when talking about herself. ‘I am a 
rebel’, she states:
Although I had eight kids [and] was tied to this gentleman [the husband] I did 
what I wanted, because I’ve never liked to be told what to do, I don’t like 
having to obey (1G Clara).
She explains, ‘I never rebelled but when I gained my independence [...] I did what I 
wanted, and nobody could ever tame me.’ In what seems a contemporary appraisal, 
Clara specifies that her job experience was central for gaining autonomy and
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independence. Through it, she channelled her ‘entrepreneurial spirit’, ‘grew up’ and 
was able to be her own boss. All these are, in her view, necessary requirements for 
‘being oneself’:
To be dependent on somebody else is dreadful, I never wanted to be given 
orders. I’ve always liked to be my own boss... the job made me grow, it opened 
my horizons, made me grow, made me be myself. Had I not worked I would 
have remained the little bird I was before (1G Clara).
The absence of counter-narratives among men of the first generation —added to their 
strong reluctance to reassess their moral framework in the light of present values, as 
we will discuss in a later chapter— could be a consequence of the prevailing 
patriarchal system in which men had the authority to sanction and police moral 
behaviour while women were expected to obey the male authority, be it father, 
husband, brother, grandfather or priest. (This did not prevent women from 
controlling other women or men obeying women. But usually women exercised 
authority ‘on behalf of a man while, comparatively, surveillance was much stricter 
upon women than upon men). The point is that men pay much higher costs for 
relinquishing conventions as they have to cede a hegemonic social positioning and 
renounce what they themselves reinforce as the right and good. In contrast, the 
external character of their moral sources may have given the grandmothers the space 
to engage in critical examinations. This difference could also reflect the fact that over 
the past decades women have had to confront new models of behaviour much more 
abruptly than men have. The variation in prevailing conventions from one generation 
to the next is much wider for women. This may have encouraged grandmothers — 
more than grandfathers— to differentiate themselves and to innovate with respect to 
the ideals of their upbringing. Albeit tardily, partially and timidly, woman-stories can 
question the restrictive nature of their times’ conventions in a way that man-stories 
cannot.
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CHAPTER FOUR— I CAN RELY ON MYSELF TOO
The narratives of the middle generation begin to question the foundation of the sense 
of the good on a ‘deber ser’ morality. This critique takes shape in a specific life stage 
-adulthood or late-adulthood— often in association with turning points such as 
marital separations or crises, new partners, new working experiences, the proximity 
of retirement or the end of their children’s upbringing. On the one hand, the model 
that measures a person’s happiness by the ‘fulfilment of duties’ becomes devaluated: 
it becomes a ‘weight upon one’s shoulders’, a ‘stressful’ and ‘boring’ series of social 
‘mores’, an external ‘demand’ constraining the self rather than a source of personal 
fulfilment or a way of developing personal potentialities as the grandparents thought. 
On the other hand, expressions that were not part of the grandparents’ moral 
grammar such as ‘what I want’, ‘what I feel’, ‘what I aspire’, ‘where am I in this?’ 
begin to gain a central role in realising the good life for second generation members 
as they approach middle age. The stories of the parents reveal a conflict between an 
inherited deber ser morality and an alternative moral source with which they begin to 
reassess and reorient their lives: that of ‘freedom’ as self-determination and moral 
autonomy.
Pilar uses her life to illustrate key divergences between the prevailing morality of her 
times and that of her father’s. Chiefly, for the second generation, as long as one has 
done no wrong there is no reason to feel guilt at not conforming to the norm. The 
grandparents were afraid of presenting themselves as different, as outside-the-norm. 
Pilar, in contrast, emphasises her singularity by articulating her whole biographical 
narrative since childhood as a story of transgression — ‘but I dared’:
[My father] completely disagrees with the way I’ve lived my life ... when 
young... I played cowboys... marbles... things that were only for men but I 
dared, knowing that my mother would reprimand me and named me 
marimachal% (tomboy)... Having had my sexual initiation in adolescence 
outside the habitual and traditional pattern... Having opted to have a baby 
without being married. Nowadays being very active and involved in my
18 Expression. Contraction of ‘Mary-the-macho-like’, that the girl’s manners resemble the behaviour 
of a boy, in a typical reduction of masculinity to the macho stereotype.
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work... also the option of having ended a relationship without fear of prejudice, 
of what people will say. That never mattered to me. My father has always been 
very concerned about his image ... They [her parents] take a lot of care to keep 
up an image of what at some point was defined as the good, the beautiful and 
what was best, but that was invented by a group of people as a fashion ... [With 
my spiritual studies] I’ve realized that I’ve got a different essence... that I’ve 
got to take the time to discover myself ... that we are all different and I don’t 
have to feel guilty because... I didn’t live up to my father’s expectations with 
regard to my life: that I should have got married and have had that typical 
marriage women have, and that traditional thing that was in place at that time...
O: Do you feel the pressure of other people's opinion?
I don’t, not me, it doesn’t affect me, I’ve learnt that it is just other people’s 
point of view... But I like who I am, how I live, I feel love for myself, I’m 
happy with myself (2G Pilar).
The father could be giving the most well-intentioned advice, but for Pilar the deber 
ser is not a vision of the good, but a dictate of social conventions that seek to control 
people by suppressing their diversity. Pilar sees no value in hiding her nature behind 
a prescribed ‘image’. In fact, it is the exploration and expression of her essence that 
bring out her true self.
The conflict between old and new paradigms impinges on central institutions such as 
marriage and the family. Those are core areas of tension between Pilar’s and her 
father’s moral orientations. In the next excerpt, Paz associates the end of her 
marriage with the recovery of a sense of self-determination and with the capacity for 
self-expression, once lost in the stressful conventions and rigid codes of conduct of 
conjugal life:
He didn’t let me be... while I was married I was a different person, I don’t 
know, he didn’t even allow me to express myself... After the separation I did 
all the things I wanted to... Today I do what I like with whom I want... 
freedom is so important to me... If I’m asked out for drinks, I’m always willing 
to go.
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O: Did you use to go out with your husband?
No, back then it was about having people for dinner... it was stressful; nobody 
would step outside the mould ...everything correct and tidy... I’ve rebelled 
against that... I love being irresponsible again (2G Paz).
It will be recalled that in her own couple relationship grandmother Margarita 
subordinated self-expressiveness to the fundamental imperative of not contradicting 
her husband in public. For Paz, instead, the management of the self, of its emotions 
and behaviour constitutes not a sign of courtesy to the guests and loyalty to her 
husband, but a stressful repression of her true being. She does not recognise herself 
in the parsimony of formal social life.
As a result of this shift, today the parents associate the good life not only with duties 
and established customs —even though there is much of this in their biographies— 
but also with the capacity to ‘choose’ their lives and fulfil personal ‘wishes’. In fact, 
the incremental gaining of space for decision-making becomes a criterion for 
evaluating the life trajectory:
I have had a certain education, I have had certain affection, and I have had 
certain material goods that I didn’t choose. And then, little by little, one starts 
learning how to make decisions, and choosing the life one wants, from the 
minute that you choose what to study, you choose your husband, you choose 
how you want to live that relationship, you are choosing your way of life. Now 
if you ask me, “do you choose what to do during the day?” that’s different 
because one has to do many things that are maybe not what you most like but, 
in general, I think that one chooses one’s life (2G Carmen).
This claim to self-determination and moral autonomy could not have been made 
without a relative pluralisation of moral referents. The possibility of ‘choosing’ 
between ways of life presupposes options. And options began to be available in this 
generation, then multiplied until they came to overwhelm the grandchildren’s sense 
of selfhood. These alternative moral sources underlie the stories of ‘rebelliousness’ 
the parents begin to recount and their attempts at reformulating habits, patterns and
124
attitudes inherited from their parents in, for example, their way of home-making, 
rearing children or handling work and leisure.
The direction of this shift in the idea of the good from deber ser to moral autonomy 
begins to trace what I will describe throughout this work as a process of 
interiorisation o f the moral sources o f the self Whereas the grandparents’ narratives 
afforded little significance to their ‘inner soul’ in making up their sense of selfhood, 
from the second generation onwards the interior gradually becomes the primordial 
moral locus of the self. Carmen describes the rhythm of this intergenerational shift, 
in hindsight, for the case of women:
[Today] women think about themselves much more than I could have done at 
their age, they have a clearer idea of their opportunities and they want to take 
them.
O: Did it not occur to you to think about yourself or did you think but say no?
I think there was a stronger deber ser.
O: So you are saying that it didn’t matter what you wanted?
Yes, but also there were fewer possibilities (2G Carmen).
The way in which Carmen narrated her life exemplifies this inward turn. For her, this 
was an ‘introspective’ exercise, in which she had to tmirar-se ’ (look inwards towards 
‘her-self) and speak about ‘yo misma’ (literally, ‘me the same’). Apart from the 
reflexive language Carmen uses —dividing a word to stress the inwards disposition 
of the exercise (<mirar-se, ‘se’ being a reflexive pronoun)— she presents her 
conception of the self as something located inside, something that needs to be 
reflected and worked upon in order to be understood and communicated. Despite her 
proficiency in the use of an interiorized self-discourse, the actual application of those 
principles at this stage in life is not an easy task for Carmen: ‘I don’t like to talk 
about my-self too much’ and ‘I don’t work much upon myself. Seeing this as a flaw, 
in the last few years ‘she has been forcing herself’ to development this ‘inward’ gaze 
through the practice of introspective activities such as yoga and watercolour painting. 
Both Carmen’s and Pilar’s excerpts above manifest how observance of the norm 
gradually gives way to an ethical undertaking based on self-discovery, self­
expressiveness and love of oneself.
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This generation’s critique of the morality of respectability is also connected to their 
scepticism that the good will prevail in the public domain. This is for various 
reasons. For a start, the ‘consistent’, ‘secure’, ‘familiar’ and ‘predictable’ world that 
shaped their parents’ lives and their own childhood is no longer there. Today’s 
children are not living in the peaceful city Pedro and his siblings used to bike across 
to school every day. Some of the scepticism has also to do with the unfulfilled 
promises of the libertarian spirit of the 1960s. A number of referents of this 
generation —popular music, fashion, new forms of dating or the pill— opened new 
scope for action and choice and for shaping the self according to individual 
preferences. But in the long run, many members of this generation married young 
and had to assume responsibilities that postponed the accomplishment of those 
libertarian dreams. Infused with the emergent discourse of the epoch, second 
generation Alvaro recalls how in his youth he envisaged a life of travel and 
adventures. Yet, at seventeen he married the mother of the baby that was on the way. 
Figures such as ‘I got married in my first communion outfit’ or ‘I was bom married’ 
signal throughout his narrative the precociousness of the event.
Moreover, in Chile the 1970s and 1980s were times of both ‘revolution’ and 
‘catastrophe’, in which people regardless of political position raised their families 
amidst civil repression, social division and economic depression:
It was a country full of fear, frightened... working opportunities, opportunities 
for expression; for communication... during the dictatorship you didn’t have 
any of these (2G Juan).
The conjunction of tight practical conditions for making a livelihood during the 
1970s and early 1980s and an upbringing marked by the ethics of austerity that 
characterised their parents’ approach to life (a value system that says that it is wrong 
to spend too much, that all achievement involves effort and that nothing good can be 
obtained immediately and for free) made this group a constricted generation. This 
generation avoids risk and values stability, certainty, security, responsibility and 
rigour. In Carmen’s terms, life should be like a ‘furrow in the soil’ not like a ‘roller­
coaster’; people should not act ‘instinctively or rapidly; one has to stop, look, listen,
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think, and then set off’. This same moderate attitude prevailed when Carlos decided 
where to spend his honeymoon back in 1982:
[We were] fearful because “oh, we’re getting married, what is this coming! It 
might be terrible to be married! How are we going to survive economically!” 
Always worried about the future... and you spoil your present that way... we 
already owned a house... but [when deciding where to go for the honeymoon] 
“no, better not to go there, it’s too expensive”... Today we say “why don’t we 
go to such and such a place?” and we pack our bags and set off (2G Carlos).
This model of austerity began to be tom apart during the late 1980s and 1990s by the 
emergent capitalism and the consumer society it inaugurated. Some members of this 
generation describe themselves as an exceptional case —the generation is other 
oriented, concerned with money and social position, but they are not. Others recount 
how they ‘got caught’ in the prevailing ‘game’ of accumulating material possessions 
and ‘showing them o ff to obtain recognition, only to realise that, in the end, they 
were not becoming better people but were, on the contrary, giving in to the laws of 
corruption. Businessman Alvaro is one of these cases. His economic success made 
him a ‘leader’, a ‘winner’ (the term is under in English), which are new titles 
conferred upon the successful person (usually understood to be a man). He ‘painted a 
world of having for his family’, ‘mixed with the rich and famous’, gave his wife the 
‘social position she wanted’, and ‘showed society the image of an ideal 37-year 
marriage’. He paid for all his children’s dreams:
I had a house in the south, a parachute, not one fishing boat but two, two 
motorcycles, new cars for everyone in the family every year ... I joined Chile’s 
poshest amateur football league (2G Alvaro).
But to obtain all of that, Alvaro had to play with ‘loaded dice’. As a child, he used to 
play Monopoly with fake notes; as an adult he has played the role of the entrepreneur 
with real money. After more than 30 years in business, he is well aware of the rules 
that make up this world:
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When you play Monopoly you try to win by leaving everyone else poor. As a 
game it’s a lot of fun, but it shows how society works; to play Monopoly you 
have to be a complete son of a bitch... Business relationships have an 
instrumental value; people have worth in terms of how useful they are for my 
business (2G Alvaro).
Unlike their parents, for the middle generation the idea that success depends on 
doing the right thing no longer holds true. Public life no longer encourages people to 
be good, but forces you to successfully perform the most valued ‘roles’ in a ‘game’ 
dictated by ‘society’. As Alvaro explains, ‘society provides certain rules that are 
functional to the stability of the social system’, not to the realization of the good life. 
These days ‘nobody really cares about who you are deep inside’; social relations are 
governed by ‘appearances’ and ‘competitiveness’, and people are respected 
according to ‘how much they have’.
At one point in life, Alvaro resented the cost: ‘On the inside you are full of shit, full 
of shields, overwhelmed by problems’. He realised he was not willing to ‘play the 
game’ anymore, it lost its meaning. His life orientations were wrong:
Shit! I am what I am. I am neither more nor less than that (2G Alvaro).
On the one hand, then, the second generation interviewees begin to discredit the old 
moral horizon of the deber ser and the ‘public image’. On the other hand, they 
express both disenchantment with the advancement of a culture of individualism that 
seems to justify riding roughshod over fellow beings and unease with the prevalence 
of a cost-benefit criterion that narrows the confines of people’s humanity.
In response, this generation retrenches to the private sphere of the family, where 
there is no public role to perform and they ‘feel at their best’. A privatization of life 
occurs. The space of the family, the security and protection of the home, allow the 
development of ‘loving’, ‘caring’, ‘honest’ and ‘harmonic’ relationships. Moreover, 
some women explain, the sense of intimacy that comes from ‘sharing with one 
another’ helps to ‘transcend’ egocentric tendencies:
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That whole status thing is very common among the people around me. Mothers 
live for their work and they work to get material things, goods, and they don’t 
value feelings, the presence of the other, and his company. With Francisco we 
value that, being together, sharing ...My aspiration is to be happy, nothing else, 
to live my life, this life... I don’t aspire to get anywhere; I don’t aspire to have 
anything (2G Pilar).
Francisco confirms his mother’s priorities:
For my mother quality of life means being happy and at peace with herself, 
feeling fulfilled, feeling that she does what she does because she wants to and 
not because she is obliged to. But on the other hand you see that for that 
generation quality of life is about having more goods, all that stuff about having 
more material possessions, but for my mother it is about feeling good with 
herself... caring about what is inside... being in harmony (3G Francisco).
The privatization of life is associated with what Taylor identifies as the “affirmation 
of the value of ordinary life” (1989). As Pilar describes, a fulfilling life does not 
depend on reaching a higher position in the social scale, but on enjoying the minutiae 
of everyday life.
4.1 Ethics of Commitment
When there is moral truth within oneself, the sense of moral accountability will be 
displaced from the fulfilment of external demands to the need to be consistent with 
personal thoughts, feelings and beliefs. Especially starting in late adulthood, what 
becomes crucial for the middle generation is that the self they enact ought to bear a 
resemblance to the way they see themselves as human beings. Like their parents, 
they put great store by being ‘consistent’ and ‘responsible’ and acting with 
‘excellence’ instead of taking things ‘lightly’. But no longer should this be at the 
expense of what they feel or think. When second generation interviewees speak of
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commitment they are not talking about compliance with what has been socially 
established as right, but about commitment to what ‘I personally believe is good’:
If I find that something isn’t right I simply don’t do it (2G Paz).
To the extent that I act in accordance with what I think, what I feel and what I 
do, everything will have a meaning (2G Pilar).
The factors that are significant in making them who they are cannot be socially 
derived; what they say and do ought to be grounded in an ‘honest’ personal 
relationship and ought not to ‘betray’ or ‘harm’ themselves or others. The 
commitments members of this generation have established with themselves and 
others attest to their fundamental orientations in life and thus, their identity. Pilar 
explains:
The sense of responsibility, which is included in what I mean by rectitude... I 
have to make an effort day-by-day to behave rightly, to act congruently with 
what I think, with what I feel and with what I do. With love above all... being 
at peace with myself, having my conscience clean and quiet, knowing that I’m 
not harming others... that’s as important as not harming myself (2G Pilar).
‘Rectitude’, ‘responsibility’ or having one’s ‘forehead clean’ were also moral 
principles framing the grandparents’ narratives. But the members of the second 
generation do not perceive these values as a set of regulations ‘internalized’ from the 
outside, nor do they identify their community as a kind of superego overlooking their 
moral virtue. They talk about their values as orientations grounded from within, from 
the interior of the self. Pilar’s definition of rectitude offers a standard by which to 
judge her relationship with herself and provides the grounds for inner peace. At stake 
is not an idea of respectability but fidelity to what she considers right.
This notion of personal accountability is reinforced by the progressive replacement 
from the second generation onwards of the belief that human beings are instruments 
of God’s will with the idea that life and destiny are the result of individual decisions:
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One says, “Why is god punishing me?” We all say “Why is this happening to 
me?” or “God has forgotten me”. As time goes on one says, ‘Why am I 
blaming God if we make our own lives?” (2G Miguel).
Under these circumstances, Pilar clarifies, ‘If I make a mistake [instead of asking 
God’s forgiveness] I have to review what I did wrong, improve it, and grow.’ In this 
view, both inherited components and personal choices have gone into making life the 
way it has been. God has been a support and a companion on the path, rather than 
one who ‘predetermines’, ‘judges’ and ‘punishes’:
I think life is a path full of opportunities and that you are the one who sees 
them and takes them... I don’t think we have anything predetermined: that 
contradicts the free will. I think we enjoy total free will, th a t... we can count on 
God as a support, as company, but not as a punishing or intervening God (2G 
Carmen).
In the narratives of this generation the prevalent view is that fundamental 
orientations in life have to be grounded from within. As Pedro says, religious ideas 
have to ‘make sense’ to oneself. The grandparents would not have doubted the 
Catholic precepts:
That quote from the Gospel that not even a hair falls without God’s knowledge, 
I’m not at peace in that respect, that’s not how it happens, no, I don’t think in 
those terms, my mother does, she can be driving down Eliodoro Yanez Avenue 
and if all the lights are green then her God is driving her that afternoon, the 
Divine Providence: that’s not my God (2G Pedro).
The point is that for Pedro faith is not a matter of moral precepts but an inner 
sentiment. And this sentiment cannot be taken for granted. ‘Faith,’ Pedro says with 
pain, ‘is a mysterious gift that I don’t happen to have.’
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4.2 Divided self
The grandparents’ opinions converge on the fact that nobody broke the rules in their 
society. Their stories testify that this is clearly an exaggeration. But the exaggeration 
allows us to calibrate the entrenchment of the norm. For them, alternative courses of 
action were not only normatively limited but also narratively inconceivable. But the 
middle generation is no longer living within the confines of those conventions. 
Consequently, they have gained enough distance to reflect upon those norms and to 
expose the contradictions they have had to internalise. In addition, for the 
grandparents the meaning of life is neither a problem nor a threat. With the transfer 
of moral truth to the individual, however, the identity of the self comes to depend 
upon an inner search and the possibility arises that existential meaning might be 
lacking. The person has to find his or her life orientations and realise what they are. 
This search can fail and thus, life’s meaning can be lost or, worse, never found. In 
this context, “many individuals’ problems with finding a meaningful life will be 
expressed as selfhood problems and identity crisis” (Baumeister 1986:202), 
provoking conflicts that did not exist one generation back when life was seen as a 
factual reality to which to adapt. One way in which these conflicts manifest in the 
personal accounts of the middle generation is in the presentation of the self as a 
divided entity.
Firstly, and temporally speaking, they describe a self tensioned by the coexistence of 
a still pervasive idea of the good as duty towards others and the demands of the 
emergent constitutive good defined in terms of self-determination and moral 
autonomy. The realisation of the new idea of the good involves a shift in the notion 
of care o f the self from a process of complying with norms to one of self-cultivation 
for the development of a rewarding personal relationship. While some parents were 
equipped for this new ethics of care of the self, insofar as they were brought up to 
develop a gratifying relationship with themselves (‘since little I was encouraged to 
feel happy with myself,’ Pilar recalls); for the majority this redirection means 
acquiring new know-how: ‘learning to say no’ to duty and other people’s requests 
and taking the chance of ‘choosing a little more’, after an upbringing and a parental 
model that taught them that ‘one doesn’t matter too much’ and that ‘one has to be 
tough on oneself (2G Pedro). For some, the reorientation also involves de-
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mystifying the goodness behind the idea of giving oneself to others. Alvaro, for 
example, defines this version of care of the self as a “false altruism” (Gilligan 1982), 
questioning its worth:
Ultimately, one does everything for oneself. That thing of doing things for 
others is a holy lie. I feel good helping others, and probably I also salve my 
conscience for things I’ve done wrong (2G Alvaro).
In the narratives of the first generation, the inner self was excluded from moral 
obligations. In contradistinction, Alvaro elevates the idea of ‘feeling good’ to the 
category of a value.
In women’s case, time for inwardness is taken at the expense of the deeply ingrained 
tendency to be constantly alert to others’ needs. Carmen explains,
I have always paid too much attention to what others might think, to what they 
are, the problem they might be having. I have always adapted myself to the 
situation, to the moment. I have not prioritised myself that much (2G Carmen).
These women were educated to serve the needs of their families, disregarding their 
feelings:
[Mother] always told us that we had to work, be very clean, and that when we 
got married we had to serve our husband even if we were angry with him (2G 
Ximena).
In comparison to the grandmothers, in Carmen’s quote the concern with what ‘others 
might think’ is a preoccupation not about what people might think or say about her, 
but about the other person’s feelings, an engagement with the subjective dimension 
of others: their thoughts, their being and their problems. While grandmothers 
associate the idea of an ethics of care with the fulfilment of a socially defined and 
evaluated moral responsibility, their daughters redefine the notion of an ethics of care 
as a psychological problem, a responsibility towards the ‘harmonic’ development of
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intimate relationships, an issue of balance between different people’s emotional 
needs.
Unlike the grandmothers, Carmen includes a list of drawbacks —what she calls 
‘weaknesses’— in her proclivity to care for others: ‘the lack of expectations [towards 
oneself] of saying “yes I want this” and going for it’. The wish to please others and 
the adaptability it presupposes weighs on Carmen’s desired ability to make choices, 
be proactive and make the most of her own life. Basically, Carmen reflects, in caring 
for everybody else’s needs she ‘put herself second’. Being close to others means to 
an extent being distant from oneself. Likewise, throughout his story, Alvaro weaves 
in the idea that concern for others —family, employees and friends— has 
undermined the care he owes to himself. However, he also admits the benefits of this 
type of care: he feels deeply loved by his people. For this generation concern for 
others, although right and good, limits the sense of responsibility owed to oneself.
A second source of tension in the self is that keeping one’s commitments, and thus, 
affirming one’s values is not easy in ‘today’s disposable world’. Carmen, for 
example, emphasises that for her marriage to ‘stand the test of time’, she has had to 
work upon the relationship. ‘This is not for free,’ she specifies, ‘it wouldn’t be 
difficult to undermine the other person who is at your side, or to say as girls do 
nowadays “I’d better look for someone else, who can be more interesting or 
different’” .
Finally, another cause of tension arises from the conflicting demands placed on the 
self by different types of commitments. Pedro’s life has been contested by two forces 
in dispute: his deep ‘commitment to politics and the public sphere’ and the ‘equally 
foundational’ value he attributes to his private life. Many divergences with his wife 
have had to do with how to balance their time and energy between these two 
dimensions. Like other women of this generation, Pedro’s wife considers that it is 
wrong (she ‘complains’) to ‘subordinate one’s interests, impulses or wishes’ to one’s 
engagement with ‘public life’. Pedro agrees and does not think his work has led him 
to incur in any neglect, ‘individually, as a couple or as a family’. Marital divergence 
apart, the point is that when commitments speak of fundamental orientations in life 
and thus, of personal identity, conflicting demands need to be harmonized because
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they produce inconsistencies at personal and interpersonal levels. Alvaro’s narrative, 
to give another example, is populated by the contradictory demands of different 
‘masculine roles’. In his paterfamilias narrative, there is a sense of traditional 
masculinity associated with hard work, organization, pragmatism, rationality, 
responsibility, authority, loyalty, the protection of the family and seriousness and 
reliability in his work. In the sexual sphere the macho discourse predominates: the 
image of the young, virile, nomadic, sexual voracious ‘warrior’ in the domain of pure 
instincts and unrepressed behaviour. Among his friends, the emphasis is on his social 
skills; the ability to move and behave successfully among heterogeneous groups, the 
generosity towards friends and his prompt response to their needs. As a businessman 
he is ‘dressed for war’ and he is ‘showing his teeth’, ready to ‘do harm’ in this 
‘cruel’ world governed by ‘twisted values’. As a football player he is the ‘innocent’ 
mischievous boy dribbling with a rag ball, ‘gifted’, ‘having fun’ driven by sheer 
improvisation and rough creativity; ‘free like the wind’ among a ‘team of equals’.
As expressed in their accounts, the way the grandparents felt in following society’s 
norms did not affect their sense of self. They do not reflect about ‘playing different 
social roles’ according to the particular settings of their everyday life. For the second 
generation, adaptation to external requirements began to mean relinquishing personal 
wishes and desires. Far from being perceived as natural, this is seen as producing 
many internal inconsistencies. All these conflicts among fundamental orientations 
manifest in a self divided between social roles and the personal domain. Because of 
this division, members of the second generation find conformity with the norm 
painful.
On the one hand, the parents distinguish an ‘outer self, the part of their being 
concerned with doing what must be done; an ‘oversocialised’ entity whose 
‘positions’ are ‘noted’ by others, and whose performances have to be monitored and 
kept under ‘control’ while a portion of their beings rests ‘somewhere else’. An outer 
self who does not leave enough room for ‘being oneself.
For women, the ‘outer self operates within the domestic and family realms. It refers 
to that part of their being who ‘adapts’ and ‘postpones’, who has been ‘so attentive to 
others’ needs’ that ‘has had the weakness of not prioritising herself’. It refers to that
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part of their being that like a ‘diplomat’ ‘mediates’ and arranges ‘negotiations and 
‘compromises’ between different parts. For men, the outer self operates in the 
spheres of paid labour and social affairs. It refers to that part of their being that in 
order to fulfil expectations ‘has had to compromise’ and ‘to be postponed’, and who 
has even been forced to act against ‘human values’, damaging their self-integrity and 
‘corroding themselves from within’. Their outer self makes men feel like beings ’full 
of ties’, ‘attachments’, and ‘burden-like-responsibilities’, who cannot follow their 
wishes and choices, experience ‘freedom’, ‘laugh as a child’ or being ‘authentic’ and 
‘transparent’. Men express a sense of distress and a wish to escape the system. 
Carlos, a bit seriously a bit lightly, shares his dream of moving to the mountains, 
amidst the purity of the forest:
I’d like to go living in the mountains and come down once a month for my 
groceries.... The pressure of consumerism, that you have to produce resources 
every single day in order to live... it’s tiring, I’d like to be more irresponsible 
but I can’t, not now, we’ve got four kids... when they were little we could have 
experienced new things but I was a coward (2G Carlos).
Likewise, Alvaro repeatedly manifests his willingness to radically change his life: 
‘send everything to the rubbish bin and set myself free’. The grandfathers would not 
have ventured any such rebellious and escapist reactions, whatever the strain, effort 
and sacrifices their lives involved. Reconciliation between different demands was not 
something that was required of them. Despite their wishes for an independent life, in 
practice, Alvaro and Carlos have spent much of their lives striving for the opposite: 
trying to secure a respectable social position for their families, a goal to which 
discursively they grant little value. The problem is that these men’s sense of identity 
is largely bound up with the very structures they want to discard.
On the other hand, there is the ‘inner self’, which appears in the security of one’s 
home and the solitude of one’s relationship with oneself. The inner self relates to the 
‘sensitive and intimate part’ of their being, it has no predefined imprints or positions 
to occupy and does not need to be ‘controlled’. Throughout life, the outer self has 
prevailed over the inner or, as Pedro says, there have been ‘few degrees of liberty’ to 
do ‘what I prefer’ or say ‘I don’t want this’:
136
For a long time when I got into the car or into the tub after a day of work, I had 
the physical sensation of being reunited myself, that I had been literally out of 
myself... so much absorbed by this external game, without really being aware 
of it... a routine dominated by this disproportion between the huge public thing 
and your little life, the few hours of your own, your wife, your kids (2G Pedro).
Second generation men describe the inner self as a ‘loner’. Miguel entitled his life 
story “Why so lonely?”, Carlos describes himself as a man without friends: ‘the thing 
is that I’m not the nice guy anymore, good at partying and always happy’. To Carlos, 
friends are a source of worry. Those who you think are friends are only ‘waiting to 
see you fall down’. There is too much ‘envy’ to maintain real friendship and too 
much to lose in revealing oneself to others: ‘if you open your heart to another and 
share your intimate things, your profound sorrows... it could be wrongly used later’. 
Carlos’ fears recall sociologist Norbert Lechner’s (1999) perception that the sense of 
loneliness and the lack of communication experienced by Chilean men are a 
consequence of the interiorisation of competitiveness and of the intensification of a 
sense of precariousness.
What is more, these men rarely share the thoughts and feelings of their ‘intimate self 
with their friends and partners:
I think that all men do the same, each one solves his problems alone... maybe 
sharing your problems is a sign of weakness and one doesn’t want to look weak 
in front of anybody, one wants always to be the powerful, potent and strong 
guy... that’s the way we were raised up (2G Carlos).
Nor did they share their feelings with their own fathers. Whenever Carlos wanted to 
talk with his father about the ‘serious’ matter of being in love, his father teased him 
and ‘didn’t take me [my feelings] seriously’. Moreover, the father used to spread the 
news among the whole family, breaking the secrecy of the confession and 
embarrassing Carlos. The grandfather’s sabotaging attitude seems to reject such 
emotional intimacy between father and son and to imply that the disclosure of 
romantic matters should be excluded from the masculine structure of feelings.
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Thus, second generation men argue that the inner self is a loner partly because there 
is no social grammar for them to expose emotions, doubts or weaknesses; partly 
because in social engagements men are expected to be agreeable and lively, a role 
that often feels inauthentic; and partly because they are not willing to pay the cost of 
being signalled as weak, powerless and impotent.
In this regard, second generation women feel more accompanied than they see their 
male peers as being: they have had more opportunities for sharing their inner troubles 
with friends and relatives without all the dangers men identify:
Unlike Marcelo [my husband] who doesn’t talk about anything, I talk about 
everything, because I think that maybe by sharing one will receive support (2G 
Elena).
If for the first generation the strategy for dealing with life consisted of ‘adapting’ to 
the different situations that it might bring; for the second, the unease caused by 
experiencing oneself as a divided entity calls, especially from middle age onwards, 
for an attempt at ‘uniting’ and ‘harmonising’ their inner and outer selves:
In my twenties I was more fanatical, and I think I didn’t have a good time, I 
didn’t. My university years were during the Unidad Popular,19 I had a bad 
time; I still have the memory... Now I feel better, more together, the pieces are 
better assembled now, also in relation to my inner world, there is certain 
maturing process, more harmony (2G Pedro).
As part of the process of integration, the inner self is afforded more space and 
expressive power. In terms of experiences, this ranges from allowing oneself to be 
‘irresponsible’ and ‘rebellious’ ‘like youth is’ to gaining a greater self-understanding 
or capacity for self-assertion.
19 The Unidad Popular (“People’s Unity”) was a coalition of political parties in Chile that stood 
behind the successful candidacy of Salvador Allende for the 1970 presidential election. The term also 
refers to the conflicted period that led up to the military coup.
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I feel like if I were a freer Ximena, a younger Ximena... I never expressed my 
feelings before... at this stage of life I have learnt to mature... I used to have 
such a feeble personality... I’ve learnt to say no to what I don’t want. By now I 
know what I want (2G Ximena).
Often it was after bringing up their children that second generation women found the 
space and time for an encounter with themselves after decades spent on the family’s 
needs. This is identified as a major change in life. In her forties Carmen realised: ‘I 
can rely on myself too’. Thus she ‘made her decisions’: ‘let’s see the spiritual part, 
be friends with the bodily part, let’s open up to other things’. Carmen began to 
construct some ‘life of her own’ (Beck-Gemsheim 2002), beyond the confines of the 
family and home and beyond the ideal that associates a woman’s goodness with self- 
renunciation. Women (especially in upper middle class) begin to fill their time with 
activities that promote introspection, self-knowledge, and self-expression or, at least 
(in the case of low middle class), develop an attitude that encourages this type of 
self-relationship, regaining a ‘personal world’ or creating it for the first time.
I like to take courses on personal growth... I’ve done some courses on human 
relationships... on the Enneagram... I love everything that has to do with the 
esoteric... and learning from other people’s experiences (2G Elena).
Some second generation men are engaged on the same quest as their female peers. 
But whereas in women’s case this is at the expense of the association between good 
woman and family carer; in men’s, it is at the expense of the good man-family 
provider association:
There are others who are more materialistic, who only think of themselves, 
maybe I’ve been selfish with myself but this is what gives meaning to my life: 
working for the welfare of my children (2G Miguel).
I work most of the day during the week but I’m also interested in setting aside 
some time for myself... in peace, for doing what I like... if I want to indulge 
myself with something I need, I buy it (2G Carlos).
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Within the masculine culture, the football match constitutes a typical personal space. 
Alvaro explains that for men these are moments of ‘cheap psychiatry’. On the pitch, 
the codes and hierarchies of business world are put on hold. ‘It does not matter 
whether you are a corporate CEO, which is what society values; what matters is that 
we all need each other to win the game. ‘You’re just one of 10 guys who are as
stupid as you are’. On the pitch, men take off their warrior dress and become ‘who
they are’, ‘free like the wind’ ‘making jokes and laughing’ like children. They 
recover the innocence of infancy, and leave behind the ‘twisted values’ with which 
they run their businesses. The inwards shift is, then, associated with the emerging 
notion of having a ‘personal world’ and of gaining some ‘personal time’.
With the interiorisation of moral truth, emotions, sentiments and inner thoughts come 
to be regarded as genuine and thus reliable sources of self-knowledge. These 
domains of existence need no longer be relinquished, but this does not mean that life 
has become less complex. The make-up of the self comprises all these levels of 
experience and calls for a process of articulation that requires the strength to 
improvise and to adapt. This is a difficult balance to achieve: costs are involved, 
somebody has to recede or priorities have to be withdrawn.
O: To what extent can you live the life you want in this society?
To the extent that I live processes of adjustment and maladjustment. One must 
always have the openness to be able to recreate new spaces... looking after and 
protecting what is most essential for oneself without disregarding everyone 
else, I also have to maintain a relationship with my environment. I generate my 
own spaces, according to what is meaningful to me, and from there I relate to 
others, but with those who can make a contribution, not with those that upset 
me, in that sense I’m a bit selective (2G Pilar).
Self-articulation involves a continuous negotiation between society’s demands and 
what the person considers right. To adapt oneself no longer means self­
postponement.
When the good is externally defined, as in the grandparents’ times, there is nothing 
to learn from oneself. Grandparents do not meditate on the meaning of existence and
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‘do not make philosophy’ of their lives. With the transfer of moral truth to the 
individual comes the idea that one can gain self-understanding by reflecting on one’s 
story. Life is made up of a flow of experiences that have to be interpreted. Alvaro 
uses the metaphor of the jigsaw puzzle to exemplify this. Life is like a jigsaw you 
have to put together. There are some experiences for which you cannot provide a 
clear interpretation right away, those are the pieces that take long time to fit into the 
‘map’ of life.
The self described by the second generation has an historical dimension. They talk of 
a self ‘shaped’ and ‘carved’ by the passing of time; one that has suffered ‘traumas’, 
overcome ‘turning points’, and undergone ‘change’ and ‘maturation’. They use 
psychological terms to interpret their selves as entities whose ‘health’ depends on 
their capacity to ‘work upon’ the history of their emotions and thus articulate the 
different events of his or her biography into meaningful stories (see chapter 6).
A number of middle generation interviewees, especially the women, begin to see the 
spiritual realm as an important fount of resources for enhancing personal growth. But 
the idea gaining currency is one of everyday spirituality, rather than religion as a 
faith prescribing a set of moral commandments and of collective rituals to be 
observed through devotional practices. Spirituality refers to a personal path of 
growth through which to connect with oneself ‘beyond the physical’ and mundane 
levels to attain ‘peace’, ‘find oneself, ‘work upon oneself’ and ‘better one’s being’ 
in this earthly life. The field of the spiritual encompasses and merges, to suit one’s 
own taste, traditions, perspectives and schools of thoughts well beyond Christianity. 
Elena pursues her inner development with a combination of Catholicism, esoteric 
resources and courses on personal growth. Whereas, in the grandparents’ 
interpretation of Catholicism, the divine and the human pertain to different levels of 
reality, Pilar believes that human beings too are endowed with a divine nature with 
which they can connect in this life:
God is not up there in heaven but here among us and in everyone’s heart... We 
aren’t different from God. The only difference is that you don’t have the 
awareness of being God as He does... Joy and paradise have to be experienced
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in this life... I don’t have to wait until the next life to be happy... My mission is 
to accomplish my role as best as I can with dignity, responsibility, creativity 
and as conscientiously as possible... and do it better each day... You have to 
work for your spiritual transformation to be able to experience the divinity that 
lies within you (2G Pilar).
4.3 Cohabitation of temporalities
The turn towards the interior acquires a number of characteristics in the narratives of 
second generation interviewees. Firstly, contrary to the idea that a person’s 
fundamental orientations in life are socially derived, this generation begins to accord 
value to the capacity to articulate moral referents through self-determination and 
moral autonomy. Concomitantly, the notion of the self as a public image is displaced 
by the idea of the self as something located within one’s interior. Secondly, this 
generation has called into question the grandparents’ belief that the good life can be 
accomplished through public activities; hence the process of privatization of life. If 
interiorisation has to do with finding moral authority within oneself, privatization has 
to do with the space for the realisation of the good. In this sense, the inward shift 
goes beyond the self, because the idea of the good comes to rests in the domain of 
the family. The family was also an important space for the realization of the good life 
in the narratives of the first generation. But in those accounts it was primarily a 
social institution (the “enterprise home” we might call it) whereas when the middle 
generation talks about family they are making reference to the field of intimate 
relationships. Thirdly, in terms of ethics of the self, the idea of ‘duty towards others’ 
as an external imperative gives way to ‘commitment’ as a consciously chosen 
engagement with the subjective dimension of the other. Fourthly, contrasting with 
the stability of character, there emerges the idea that the self is an entity subject to 
change and redefinition according to the lessons gleaned from life experiences. 
Lastly, in contraposition to the repression of emotions and feelings, expressive 
engagement and emotional disclosure are increasingly understood as necessary 
components of a sense of selfhood.
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Unlike the grandparents, the relative pluralisation of moral referents gives members 
of the middle generation more room to position themselves with respect to prevailing 
discourses. For instance, some interviewees, like Carmen, who identify themselves 
with and accord a higher value to a more ‘traditional’ way of life, justify their 
conventionalism by emphasising the still pervasive coercive force of the deber ser. 
Carmen usually justifies what she has done in life saying that it corresponded with 
‘what people used to do’. Carmen “borrows” (Modell 1992:78) from what she 
presents as the prevailing discourse to legitimise her way of life. Showing continuity 
with the grandparents’ narratives, she does not reveal many dissonances between her 
experiences and the prevailing interpretative framework of her times. To refer to 
aspects of her moral orientations that the current generation has put under scrutiny, 
she adopts a slightly ironic tone: ‘you know, this is not the way things are anymore’. 
But overall, she feels ‘comfortable’ with the conventions regulating the self in her 
times. Some grandmothers observe that although they might sometimes have desired 
sexual intimacy with their boyfriends, they did not dare because the norm was too 
deep internalised to breach. Carmen ‘feels’ that waiting until marriage to initiate her 
sex life helped Mario and her to know each other better. She did not feel limited by 
the rules regulating the relationship. But Carmen’s need to justify her conservative 
stance proves that a story of conformity no longer feels unquestionably right. The 
defensive tone of Carmen’s story betrays an emergent mentality that says that ‘being 
classic’ is not necessarily good. In fact, other interviewees, who portray themselves 
as more ‘rebellious’ or avant-garde, like Paz and Pilar, stress their autonomy with 
respect to mere conventions and highlight the value of their innovative decisions as a 
means of justifying their defiance and redeeming the legitimacy of their choices.
In this generation’s stories, the relative pluralisation of moral referents manifests as a 
matter of positionalities with respect to predominant discourses and of cohabitation 
of different temporal references within a single narrative. For example, Pilar presents 
herself as ‘ahead of my generation’ in such things as the formation of an atypical 
family (a monoparental female-headed family unit, where the ‘existence of affective 
bonds’ takes precedence over the structural organics in defining what a family 
amounts to) or when depicting herself as the successful career-minded woman. But 
she also describes herself as ‘old-fashioned’ in such matters as her preference for 
‘formality’ and ‘cordial ways of dealing with others’. Thus, although the middle
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generation broke with many of the principles that oriented the grandparents’ lives, 
some elements of the old ethics are still sustained. Novel and old values are 
interwoven in the moral topography of the self.
In this sense it is important to stress that the value that begins to be placed upon the 
subjective dimension does not free the middle generation from the influence of 
conventional roles. Carlos, for example, describes how he spent weeks being quiet at 
home during a period of unemployment, so the neighbours would not notice that he 
was in instead of at work, as the head of family was expected to be.
When their particular circumstances have placed them at odds with conventional 
expectations, members of this generation have had to accommodate their life 
decisions in order to protect themselves from the consequences of social dissent. As 
a single mother, Pilar ‘transgressed’ the prevailing conventions regarding female 
sexuality and the family. She therefore made a conscious decision to study at the 
secular University of Chile rather than the Catholic University, because the latter’s 
‘over-moralistic’ profile would have precluded a normal and rewarding student life: 
she was not willing to ‘keep up appearances’ by marrying the father of her baby as 
she thought a Catholic milieu would demand. Such a course would have contravened 
her approach to life. It is worth noting that, like in the narratives of the first 
generation, Pilar did not elaborate right away on this need to reconcile her decisions 
with the prevailing morality. As the excerpt below demonstrates, I had to insist with 
a series of questions to get at the core cause of her university option. But in this case 
I believe that, largely, what prevented Pilar from being more explicit was not only 
the difficulty in acknowledging her defiance but also a concern not to appear too 
conventionally-guided for what she thought was my own appreciation of such 
matters:
O: Why did you choose the University o f Chile?
At that time it was because I had [the idea] that the Catholic [University] was 
too moralistic.
O: Even though you were very Catholic?
Yes, but I was Catholic but not moralistic and rigid, or given to sanctioning 
others. I was Catholic and I believed in my God and even though I took the pill,
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become separated and had my kid christened alone [without the father] I didn’t 
feel that I was living in sin, you see?
O: And you thought that in the Catholic [university] it would be harder?
They are more moralistic.
O: That they wouldn ’t accept you way o f life?
Yes, I think that in a way I had some experience, some information along those 
lines, that it had tendencies that I transgressed a bit, without trampling on 
anybody of course, but I really felt that as a woman it didn’t make any sense to 
live with somebody because of my son, I mean, keeping up appearances isn’t 
me, you see?
O: And that would have happened in the Catholic [university] ?
Yes, to a certain extent, that thing of keeping up appearances, maybe it is not 
that way now but in those times [it was] (2G Pilar).
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CHAPTER FIVE— BEING MYSELF
In their narratives, the grandchildren connect the good with the exploration of the 
moral truth within oneself, ‘free from other people’s impositions’, ‘pursuing what 
one feels and wants’ and expressing ‘who you truly are’. Their stories attest to the 
interiorisation of the moral sources of the self.
When asked about the type of person she has been, Julia replied, ‘I’ve tried to be 
myself.’ Likewise, Federico’s self-obituary reads ‘He did what he wanted and 
enjoyed life’, whereas Matilde entitled her life story ‘She Never Stopped Being 
Herself’. In order ‘to be oneself, in moral terms, life goals ought to be defined 
according to what one thinks is right, as opposed to pursuing goals ‘imposed by 
somebody else’ (eg., other people, God’s will):
I’ve set myself these challenges; they weren’t essential to carry on living but 
they were all major challenges at the time (3G Federico).
Federico does not recognise the deber ser as a legitimate moral source. He places 
himself as the measure of his challenges. Among the grandchildren and regardless of 
political position, this view is reinforced by the definition of themselves and by the 
perception of the generation as a secularized group, where the idea prevails that 
‘everything springs from the human being’ and that life and its meaning are the result 
of the person’s own making and not of God’s will:
Religion is the opium of the people, because it makes them think that their 
misfortunes are caused by a supernatural entity... I think one makes one’s own 
life... I don’t think an omnipotent God exists. A stage will be reached when 
human beings will have the knowledge to explain where we come from and 
how we were created (3G Francisco).
I feel that there is a constant reflection, a permanent questioning... about being, 
happiness and about where happiness lies, about not being really able to feel 
happy... and the tired attitude has to do with disenchantment... that there is no
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meaning, despite everything I can’t find the meaning yet, it’s not that I’m an 
embittered guy that can’t just do things and enjoy them, in a way I’m happy, 
but this transcendence thing, that chip they put in your head that you can never 
really take out, it means you’re in this game [the question of transcendence] 
without believing in it... I want to believe that I am who I’ve wanted to 
become, I’ve found it on my own ... You know that your own steps make you 
suffer (3G Cristobal).
Despite his Catholic upbringing, Cristobal has chosen not to ground the fundamental 
orientations of his life upon theistic foundations. He wants to believe that it is not 
God’s will but his ‘own steps’ that have made him suffer. But the question of 
transcendence raises contradictory notions in the effort to develop a personal 
explanation for the meaning of life in the light of death and the search for happiness. 
At a subtle level he is constantly questioning the meaning of existence. He may be 
able to come up with only provisional answers but at least these are of his own 
making.
When moral truth lies within oneself, when ‘I am me’, as Matilde puts it, values are 
not universal criteria to be inculcated or replicated, but a set of orientations to be 
discovered through experiential knowledge and the particularity of each situation. 
According to Cristobal’s rationale, ‘there are things that I always consider wrong like 
everything that has to do with abuse’. But in general, he adds, ‘if you aren’t in that 
position, you can’t tell if it’s bad.’ ‘If I put myself in a completely new situation,’ 
Alejandro adds, ‘I would have to wait and see who I was.’ As the lyrics of 
Cristobal’s favourite songs asserts “you have to get in to get out”. Cristobal and 
Alejandro are saying that the conformation of normative criteria requires direct 
exposure to a situation in which they can test what their values are. Direct evaluative 
experience becomes a requisite for the definition of where to stand in relation to the 
good. The moral outlook of the self is not socially derived; it is composed of a series 
of orientations that only I can define and articulate. The moral standards of the self 
are internally defined.
Under this configuration, feelings become an important source of evaluation of the 
worth of one’s actions. I suppose that I’m doing the right thing —Matilde reflects—
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because I feel comfortable. As Taylor observes, being in touch with one’s moral 
feelings, in connection with one’s interiority “comes to be something we have to 
attain to be true and full human beings” (1989:26).
In the grandparents’ times, value was posited in doing what ought to be done 
regardless of their personal views. By the grandchildren’s times, the prevailing 
discourse has come to emphasise that life should be lived by your own measure, 
according to your views and inclinations. If you disagree with a certain proposition 
you should not feel committed to endorse it. What matters now is how you “feel” 
about “your” life (Sennett 1998).
The grandparents found satisfaction in accomplishing their duties; however, the word 
‘duty’ as a moral endeavour is absent from their grandchildren’s stories. Instead, they 
talk of ‘enjoying’ life doing ‘the things I like’. They associate happiness with self- 
determination:
If I didn’t feel myself being with my family I wouldn’t be with them, I 
wouldn’t meet them for lunch, I meet them because I want to (3G Federico).
Happiness and the meaningful life are also linked to finding the spaces to ‘express 
oneself, to create and to interact with the world’ (3G Cristobal) ‘peacefully’ and 
‘calmly’.
Self-deception is conceptualised as the failure to be oneself, resemble one’s own 
nature and fulfil one’s potential. Value is attributed to ‘being consistent and sincere’, 
‘regardless of what can happen, never give up’. Javiera explains, ‘respect cannot be 
obtained unless one is honest’, and honesty cannot be achieved unless one 
‘expresses’ one’s ‘feelings’. Otherwise, hiding personal thoughts ends up ‘rotting 
you from within’. This is the form that moral corruption takes for the grandchildren. 
The ills of the grandparents’ self allude to a weak and bent character lacking the 
strength to fulfil its duties and the moral quality to speak the truth; the ills of 
grandchildren’s self manifest as a breach of the fidelity one owes to oneself as the 
author of one’s moral orientations.
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To be whom they want to be, the family and society as a whole has given this 
generation the opportunity to explore and the possibility to choose their moral 
standards. Most of them were brought up ‘to make their own independent decisions’ 
and to rely on themselves with confidence:
My family has pampered me and given me every possibility to do what I 
want... [they think] the decision I make will be the right thing for me, they 
have given me the freedom to decide what is good for my life (3G Francisco).
Indeed, interviewees of all generations coincide in describing the Chile of the 1990s 
as a society with:
More freedom, which allows you to say more things, to know and experiment 
more... one can orient oneself according to what one feels rather than according 
to what society stipulates, it’s a more flexible society (3G Francisco).
Compared to their predecessors, this holds true for both sexes:
Women and men have much more freedom to decide what they want to do, 
where they want to go... what they are going to do with their lives (2G Paz).
The possibility to choose one’s life depends on having a range of opportunities 
available, as well as a decline in the legitimacy of the collective realm as a regulator 
of personal life, a broadening of what is considered culturally ‘acceptable’ and an 
increasing respect for the deliberative power of the individual:
[Nowadays there is] less repression, less control in terms of shared pleasure... 
more possibilities of exploration in relationships, in what is permitted; there is a 
redefinition of gender relationships and of what is acceptable (2G Pedro).
The family burden also loosens ...one can say no to lots of things... there is 
more tolerance and respect for what one knows how to do, more awareness of 
the individual, that’s important, what it means to be an individual (3G 
Cristobal).
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The grandparents speak of controlling, taming and domesticating the self as 
components of the moralization process. A morally exemplary person has succeeded 
in establishing this relationship of domestication; has ‘internalised’ the prevailing 
values (see section on childhood in chapter eight). The grandchildren utterly dislike 
being controlled or being told what to do. This precludes the practice of freedom and 
runs contrary to their attempts to define their orientations in life by listening to the 
inner voice:
I don’t like to be controlled... if that saying that goes “man proposes; God 
disposes” [is true] then I don’t know what we live for (3G Francisco).
But the rise of the values of moral autonomy and self-expressiveness do not wash 
away the old ethics. The following reflection by Federico illustrates how new and old 
ideas coexist in the style of his upbringing. Whereas his mother fostered the 
experiences of freedom and enjoyment, his father inculcated the idea that the good 
life requires sacrifice, discipline and hard work:
[my mother] incited me in everything that has to do with freedom, she used to 
encourage me, ‘go on, go on’. Dad was more concerned with discipline, effort, 
with breaking your back to reach your goals. My mother was more like let’s 
live each day at a time, let’s have fun, let’s go for a walk. In my father’s family 
there were 12 siblings among whom he was just one of many and he worked 
really hard to finish his studies and pay his university fees... he didn’t have 
another education, he was a military man, and the harshness... he is the tough 
guy (3G Federico).
The association of the idea of the good with the exercise of one’s deliberative power 
is linked to the rise of diversity as a value. For many interviewees, university 
entrance —especially to big universities such as the University of Chile— represents 
a first ‘radical’ experience of diversity. But whereas second-generation Carmen 
could never find her bearings in this huge and ‘labyrinthine’ institution, always 
feeling ‘disorientated’ and ‘insecure’, and whereas second-generation Pilar chose to 
study there as a single mother (to protect her integrity from the sanction she would
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have faced in a more ‘conservative’ environment such as the Catholic University), 
for Federico, Alejandro or Paula the ‘plural’, ‘open-minded’ and secular ethos of the 
University of Chile represented the most suitable moral environment in which to be 
oneself.
5.1 Ethics of authenticity
When the self becomes the source of moral authority and the idea of the good 
enshrines a way of being, an ethics of authenticity regulates the practices of self upon 
self. A core value regulating grandfather Jose’s relationship with himself was to be 
‘true’. This means acting and speaking with the truth, at a time when there were 
unquestionable truths to maintain. For the grandchildren, however, authenticity refers 
to their capacity to articulate their original way of being in the world. Unlike the 
ethics of respectability, that of authenticity is rooted in subjective and formal 
principles:
If you’re going to be a complete hippie, be a hippie, but do it well, if you like 
money go after money but do it well, do well whatever you choose to do (3G 
Federico).
Among the grandchildren, peer evaluation is not in respect of their proximity to a 
standard way of life, but in terms of their consistency and success in achieving the 
goals each of them has set by and for him or herself. For example, Alejandro’s 
friends admire those who:
Are happy doing what they are doing, achieving what they see as success in 
doing what they do, which is not necessarily success in the public view (3G 
Alejandro).
There are several procedural requisites for leading an authentic life. First, as in 
Federico’s quote above, authenticity presupposes respect for each person’s moral 
autonomy. Second, in opposition to outward orientations and the influence of other
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people’s opinions, authenticity calls for a journey into one’s inner depths to get in 
touch with the uncharted realities of your being, discover who you are and ‘work 
upon yourself’ to better your being. The identity of the self emerges from self­
exploration for which, Alejandro specifies, self-reflexivity is a key practice:
There has been a constant reflection for a good while... in which I’m 
questioning myself, I’m working on myself... trying to improve certain things 
(3G Alejandro).
Third, authenticity requires the self-faithfulness to show ‘who you really are’ and the 
self-confidence to be yourself. The aim is to:
Be yourself without being afraid of not being the person others want you to be 
(3G Matilde).
Keeping up self-faithfulness and self-confidence requires a ‘respectful’, 
‘responsible’, careful, and ‘loyal’ relationship with oneself, so as ‘not to betray your 
way of being’ (3G Federico):
Respectful towards your body, proud of yourself, of your achievements... 
responsible... don’t expose yourself to bullshit that can put your life at risk or 
expose yourself to situations where you can be humiliated, being careful (3G 
Alejandro).
In the grandparents’ narratives, self-confidence was not recognised as a personal 
requirement. They had to comply with their duties regardless of self-reliance. The 
need to trust oneself emerges with the interiorisation of the moral sources of the self.
This need to trust one’s deliberations is associated with the transfer of the capacity to 
make moral judgments. This modifies the outlook of the good woman over time. 
Whereas the prevailing view for the grandparents was of the sacrificing, long- 
suffering woman, devoted only to her household duties, for the grandchildren it is of 
a ‘liberal’ and ‘independent’ woman, who leads her own life, shows ‘self­
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confidence’, ‘makes herself heard’, is not afraid to speak up if necessary but also has 
the ability to negotiate.
In the next quote, granddaughter Matilde reveals a key difference between the ethics 
that regulate second- and third-generation women’s lives. Despite the inward turn 
they have experienced in their late adulthood, second generation women still see the 
well-being of their families as the most fundamental value (a hypergood in Taylor’s 
terminology). Thus, love of oneself, although right and primordial, is ultimately a 
means for loving others:
O: Which resources have your generation had to progress in life?
More confidence, my mother did her job very well, but I couldn’t do the same 
job. I ask myself to be too sincere and honest. I couldn’t live with a husband 
like my father; I would demand that he change.
O: Do you think that your mother wasn *t honest then?
No, she was honest, because she cared so much about her family, she would 
sacrifice anything for her family’s well-being, because her personal happiness 
depended upon the well-being of her family... I think that my mother has been 
very authentic (3G Matilde).
This relational aspect of the female moral constitution tends to fade among 
granddaughters, probably because most of them have yet to form a family, but 
probably also because, as everyone agrees, both men and women of the youngest 
generation are more ‘individualistic’ than their predecessors. For them, care of the 
self is a means through which to maintain self-integrity:
I’ve got a lot of self-esteem, I love myself, I tell myself how much I love me, I 
kiss myself... I respect myself, my tiredness, my times, my learning processes, 
I’ve got faith in me (3G Julia).
O: What are the most important values guiding the way you relate to yourself? 
Love for myself, a lot, love for oneself of course is the maximum of everything, 
respect and care of oneself, that’s important, having love for what one does, for 
what one gives to others, taking care of that, and that I think always ends up in
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love for oneself, if one knows where that lies, because if you don’t you can end 
up saying just nonsense, but love for oneself also has to do with taking care of 
one’s relationships (3G Cristobal).
Love for oneself does not necessary imply do not care about other people. On the 
contrary, as Cristobal postulates ‘I am-in-others’; others are a constitutive part of his 
existence. The point is that nobody else can take responsibility for the care and love 
one owes to oneself. That is a personal task.
But for the grandchildren, care of the self also operates as a means of protection 
against society:
I love, respect and care for myself... I’m in first, second and third place.
O: Has this attitude helped you in life?
Sure. If I didn’t take that attitude, I would be completely depressed or stressed 
(3G Andres).
Finally, love of the self is identified as a social demand. Peers and friends, says 
Cristobal, ‘don’t like seeing you in bad shape, that you’re letting yourself die, that 
you feel little love for yourself.
In an epoch in which change, unpredictability and ‘obsolescence’ have become the 
rule rather than the exception, a fourth demand of an ethics of authenticity is that the 
individual must be ‘active’, ‘keep moving on, moving on’, so as to show that one is 
in charge of one’s life. Social transformations no longer happen in the distant 
northern hemisphere ‘ten years before they get to us’. Nowadays developments 
occurring in one comer of the globe have instant effects upon the rest of the planet. 
This compression of time and space means that even if geographically Chile is 
‘hanging off the edge of the international map’, ‘change is happening here and now’ 
and thus, the youngest generation has to confront as never before the dread of 
‘obsoleteness’ and the temporal shallowness of tendencies, fashions, artifacts, 
knowledge and even personal traits. If grandparents speak of adaptation and parents 
of harmonising, the grandchildren live in a dynamic social context that confronts
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them with the demand to keep themselves up-to-date with ever-changing life 
situations:
A heavy20 change. Like change happening every other day, something 
becoming obsolete within a month, this was very heavy for our generation, it 
demands you be up-to-date, events are faster, telecommunications are faster, so 
if you aren’t up-to-date you’re out21, you’re really getting it wrong, there’s no 
reason not to be up-to-date today, you have to be, if you aren’t it’s because 
you’re a fool (3G Matilde).
A bad life is no longer associated with the failure to commit to respectability —like 
the callejera woman or the man who breaks the law— but with a lack of ‘courage’ 
and ‘perseverance’, with not ‘working hard enough’ ‘to better oneself in whatever 
one has decided to pursue. It is associated with ‘ambiguous’ people who lack 
‘priorities and who are indifferent about everything’, those ‘who seem to like 
nothing’, and ‘show little interest in living’:
If you are going to do something, give it your best, if you’re going to have a 
child, give it the best, if you are taking a job, do your best, but don’t hang 
around doing things you don’t want to, if you are going to tell somebody that 
you love her, be sincere... I think this is what it is all about (3G Julia).
An authentic life should be lived with intention and with intensity, to the very last 
consequences.
A fifth value related to an ethics of authenticity is to be ‘creative’, both in a 
procedural sense —by discovering the means to fulfill one’s wishes— and in a 
substantive sense — by expressing something ‘original’. Whereas in an ethics of 
respectability, conforming to the norm was a way of acting as equals, in an ethics of 
authenticity, life paths should be designed according to oneself. ‘Uniformity’ has no 
value. The grandchildren show hostility to everything associated with the
20 The English word “heavy” is used to denote something of great, even momentous, significance, 
usually in a negative sense.
21 The English Word “out” is used in the same sense as it is in English.
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conventional, prototypical or standardised, and deride what they consider mainstream 
or conformist. They see little sense in ‘doing things because everybody else does 
them’. They champion a destandardisation of life. In the grandchildren’s time, the 
way the good is formulated encourages distinction with respect to others. In this 
sense, a swing occurs through the generations, from the value of conformity to that 
of uniqueness:
I really don’t like the word “anarchic”, but I feel that in a sense I am part of 
that... I strongly dislike everything to do with standards, like a life were you 
have to finish university, get married, have children, who then go to school, 
graduate, go to university, and get married. It’s a chain! No! Stop! Why should 
life be like that? Life is for yourself, and you have to live it the way it makes 
you feel best. If sometimes you don’t agree with certain things, you don’t have 
to do them (3G Federico).
What gives my life meaning? I think doing the things I want, trying to impose 
my own style, leaving your mark in life, what motivates me the most is doing 
the things I feel make my life special. But I don’t find life much fun, because 
you’re forced to live it and you’re not given many options to do anything else, 
you have to do the same as everybody else, that’s something so strong that it’s 
difficult to change. I think that everybody disagrees with this being forced to 
study, to work, to have kids (3G Francisco).
The value attributed to originality and being in charge of one’s life is epitomised in 
the third generation’s extensive use of the notion of the proyecto22. Everybody has to 
craft and pursue his or her own proyecto, that is, a self-tailored, endeavour 
undertaken over time to create a unique outcome. But these are not revolutionary, all- 
encompassing dreams. They are practical and concrete proyectos.
If, as Taylor (1989:373) maintains, aesthetics refers to the mode of experiencing or 
the quality of the experience involved, the grandchildren attach significant value and 
care to the form their existence takes; to the style of their way of life. The ‘look’, the
22 The nearest English equivalent to the word proyecto is probably the term “what you want to do”. It 
is akin to a plan, a way ahead.
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profession, and the neighbourhood of residence are all explicit forms of self- 
expression; they are all ways of presenting and knowing the self. Through material 
crafting, in this generation both the female and male bodies become iconic sites of 
identity performance. The values of uniqueness, originality and creativity are 
accomplished by ‘playing’ with ways of dressing and appearing:
Sometimes I buy weird clothes because I’m a bit weird in my way of being... I 
try not to wear a uniform and end up dressed like the rest, in the grunge style, 
the punk wave, like everybody else. I imagine that I might dress like other 
people but I dress as I like and not according to fashionable stereotypes (3G 
Francisco).
One has an aesthetic experience when dressing... clothes in themselves don’t 
say anything, the meaning comes when you wear them... I can dress nicely but 
without intent. I care a bit about what I wear, there may be some items that 
symbolise something, and because I wear them and choose them they might be 
more beautiful... Lately I haven’t taken much care. I’ve begun to wear the 
uniform (3G Cristobal).
Also most grandchildren present their profession as a source of self-exploration and 
as a means for expressing who they take themselves to be. Their university careers 
were something they chose, something that gave them ‘an angle from where to 
observe and relate to the world’. The overwhelming representation of artistic 
professions among my small number of cases gives an indication of the 
pervasiveness of this experiential and expressive self, and also of this generation’s 
attempts to blur the barrier between work and leisure—or what they refer as 
‘pleasure’ and ‘enjoyment’.
Finally, as we saw earlier in Federico’s rejection of ‘standards’, life paths themselves 
become aestheticised; their self-made form bears the traits of one’s uniqueness.
Some authors have associated the aesthetisation of the self to the commodification of 
everyday life (Featherstone 1990). But I would also argue that, in Chilean society, as 
in some post-communist Eastern European countries, for a post-political transition
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generation the aesthetisation of the self is a way of responding to the ‘external 
pressure’ to express oneself ideologically while remaining grounded in the value of 
self-expressiveness. Through her acting, Matilde is ‘trying to transmit what is 
happening in my times’. Matilde wrote her bachelor’s thesis about ‘current’ national 
problems. Cristobal developed his thesis around his sense of existing in a world 
without transcendence; he endeavours to render this feeling of intranscendence on his 
canvas without resorting to preconceived symbolisms. His paintings aim to salvage 
feelings from their subordination to reflection, thoughts or a shared consciousness. 
The youngest generation also uses expressive manifestations to distinguish itself 
from an over-politicised (60’s and 70’s) generation and an over-materialistic (80’s 
and 90’s) one.
5.2 Experiential self
The idea of the self that prevails in the grandchildren’s narratives no longer 
designates an attitude, as the grandparents’ stories did, but a way of being, an 
existential experience:
One is a soul, one is what one builds up, what one feels, what one lives (3G 
Cristobal).
The grandchildren associate personal identity with the ‘search for who I am’ as a 
particular human being:
I don’t know myself entirely... I mean I think nobody ever does fully, there is 
always something there that is changing, that is reflecting, now that I’m older I 
have realised more or less who I am because I have matured... [I have got] to a 
point of equilibrium where you are always yourself (3G Alejandro).
Whereas the grandparents achieved their idea of the good through deeds; the 
grandchildren do so through self-exploration, reflexivity and self-expression, all 
practices of the self that began early in life, as will be reviewed later in the section on
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childhood. As long as self-knowledge is produced, it has to be expressively 
articulated because it reveals one’s identity:
My two weaknesses are not being able to express my feelings and not being 
able to express my emotions. I think that it is vital for a person be able to 
express both of these (3G Andres).
A character’s self-worth depends upon the observance throughout life of the 
prevailing rules of conduct, regardless of the situations that arise. Contrasting with 
this tran-situational and stable character, for the grandchildren, the question of who I 
am is shaped throughout life by personal experiences which, in turn, become 
manifestations of my identity. Therefore, coming to know the self is a life-long 
enterprise and personal craft, a recurrent practice of self upon self. The self turns out 
to be an evolving entity:
The reflexive and sensitive dimensions have always been with me, and 
therefore, the ability to construct ideas and opinions (3G Cristobal).
Feelings, affects and the domain of the sensuous are primordial sources of self­
exploration, self-expression and self-reflexivity, thus “sensitising” the self and 
offering an alternative field of experience to that provided by the domain of the 
rational. The “sensitive” experience of the world is a key resource of identity 
construction. The grandchildren define the self, largely, as an experiential entity.
Among the activities the grandchildren value and therefore identify most with, are 
the tertulias23 with their friends. These are occasions for relaxation, safe self­
disclosure, testing out ideas, sketching collective proyectos and learning from people 
they admire, love and feel comfortable with. These are opportunities for ‘really being 
yourself:
In the tertulias with your friends you really express yourself through words in a 
comfortable environment (3G Cristobal).
23 Tertulia is an old-fashioned term, which this generation has revived. It refers to a gathering of close 
friends where the main activity is the friendly discussion of a number of topics.
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Friends are a key moral reference in grandchildren’s lives; they contribute to the 
definition of their moral horizons:
With my good mate I talk about it because he also has a girlfriend so 
sometimes he says, “I don’t know what to do”. He left last month for Europe 
and he was like “I don’t know whether I should end this relationship or not, 
because I’m leaving for two years, what would you do in my place?” And what 
I do is to try to get into common things, things that we both value, and 
sometimes also when you are inside a problem you can’t see it clearly (3G 
Federico).
The expression of affection between friends is paramount for the youngest 
generation. Even men, defying the still-pervasive macho culture, do not hesitate to 
show their appreciation of their male friends. Grandsons consider that the public 
display of such feelings is no longer inappropriate, and thus, the equation between 
lack of manhood and public exhibition of physical affection begins to disintegrate:
With my male friends sometimes, on special occasions, we say goodbye and 
kiss each other on the cheek... I really don’t mind what the guy next door 
might think. I’m also affectionate with my male friends (3G Federico).
My father never... He is not into kisses... [He is more into] hand-shaking and 
shoves; tough-guy things. With my friends I’m not like that, I’m very caring, I 
hug them like I hug my girlfriends (3G Cristobal).
In Andres’s earlier quote, he identifies the inability to express himself as a 
‘weakness’. Let us remember that second-generation Carmen sees her tendency ‘to 
put herself second to others’ as a ‘weakness’ while the first generation speaks of 
‘weaknesses’ when referring to ‘vicious’ (male) activities such as gambling, 
womanising or drinking. The changing meaning of what constitutes a personal 
weakness reflects the shift towards interiorisation.
In this way, the attributes Cristobal chooses to define himself are very distant from 
those selected by his grandfather Joaquin:
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I’m a creative, sensitive, affectionate and conscientious person (3G Cristobal).
[I’ve been a man of] sincere faith, right-acting and always at the service of the 
poor (1G Joaquin).
5.3 Liberalism of neutrality
The grandparents, especially grandmothers, emphasise how little space the prevailing 
notion of the good leaves for personal thoughts and wishes. At the opposite end of 
the scale, the grandchildren seldom recognise external determinations in the design 
of their lives. ‘I want to assume that who I am is who I’ve wanted to be,’ Cristobal 
affirms. ‘I set my own challenges, these are no challenges imposed by anybody (...) 
I’m the one who’s taken the options,’ explains Federico. It is as hard to believe that 
no grandparent ever defied expectations as it is to believe that all the grandchildren’s 
life decisions have been freely taken. Both cases exemplify how the respective notion 
of the good guides and penetrates the argumentative lines of the biographical 
narrative. They also give indications of the mechanics of self-coherence defined by 
each self-configuration. In an epoch where people are supposed to choose their 
values, the grandchildren’s self-articulation processes follow the same strategy as the 
grandparents’ but with a different purpose. Whereas the idee force in the 
grandparents’ times could be summarised as ‘do what ought to be done and if you 
don’t, never admit it’; for the youngest generation it is a matter of ‘doing what you 
have chosen to do and if you have not made that choice freely, don’t admit it’.
The grandchildren have had an unprecedented opportunity to choose ‘what I want’. 
But also, as never before, they have had to be aware of their options and priorities 
and defend their choices. This within a prevailing discourse in which choice paves 
the road to happiness and existential predicaments are a matter of personal 
meaningfulness and not of social conformity, or what Matilde below calls ‘social 
pressure’:
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Regarding men... I see pictures of my father when young ... I think that at that 
time it was much harder to be who you wanted to ... too much social pressure... 
my university classmates couldn’t care less when people called them fags, 
homosexuals, it didn’t matter to them, but in those times it wasn’t that easy 
(3G Matilde).
Thus, for the grandchildren, decision-making is a sensitive endeavour, not only 
because they are personally responsible for their choices but also because choices are 
interpreted as signs of personal identity. This is the reason this generation gives for 
considering it morally wrong to be ‘ambiguous’ or ambivalent. Consequently, moral 
tension arises as a result of the ‘pressure to take a stand’ (what they call the 
requirement to ‘define oneself) on the one hand, and the effort to avoid commitment 
to anything (as this amounts to ‘quemarse,24 or ‘burning bridges’), on the other hand. 
This is especially difficult when the idea that the ultimate goal in life is the fulfilment 
of duties gives way to the notion that life has to be ‘enjoyed’, and that enjoyment 
depends on the chances of following personal inclinations.
Although the grandchildren greatly value the wider range of opportunities they have 
had to build their lives and have enjoyed the overall environment of freedom and 
‘respect for the individual’, they also detect a trap within that gain: ‘diversity 
confuses’, especially when prevailing discourses attach value to people’s capacity to 
freely make choices in life. On the one hand, the diversification of opportunities 
leads towards relativism, a loss of parameters, a sense of ‘disorientation’ about what 
the normal or standard means and how the good and the right should be defined and, 
on the other, it makes the grandchildren feel vulnerable and constantly ‘exposed’ to 
both ‘good and bad influences’.
I think it is difficult to hold your values correctly nowadays, there are clashes, 
one perceives pressure, demands, you’re asked to betray your values a bit, it’s 
complex, there is no common line for everybody, today there are many more 
lines, so it’s easier to clash with those lines (3G Alejandro).
24 Verb. Literally ‘burning oneself up’. Akin to “burning one’s bridges”. In decision-making, the 
choice of one alternative automatically deactivates the others and implies a commitment to the 
selected option. This reduces room for manoeuvre and thus one ‘bums oneself up’.
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One of the sorrows running through Alejandro’s narrative —his ‘cross’, his ‘karma’, 
as he puts it— is the need, as a future physician, to overcome his personal insecurity:
As a physician you can be introverted but you cannot be insecure in your way 
of acting, in your relationship with patients and colleagues, in your diagnoses 
(3G Alejandro).
But the exposure to alternative orientations —what he calls ‘lines’— drives him to 
‘continually question’ his standards. The prevailing moral context makes it difficult 
‘for you to get to your own stuff. Alejandro sometimes cannot hear his inner voice 
or give it precedence:
‘I would like to have more self-confidence, in the sense that if somebody comes 
with an alternative vision to the one I have, I can be confident enough to 
evaluate that alternative and come up with a result... Because generally I lean 
towards what the other person says ... that’s the wrong attitude’ (3G Alejandro).
Diversity, then, can represent a pitfall, making it difficult to stick to one’s moral 
stances over time. Thus it becomes ‘easy’ to disrespect oneself. ‘Harming myself 
costs me nothing,’ remarks Matilde.
The situation is worsened by the fact that, in the realm of authenticity, ‘modem 
people’ are supposed to refrain from delivering strong judgements about others. The 
realm of authenticity promotes what Taylor calls ‘liberalism of neutrality’. The 
spaces in which we coexist should be devoid of moral motivations. One ought not to 
pass judgement on other people’s values. But self-recognition alone is not sufficient 
for self-affirmation; today, like before, qualitative distinctions are traceable only 
though the social (as associations). Hence, there is no way for the social —or human 
beings’ participation in it— to remain objectified for long. This is the limitation on 
the notion of being oneself as a moral source of the self.
Despite their attempts to keep normative components out of their statements, the 
grandchildren’s stories attest to their dependence upon external valuations, showing 
the influence of other people’s moral criteria in the definition of personal
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orientations. In their working careers, for example, the grandchildren reveal a 
constant ambivalence between the way they present themselves and the type of 
information they give in their narratives. On the one hand, they make self-confident 
statements such as: ‘I’m the one who defines my alternatives and goals’, ‘I pursue 
what I consider relevant, not what others impose’. On the other hand, they feel the 
pressure of coping with the most competitive labour market ever. Matilde, for 
instance, explains that she has at least three alternatives for developing her career as 
an actress: academia, community workshops and acting. But, among her colleagues, 
these ‘options’ have different values. A respectable actress has to work in plays; the 
rest are secondary jobs. Those doing dramatic art workshops, for example, are seen 
as housewives and mothers that lack the time or the courage to take their profession 
seriously. Among her colleagues, ‘when they ask you “what are you doing?” and you 
are not acting, you are doing nothing’, she explains. But what Matilde likes most is 
community work. Despite her self-assured comments, when asked how she nurtures 
her confidence she replied, ‘keeping myself up-to-date acting in a play’. She regains 
self-confidence working in the sub-discipline her colleagues value the most. 
Likewise, Cristobal recounts how seeing other friends choosing to study fine arts 
reaffirmed his own choice: ‘I felt supported’, ‘I wasn’t the weird one’, ‘there were 
others taking the same path’.
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CHAPTER SIX— MAIN MOTIF AND THE ORGANIZATION OF THE 
NARRATIVE OF THE SELF
This chapter aims to capture the changing form of moral self-constitution as it 
manifests in the organization of the personal story. As mentioned in part one, for this 
I conceive biographical accounts as technologies of the self, that is, as a series of 
procedures through which the storyteller works upon his or her story in order to 
configure a certain mode of being. Specifically, I explore the main motif behind the 
narrative, the genre imprinted on the tale, the modalities of self-enunciation and the 
storyteller’s approach to the narrative work. Here, rather than a thematic analysis of 
excerpts of interview material as in the previous substantive chapters, I focus on the 
complete interview transcript and treat the story itself as the object of study.
6.1 Main narrative motif
It is argued that personal narratives are told as moral tales (Plummer 2001), 
recounted as stories of achievement, transformation or “quest” (Gergen 1992). The 
stories I collected are no exception. They are historias de superacion. They all 
manifest the storyteller’s concern with being a better person and achieving happiness 
in the course of existence. In this section, I examine the redefinition of the rhetoric of 
the good life over time, by analysing the main motif, interpretive key or meta- 
narrative underpinning the organization of the personal account.
6.1.1 The ‘struggle to make something of oneself
The grandparents storied the self through a social narrative of material progress. The 
idea of ‘becoming another person’ is the central narrative drive. This 
“transformation” of the self does not depend on an inner search nor is it about 
overcoming emotional deprivation, despite the lack of individual attention, affection
25 Tales of achievement or adversity overcome.
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and emotional support evident in many of their childhood stories. Their quest aims to 
change initial living conditions through material progress and social advancement so 
as to give one’s family ‘a different life’.
This goal underpins the idea of surgir26 —literally ‘to arise’— which is at the base of 
many of the grandparents’ stories. Basically, surgir means to move up a social class. 
‘Looking for greater wellbeing’, ‘a change of life’, ‘carrying on building and 
building’, ‘coming to have a lot’, ‘climbing higher’, ‘changing economic status’, 
‘living better’, ‘going further than your forebears’ or becoming a ‘superior’ person 
are all concepts semantically linked to surgir. Even Anselmo, a union-leader who 
feels ‘deep affection’ for ‘my class, the working class’, believes that human 
betterment is achieved through social mobility. He is convinced that, if they had been 
upper-class, his children could have been better people:
I would have given my family —my sons, my daughters— another standard of 
living, they wouldn’t be what they are, they are not bad people, not at all, but I 
mean, giving them another class, a superior one, for them to be better (1G 
Anselmo).
The success symbols of modem society —income, class, status— signal the 
attainment of social respect: a position in the ‘middle class’, ‘owning my own house’ 
in ‘a good —decent— neighbourhood’, ‘being able to afford my children’s studies’ 
and ending life feeling proud of the ‘palaces’ in which the children live today, are all 
indicative of a successful quest:
You should see the palace they have [daughter and son-in-law], because it’s a 
palace, so beautiful... I like that, I like that.
O: That they have the means to buy things?
Yes. I tell them, “Congratulations, let’s hope God gives you more everyday”... 
My children progressed in life, that’s why I’m happy (1G Guillermo).
26 The struggle to get ahead, to make something of oneself, the will to improve.
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Upper-middle class grandparents use the same symbols. Joaquin starts his story by 
introducing his family as enlightened landowners of European origins. Land, 
education and status ensured a ‘very easy life’, ‘without much suffering’:
I think it is important to tell you first about the origins of my family and about 
its social class. On my father’s side my surname is Brown, an English surname. 
My great grandfather [served in the UK government]. He came to Chile in the 
early nineteenth century, married and had 11 children. Many died young, the 
youngest is my grandfather. My grandmother is Spanish on both sides. My 
grandfather was not a professional but he was clever and spoke French and 
English. My grandmother inherited some land [in the south of Chile], we 
inherited a third of it. This land plays a very important role in our lives because 
we lived there our youth until we gave it up in 1977...That land had 36 houses 
for the workers. The land was in the family’s hands for over 120 years. My 
mother was the daughter of a member of [a high public office], her grandfather 
was President of [high public office], a very clever family. On my mother’s 
grandmother’s side there are also English people, so I calculate that I’ve got 
one fourth English blood (1G Joaquin).
In a number of stories a ‘triumphant life’ is linked to having a great number of 
friends and acquaintances. This shows that one is known and respected, and able to 
keep these loyalties, by solving different needs one’s friends may have. A diverse 
network indicates a person’s social standing and influence:
In my view we were very happy... look, everywhere I went I had friends (1G 
Guillermo).
Those friends would gather for the last farewell, as they did for Margarita’s 
husband’s memorial service. To illustrate Alberto’s successful life, Margarita recalls 
the ‘people lining the funeral cortege for blocks and blocks’ as if it had been the 
‘funeral of a figure of authority’.
Social advancement is grounded in a notion of history as a linear progression and in a 
sense of confidence regarding the possibilities society offers for achieving a
167
satisfactory standard of living. Among those with a lower socioeconomic 
background, the idea of self-improvement through social mobility also conveys a 
civilising element:
We started with that idea that our children wouldn’t be like little animals 
running around adrift like dogs; we gave them a Christian education to become 
professionals (1G Jose).
‘Hard work’, ‘sacrifice’, ‘suffering’, ‘major efforts’, ‘will’, ‘seriousness’, 
‘responsibility’ and ‘perseverance’ are the values that strengthen the moral basis of 
the self. ‘Without effort’ —says Laura— ‘one gets nothing.’
There are two paths... if you don’t work, don’t study, don’t follow the right 
path there is the other [path] leading towards delinquency... laziness, laziness 
leads to delinquency, so there was no way to get confused (1G Anselmo).
A culture of endurance underlies this generation’s moral economy: having ‘una vida 
machucada’ (“a bruised life”) (Guillermo), 'una vida aporreada* (“a life full of 
blows”) (Ricardo), a ‘long-suffering life’ (Laura) or a ‘life of struggle’. This is the 
good life, ‘as it prepares you for everything’ (Laura).
To the grandparents, life is not something enjoyable but a ‘tough’ reality to 
surmount. The heroic tone imprinted upon their narratives helps to represent this idea 
of the good. Sometimes hyper-realistically, the grandparents describe their capacity 
to overcome hardship without anybody’s help. When Margarita married Alberto they 
were ‘poor as rats’ and had to ‘start from scratch’. Asking no one for help, ‘owning 
not so much as a pencil’, they ‘came to have a lot’.
Let me take Guillermo’s story as an example. Guillermo entitled his biography ‘A 
Life of Much Work and Suffering’. ‘Our life,’ he elaborates, ‘was only about work, 
suffering, forced work, all that.’ The use of the possessive adjective “our” signals the 
collective nature of this quest. Social advancement is a family endeavour, headed by
168
Guillermo but demanding the engagement of all its members. In this enterprise, the 
family ought to be like a ‘ship’, everyone working towards the same goal, as Ricardo 
explains. Guillermo threads the events of his life along his working trajectory, as do 
all the grandfathers. Labour and, particularly, physical labour was the only resource a 
poor man had to ‘become someone different’. The centrality of work —whether paid 
or domestic— in this generation’s quests shapes the conception of the self as a doer 
or maker.
The first self-image Guillermo recounts is that of a poor six-year-old boy, living in 
the countryside in the outskirts of the metropolitan region, with a working mother, 
many siblings and no father, walking miles every day to the estate where he served 
as a peasant labourer. Wearing no shoes, only hojotitas.21 Then he minutely describes 
every job he did after moving to Santiago in his adolescence: courier to a rich family, 
building-site worker, fruit picker, factory worker, mine worker, manager of the mine 
dinning-hall and finally a restaurant owner. He describes how he seized every job he 
was offered, even if it made ‘his body bleed’ and he ‘had to sleep on the floor’, had 
no proper contract, was at his employer’s mercy and had no holidays. The main 
capital of a manual or industry worker is bodily strength (Urresti 2007: 283-85). A 
body able to bear pain and long hours of physical work. Like Guillermo, other 
grandfathers use corporeal references to speak of their working endurance. In his 
youth, mine worker Jose thought nothing of taking two shifts in a row: ‘I was 
healthy enough’ and the job ‘was ingrained in my skin’, it was ‘the air that I 
breathed’.
Guillermo’s story says that not only hard work but also his respectful, humble and 
humanitarian attitudes earned him the respect of his superiors, to the extent that the 
boss often ended up loving him ‘as a father does his son’. In some of his jobs, this 
huacho28 found the father who had been absent from his own family, while the love 
and care of the boss’s wife compensated the absence of his caring mother. As shown 
by this association between working milieu and family, the public character of the 
grandparents’ narratives does not necessarily mean they are stories of formal and 
anonymous relationships.
27 Traditional flip-flops typically used by country people.
28 Literally “orphan” (see chapter three, footnote 3).
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At the end of his story Guillermo reflects:
I never thought that I would get where I got, never ever. Imagine: working in 
the fields wearing hojotitas, then the pit, then being the owner of the dining hall 
and then I bought the restaurant here [in Santiago]. How could I ever imagine 
all that? All that in just one life (1G Guillermo).
Nowadays, Guillermo lives in his comfortable house in a flourishing middle-class 
neighbourhood. He works part-time as a council gardener, not for the salary, as was 
the case in his youth, but to keep busy and active:
I’m happy because I eat what I like, I lack for nothing, by the grace of God. I 
live happily nowadays (1G Guillermo).
After experiencing ‘what poverty really is’, and ‘suffering a great deal’, today 
Guillermo can return to his land of origin transformed into ‘a different person’, a 
‘superior’ man:
When one leaves his land, one leaves with the ambition of being someone 
different, and of coming back to one’s land as a superior [being]. If you left 
wearing shabby trousers, you would want to come back wearing a good suit 
(1G Guillermo).
Dress is a sign of respectability. He has lived a heroic life.
6.1.2 Personal growth
Whereas the grandparents constitute the moral domain by telling realistic stories of 
traversing hardships; the parents recount impressionistic narratives about facing 
turning points and overcoming traumas and trancas (hang-ups). They draw on a 
sense of psychological interiority to build their biographical stories. At the core of 
this generation’s narratives there is a quest for ‘personal growth’. A state of health, 
solace and a meaningful and fulfilling life are sought not through the transformation
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of material circumstances, but through learning to come to terms with one’s story 
and gaining self-reflexivity and self-understanding.
Whereas the grandparents’ quests revolve around economic resources —money, 
jobs, goods, houses, neighbourhoods and networks— the middle generation assemble 
their narratives with personal relationships, ties and bonds. When the moral sources 
of the self rely on external figures, the public realm is a central space of narrative 
production. Much of grandparents’ accounts concern their public life: their working 
trajectory and their community life (even family memories are tied to larger social 
spaces such as the neighbourhood). The parents, in contrast, set large sections of 
their narratives within the intimate space of the family.
The working trajectory was the connector of Guillermo’s story. Second-generation 
Elena has worked since she was young, and in a number of occasions she has been 
the main provider for her immediate family. Yet, unlike Guillermo, she articulates 
her story through psychological ‘traumas’; emotionally threatening events that had 
long-lasting effects on her psychical make-up. Through these traumas Elena also 
establishes temporal links between adolescence, youth and maturity and constructs 
the portrayal of her family and marriage.
Elena’s account starts with ‘the first big blow of my life’, one of the ‘shocks of my 
life’ —an unexpected change of school due to the family’s straightened 
circumstances. The second school enjoyed a lower status, but the trauma was not 
socio-economic. Elena presents the change of school as an emotionally stressful 
event that abruptly transformed her everyday environment and the landscape of her 
relationships; it threatened her familiar world and represented the ‘first’ moment in 
life where she felt displaced, helpless, confused and insecure:
The day before the start of term my mother says, “Darling, you aren’t going to 
your school tomorrow”... In the other school they welcomed me very well, but 
after 12 years I was suddenly in a new school, can you imagine? My life-long 
classmates, and then, finding myself in a new thing, I swear it was a huge blow 
for me, it was one of those things that have marked my life, from one moment
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to the next seeing yourself in another environment, in another school, with 
other classmates, I knew nobody (2G Elena).
Elena discloses a second trauma in response to a general question about her family 
memories. As the oldest child, the teenage Elena had to care for her seven siblings 
and the home while her parents were at work. Whereas the grandparents take this as 
the most ‘natural’ and unquestioned of duties, Elena considers that such a ‘burden’ 
should not be an adolescent’s responsibility. In her case, it caused a ‘trauma’ that 
disrupted the relationship with her mother and siblings and her own identity:
My family life was a chaos, I mean, ehhh, a chaos in the sense that I think that, 
this part is really difficult for me [Elena starts crying] the thing is that it was a 
huge burden for me, you see, ehh, I dislike it because it has brought 
consequences to my adult life... my parents worked, I’m the eldest of eight, so 
in a way I was the mother of my siblings ...One of the things I have worked 
upon in life is that period of my life when [I had to] assume the responsibility 
for that household [a responsibility] I shouldn’t have had to assume... It meant 
I didn’t have a youth. It made the relationship with my siblings inexistent... It’s 
been hard to get rid of this baggage, and not to keep reproaching my mother as 
I did at one point. I had this strong feeling against her “why is she saying that 
she doesn’t like her household?”... I used to think she worked to evade the 
mess the eight of us made, so I had to bear the mess... and that shit fucked me 
up, it really fucked me up a lot, and it marked me very much... until this very 
day (2G Elena).
These responsibilities prevented her from enjoying her youth, and placed Elena and 
her siblings in different positions. They never shared or did things together: ‘we were 
and are absolutely different’, ‘I’m the isolated one’. ‘I feel they have a kind of 
resentment towards me because of this role’ —and in turn, she feels resentment 
towards her mother because Elena had to assume a responsibility that was her 
mother’s.
Over the years Elena has worked upon this event of her biography in search of 
‘personal growth’. She has worked through her negative emotions and the
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relationship with her mother and siblings. She has also elaborated an interpretation 
with which to confront her pain and is deeply aware of the possible influences of this 
trauma upon her own maternal role:
The anger built up and built up and it began to take me over and I began to take 
it away through therapies, personal therapies of personal growth, I’ve got rid of 
this baggage, and I’ve tried to understand why it happened (2G Elena).
She has embarked on what other members of this generation call a ‘healing process’, 
trying to be at peace with her story and, thus, with herself.
Finally, Elena recounts the trauma of her marital separation, telling through it the 
story of her immediate family. Three years ago, Marcelo, Elena’s husband, lost his 
job. He moved to the south to start a new business. Once there, Marcelo began to 
neglect his family, he rarely visited them, and Elena had to make all the effort to 
keep their relationship going. Left alone in Santiago, in charge of the home and their 
three children, Elena felt overwhelmed and disheartened. After some months she 
decided to split up with him. But during these years they have come together and 
separated a number of times. The future looks uncertain. Elena no longer knows what 
she needs him for. In his absence, she became the ‘man’ of the house, providing for 
the children both economically and emotionally. She misses his company but she is 
also enjoying living a life of her own.
Constructing her story from trauma to trauma, Elena presents her identity as the 
result of disruptive events and of all the personal traits they have imprinted on her: 
being courageous and never disheartened, having strength of spirit, becoming ‘a 
man’ and taking the lead if necessary. Elena entitled her story as ‘A life that has not 
been easy, nor boring’; there is always a lesson to learn from the events of one’s life. 
Learning about oneself is a basic condition for structuring a sense of inner 
integration. The biographical narrative articulates a sense of psychological continuity 
and helps to cope with life.
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6.1.3 Moral independence
When the moral sources of the self are articulated from within, the life story becomes 
a laboratory to test out ideas of one’s own making about fundamental questions of 
human existence. The grandchildren comprehend life through the idea of the 
proyecto29 and undertake narrative works as an experiment. In the third generation 
the self becomes the object of problematisation.
The quest grounding these stories is about ‘getting to be oneself’, in the sense of 
being able to construct your personal account of human existence and to apply your 
moral views to life’s affairs. It is important that ‘you get to your own answers’, you 
‘do what you really believe’ and you get to ‘the point of equilibrium, where you are 
always yourself, as Alejandro explains. This requires ‘self-examination’ and ‘self- 
knowledge’. These are requirements for the relation of self upon self when the 
measure of the good is articulated from within. This is particularly important when 
self-knowledge is perceived to be a never-ending process: ‘there is always something 
changing, something being questioned’. Thus, ‘gaining experience’, i.e., coming to 
know one’s reactions in diverse settings, becomes a constitutive part of the quest.
The significance of exposing oneself to diverse experiences is also associated with 
the importance of ‘having more stories to tell’ (Javiera). A large and diverse set of 
stories gives proof of an exciting life. Extreme experiences, such as being in prison 
for two days, were recounted in minute detail (Francisco spent half an hour of his 
interview on this).
If the first generation strives to describe normal, flat and nothing-out-of-the-ordinary 
types of lives, the third emphasizes the depiction of diverse, exciting, interesting, 
extraordinary stories. Significant trips, mystical experiences, moments of realization 
or epiphany attest to this. In fact, the grandchildren’s narratives can be interpreted as 
a “deroutinisation of the mundane” (Beck and Beck 2002). Life should be fun and 
enjoyable; ‘routine’, repetition, ‘standard’ biographies and ‘plain and monotonous’ 
lives certainty are not.
29 See chapter five.
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If the moral voice behind the stories of the parents is largely of a psychological 
character, in the grandchildren it is predominantly cognitive or intellectual. 
References to the ‘head’ and the ‘brain’ indicate where their concerns rest. Cristobal, 
for instance, speaks of ‘that chip they put in your brain’ in reference to the 
inculcation of moral orientations by social institutions such as school and church. 
The image of the ongoing inner discussion is also of common use.
Federico’s narrative, to take an example, is saturated with a grammar of moral 
independence. His story affirms that he got to be the person he wanted to be. It says 
how the decisions taken, the options chosen, and the views he holds have been 
largely of his own making. His story is a testimony to the value this generation 
attributes to making decisions independently of external influences.
As in previous generations, Federico starts his story introducing himself in the 
context of his immediate family. However, he uses the descriptors of class, status and 
religion to set himself apart from the collective imperatives that shaped previous 
generations’ lives:
I was bom here in Santiago, to a traditional family. My parents were married 
and already had two girls, my two elder sisters, and obviously I don’t 
remember much about that period.
O: What do you mean by traditional family ?
I mean a couple married by the Church, one who does things the proper way.
O: Like what?
Eehh, like what we can call high society [he used the English term] in this 
country, I don’t subscribe to that but I was bom into that kind of family, they 
took me to Mass every Sunday... That’s what I mean by traditional values, 
[values] too based upon [what] the Church [says] (3G Federico).
These are not subjectifiers Federico wants to inherit; ‘the family issue is not mine, I 
was bom into that family’, he specifies. However, in order to affirm his position, 
throughout his narrative, Federico places himself counter to the traditional, 
conventional, standard or classic way of life. Although he wants to break free from 
external referents, he cannot tell the story of a young man with the capacity and the
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‘need for independence’ without drawing on the moral framework that he opposes. 
This is another example of the limits of a liberalism of neutrality, this time at the 
level of the organization of the biographical narrative (see chapter five).
When recalling his school days, Federico says that he set himself the goal of being 
aware of the values his Catholic school was inculcating in the students. Later on he 
reflects:
I was very anarchic in that system, but in reality I was only a freer person, I 
would have liked not to fight that much, but I also like that... having reasons 
for fighting... If I’d had more freedom I would have fought for things well 
beyond (3G Federico).
As an undergraduate, and despite having food, shelter, money and care at his parents’ 
house, Federico moved away to live on his own. Once more he justifies this decision 
in terms of the ‘values of independence’ and ‘self-reliance’ — ‘to arrange things on 
my own’— and the importance of ‘living in a space that is completely mine, with my 
stuff and my rhythm, because what I study and do don’t obey normal schedules’. 
The lifestyle of his choice is different than the one most Chileans follow today:
O: How do you see the Chilean adults?
Ehhe, in general, strongly driven by material things, don’t know, the option for 
a lifestyle, they are so like “I want this lifestyle” and they do everything in their 
power to get that. They live for that, around that model, and for that model.
O: What model is that?
The model... I don’t know, if you studied business, to work and get your 
money, your house, your cool car, like that... like a standard of living that I 
don’t know.
O: What is that you value in life?
My lifestyle, that I’m a pleasure-seeker, I do the things I like (3G Federico).
The ‘fight’ of the grandparents defines a culture of endurance, of traversing many 
sacrifices and experiencing great suffering to achieve a better standard of living for 
their family. What Federico has to overcome are others’ attempts to impose their
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views and dogmas about what would be a good life for him. He has to counter other 
people’s desire to interfere in his moral deliberations and restrict his scope for action.
6.2 Interview setting, modalities of self-enunciation and narrative genre
In chapter two I claimed that selves are constructed ‘in’ and ‘through’ personal 
stories. Telling who I am as a self has to do with the ‘whats’ as much as with the 
‘hows’ of story-making. I also touched briefly on the question of the situated 
character of personal narratives. Plot lines, rhetorical devices, modalities of self­
enunciation, narrative genre and, more generally, the interviewees’ approach to the 
narrative work, are some of the techniques with which the self is presented in the 
organization of a narrative.
This relation between the ‘hows’ of narrative construction and selfhood can be 
approached from different angles. Plummer (2001), for example, analyses story­
lines, genres, plots, characters and tropes to understand how people interpret the way 
their lives develop: this he calls “narratives of life patterns” (for other approaches see 
Bochner and Ellis (2000) and the “ethnographic narrative” or Hostein and Gubrium 
(2000) and the life story as an “interpretative practice”).
In this section I analyse issues of narrative organization, such as the predominant 
form of self-enunciation and the genre imprinted on the narratives over time. In a 
personal story, the modality of self-enunciation informs about the storyteller’s 
position as a moral agent, it gives a notion of the subject of ethical reflection (‘one’) 
(Lakoff and Collier 2004). The narrative genre, meanwhile, tells us about the 
storyteller’s form of moral reasoning. Following Riessman, by genre I mean “types 
of narrative that are distinguished by a set of constitutive conventions and codes of 
presentation, including verb tense, temporality, sequencing, discourse markers, and 
other linguistic elements” (1990:1196). I also discuss some elements of the 
interaction between storyteller and interviewer, such as the interviewees’ approach to 
the narrative work to establish further connections between personal narratives and 
changing conceptions of selfhood.
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6.2.1 Anecdotes
The fact that the grandparents tell heroic stories does not mean that they present 
themselves as extraordinary characters. Far from it, theirs have been ‘normal’ and 
‘flat’ lives. The genre of their stories and the role the grandparents assume in them 
attest to this.
In terms of genre, there is a preference for storying the self through the use of 
anecdotes and short stories. For example, Margarita’s is an events-based biography: 
each story introduces a momentary set of characters, and does not necessarily follow 
the previous tale in chronological or thematic terms. But Margarita, as the main 
character of each story, brings continuity to the general narrative. The use of this 
genre indicates that her story should be interpreted through her actions rather than 
her statements. The structure of the anecdotes also denotes that there is no need to 
understand Margarita’s whole life chronologically to deduce who she has been; her 
sense of self is not subjected to structural changes through life, nor is it the sum or 
the result of different vital stages, an entity that has evolved, or the subject of 
discovery or reflection. She takes herself to be basically the same person throughout 
life, therefore, any of these stories gives a sense of her identity. In fact, it is the 
recurrence of a message that constructs her self-portrait as a woman who had 
enormous energy and commitment for ‘doing’ things for herself and, principally, for 
others.
Most of Margarita’s anecdotes speak of reaching a goal by overcoming others’ 
impositions, opposition or even betrayals. In this sense, her anecdotes portray her 
very effectively in motion, as a doer self. But they also allow Margarita to present 
her achievements through the voices and actions of other characters. Margarita 
recognises her agency not overtly but covertly. Others speak of her courage, 
perseverance or active character. A first-person narrative would have sounded too 
boastful.
Through the anecdotes Margarita also transfers to the listener the task of extracting 
meaning from the detailed descriptions of the events with which she composes these 
stories. Remaining a “factual reporter” of her life, she avoids sharing personal
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opinions and feelings. As noted in chapter three, this generation’s idea of moral 
accountability has less to do with what their inner soul tells them than with the 
accomplishment of duty. The few times Margarita does offer some commentary she 
precedes it with: ‘this is my way of thinking; I don’t know whether it is right or 
wrong’. Margarita does not judge, reflect or evaluate herself or others explicitly and, 
therefore, keeps her life story very ambivalent. The other structure that supports her 
comments: is ‘I’m happy because I’ve given my all for others. My sister-in-law 
criticises me because I give everything’. She explains her stance but immediately 
adds that she has been criticised for it. The qualification exempts her from talking 
explicitly about her worth. Again, this would look too arrogant for her sense of 
dignity. The story of how Margarita worked to better her neighbourhood illustrates 
these points:
When they sold us the land, they said they had development plans for the 
neighbourhood, but eventually poor people settled there... it was difficult. [The 
neighbourhood] didn’t have water or electricity supplies... so we started doing 
[things], as I tell you, without knowing how to write or read, I first 
concentrated on getting the water, then it occurred to me to get the electricity, 
and then it occurred to me to clean up that [illegal] landfill ... it was only me, 
because the ladies had all the time to go around chatting, at the butcher’s, at the 
shops, but when it came to doing things for their homes: “no, I don’t have 
time” ...[To get the political support] I promised to vote for the socialist 
candidate... and I also promised to vote for the conservative... Mr Fernandez 
[the mayor] didn’t want to help... So I gathered all the children I found on the 
streets and in an industry close by ... the owner allowed the workers to 
demonstrate ... so everybody stood in front of the press... Do you know what 
the cause of all this was? A dead person... when this person died I went to his 
home to say my prayers, when I came in everything was black... suddenly I 
realised that it was black because it was full of flies!! [attracted by the rubbish] 
so I approached the deceased and said to him, “I swear I will get that landfill 
cleaned up”... I gave my word to a dead man, so I had to keep it... and the 
mayor accepted.... The dead man gave me the courage [to talk with the
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politicians]... Eventually I got the water, the electricity and they did away with 
the landfill (1G Margarita).
Margarita speaks of her agency: her courage to talk to politicians despite her 
illiteracy. She speaks of her capacity to move the masses and organise a public 
demonstration, her awareness of the power of the media in the management of 
conflicts. She does not explicitly acknowledge these attributes as her own; she was 
‘empowered’ by a ‘dead person’ to whom she owed a promise. Margarita hides 
behind the structure of her narrative. Yet, this does not prevent her from telling of her 
agentic life through the voices of others.
I asked all the interviewees to write their obituaries. Margarita’s reads: “Margarita 
Urrutia, widow of Mr Riquelme”. I not only found this response too short to describe 
the remarkable life of a businesswoman, local leader and mother bom into the lower- 
middle class at the beginning of the twentieth century, but I also found it unfair to 
give all the merit to her husband by choosing to be remembered by his name. After 
all, she had mixed feelings towards him. She says that they achieved everything 
together, but implicitly she also identifies him as an obstacle: he was a gambler who 
often left her alone at night with five children; he was a womaniser who cheated on 
her and he was better at socialising than at business. Her obituary puzzled and 
disappointed me. ‘That’s all?’ I spontaneously replied. ‘Yes, what more would there 
be?’ she firmly answered. It is not part of Margarita’s sense of self to claim 
authorship of her achievements. That is not in the vocabulary of motifs of the ‘lady’ 
she aspired to be.
Quoting the voices of others, using an active mode of speech and re-enacting past 
events, Margarita also adds facticity to her narrative. Among the first generation 
there is a concern —which vanishes in their descendants’ stories— to be ‘true’ to the 
facts as they were. Life is a factual reality and so is the tone of its narrative. Indeed, a 
number of them equated the experience of delivering their personal stories with the 
practice of the Catholic confession, that is, a confidential act of healing of the soul. 
As if they were before a priest, they strove for accuracy, veracity and ‘honesty’ in the 
rendering of their accounts. In the telling of one’s life, there is a ‘truth’ to reveal:
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It would have been very easy for me to totally change some part of my life, and 
tell you about it in another way, in a prettier, nicer way, but that’s not the 
idea... because there are many who hide the truth... because now they wear a 
white collar and tie they forget the past and want to tell of an exemplary life 
when it was not like that (1G Anselmo).
Playing the role of the reporter, in general, the grandparents delivered descriptive, 
literal and often hyper-realist life narratives.
6.2.2 Soliloquies
If for the grandparents the sense of selfhood derived from being known by their 
deeds, for the middle generation knowing the self is intimately linked to the personal 
story constructed in response to the question of who I am. Selfhood and biographical 
narrative are coterminous. Each reflects and needs the other. To know the self is to 
know its story, and to know the story is to know the self. Therefore the sense of self 
depends largely on the personal narrative to be assembled.
Whereas the grandparents aimed for accuracy, for which too much interpretation was 
a distortion, middle-generation interviewees rendered their stories as impressionistic 
accounts, as they believe genuine tales of the self should be. The narrative 
experience, therefore, was not so much about looking back on the many facts of 
one’s life, as it was about looking inwards, towards ‘one’s-self to be able to speak of 
yo misma (myself). With the interiorisation of moral truth, emotions and inner 
thoughts become a genuine source of the self. The middle generation used the ‘I 
think’, ‘I believe’ and the ‘I feel’ structures regularly and interchangeable. They 
‘observed’ the self through the exploration of feelings, thoughts and actions.
This is consistent with a generation whose sense of selfhood derives from their 
reflections more than their actions. Indeed, the parents approached the narrativisation 
of life as an exercise in self-reflexivity, an opportunity for revisiting one’s interior 
and reassessing past views. Carmen, for instance, explicitly says that she undertook 
the construction of her narrative as a ‘self-introspective’ act. Her ‘self was the
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subject of observation, a practice that, although she has come to find necessary, she 
is unused to:
Just as I don’t often look at myself in the mirror, I don’t look at “my self’ too 
often (2G Carmen).
The parents and the grandchildren both took the interview as an opportunity to make 
themselves ‘heard’. The parents were especially sensitive to this, for a number of 
them described their personal contexts as providing little space for talking about 
themselves at any length. ‘Everyone wants to be heard,’ Ximena explained, ‘but 
nobody wants to do the listening.’ The problem, she adds, is that when you begin 
sharing a concern, it’s only a matter of time until the other starts taking over the 
conversation, weaving in her own troubles and leaving no room for your story. In 
this generation, the exercise in narrative work provides the ground for a social 
critique: current society is over-populated with speakers and in urgent need of 
listeners.
In fact, many second- and third-generation interviews likened the experience of 
telling their life to a psychological ‘therapy’. For example, at the end of Miguel’s 
interview, when we were evaluating the experience, he recalled an episode of his 
childhood that had been discussed during the interview:
As I told you, one of the moments that left a lasting mark was that thing my 
father told me, that I didn’t want to study... that thing marked me and maybe it 
still marks me, don’t know, maybe now I have accepted it, I have never told 
this to anybody before so I think that now I can be more at peace, at least I 
learnt to tell it (2G Miguel).
By applying what he takes to be the methodology of a therapeutic procedure —the 
disclosure of traumatic events and their integration into his sense of self, into his 
personal narrative— he gains an opportunity for self-healing. Through the interview, 
Miguel learned to ‘tell’, that is, to externalise or make sense of a harmful childhood 
experience that left a profound imprint on his sense of self. It is a personal 
responsibility to process the events of one’s life into a meaningful story. The listener,
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therapist or interviewer operates as a witness, a companion and a facilitator of the 
procedure. For Miguel, the main purpose of the interviews was to help me with my 
research, but in his remarks there are also signs of personal accomplishment. The 
saying of things that nobody else has heard and the sharing of a trauma was a 
liberating experience. Telling his story, Miguel gained ‘peace’. Rather than depicting 
certain truth, the job of the narrative is to reveal and help to construct the most 
meaningful and comprehensive account of one’s life.
The grandchildren produce critical views of psychology’s role in shaping people’s 
life narratives. Federico extends his generation’s disapproval of other people’s 
intrusion into the definition of moral standards to the ‘science’ that modernity has 
produced for dealing with the problems of the soul:
Because I don’t believe in them, I don’t think that somebody who is exterior to 
you can come and solve your life, I think that solutions are within you and the 
people around you. If you’re in good company you can solve your hang-ups, in 
fact psychology is a modem science (3G Federico).
The first generation, for its part, tends to disagree with the belief that ‘talking is 
always good’ (3G Matilde’s expression). In a way, the grandparents’ criticism is that 
talking is overrated. Laura, for example, finds nothing good in the ‘telling’ of her 
traumas:
Well, I lost the first baby after birth, it was a long delivery and it caused me... 
it made a big impact on me, but I kept going. As I tell you, for me things... I 
don’t know how to put it, I have accepted everything, considering that I have 
not had big things, I’m not a person to make a tragedy out of misfortune... it 
affects me more to have to recount it, to repeat the moment, because when 
things happen you just accept them and go on living (1G Laura).
Laura comments on the personal effects of recalling painful life events. The pain, 
however, does not arise because she has not confronted it; it is not a consequence of 
processing and integrating those traumas into her personal narrative. For somebody 
who ‘has always accepted everything’ without much ado (even the death of her first
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baby) that is an alien requirement. She does not feel the need to process her loss in 
those terms. Laura’s pain comes from the act of remembrance. At the beginning of 
our second interview, Laura told me that she had not slept well the night after telling 
her life story: ‘I dug through many things, I’m not used to this’. I asked what kind of 
thoughts kept her awake. ‘None,’ she replied, ‘it was just the memories, it seemed as 
if one was reliving them’. The grandparents say that the interviews made them relive 
things. The parents and grandchildren emphasise how remembrance made them 
‘think’.
The grandparents do not dwell on the effects that emotional wounds can have on 
their sense of self. When they got to a point in their stories where a sensitive issue 
was to be disclosed, typically they said very little. Thirty years ago, Anselmo lost his 
youngest son in a car accident. He recounts the event, tells of his deep sorrow and 
recalls how he sought solitude to cry out his grief. But sorrows, Anselmo concludes, 
‘have to be faced and then shouldered and you have to get on with life’. He leaves 
the event in the past, he does not dwell on the consequences of this loss for his later 
sense of selfhood. But the fact that sufferings are not thematised does not mean they 
are forgotten. Every morning for the past thirty years, Anselmo has commended 
himself into his son’s hands.
Despite their claimed unfamiliarity with introspection, in general, the parents 
delivered narratives that had been already thought over, stories that had been 
ruminated or reflected upon before. They are very fluent in the language of self­
reflection. This is well expressed in the tendency to structure their accounts around 
themes rather than chronology. As reviewed earlier, Elena connected her narrative 
through ‘traumas’. Pedro starts his with a synthetic introduction to his life organised 
around ‘key identity referents’, then proceeds to delve deeper into those themes in a 
dialogue with the interviewer (the synthetic overture was more of a monologue). 
Alvaro’s story jumped from childhood to adulthood, then back to adolescence time 
and again. Rather than the temporal structure of the narrative, what mattered to him 
was the description of an identity trait. Life stages are put at the service of these self­
descriptions. Even those who followed a chronological order, like Carmen, evoked 
different epochs to reconstruct interpersonal milieus (e.g., family or friendship). 
Others used the passing of time to signal existential discontinuities in their sense of
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self, those ‘marks’ that life has imprinted on Miguel’s identity. The prevalence of a 
thematic rather than a temporal structure is the narrative representation of this 
generation’s idea of the self as something that is constructed through an inner 
process. The time dimension in the history of personal growth evolves but also 
circulates; it goes back and also anticipates, it is an inner time whose point of 
reference is the hermeneutic effort of interpreting one’s life.
Thus, the genre traversing the parents’ narratives resembles a soliloquy or interior 
monologue, in which the narrator speaks his or her thoughts aloud, talking as if 
alone. This genre is characterised by the construction of enormous sentences with 
little punctuation. These long soliloquies are usually disquisitions on a topic. As a 
result, large tracts of the parents’ interviews are dominated by non-narrative forms.
The figure of the anecdote hands the task of interpretation over to the listener. A 
soliloquy, instead, provides the description of the event in the context of the 
narrator’s interpretation. The soliloquy is an interpretive endeavour. When I asked 
Elena about her father, she constructed this long and analytical response:
My dad was very aggressive... he never touched me, but he beat the hell out of 
my sisters... Despite everything, we had a good relationship the two of us, in 
fact we used to go out together. For example, I used to go to Chilian on 
holidays and he would come over to see me, then in Vina del Mar where I won 
a beach-beauty contest he came over to see the ceremony, quite proud, there 
you see, the thing is that dad was a very cool guy, in the sense that was 
easygoing, funny, friendly, he was really a joke, but he also had this other side 
that I don’t know whether it was a frustration he had, maybe it was because he 
was all ruined, penniless, maybe it was a way of evading his problems, having 
eight children, trying to make ends meet, you see? Dad was about to put on his 
shoes and they had no shoelaces because my brothers had taken them off, or he 
was about to put on the coat and it didn’t have the buttons. I analyse it now that 
I’m a grown-up because when I was young I was living amidst this chaos and 
you’re simply incapable of analysing things, but I see it now and I really say 
poor him, without a penny, his life was a bit of a misfortune, for a start at the 
weekends dad didn’t get up so I think that on top of everything else he was a bit
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depressed, dad would put on the headphones, there was a little radio and he was 
a football fan, he would spend the weekend listening to football games and 
wouldn’t get up (2G Elena).
Over the years, Elena reassessed the relationship with her father. The aggressive and 
depressive man was not a bad person; he was frustrated and overwhelmed. He simply 
could not cope adequately with life. The chaos notwithstanding, father and daughter 
managed to build up a good relationship. That is a positive thing. Today Elena seems 
at peace with her father. Talking about him she can even show compassion for the 
‘poor’ man.
6.2.3 Perspectivism
To satisfy the demand for self-description, the grandchildren also draw on the 
explanatory potential of personal narratives that have been assembled in the past or 
that were worked out during the interviews. But unlike their parents, they treat those 
accounts as provisional — as in a work in progress — mainly because they detect 
inconsistencies in their argumentative lines, holes in the development of their 
interpretations or an inability of their readings to fully represent what they are feeling 
or thinking. In the parents’ case there was a feeling of uneasiness towards society. 
Here, the sense of unease, urgency and sometimes exasperation comes from the 
experience of one’s own limitations in expressing one’s story.
The genre traversing the form of grandchildren’s tales could be termed 
perspectivism: the delineation of different vantage points from which to make 
assessments. Perspectivism operates when the ‘it all depends’ (Sofia) grows in 
significance, when the point of view is important in validating a proposition, when 
the predominant view is that ‘things are relative’ (Alejandro) and that evaluation 
depends on the context of occurrence. Perspectivism allows different, juxtaposing 
images of oneself to stand together. Below, Cristobal speaks of ‘reconfiguration’ of 
his moral standards when reflecting on an experience in which he hurt some friends. 
Seeing himself inflict harm on others introduces another self-image to the 
composition that is his sense of self. Perspectivism places the ‘more conservative
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man’ alongside the man who loses his sense of moral orientation (the man that falls 
into an unimagined ‘abyss’:
At one point I felt myself to be more conservative about those types of values, 
like I felt that I wouldn’t compromise ... Things have got more complicated, 
like everything has shades and you cross a little onto one side and a little onto 
the other ... like I feel that I’ll always be leaning sometimes towards some 
abyss or some crap, I don’t know, that might draw me and at the same time I 
think, shit if only I’d been firmer... [I learnt] to know an aspect of myself that I 
never imagined I could have, I learnt that I could be disarmed and fall into an 
abyss ... and that one can put oneself back together, that I learnt, that there can 
be bad things, that one can be seen as somebody who has hurt others, that’s a 
huge lesson (3G Cristobal).
Cristobal does not try to justify having hurt his friends, to explain what kind of 
higher good made him harm loved ones. He is not attempting to integrate this event 
into an overarching narrative. The ‘lesson’ has to do with finding the courage to let 
the self-image of an evil-doer stand alongside with that of the one who does good.
Perspectives interplay in the attempt to construct a personal viewpoint. ‘This 
contradicts what I said before’, is a recurrent statement made by the grandchildren in 
their exercises of self-examination. Perspectives make it possible to find 
correspondence behind what at first glance seems contradictory:
I’ve reflected constantly about that, I think that God has your destiny defined, 
but you are still free to do what you like, whatever you do is already written... 
but that has driven me to deeper reflections like, if God is supposedly a good 
being who wants the best for everybody how could he have written bad 
destinies? And I get stuck in the contradiction (3G Alejandro).
Different elements may explain the provisional or tentative character of the 
grandchildren’s interpretations. One could be their youth. In fact, during the 
interview discussions on issues such as the formation of their own families, 
parenthood or career had to focus on aspirations rather than on lived experience.
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Another could be the generational proximity with their interviewer. Often the 
grandchildren talked to me like a peer. The speculative character of their propositions 
may also be indicative of the assertion that in this epoch “there is no entirely firm 
ground upon which to tell stories” (Andrews et al. 2006:8) and, as I suggested in 
chapter five, it may be attributable to the limitations that an ethics of authenticity 
posits to self-interpretive purposes when it serves as a hypergood.
In sum, an intergenerational analysis of the biographical account’s main storyline 
sets the context for a discussion of the moral rhetoric of the good life. Particularly, 
from the grandparents to the grandchildren it traces a shift in the idea of self- 
improvement from the achievement of social mobility to the attainment of inner 
development, and from overcoming the physical, material and emotional suffering 
life puts in one’s way to overcoming many obstacles in the attempt to be oneself, in 
the sense of orienting oneself by the coordinates one has defined as the right and 
good. Such an analysis also illustrates the increasing importance for the sense of 
selfhood of the capacity to articulate a personal narrative. It shows how the 
association of the good life with the idea of sacrifice gives way to the notion of life 
enjoyment and pleasure and, in this line, it describes a tendency towards the 
deroutinisation of everyday life. Lastly, it reconstructs the transition from the value 
of normal, average, flat or standard ways of life to diverse, peculiar or extraordinary 
personal stories. Through the analysis of the modalities of self-enunciation and the 
predominant narrative genre assumed by the interviewees, I detected a shift from 
predominantly descriptive and over-realistic accounts in the grandparents to more 
impressionistic and experimental styles in the subsequent generations. The 
discussion also points to the increasing reflexivity added to the personal story. This is 
exemplified in the declining figure of the anecdote, the rise of the soliloquy and the 
emergence of more provisional and speculative narrative styles —which I label 
“perspectivism”. Finally, regarding the interviewees’ approach to the narrative work, 
we reviewed how, especially for the second and third generations, this was a chance 
to recap their lives, be heard and learn about themselves. Moreover, in some cases, it 
was a liberating experience, an opportunity to heal the soul. This in a context of 
interlocution that fluctuates from the grandparents’ belief that the thematisation of 
life is not necessarily good, to the current age where everything can be subject to 
discursive analysis.
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CONCLUSIONS PART II 
THE INTERIORISATION OF THE MORAL SOURCES OF THE SELF
As noted in the introduction to this second part, we can interpret the changing 
relationship between ideas of the good and notions of selfhood over time in terms of 
a process of interiorisation of the moral sources of the self. After Charles Taylor 
(1999), by interiorisation I mean a shift in the location of the authoritative power in 
moral issues from a moral ontology that gives predominance to the voice of others to 
one that gives prevalence to the person’s interior voice. In this sense, interiorisation 
comes to describe the relation between self and moral sources mainly in terms of the 
relationship between self and others.
According to the moral ontology of the self behind the grandparents’ narratives, 
moral authority lies in an external voice (the community, God). Consequently, in 
practice, for the first generation, morality is a matter of sanctions imposed by others, 
and being a moral agent has basically to do with the fulfilment of duties externally 
defined. In contrast, the grandchildren’s narratives attest to a sense of selfhood 
constructed in the autonomous exercise of deliberative powers. Being a self now 
consists of having the right to make independent moral statements, being able to 
make autonomous decisions and to sustain personal moral views. The outer-oriented 
perspective prevailing in the grandparents’ times is epitomised by the epoch’s 
concern with el que diran (what people will say), a Chilean expression that connotes 
the external location of moral authority. Conversely, the interiorisation of the moral 
sources of the self is incarnated in the value the grandchildren posit in following an 
authentic life, that is, a personal trajectory that corresponds to their own way of being 
in the world, free from external references.
This relocation of the authoritative sources in moral issues does not imply a tendency 
towards the decline of the social. In all the generations there are ‘others’ influencing 
the moral outlook of the self. The difference lies in the fact that for the grandparents 
the idea of a higher life is linked to an attitude of conformity with public morality 
and, therefore, in narrating the self they tend to accentuate the influence of others in 
the definition of personal moral criteria, i.e., they align their ‘conscience’ with the 
predicates of the prevailing mentality and tend to discredit those instances where
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they have exercised agency in moral matters or their actions evidence a deviation 
from the norm. In contrast, members of the third generation connect the idea of a 
higher or fuller life with the exercise of independent and autonomous moral 
deliberations and thus throughout their narratives they tend to play down the 
influence of others in the definition of their moral stances, claiming their inner 
judgment to be separate from public moral voices.
In terms of technologies of selfhood, or the kind of practices the person has to 
perform upon him or herself in order to attain the prevailing idea of the good, with 
the displacement of moral truth from the community to the individual emerges the 
idea of the development of a sense of inwardness. This does not mean that the 
grandparents lack a sense of interiority. What is new is the status granted by their 
descendants to that interiority as the primordial locus of the self.
The development of a sense of inwardness is based on a new ethics of care of the 
self, one that encourages self-knowledge, self-affirmation, self-expressiveness and 
love for the self. For the grandparents, these are wrong — ‘hedonistic’— practices. 
Within their moral framework, being a good person requires sacrificing oneself for 
others, especially one’s family, while care of the self and care of others are opposite 
practices. From the second generation onwards, that oppositional view appears to be 
superseded by the notions that self and others are interdependent entities and that 
care of others presupposes care of the self.
In order to develop this sense of inwardness, being in touch with one’s feelings and 
emotions comes to be something people “have to attain to be true and full human 
beings” (Taylor 1989). While in the grandparents’ narratives, being a moral agent 
has little to do with their inner feelings and emotions, their descendants afford these a 
key role in the moral constitution of the self. Questions that were alien to 
grandparents’ moral grammar, such as “How do I feel?” gain importance as a means 
of connecting with and monitoring one’s interiority.
The idea of moral interiority also elevates, through the generations, the notions of the 
‘individual’ and of a person’s originality, uniqueness, or essence to the status of 
values. Consequently, a politics of equality gives way to a politics of difference.
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When the sense of good is dependent on external sources, as is the case with the first 
generation, it calls for people to be equal. This is exemplified by the value attributed 
to a life lived in conformity to the norm. Within this moral outlook, inner differences 
ought to be eliminated: hence the grandparents’ tendency to deny or to reduce in 
their stories the implications of deviations with respect to conventions. The youngest 
generation, in contrast, do not evaluate their peers by proximity to a standard way of 
life, but by capacity to be unique. Grandchildren are expected to be true to 
themselves, as if the only authoritative voice were the one that speaks from within. 
Imbued with this individualised discourse, they fail, however, to recognise the social 
nature of this demand and the need for the other to exist in order for them to judge 
their own originality.
As regards the perception of the meaning of life, when the notion of the good is 
externally defined, life is not interpretable or questionable, nor is it subject to 
reflexive analysis or evaluative claims. Life is a factual reality to which to adapt. 
With the process of interiorisation of the moral sources of the self emerges the 
question of the meaning of life as an inner search. The grandparents do not frame 
their stories as a search for a sense of being. They do not expect their narratives to 
answer the question of who they are. In contrast, the second and third generations 
feel the need to discover their fundamental orientations in life through inner 
exploration and experiential processes. The meaning of life becomes a question with 
a subjective answer while the identity of the self acquires a historical dimension. In 
this context, the exercise of narrating the self grows in significance as a way of 
grasping the experience of being through time.
Likewise, through the generations the association of the good life with a culture of 
endurance —based on ‘self-sacrifice’, ‘suffering’ and self-postponement— is 
challenged and gradually replaced by the belief that life has to be ‘enjoyed’.
With regard to the substratum of the individual’s deliberations, interiorisation is also 
linked to a gradual movement away from traditional theistic foundations (in the form 
of Catholicism) towards other moral sources and to a transfer of the capacity of 
spiritual perfectibility from God’s will to the individual’s.
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If we consider the exercise of assembling the self in narrative form as a technology 
of the self, this is, as a series of procedures through which the narrator works upon 
his or her story in order to configure a certain mode of being, the interiorisation of 
the moral sources of the self also manifests in a reconfiguration of the biographical 
account. While the grandparents frame their personal stories as quests for material 
progress, the stories of their descendants take on a psychological and even an 
existential character. Here, the problematisation of the relationship of self upon self 
is at the centre of the narrative work and the capacity to come to terms with one’s 
story and to integrate the events of life into a meaningful and comprehensible 
account become paramount. In this sense, personal identity is intimately linked to the 
hermeneutic effort of interpreting one’s life.
Through these movements, the measure of the good gradually and unevenly moves 
away from external sources (the community, God’s will) to come to rest in each 
human being’s interior. As the new moral locus of the self, as the place that has the 
answers for leading an ethical, worthy and meaningful life, as the core of one’s 
essence and ultimate truth, individuals’ interiority has to be listened to, sensed, 
known and expressed.
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PART III
PRACTICES OF LIVING WITH RESPECT TO THE GOOD
In setting this research agenda I argued that the influence of prevailing ways of 
thinking about the self extends far beyond the discursive domain. Prevailing 
discourses about the self feed into modalities of parenting, befriending, working, 
loving or marrying; they affect our daily practices, our “routinized ways of 
understanding, knowing how and desiring” (Reckwitz 2002:250).
The previous chapters study the relation between ideas of the good and conceptions 
of the self through time. In this third part, the discussion is translated into the 
question of the practices of living with respect to the good. Through this type of 
reflection, we can observe “the moral life at work” (Plummer 2001:251); the 
embeddedness in people’s way of life of the goods that they “articulate in qualitative 
distinctions” (Taylor 1989:85). With the term “practices” I refer to the more or less 
conventionalised or patterned configuration of activities “which consists of several 
elements, interconnected to one other: forms of bodily activities, forms of mental 
activities, ‘things’ and their use, a background knowledge in the form of 
understanding, know-how, states of emotion and motivational knowledge” (Reckwitz 
2002:249).
Therefore, the chapters in part three scrutinise the changing meaning of different 
dimensions of life, such as work, childhood, close relationships and sexuality. The 
aim is not to provide a comprehensive overview of each of these areas of everyday 
life, but to illustrate how the thesis of the interiorisation of the moral sources of the 
self operates in both private and public realms and to develop other elements of the 
shifting relationship between selfhood and morality over time.
Chapter seven focuses on the changing meaning of work, its relation to self­
constitution and the connections between the morality of the self and work ethics, 
tracing the emergence of the idea of work as a source of “personal development” and 
the growth of the concern to protect private time against working time. This type of 
analysis allows an exploration of how formulations of the good interplay with the
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logics governing public life, how personal ethics and public predicaments interact 
one with another and what the consequences are for the sense of self.
As a period of early socialisation, childhood has a direct bearing on the constitution 
of the sense of self. Moreover, one of the characteristics of the life-story interview is 
that it presents the self from the early years to the present and beyond. The first 
section of chapter eight looks at how the idea of the normal child and of methods of 
ethical discipline in bringing up children have been redefined over the generations 
and by exploring childhood narratives it complements the self-configurations 
described so far with different temporal layers.
Different social disciplines have stressed that people who are close usually “have 
particular significance in and commitment to the shaping of the self’ (Jamieson 
1988:3). The second part of chapter eight examines how the idea of moral interiority 
is expressed in the rise of intimacy as a particular way of being “close” in personal 
relationships.
Sexuality, in turn, is usually conceptualised as a private domain, which is 
paradoxically subject to strict social regulations on moral grounds. Additionally, 
interviewees of the three generations coincided in identifying sexuality as the area of 
life that has undergone most radical redefinitions over the last decades. A case study 
of sexuality also proves conducive to the analysis of selfhood in terms of the gender 
dimension. Chapter nine, on normative redefinitions of sexuality and gender, 
elaborates on the argument about the development of the sense of inwardness and the 
reformulation of the ethics of care of the self.
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CHAPTER SEVEN— WORK
This chapter addresses the changing meaning of work, its relation to self-constitution 
and the connections between the morality of the self and work ethics. This type of 
analysis allows an examination of how formulations of the good interplay with the 
logics governing public life, how personal ethics and public predicaments interact 
one with another and what the consequences are for the sense of self. In particular, 
the chapter traces the emergence of the idea of work as a source of ‘personal 
development’ and the growth of the concern to protect private time against working 
time.
7.1 The meaning of work
In chapter six, through the analysis of the main narrative motif, I touched briefly on 
the meaning of work for the first generation. Particularly for those grandparents of 
lower-middle class, labour is a key resource for ‘being another’ both in moral and 
economic terms. The good people are ‘people of work’. Work provides the means for 
economic well-being so as to form a decent home, one in which ‘all needs are met’ 
and ‘one lacks for nothing’. Work, especially for men, is the central device for social 
positioning.
Grandfather Jose, for example, associates his good professional performance with 
having had access to the money to pay for his six children’s education. His own 
father could not afford Jose’s medical studies, as they had planned. Instead, Jose was 
awarded a scholarship to follow technical studies in mining:
I knew how to work professionally and so I earned more money because I was 
getting to more and more highly paid positions, so none of my children had to 
work to pay for their studies, we paid for their education, I paid for it with the 
money I earned... they graduated from University due to my effort, frankly, as 
the popular expression goes, I used to earn good money (1G Jose).
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That ‘good money’ allowed the upward social mobility of the family — ‘a radical 
change of status’— in Jose’s words. The good money let Jose’s wife concentrate on 
caring for the kids and let the children devote themselves entirely to their studies. 
Neither the mother nor the children had to deviate from these core responsibilities to 
make an economic contribution to the household, as Jose did as an adolescent. The 
good money paid for the relocation of the mother and children to a main city where 
the kids got a private education of ‘prestige’ and, later on, to Santiago where they 
entered university:
In [a main city] my children were all focused on high school, and when the 
elder ones started to come to Santiago, we all moved, and we radically changed 
our environment, then all my children became university students, the six of 
them, but for that we had to move to Santiago, for economic convenience (1G 
Jose).
After 35 years of uninterrupted work, the announcement of Jose’s retirement also 
confirmed his standing as a good worker. He led a hard-working career and was 
gratified at the end of it. Not only did his colleagues give him a farewell party, but 
the workers also organised a celebration in his honour. This, Jose explains, was 
unprecedented in the company.
With the passing of generations, ‘good money’ becomes less of an indicator of 
professional achievement and good working performance. The parents and the 
grandchildren tend to regard work not only as an ‘economic but also an intellectual 
necessity’ (2G Carlos), that should enrich you not only in monetary terms but also 
‘internally’ (3G Julia), and that should provide the basis for ‘inner growth’ and 
contribute ‘to your personal development’ (2G Pilar) rather than being the central 
device for placing oneself socially. This is Jose’s daughter’s view:
I like my job and I also work because I need to provide for myself... I enjoy it, 
I’ve developed greatly, I’ve reached a certain professional status, my 
colleagues acknowledge and value the work I do, and we have a very good 
time, it’s fun, we enjoy ourselves, we do lots of things... The place is nice, the
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people, the community also values it, it has a lot of prestige, reputation ... We 
have a good time, we spoil each other we always have moments for sharing, for 
a nice lunch, some treat or other, and we’re always looking for ways to 
celebrate. So in this sense, we treat each other well, we like each other, look 
after each other (2G Pilar).
Like in her father’s case, there is an economic element to her work; it provides the 
means for material sustenance, but also for independence. As a single mother of two, 
Pilar can afford to live on her own, without depending on money from any man. 
There are elements of social recognition: her work performance has earned her 
‘prestige’ within the community and ‘status’ among her colleagues. But these 
external references convey how good she is at her job and how much she likes it, 
they do not indicate how it provides the means to achieve things in other spheres of 
life —social mobility through a better education, as in Jose’s case. In fact, Pilar 
disapproves of those she sees around her, ‘living for work and working for material 
things and goods’, forgetting what is most important: the area of affections and 
personal relationships and the search for happiness in ordinary life, not in climbing 
the social ladder. As Pilar said in an earlier quote, ‘I’m not aiming to get anywhere’. 
As Sennett observes comparing Rico’s to his father Enrico’s life, Pilar “has fulfilled 
his father’s desire for upward mobility” (1998:13): she is an independent, successful 
professional woman. Yet she “rejects” the way of life her father approves. Economic 
concerns must not take precedence over a much more fundamental, relational aspect 
of life:
[My mother] wanted us to be Catholic, Roman Apostolic Catholics [but on the 
other hand she] stressed the economic side, that we should move on and attain 
economic security... [In her view her] sons are doing well if they are doing 
well economically, I mean it doesn’t matter to her if a son has family problems 
or problems with his wife. He is fine as long as he is doing well economically 
(2G Alvaro).
The comparison that second-generation Carlos makes between his current job as an 
employee in a retail company and his previous experience as a self-employed
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carpenter reflects the tension that Pilar and Alvaro describe in their dialogue with 
their parents and with society at large. Carlos’s dissatisfaction with his current job 
arises from the realisation that ‘for the past four years I’ve devoted myself to this job 
100% and I’ve left myself aside’. Carlos cannot identify himself in the work, and this 
is something a good job ought to provide. These were barely issues in the 
grandparents’ working narratives. The grandfathers talked of suffering and sacrifices 
but they never saw their dedication to work as a menace to their sense of identity. In 
Carlos’s case, the job change has impacted his sense of self, his ‘spirit’. ‘Before I 
was happier, now I wake up complaining, in a bad temper.’ To regain his sense of 
self he needs ‘not to be myself through work like before [and as the preceding 
generation did] but to be myself first.’ The ideal would be ‘leaving everything to do 
with work as a second option’, ‘having a flexible schedule, some spare time’ and a 
job to enjoy:
I would like to be a carpenter again, making handcrafts, wearing my overall, 
having my little workshop, I love that, making furniture, you give me a piece of 
wood and I transform it into something, this I’ll do happily (2G Carlos).
Carpentry would provide a meaningful occupation, in which to be free and creative, 
but would not confer the best status, as we may conclude from a conversation his son 
recalls. Alejandro and Carlos were filling in a form for university funds. When 
Alejandro asked his profession Carlos replied, ‘Carpenter’. “Why carpenter?” 
Alejandro asked, disenchanted. “What’s wrong with it? I love it, Jesus was a 
carpenter,” Carlos replied. In this story, Carlos identifies with the paradigm that a 
man cannot construe himself as a provider alone, that he has to undertake a 
meaningful job, albeit a humble one. But in the next passage, again recalled by his 
son, Carlos’s position is more ambivalent:
The only thing dad wants is to see me become a doctor, that’s the only thing he 
wants, and he makes this a standard for my sister, and it really pisses me off. 
The other day she said, “What if I study nursing?” Dad let her down so much, 
he told her, “How could you be a nurse if you have a brother who will be a 
doctor!” There I stopped him. Bullshit. I said that if she wants to study dramatic 
art she should do so and be happy and be the best actress... Even if dad is an
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open-minded person, there you see how ultimately he is aiming at economic 
well-being and that is related to high standards. Apart from being a good guy, 
who can develop well and be happy with his resources —that’s the ultimate 
expectation— there is this concern with economic performance that I’ve seen 
in my dad. Mom isn’t like that, her expectations are that you have to fight, give 
it a go and get it, that sort of thing (3G Alejandro).
Carlos says he does not want to get into the career game; he knows he would be lost 
there. Yet, he puts pressure on his children to enter that competition by maintaining 
the highest possible standards.
Being a self-employed carpenter would also allow Carlos to avoid exposure to the 
‘brutalities’ he ‘had to endure’ as an employee. Perhaps, it would allow him to take 
off that ‘shield’ he learned to wear. As analysed in chapter four, the middle 
generation is sceptical of the possibilities for the good to prevail in the public 
domain. This is especially salient in the field of work ethics. For Carlos’s generation, 
what is of crucial importance for the moral constitution of the self is that what they 
think and feel has to correspond with what they do. In the domain of work, however, 
they denounce an increasing distance between “the qualities of the good work and 
those of the good character” (Sennett 1998:21). And this is a source of tension, 
contradictions and inconsistencies in their sense of self. Eventually, the perpetuation 
of the culture of subordination and dependence characteristic of the sistema 
patronal30 in conjunction with the development of the ‘instrumental logic’ of a 
‘capitalist society’ turns the “culture of endurance” that formed the basis of the moral 
economy in the grandparents’ times into a “culture of reviente” (blow-out), tearing 
the person and all he or she stands for apart. The requirements of work intrude, 
oppose and in many cases jeopardise the moral constitution of the self.
The parents mention different fields of professional activity to exemplify this. They 
refer to the ill consequences of the prevalence of ‘personal benefit’, ‘material profit’ 
and an ‘instrumental mentality’:
30 The Latin American sistema patronal was akin to a rural feudal system, with the patron (thence the 
adjective patronal), or owner of the hacienda (or fundo, in Chile), at the top. The system encompasses 
position with respect to the means of production, social class and race (white patron-owner vs. 
mestizo-labourer), among other elements.
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What matters to the building companies is the monetary side, they don’t care if 
the workers are breaking their backs, I wake up at 5am and get home at 9.15, 
9.30 pm... what matters to them is the economic thing, the material thing. All 
the works start late, they ask you to do a job that should have been finished 
yesterday, but they only give it to you today, they want everything fast, there is 
such a tension, the stomach ache I had this morning was due to the job, it’s a 
stressful job... they want robots (2G Juan).
This is the ‘dark side of life’: ‘everybody is working with twisted codes’ and ‘bad 
weapons’. ‘Commercial relationships have an instrumental value’, people’s worth 
depends on ‘their usefulness for my businesses’. To survive in this world, ‘you have 
to show your teeth’, ‘prove that you can do damage and be ready to hit your rival 
back harder’. Among colleagues, the picture is no different. Gestures of empathy and 
sincere happiness at a colleague’s success are drowned in the waters of 
individualism:
There are some empathetic people, but for the most part they are looking for a 
way tread on the other so they can get promoted (2G Juan).
The middle generation’s discourse about work not only contradicts what their 
children say about their parents’ expectations regarding their —the children’s— 
career but is also at odds with the description of a working milieu where people are 
more concerned with profiting from one another than with directing their energies 
towards performing a fulfilling job.
The parents say they bore with this ‘twisted’ world for a period. But nowadays, they 
are trying to recover their sense of self. After more than twenty years in the industry, 
Elena put her business up for sale. She is exhausted from ‘constantly watching all 
sides so nobody fucks you over’. In this world ‘loyalty doesn’t exist’. ‘At the 
beginning I cried out of impotence’, but with the passing of time, just like Alvaro and 
Carlos, Elena’s ‘grandmother’s heart’ hardened so much that ‘nowadays it is bullet­
proof.
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Unlike the grandfathers, Juan sees in the “culture of endurance” the perpetuation of 
humiliating working relationships. He is convinced there is no dignity in keeping up 
with this system:
To be a good worker, you should start changing the patronal culture. 
Everything stems from that. The problem is that people bear with it so the 
system doesn’t change. The engineers think that they have to sweep with the 
workers... I probably bore it when the kids were little, out of necessity, but 
once they grew up I said, “Go to hell,” today if I argue with my boss, I pack my 
stuff and leave, end of story (2G Juan).
The grandchildren extend the criticism towards what they detect as the predominance 
of a ‘commercial mentality’. In the field of design, Federico explains, ‘selling for the 
sake of selling’ has become a ‘cult’ practice. Instead, he aspires to design objects that 
are able to capture ‘people’s attention’. Francisco, in turn, explains at length how he 
had to justify his choice to study international cuisine within a highly competitive 
and masculine milieu (a very prestigious, single-sex public school). ‘I had to show 
the worth of studying something different, something that you really like’ instead of 
‘choosing the normal subjects which are supposed to earn you lots of money, like 
engineering’. Despite the hostile environment Francisco persevered with his choice; 
only as a chef would he feel ‘personally fulfilled’. Matilde was forced to disappoint 
her parents because she was not willing to meet their expectations regarding her 
professional life. Matilde is not interested in ‘being a winner’. Coinciding with 
Alejandro’s view of his father Carlos’ approach, Matilde explains that her parents 
‘like degrees and a good curriculum and they are certainly worried about my future 
economic stability.’ Matilde, Alejandro and also, as we will see later, grandson 
Andres denounce the previous generations’ concern with ‘social standing’, ‘status’ 
and ‘economic stability’. Matilde says she is not ‘ambitious in that sense’.
This does not mean that the grandchildren are naive. Like their parents, they are 
aware that they are facing the most ‘demanding’ and ‘competitive’ labour market 
ever. They know they have to play the ‘self-confident’ role (Julia); that they cannot 
behave ‘like little birds’, unless you want ‘them to eat you alive’ (Javiera). They are 
aware that the ‘colour of your skin’ (Sofia) your ‘physical appearance’ (Francisco,
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Cristobal), ‘manners’ (Federico), ‘way of speaking’ (Julia), and even ‘your surname’ 
(Cristobal) still play a part in getting jobs. They know that they have to ‘stand out 
from the crowd’, and for this they need expertise, creativity and the capacity to 
innovate. They recognise the pressure exerted upon young people to get a 
professional degree and achieve (economic) stability. ‘You have to get your degree,’ 
says Javiera, you cannot be engaged in the search forever. If you are, ‘that’s a sign 
that you’re lost, it’s weird’. As analysed in chapter five, for this generation, ‘self­
definition’ stands as a key demand upon the self.
In this generation’s working narratives, there is an attempt to liberate the meaning of 
work from an instrumental logic so it can really carry meaning for the self. For 
people who place a high value on achieving independence, earning a living is 
something which ‘part of your head is concerned with’, ‘especially if you are an 
artist like me,’ emphasises Cristobal, or if you have chosen to be a chef rather than 
an engineer, as Francisco elaborates. Yet, there are other elements to a fulfilling 
career apart from the pursuit of money. For Matilde, they relate to the contribution 
she can make to others’ welfares. In the workshops she runs, she aims ‘to help people 
to express themselves, their personality’. Federico associates success or achievement 
with the ability to communicate with others through the objects he designs. In the 
field of pedagogy, Andres aims to keep studying, not to attain social standing, as his 
father Juan expects, but to influence the education of future teachers at the university. 
He also aspires to study other subjects, like nursing, which would not necessarily 
complement his career, but would fulfil a lifelong passion.
Moreover, the grandchildren see no good in sacrificing what they conceive as quality 
of life simply for the sake of a better salary. It is more significant to live in peace and 
in contact with nature, to have spare time for their hobbies and for seeing friends and 
sharing common interests such as music, art, cinema or a simple chat:
[if I were interested in doing what everyone does in high society] I wouldn’t be 
living here, I wouldn’t have studied what I did. I’ve had work opportunities that 
would give me lots of money, more than I earn now, but I would be working 
full-time, with a fixed schedule, and that for me isn’t quality of life (3G 
Federico).
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What does it mean then, that work should be a source of inner development? For a 
start, there is an element of self-assertion that some members of the second 
generation emphasise, women especially:
To me personally, when I started working... because the environment was very 
enjoyable, they applauded you and as I performed well I could do what I 
wanted ... when you make sales they treat you like a queen, the truth is that it 
was like this all the time, I did what I wanted, sometimes I made sales with a 
bit of wickedness, because instead of following the regulations I had given the 
person special credit terms or something, anyway I made all those sales (2G 
Paz).
There is also an issue of self-esteem that sometimes exceeds the field of work to 
nurture life in general:
“You’re doing fine, excellent; we want you to keep it up because you’re a good 
element in the business.” So once I told them, “You know what? I feel so good 
because I have never worked with people like you before, another type of 
people, and in a company, it’s like you give me the energy to keep going” (2G 
Ximena).
The grandchildren —because they are working in professions of their own choice 
and they claim to have made their decisions according to personal preferences more 
than economic calculus— aspire to state who they are through the work they do. 
They regard work as a key channel of self-assertion and self-expression. Matilde 
claims that ‘I can be who I am’ through the workshops she runs. In this space, 
‘nobody is going to tell me what is right or wrong, no, here I’m who I want to be’. 
Federico talks of the importance of feeling identified with the jobs he decides to 
undertake:
In the area of work, if the job is really bad, if it has nothing to do with me I just 
cannot do it... I mean, I can do it but I’ll do it poorly... I do the things I like 
(3G Federico).
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Largely, the changing meaning of work has to do with the transit from a generation 
in which jobs were taken out of necessity to one in which they are a matter of 
personal choice. Andres’s case is a good example. Andres had wanted to be a teacher 
ever since he was a little boy. For a time he even dreamt of being a kindergarten 
teacher, ‘The third man in Chile in that profession,’ he specifies. This aspiration 
contravened the expectations of a working-class builder regarding the future of his 
elder child and only son. In fact, Juan made a great financial effort to register his son 
Andres in a private school where he could get a degree on ‘mechanics of inner 
combustion’. ‘But I failed,’ Andres explains, ‘I only wanted to be a teacher.’ At the 
time of the interview Andres was in the last semester of pedagogy, and was also 
teaching in a primary school.
In the grandchildren’s work narratives, showing who you are has little to do with 
modernity’s traditional symbols of achievement: a top position in your field or 
company, having your children in prestigious schools, moving to a wealthy area of 
town or becoming member of an exclusive club. Neither the subjects the 
grandchildren studied nor their future aspirations could direct them towards these. 
The grandchildren had many more years of education than their grandparents and 
had already gained some years of professional experience, but at the time of the 
interviews none had a long-term contract or a full-time job. The majority were 
working on the implementation of independent proyectos.
As Pilar and Paz say in earlier quotes, there is also the expectation of enjoying work. 
This was a barely a requirement for the grandparents, not because they did not enjoy 
working, but because it was not part of their normative narratives of labour. Pilar 
also links job satisfaction with a caring atmosphere among co-workers — ‘we love 
each other, we pamper each other and we celebrate’. The grandfathers spoke instead 
of practices of ‘solidarity’ among colleagues: providing economic support for those 
undergoing economic crisis, caring for the family of an ill or injured worker, 
rescuing a colleague when an occupational accident occurred, even if it meant risking 
their own lives.
In the grandchildren’s view, this idea of enjoyment also encompasses that of doing 
an ‘exciting’ job, in which their abilities and knowledge are challenged and they can
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improve their expertise, learn about their subject and about themselves and achieve 
inner growth:
I don’t want to keep doing the same always. I’ve always wanted to know more, 
to learn more, one never stops learning, I don’t want to get stuck as a bilingual 
secretary... because you get stuck as a person, you don’t grow internally, you 
get stuck in a monotonous life, I don’t like routines (3G Julia).
An ‘exciting’ working team is a key element in this and, for some, a crucial variable 
when considering whether to work in partnership or independently:
I’d rather do it by myself than entrust it to somebody I don’t know, so if I need 
some support... I’ve got my partners and I know that if I’m not there they 
would know what to do, that’s what I mean about the support when you work 
in a team... lots of emphasis on the team and on its people, that you share more 
or less the same views, that you trust them, when there’s money involved that’s 
fundamental (3G Federico).
Grandfather Anselmo says that he ‘has always been in love with his job’. Grandson 
Cristobal states that ‘one ought to feel love for one’s work’. Anselmo says he loves 
‘work’ in general, and that he aims to be morally good through work as such; 
Cristobal talks of ‘his work’ —work in the singular, a specific form of work. Unlike 
Anselmo, Cristobal refers to care of the self and the capacity for self-betterment 
through care of one’s work:
This has to do with love of oneself, of being aware that you have to care about 
what you do, you have to love it and be competent, not in the sense of 
competition but in the sense that you ought to know that you can be better (3G 
Cristobal).
While this rhetoric of personal development and inner growth is absent from the 
working narratives of the grandfathers, traces of it can be found in some 
grandmothers’ working accounts. Tales infused with a language of independence,
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emancipation, pride, success and self-fulfilment. A paid job allowed the development 
of skills and of a personal relationship that the household environment did not 
provide. As in the grandfathers’ case, these personal resources are provided by work 
‘as such’, the mere fact of working, rather than the specific form of work, as with the 
grandchildren. ‘My job gave me distraction, entertainment, everything,’ says 
grandmother Ana, ‘it was a thousand times better than being home.’ Through her 
working experience, Clara gained self-confidence and personality:
working made me grow [...] expanded my horizons [...] and made me stand up
and say “I am Clara Mendez.”... before I was such a shy person (1G Clara).
Clara worked all her life except for a 10 year-period dedicated to her children. While 
single, her job gave her independence and the economic power to pay for a 
comfortable standard of living. She could even afford a mortgage, quite an audacious 
business for a single woman in those times.
7.2 Working time and personal time
A clear demarcation between working and personal times begins to emerge in the 
stories of the second generation. Although the parents find that marking boundaries 
between these two spheres is worthwhile in personal and interpersonal terms, 
conflicting demands make such boundaries difficult to observe in real life. On the 
one hand, this generation speaks of the ‘costs’ of work in terms of personal life, such 
as ‘having no time for myself’ (Carlos) or ‘for one’s family’ (Pedro). We have seen 
how, as an employee, Carlos resents the lack of spare time and a flexible schedule 
and how a 100% dedication to his job has prevented him from being himself and 
doing personal things. ‘I miss my freedom, my freedom of schedule, my freedom to 
do my own things, do what I want, when I want and how I want.’ The need to protect 
private time goes together with the need to protect the space of the family, and 
reflects another angle of this generation’s concern with the value of ordinary life (see 
chapter four). This need to protect the field of intimate relationships and of personal 
time is, largely, a reaction against the corruption they see in the public sphere.
206
The grandparents do not express any such opposition between private and public life. 
As their social quests revealed, the prevailing working culture of lower-middle class 
grandparents is founded on the idea that the more a person works the better he or she 
is. Their narratives attest to a work ethic based on “self-imposed discipline” in the 
use of their time (Sennett 1998:99); grandfathers stress they ‘hardly ever missed a 
working-day’ or ‘left a task for the next day’, they were ‘work-obsessed’. Many did 
overtime, both for the extra money and to prove the moral and physical strength of 
the self.
As reviewed in chapter three, spending time chatting or in the street is socially 
sanctioned, especially for women. Leisure time is good only when it helps to recover 
the energy to keep doing one’s work well or when it is taken as a reward after long 
hours of painstaking work. Grandfather Guillermo tells how when he came home 
exhausted after a double shift down the pit, his wife ‘would encourage’ him to have a 
drink and relax. She would even send one of the kids to get the wine. Most of the 
grandparents’ leisure activities are associated with the working milieu: going for 
drinks with colleagues or to a party organised by the company. This is especially true 
of industrial workers who made their lives in industrial towns like nitrate or copper 
mining camps in the north of the country, or for peasants and rural workers in the 
haciendas of the south. There, all spaces were institutional, from the houses where 
the workers lived, to the canteen, the theatre and the chapel. In a Catholic milieu, 
leisure time is also good when it is spent in devotional practices such as mass, 
religious festivities, or helping the poor and ill. Lastly, leisure time is well spent 
when it is used to assemble the family or to visit relatives experiencing problems, 
living alone or in need of assistance. All these cases define a sphere of leisure that is 
highly institutionalised, of a social character and attached to one’s duties towards 
others.
Additionally, the external character of the moral sources of the self manifests in the 
little value the grandparents attribute to the personal sphere within the constitution of 
the good life. Life is not about ‘having a good time’:
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I don’t remember having a good time, one enjoyed oneself when having a 
drink, chatting, going to the hall for a dance, but our life was about work, it was 
a tough life (1G Guillermo).
Only among the upper-middle class, with its pastimes of fishing or hunting, does the 
idea of leisure as no work prevail. Yet, time spent in these activities only exacerbates 
this class’s difference and exclusivity, making it an institutional practice also.
The middle generation intensifies the concern with family life. This does not mean 
that they had better families. In fact, this is the generation of broken family bonds. It 
means that the focus began to be what Beck and Beck-Gemsheim (2002) call a 
“family-centred privatism”.
In the daily life of the grandchildren there is, instead, an intersection of private life 
and work, of ‘pleasure’ and ‘responsibilities’. As mentioned in chapter six, there is a 
“deroutinisation of the mundane” (Beck and Beck 2002). Deroutinisation has an 
organisational component: it crosses the divide between working and spare-time 
activities, restoring the disjunction between inner and outer self that predominates in 
the previous generation. In this, the idea of the proyecto is central. The grandchildren 
have proyectos in which their professional expertise intersects with their hobbies and 
economic gratification with their personal interest. Within the figure of the proyecto 
all of Cristobal’s activities as a fine arts teacher, an artist, an amateur musician and a 
screenplay writer, converge:
One is in search of fulfilment in the professional arena, so for me opportunities 
for relationships are very much linked to my work, all my proyectos, the films, 
the exhibitions, the workshops, this and that, plus my work as a teacher, in the 
end I feel that the moments of pleasure are connected to these projects or to the 
people I work with (3G Cristobal).
Deroutinisation also has a spatial dimension for the grandchildren. It is linked to 
inhabiting spaces where they feel good. A number of them associate peace and 
contentment with being in places with which they can identify: being in ‘my 
territory’, where I can imprint ‘my schedule’ and ‘my rhythm’ and where ‘I stand on
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firm and calm ground’. In some stories, this deroutinisation of space exudes a 
nostalgic sentiment. Although the grandchildren are very critical of the grandparents’ 
way of life, they admire the sense of community and familiarity they believe was part 
of Chileans’ daily life in the past. Making a neighbourhood —having a local life — 
is elevated to a virtue. Comparing her generation to that of her grandparents, Matilde 
reflects:
I like the group thing, the community thing... this group of people working 
together, creating things together, supporting one another, building the school, 
the church for the community. That touches me. I cannot see myself doing such 
things. We don’t have the time. Try gathering a group of folk to build a church 
these days, for free —please! Who would think to gain a place in heaven by 
doing that! Now you see people working together to help the poor, but back then 
they did it for their own sake, to become better people, to be able to give better 
things to their children, they were building a homeland (3G Matilde).
The privatised self Matilde describes lives a ‘less committed kind of life’ (3G 
Alejandro). She would hardly embark on those kinds of proyectos that moved people 
to work together in the past. ‘Individualism’, ‘self-centredness’ and ‘selfishness’, the 
grandchildren say, work against them. The demand for authenticity represents an 
additional obstacle. The ‘I am me’ principle jeopardises identification with the 
community:
My elder sister identified with the socialist party and the socialist party identified 
her in every single aspect of her life, I don’t have that, I can identify with some 
things but not with others, you don’t take anything that seriously... I don’t attend 
any community centre, I don’t belong to any political party, to any church, before 
it was taken for granted that you should belong to something, now people don’t 
belong to anything and it doesn’t matter, it’s not an issue. I identify with myself 
and not with the group, I am me. Period. These are my values, I believe in this 
and if you don’t, well, I’m so sorry (3G Matilde).
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In each generation the practice of working is conceptualised as a source of personal 
identification. Upon this common ground, the interiorisation of the moral sources of 
the self manifests in the supersession of the view of work —as such, any kind of 
work— as a means to improve the family’s material welfare by the idea that the work 
one undertakes —a specific kind of work— has to contribute to one’s inner- 
development and connect with one’s sense of inner orientation. The grandparents 
speak of their working trajectory with a sense of personal accomplishment: they 
worked extremely hard to get where they are. But as workers they did not pursue the 
inner-development and expression of the self but economic success, not for their 
personal benefit but for the service of their families. They also expect public 
recognition as good workers (respectability). With the passing of generations, the 
‘good money’ is not necessarily as meaningful as the development of one’s expertise 
in a challenging and exciting working environment, the enjoyment of work, and the 
pursuit of other interests outside the sphere of work. This redefinition of the idea of 
the good work is accompanied by a change from a generation for whom job choice 
was a matter of necessity to another in which jobs are defined according to personal 
preference.
The grandparents attribute little significance to the personal sphere in the constitution 
of the good life. Working is always good and life is about sacrifice rather than 
enjoyment and fun. In their narratives, leisure activities are predominantly social in 
character, part of the sphere of duty and highly institutionalised. Their children see 
working and personal time as opposites: the demands of work restrict personal time, 
the prevalent work ethics often contradicts what they stand for. Indeed, they describe 
the current labour market as governed by an instrumental logic in the management of 
businesses and characterised by the perpetuation of a patronal culture in working 
relations. This has come to drastically revert the goodness of the culture of endurance 
characteristic of the grandparents’ working narratives, into an evil “blow-out culture” 
that tears apart many of the values parents and grandchildren stand for. In this 
context, the need to balance and regain control over time management must also be 
interpreted as a way to regain control over the self. The grandchildren’s narratives 
attest to an attempt to merge work and leisure, public and private life within the idea 
of the proyecto and their aspirations of a more locally-based community life.
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CHAPTER EIGHT— CHILDHOOD AND CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS
As a period of socialisation, childhood has a direct bearing on the constitution of the 
self. What it means to be a child and what infancy involves in a person’s 
development both manifest prevailing regimes of selfhood and contribute to their 
figuration. The work of historians Philippe Aries (1962) and Hugh Cunningham 
(1995) and of sociologists Chris Jenks (1996), Allison James (1993) and Alan Prout 
(2000) has traced the changing meaning and moral status of the category of 
childhood over time. Accordingly, in the first part of this chapter, I study the 
transformation of the idea of the good and normal child and of each generation’s 
methods of ethical discipline in childrearing. This illustrates the process of 
interiorisation of the moral sources of the self and its consequences for the definition 
of selfhood.
In childhood, personal relationships play a central role. Emotional life in early 
infancy, it is argued, impacts on the psychosocial constitution of the adult person — 
as in Giddens’ (1991) “ontological security”. Personal life and close relationships 
are, indeed, a recurrent topic in this thesis. Elsewhere, I discuss the role that 
significant others play in shaping the moral orientations of the self in both the 
constitution of moral standards and the reassessment of these in the light of changes 
in the predominant moral framework. In the second section of this chapter, I examine 
the redefinition of close relationships in the context of the transformations of the 
moral orientations of the self.
8.1 The good child
According to the grandparents’ accounts, in Chilean society of the 1920’s and 
1930’s, childhood was the period for the ‘inculcation of character’ or the infusion of 
a morality defined primarily in terms of obligations towards others (‘duties’). This 
was achieved through the ‘taming’ or ‘domestication’ of the child’s will, getting him 
or her to internalise a code of conduct. The process required children to have self­
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control in making reason prevail over instincts and feelings, objectivity over 
subjectivity, and the parents’ and adults’ will over personal will and inclinations:
We were completely different, we were submissive, it didn’t occur to us to 
disrespect our parents, do anything against their will... We were much more 
disciplined, obedient... We didn’t let our thoughts flow... Kids [nowadays] are 
much more free-spirited, they do what they like, they are not under the tutelage 
of the “do this, do that”... We were so used to being told what to do that we 
didn’t think (1G Ana).
In those times, the good child was ‘tamed’, domesticated’, ’submissive’ and 
‘obedient’, one who ‘followed rules’ and ‘did what had to be done’, ‘never defying’ 
authority. The good child was ‘innocent’, ‘playing silly games’ ‘and nothing else’, a 
child who ‘didn’t think’ for him or herself, did not show inner thoughts or feelings 
and ‘couldn’t be sincere’. Conversely, the ‘wilful’ or ‘headstrong’ (voluntarioso)31 
child was at fault, bad and rebellious, lacking character or moral maturity:
My mother was guapa (tough)... she would beat me.
O: Why?
I don’t know, maybe I was obstinate, haha, ha...
O: But did you think o f yourself as an obstinate person?
Voluntariosa maybe, I don’t know.
O: What do you mean?
Because if she said something and I didn’t like it, I did the opposite... and she 
would beat me (1G Rosa).
When moral truth is the property of a community that sets the rules of the good life, 
sanctions defiance and rewards adherence, there is nothing to learn from one’s self. 
The development of a sense of interiority is denied, since it is associated with 
wilfulness or self-assertion against external norms. This, despite the large measure of 
self-awareness and self-restraint grandparents needed to discern ‘how to behave
31 To me, being voluntarioso (adj.) is consciously exercising will power. For first and second 
generation interviewees, however, it denotes a negative quality; ‘being driven by your own will’ or 
headstrong. The adjective carries both entries in the dictionary of the Spanish Royal Academy.
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properly’, or the sense of responsibility in undertaking domestic and occupational 
work from an early age.
In those times, techniques of ethical discipline rested on the principle of 
‘internalisation’ of the ‘correct’ behaviour through repetitive practice, physical 
sanction and ‘severe’ ‘regulation’, as if the child were something that could be tuned. 
In a ‘very consistent world’, there was little discursive elaboration of the reasons for 
expected behaviour:
Oddly enough, my mother never talked to us about anything (1G Clara).
The assimilation of a code of conduct requires the uniformity of a ‘Prussian army’ 
(2G Carmen) style of education. Little space was afforded to the expression of inner 
differences among children. Habits and discipline were inculcated through strict 
regulation of the procedures through which the child could relate to his or her body, 
belongings or other people:
All my life I was so disciplined... too much discipline at home ... my mother 
was terrible... All our life they regulated our cleanliness. When I was little this 
governess ... kept our underwear separately... a pack with a red ribbon for the 
panties, socks to be put on in a specific manner, I never saw white shoes dirty, 
ever, so all this becomes part of you (1G Clara).
With the interiorisation of the moral sources of the self, from the second generation 
onwards, the ideas of moral interiority and of expression of subjectivity become 
established. (In particular, the narratives of upper-middle class parents and 
grandchildren elaborate upon these ideas more explicitly. The same tendency was 
noted regarding the shift in the idea of care of the self inaugurated by second- 
generation women: those of upper-middle class background not only spoke of an 
attitude of self-expressiveness and self-assertion —as women of lower-middle class 
also did— but had engaged in activities encouraging this kind of relation of self upon 
self). Thus, the notion that a child can be made to construct a sense of self by 
internalising proper conduct gives way to an idea of childhood as a period for self­
exploration and expression through the cultivation of an intimate relationship with
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oneself and the surrounding world. As a result, by the time of the grandchildren’s 
infancy, childhood was to become envisaged as a crucial phase for the integral 
development of a person’s potentials, skills and affectivity. For this, firstly, constant 
early ‘stimulation’ is crucial:
[At kindergarten] they knew how to stimulate me. I’ve got very good memories 
of manual activities, of games, it was a very playful phase, a lot of friends, of 
having fun... I associate that period with nice smells, nice food, flowers, 
oranges, sensations (3G Matilde).
Within child-centred, nuclear family households, the mother becomes the ‘facilitator’ 
of the kids’ development. As part of this transformation, second-generation women 
had to ‘rebel against’ the centrality grandmothers and other mothers afforded to 
‘having everything impeccable, clean and tidy’ in the house, because ideally under 
this new conception, ‘children should be swinging on the lamps, up a tree, wreaking 
havoc’ (2G Paz), ‘untidying the tidy house’ (2G Carmen). Mothers also had to 
relinquish the grandmothers’ style of childrearing and conventional wisdom for a 
more legitimate source of knowledge on children’s matters: scientific disciplines. 
Instead of consulting her mother, Paz turned to the ‘encyclopaedia’ and Carmen took 
her queries to the paediatrician and read specialised literature ‘to learn’ about the 
‘different stages’ of child and adolescent development, to ‘have more ideas, and give 
them the best’.
The idea of stimulating children is enabled not only by the professionalisation of 
motherhood, but also by the specialisation of childhood as a developmental stage 
with its own activities and concerns. During the grandparents’ childhood, there was 
no clear demarcation between the child and adult worlds.32 In those days, children 
adapted themselves to adult routines; weekends and holidays were subsumed to 
parents’ long, demanding work schedules and kids had no say in the family’s spare­
time plans:
32 Philippe Aries’ (1962) genealogy traces the emergence of the ‘modem’ notion of childhood to mid­
eighteenth century Europe, as a stage distinct to adulthood. These narratives place the shift much later.
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I don’t have any great memories of being at play because one was entertained 
with the housework... My parents had the shop, we used to entertain ourselves 
there, there was no television or books, and nobody inculcated reading or other 
pastimes... We used to play silly games... Climbing a roof, because mothers 
used to be very busy so they were not watching over you all the time... On 
weekends an aunt... used to take us out. For us going out meant taking the bus 
to Tobalaba Avenue, can you imagine? As we were at boarding school, we 
didn’t go out often... And then we used to go on holiday, this aunt took us, or 
our grandmother did... Mother and father came to visit us, because back then 
shops were open till 11 pm... and they didn’t close on Sundays either (1G 
Laura).
There was no particular programme for children’s development, sports were not yet 
widespread nor was intellectual progress particularly stimulated, except in the upper 
classes. In fact, as a rule, most had to undertake adult responsibilities like housework 
or occasional or even permanent jobs in their early teens, which curtailed the period 
for playing and being a ‘child’:
My mother was always working to feed us... we spent our childhood working 
in the countryside, ploughing, chopping wood, burning coal... we had to walk 
more than 20 kilometres to get to work (1G Guillermo).
By the third generation’s time, children are encouraged to pursue activities 
appropriate for their level of development and to choose, according to their own 
inclinations and preference, between different sports, membership in leisure 
organisations or the study of languages for the wealthiest families. After-school clubs 
gained popularity and peer group socialisation became an important aspect of a 
normal child’s development. Only in the youngest generation was children’s 
friendship explicitly encouraged and failure to make friends considered a problem.
Secondly, integral development requires the treatment of physical, neurological or 
psychological impairments or disorders to prevent chronic disease, secure future 
well-being, and prevent self-confidence being damaged by visible deviances or late
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development. In Elena’s terms, until the second generation kids were raised as 
‘children of inclemency, brought up in an open field’:
That was his method, the rod was the best teacher... nobody could made him 
see it any other way, [the possibility] that somebody could have told him 
“you see, from a psychological point of view...” No way! To hell with your 
psychological point of view, that’s how dad raised me (2G Elena).
As Juan adds, neither preventive medicine nor children’s self-esteem figured on the 
childrearing agenda:
She was a good mother, but ... when you have a child you have to worry 
about the dentist, the doctor ... my mother only worried when the problem 
was really huge... I lost my teeth because she didn’t take care in advance.
O: Preventing, evaluating?
Yes, preventing things as mothers do nowadays (2G Juan).
Therefore, the realisation of a person’s potential requires both enhancement of inborn 
skills and early treatment of disorders. In the grandchildren’s generation, normality is 
no longer defined in terms of conformity with moral rules but in terms of proximity 
to a scientifically determined standard of physical and psychological well-being. 
Psychological knowledge has entered schooling narratives, emerging as the expert 
system regulating conduct via the pathologisation of children’s behaviour. The 
hitherto ‘wilful’ child is now classed as ‘conflictive’ or ‘hyperactive’. Psycho­
pedagogy is applied to ‘learning difficulties’ and psychology supports the whole 
family system through ‘collective therapies’. Second-generation Ximena’s son was 
diagnosed with attention deficit. Ximena accepted Sebastian’s psychological label 
and paid redoubled attention to his education: ‘it was harder for him, I felt I had to be 
closer’; Ximena’s father had rejected this kind of expertise when Ximena herself was 
diagnosed with ‘learning difficulties’. In the father’s view, there was nothing wrong 
with his daughter, ‘psychiatrists are for crazy people’. Ximena explains her father’s 
response, distinguishing expert from lay knowledge: Guillermo’s reaction is typical 
of an ‘illiterate countryman’. There was probably less information on the role of 
psychiatric knowledge in the education of ‘mentally normal’ kids in the 1960’s than
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there was by the time of Sebastian’s schooling. But it is likely, too, that the notion of 
childhood and personhood prevailing in Guillermo’s times precluded the open and 
public treatment of impairments or mild disorders. Guillermo affirms his family’s 
normality by denying the label of ‘crazy’ for his daughter.
When morality is publicly evaluated, the visible part of the self becomes the target of 
ethical discipline. Grandparents largely described having been taught values that 
were publicly and often visually assessed through a person’s physical presentation, 
manners and behaviour. They were encouraged by family and teachers alike to 
maintain ‘cleanliness’ and ‘order’ (of clothes, body, personal belongings or spaces) 
and to develop a ‘serious, correct and formal’ attitude ‘so as to gain the respect of 
others’ especially through ‘hard work’:
O: What type o f education did you receive from your school?
Well, like in the house, to always be correct, everything always in order... 
doing my duties, knowing how to embroider, knowing, I don’t know, your 
hygiene with your things, your objects, having your clothes organised in your 
drawers (1G Laura).
The promotion of a sense of interiority is accompanied by the interiorisation of 
discipline. Extending Foucault’s argument in Discipline and Punish (1979), the 
management of children’s behaviour is oriented to capturing them from the inside 
rather than constraining them from the outside. The spread of psychological thought 
in the understanding of children’s development, at school and at home, is central to 
the interiorisation of discipline.
In the grandchildren’s formative years, ethical discipline instigated introspection for 
the children to learn about who they were and build self-esteem. Second-generation 
Carmen, for example, educated her children to be ‘independent people’, able ‘to 
make their own decisions and analyse circumstances; people confident in themselves, 
in their skills and potentials.’ Ximena wanted her children ‘to be themselves’ and not 
to ‘impose’ a model upon them, so ‘they could become who they want and find their 
own way in life’. For this generation, the good child was ‘tolerant’, ‘respectful’, 
‘sincere’, ‘sensible’, ‘emphatic’, ‘autonomous’, ‘self-sufficient’ and ‘happy’:
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I think my parents’ were keen for me to be able to explore, I think that they 
value a lot what I do artistically, what I say, what I think, the relationships I 
have established (3G Cristobal).
Recalling their infancy, the grandparents present themselves as children who never 
defied authority (though according to their stories, most of them did at some point, as 
every kid does). Defiance was wrong. By the grandchildren’s time, contestation 
becomes part of a child’s development, a mechanism of self-affirmation. In their 
childhood narratives, the third-generation interviewees explain how they broke rules 
that they considered diminished their sense of dignity or disrupted their expressive 
needs, and they manifested their thoughts and feelings even if these deviated from 
those embraced by authority:
We never ever went against my mother’s will and we never made any mistake 
about what she had inculcated in us (1G Clara).
Before, you had to eat in the kitchen... I remember that my uncle made us kids 
eat in the kitchen, I always complained and showed up in the dinning room, 
there was no reason to eat in the kitchen... Had I been the way I am in my 
mother’s times, they would have beaten the hell out of me hundreds of times 
(3G Francisco).
Over time, parents and schools replace physical punishment and the internalisation of 
behaviour through iterative sanction with an education-based notion. First, adults’ 
behaviour is treated as exemplary, second, an affective although mainly implicit 
relationship of mutual care and respect is developed between children and parents, 
and third, misdeeds are managed discursively:
We had a great time, our clothes always ended up so dirty... [Our parents] 
admonished us but they didn’t beat us... with belts and terrible things like that, 
no (3G Julia).
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In second-generation Carmen’s view, as a child, she behaved well because she loved, 
appreciated and ‘didn’t want to hurt’ her father, not because she feared him. 
Presenting himself as an example, sharing activities with her, Carmen’s father earned 
—rather than imposed— respect and affection. Third-generation Paula has a similar 
evaluation:
I think they gave us a good example ... my values come from them, from how 
they were. I never saw my parents arguing or my father drunk. My mother was 
never dirty: if she had to cook she would pin her hair up (3G Paula).
When children are educated to express opinions and obedience depends upon adult 
example, authority is no longer taken for granted and may be disputed. As noted 
earlier, no grandparent presents him or herself as having questioned their parents’ 
role, despite the severe disciplinary system they say they endured. Below, second- 
generation Juan compares his caregiver role with his father’s, while grandson Andres 
criticises Juan’s performance as a father:
The difference [with my father] is that I didn’t give my kids a bad example... I 
like drinking... but I’m not an alcoholic... I’ve never taught them a bad word, 
in fact they have never seen me in bad shape... ultimately I told them to do as I 
preached and not as I did (2G Juan).
The days my father had money he used to get drunk... I found him so 
irresponsible... once he spent a whole week drinking... my poor mother had to 
pick him up at the police station... he used to drink in that comer over there, he 
would start singing at six in the morning. I could hear him, I was so angry, I felt 
powerless (3G Andres).
The old techniques of ethical discipline did not vanish. A number of second- and 
third-generation interviewees recall ‘very little’ talking with their parents, and 
punishment rather than explanation of poor manners. In addition, some teaching 
systems still used mockery, pain, humiliation, and control of children’s physiological 
needs to build a ‘strong character’:
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The priests were very strict; they seized you by the ear and brought you inside 
almost in the air.
O: Did they hit you?
Yes, of course, they hit us. I remember they hit us with those big T-shaped 
rulers ... on the hands ... I used to snatch my hands away. “Put them back, I’m 
going to hit you twice.” Paf! Paf! and your hands went red and then they hit 
your buttocks... They hit me because I knocked that boy over and because we 
didn’t know the lines of the books by heart (2G Miguel).
If I look back, in the sense of how a teacher nowadays would take care not to 
make certain comments ...my teachers were too tough [and] made hurtful 
comments...I didn’t do extremely well at math, and one teacher said, “Uff, 
wasn’t your father a builder?” ... My mother made the covers for my 
workbooks and the teacher commented, “Isn’t your mother stingy?”... [They 
even] didn’t allow you to go to the toilet because you couldn’t interrupt the 
class (2G Carmen).
In sum, the analysis of childhood narratives reveals a shift from the first to the third 
generation in which the conception of childhood as a period for the inculcation of 
character in order to do one’s duty gives way to the notion of childhood as a period 
in which to cultivate moral interiority and express the self. Different movements 
explain this shift. Firstly, care of the self and self-awareness change from 
requirements for the child’s correct alignment with expected moral conduct to 
requisites for developing a good relationship with oneself and others. Secondly, the 
idea of the ‘innocent child’ gives way to the recognition of children as beings 
capable of discerning between good and bad, right and wrong. For example, in 
recalling her upbringing, second-generation Carmen observes:
[My father] liked us to be aware, taking care of your things and your person, 
being attentive at dinner time in case someone needed something, in classes at 
school... Responsibility, integrity and gratitude for what we had, because... my 
father used to tell us his stories about being an immigrant, leaving his house 
being very young, arriving in Chile, feeling very lonely ...and suffering that...
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It was not a Prussian discipline in which you are told to do this or that ...
Punishments were about making you realise that you had messed up (2G
Carmen).
Thirdly, individual difference and the recognition of each person’s singularity or 
uniqueness replace the value of uniformity. Singularity is supported by the 
transmission of the child’s family story and by the new conceptualisation of 
childhood as a period for bringing out inclinations and developing skills. Whereas 
the grandparents were never asked what they wanted to do in life and had little 
opportunity to choose, the grandchildren were encouraged to consider options and 
express preferences. Singularity is also reinforced by giving individual attention to 
every child both at home and school. Second-generation Alvaro uses the values of 
singularity and uniqueness to frame his schooling narrative. He says he felt 
‘welcomed, protected and loved’ in his school, where he had the ‘privilege’ of 
having had a ‘personalised education’ that promoted ‘profound relationships between 
teachers and students’, targeted each ‘child’s individual needs’, and allowed each to 
express him or herself according to his or her skills.
Fourthly, whereas for the inculcation of character the child’s feelings were irrelevant; 
in a notion of the experiential self, the child’s self-image is paramount; human beings 
are expected to develop a rewarding relationship with themselves from early age. 
Second-generation Pilar, for example, recalls her infancy as a time in which ‘mother 
would do things to please me, so I could be who I wanted’: she sewed nice clothes 
‘in the style I chose’, curled Pilar’s straight hair and accompanied her to teenage 
parties to help her feel reassured. When self-fulfilment and comfort are at stake 
rather than compliance with what others have established as right, it becomes a 
necessity to develop self-esteem.
221
8.2 Close relationships and the intimacy of the self
All the generations converge in describing personal relationships as those in which 
one feels ‘close to’ another person; there is a tie that ‘unites’ self and other, 
especially but not exclusively when family bonds are involved. Love, respect and 
mutual appreciation constitute the ‘glue’ of these relationships. The generations also 
agree that those who are close are especially significant in shaping personal identity. 
Largely, this is what makes them “significant others”.
Upon this common ground, over the course of time, a particular way of being ‘close’ 
emerges in personal relationships. The idea of moral interiority calls for a type of 
personal relationship —between the couple, between parents and kids and among 
friends— based on intimacy. Intimacy refers to an emotional rapport with another 
that presupposes the sharing of subjectivity; it is, then, an “intimacy of the self’ 
(Jamieson 1988), a disclosure and mutual sharing of significant ideas and feelings, 
including one’s life story (see chapter six). Intimacy presupposes and enhances trust, 
respect and mutual understanding and involves the physical expression of affection, 
as this is thought to both strengthen and attest to the proximity between the parties to 
the relationship. Intimacy is a way of knowing the self in terms of both thoughts and 
feelings. It is also a form of self-expression and a standard against which to evaluate 
the depth of a relationship. Thus, intimacy has different dimensions: emotional and 
discursive intimacy and physical expressiveness, together with the concomitant 
feelings of trust, respect and affection. These dimensions parallel Jamieson’s 
categorisation of the modem sense of intimacy, namely, close association, privileged 
knowledge, deep knowing and understanding and some form of love (op.cit.8).
Intimacy emerges as a topic in the second-generation adult narratives and develops 
further in the grandchildren’s stories. Many of those dimensions of intimacy are 
absent from the grandparents’ narratives and the middle generation’s childhood 
recollections.
The grandparents’ childhood stories are based on the assumption that emotional 
communication was rare in the society of the 1920’s and 1930’s. Regarding the
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parent-child relationship, for example, Joaquin recalls having seen his mother crying 
only once and comments that she did not share family crises with him:
For instance, I didn’t know that my mother apart from the eight of us ... had 
had three or four miscarriages... Nor had she ever shared her sorrow over the 
death of my elder siblings with me, never, she never touched upon the subject 
(1G Joaquin).
The grandparents converge in identifying their parents’ and, especially, their fathers’ 
seriousness as an obstacle to proximity with their children:
My father had a dry, serious character; he only needed to give us a look for us 
to know what the matter was (1G Laura).
Nor was the physical expression of affection common in the family inventory of 
experiences:
There was no intimacy of any sort, I don’t remember seeing them [my parents] 
hugging or kissing, no, nothing, the greatest indifference. This could have 
traumatised us, you see? Ha! Ha! Ha! (1G Clara).
Clara interprets an action of the past, a memory, according to the predominant 
discourse of today. She is aware of the importance emotional disclosure has gained 
with the times and with ‘trauma’, she uses the psychological language that is much 
more common in the narratives of the second-generation women. The laugh that 
closes the quote, however, places her back in her own times, in which this 
vocabulary of emotional disclosure and reference to the impact of threatening events 
on the subject’s psyche look rather strange.
Regarding discursive intimacy, the grandparents recall little talking among family 
members:
The children had a better relationship with me, they have more confidence, 
things look better, because back in those years, my mom loved us, hugged us
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but she didn’t communicate with us like I communicate with my son (1G 
Guillermo).
In their roles as parents, partners and friends, the grandparents’ generation made little 
change to this repertoire of practices. Their narratives and those of their children 
attest to this. Resembling her parents, grandmother Clara talked with her daughters 
only when they had some ‘spare time’, but this was scarce amidst all her duties and 
all the children among whom to distribute her attention:
Because I worked and they were at school, so in the evenings, there were too 
many children, also, there were many things to do too, I didn’t have the time to 
sit with them and talk (1G Clara).
Second-generation Pedro notes ‘little discursive management’ in his education. 
‘Things worked factually and very effectively, with little symbolic pointers here and 
there,’ he explains. Second-generation Carmen recalls —at this point humorously— 
how the night before her wedding her mother approached her nervously trying to talk 
about the intimacy of marriage. With empathy, Carmen relieved her mother’s 
embarrassment saying, ‘Mother, I know’. ‘I didn’t know,’ Carmen clarifies, ‘but my 
mother was so confused’ that Carmen preferred to liberate her from the 
uncomfortable situation. Carmen was aware that the requirement for intimacy was at 
odds with her mother’s structure of feelings and sense of self. Rather than engaging 
in explanations for their model of upbringing, the grandparents’ predominant style of 
childrearing was based on ‘short, clear statements’, little ‘symbolisms’ and the power 
of facticity.
Particularly up to the second generation, maternal affection is associated with being 
permanently attentive to children’s material needs, while fathers are often portrayed 
as representing the strong presence in a proper upbringing. Carmen’s mother was 
‘always by our side’, in the ‘kitchen’, in the ‘garden’, around the house. It was a 
matter of spatial proximity, not physical and emotional intimacy. Thanks to this 
spatial proximity, Carmen felt her mother ‘was closer’ than her father, but in a way, 
Carmen adds, ‘She was also more distant because we never touched on intimate 
issues.’ Questions such as: How do you feel? How is it going? What happened to
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you? were not asked. There was little discursive intimacy. The mother showed her 
affection by ‘doing’ things for the family. Below, Carmen recalls a vacation day at 
the beach:
We were with our father, playing, enjoying the place, sunbathing together, 
treading on his back... this lady went to the beach very rarely, I think I never 
saw mom in swimwear, mom was always in charge of making sure nothing was 
missing, she was really something. For instance, if we decided to stay at the 
beach for lunch, she would came down with a large basket with the most 
exquisite things you can imagine, so, always very much oriented towards 
others, and very little towards herself, my mother showed her affection by 
doing all the things she used to do (2G Carmen).
Carmen’s father, in contrast, did share the stories of their immigrant family, which 
made Carmen feel a certain proximity to him. She knew his —their— past. She 
thinks that her mother did not share her family history probably because they used to 
visit relatives on her mother’s side regularly. ‘I had their world,’ she explains. As 
Pedro emphasised before, among the grandparents the prevailing view was that the 
connection with one’s family ought to happen ‘factually’, simply by being together.
A similar picture emerges regarding emotional intimacy. Within his immediate 
family, Pedro recalls, there was ‘zero emotional elaboration, no statements about 
feelings whatsoever’. Although the general trend is an absence of visible displays of 
affection, there are exceptions, like Carmen’s memory of walking over her dad’s 
back, or Carlos’s ‘affectionate’ relationship with his parents:
Mom used to hug me, kiss me, spoil me. Dad did the same, he used to call me 
‘my little sunshine’, he would kiss me, I would have a nap with him. That was 
wonderful! (2G Carlos).
The lack of intimacy in the conduct of personal relationships does not imply that the 
grandparents view the bond with their children, partner or friends as distant. They 
had other ways of being ‘close’. Anselmo, for instance, obliges his descendants to 
meet regularly at his home to celebrate birthdays, Christmas or his wedding
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anniversary. He also makes his children call him regularly on pain of being 
reprimanded. To his mind, this is a form of care, a type of reciprocity and a ‘duty’ 
one owes to one’s relatives:
When I don’t see them I miss them, it doesn’t matter whether I see them or not, 
that’s why we have the phone, they all have phones, and when they don’t call I 
scold them.
O: So you call them then?
No I don’t call them... In my view, that’s their duty, because I was like that 
with my parents, and now it’s their turn to be like that with their parents... 
Sometimes I’ve been very tough in scolding them (1G Anselmo).
Hence, we see the vocabulary of duty framing not only the relationship of self upon 
self but also that between self and significant others.
‘The gathering of the family is the union of the family, the respect for the family,’ 
Anselmo maintains. Being close is about the factuality of connections established 
through physical proximity. Like the closeness that arises out of intimacy, this type 
of proximity also has to be worked upon. Frequent contact dispels the sense of 
interpersonal distance:
I call this cousin to keep up the friendship and to avoid distance... that’s my 
life, being concerned with things like this... Since my parents died, I’ve been 
the one concerned with keeping them united, in contact (1G Laura).
Grandmother Rosa recalls spending a great deal of time with her extended family as 
a child. They all lived nearby in town and visited each other regularly. Granny was a 
caring figure in her upbringing and her single aunts taught her cooking. It was a 
‘united family’. Yet, Rosa also portrays herself as a lonely, reserved little girl who 
‘shared her feelings with nobody’. Frequent encounters with the extended family do 
not guarantee shared intimacy of the self. Yet, she defines the family bond as close 
and united. Over the years though, the ‘family has gotten distant’. The problem is 
‘that everyone is thinking of himself rather than of others’. Once more, this 
generation defines care of others and care of the self as opposing practices. In the
226
grandparents’ view, being close as a family has more to do with the disposition to 
care for one another and with respect for the institution of the family, by attending 
family gatherings and seeing or talking to each other regularly, for example, than 
with the disclosure of inner feelings and concerns.
In male friendship, ‘Intimacy,’ grandfather Joaquin says, ‘is not something you want 
to give’. Yet, this has not prevented Joaquin and his good friend of whom he speaks 
below from knowing each other’s tastes and developing a caring relationship:
I have a friend who has come for dinner here twice in his whole life and I have 
gone to his place twice too, but yesterday he brought me a basketful of caquis 
[a native fruit], ripe from the trees at his house, out of the blue, just because I 
love caquis. He is such a lovely person! (1G Joaquin).
According to the morality of respectability (see chapter three) regulating 
grandmothers’ behaviour, being too friendly was improper as it distracted women 
from their duties as mothers and housewives. The grandmothers tend to describe 
their adolescent and adult lives as almost deprived of friends:
No, no, there were no neighbourhood girlfriends.
O: Who were your friends then?
My sisters and no one else, no.
O: What about the boarding school, didn ’t you made friends there?
Yes I did, one or two, but they weren’t special friends, there was just a feeling 
of sympathy for one more than another... Some I saw once in a while but we 
weren’t used to visiting each other’s homes, or going out together, no, always 
with the family and nothing else (1G Laura).
Concerning the couple relationship, Laura comments that she sees her daughter 
Carmen sharing moments with her husband that Laura did not have with hers:
Her husband wants her to accompany him everywhere he travels... On 
Sundays, Carmen has to go cycling with her husband, both together, early in 
the morning.
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O: Do you think that they share more than you did with your husband?
Of course, but I didn’t miss that. As we were educated the other way, I found it 
the most natural way (1G Laura).
The ‘other way’ Laura talks about was a ‘life with my husband and I always apart’ 
regarding the sharing of activities. On a normal Sunday, ‘he would go to the club and 
I would set off to my mother’s with the girls’. She portrays the couple as living more 
compartmentalised and segregated social lives than the next generation does. 
Moreover, with an average of six children per family, grandmother Clara explains, ‘it 
was quite difficult’ for the couple to go out together; both money and spare time 
were short.
The grandparents were not used to engaging in deep conversations about life or self 
with their partners:
O: With whom do you talk things in life, your problems and feelings?
With nobody...
O: And when he [husband] was alive, did you share with him your 
feelings, your thoughts?
No ... I didn’t use to complain about anything (1G Rosa).
Nor were they used to discussing their sex life (see chapter nine). The most common 
subjects of conversation were the kids, the extended family or the situation of the 
country. Again, for this generation life —including marriage and bearing children— 
is a factual reality to which to adapt, not the object of discovery and thematisation.
Whereas the second generation signals ‘love, true love, in the sense of 
communication with each other’ (2G Carlos) as the key to keeping marriages 
together, love and intimacy were not requirements for marriage in the first 
generation:
‘I was 17, and I didn’t know what life was about, I didn’t know what dating 
was about... we wouldn’t talk about love, there was no advice about love’ (1G 
Rosa).
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Rosa’s humanity was not equipped with the subjectifiers of love; she did not possess 
this competence. In those times, some marriages (including hers) were prearranged 
between people who barely knew each other. In this epoch, marriage was more about 
setting up a home than consolidating love and intimacy between soulmates. As 
Anselmo explains, commitment is associated with the fulfilment of the particular 
‘obligations’ and ‘responsibilities’ the institutions of marriage and family carry for 
the respective partners, not with the sharing of their inner selves:
One’s particular obligation is to provide for the household expenditures... if the 
man marries it is because he knows that he has that responsibility... The family, 
in my view, is composed this way, the man is bom with a responsibility, and 
the woman has hers, isn’t that true? That the day you become a mother, you be 
a mother (1G Anselmo).
For setting up this enterprise, they chose a ‘clean’ and ‘hard-working woman’ or a 
‘serious and responsible man’ for a partner.
Instead of sharing similar interests and activities, weaving the inner troubles of the 
self or rooting their union in romantic or “confluent love” (Giddens 1991), within the 
marriage the grandparents speak of the importance of being ‘loyal’. This is a loyalty 
to the institution of marriage and the family it sustains. Loyalty throws the ‘inner 
self into a secondary position. We may recall that it silenced Margarita’s anger 
when her husband Alberto brought unexpected guests home for lunch. It required 
Margarita to improvise a nice meal and treat the guests politely. As the value of the 
intimacy of the self grows in importance, this modality of closeness would retreat 
into the past, largely because new generations would not be willing to bear the clash 
between its interests and those of the self. When a grandmother says that ‘no other 
woman endured what I had to endure’ —referring to her husband’s womanising— 
she is offering proof of her loyalty and love for her partner, her decency and virtue. 
With the passing of time, ‘accepting everything’ the other says and ‘enduring’ 
everything he does, even to one’s own detriment, would be regarded less and less as 
a virtue.
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In the grandparents’ lives, the lack of discursive intimacy and of time shared as a 
couple, or the fact that many of them did not marry ‘for love’, do not mean that their 
partners could not become lifelong companions. Holding a radically different view 
of the self, of its moral references, of marriage and of womanhood than her 
grandmother, Matilde describes the deep bond between her grandparents:
I think that my grandmother has never been as happy as she was when my 
grandpa was alive, never, she misses him a great deal, he was her complement, 
he really was her other half... Now she tries to go on, but I think she misses him 
very much, very much, she feels as if she’s limping along without a crutch, it’s 
obvious... my grandmother feels a bit dead without grandpa (3G Matilde).
I use Matilde’s reference because her grandmother would hardly use such 
subjectifiers. The grandmother depicts what Matilde describes as a marriage of 
soulmates as ‘a friendly, sincere, clean, caring [relationship] nothing else’. This 
reflects that intimacy is not only a way of conducting close relationships but also a 
way of narrating them through the use of an interiorised discourse.
With the passing of time, the value placed on emotional communication radically 
alters people’s ‘structure of feelings’. According to second- and third-generation 
interviewees, the incorporation of physical affection and emotional communication 
requires the development of personal intimacy, ‘sharing stories of the past’ or 
entering personal terrains. Unlike Joaquin’s mother, who never shared the pain of 
losing her babies with her family, second-generation Miguel found it essential to 
explain to his children the separation from their mother. Without such parental 
disclosure, his children’s affection, trust and respect for him could have been 
irremediably damaged:
O: Is the relationship with your children closer than the one you had with your 
parents?
Yes, definitely.
O: How can you tell?
Because I have talked with them, I’ve always tried to let them know why what 
happened ... My parents, in contrast, never told me, “Look, we argue because
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of this and that but you have to do this, study for your well-being”... Yes [my 
children] love me, we laugh together, we are affectionate, and we hug and kiss 
each other. I’ve always given them affection, it’s not for nothing that I’m here 
[at his children’s home every Saturday for the last 10 years] (2G Miguel).
Miguel’s daughter agrees,
The relationship with my father is good and I have a lot of confidence in him. 
He is the father-friend, the cool father, the sincere and affectionate father (3G 
Julia).
Additionally, affectionate episodes such as the one below are much more common in 
the grandchildren’s recollections than in those of previous generations:
My mom is very caring; she squeezes and hugs us... [My dad] would be lying 
on his bed watching telly, he would hold me and say: “Ok, pampering time,” 
and I would count down the minute while we hug. “Ok, done,” I would say and 
he would release me. All of that was part of the spoiling thing, you see? (3G 
Javiera).
Like the care of the self, for many second-generation interviewees, emotional 
disclosure and affective expression have been hard to develop. For men, the 
ingrained patriarchal culture precludes serious emotional disclosure and affective 
intimacy in the relationship with other men. They are used to communicating with 
their sons through rough physicality and mockery:
I think we didn’t have the confidence to say, “This is what is going on with 
me.” Because my father would attack me either verbally or physically, 
[although] the physical part was very rare.
O: What did he use to say to you?
He called me ‘huevon,33.
33 Huevon (adj.) is the best-known and most popular Chilean neologism. Its meaning is as broad as its 
use and, in recent years, it has been successfully exported to neighbouring Latin American countries. 
It also has associated forms: a verb (hueviar), noun (hueva), gerund (hueviando), and more. The root
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O: Did he humiliate you?
Sure, he did (3G Andres).
Juan confirms his son’s description: ‘we are very close’ ‘we make jokes and have 
fun’. Yet, he does not recognise the impact of his emotional rejection on his son’s 
well being and identity, nor does he perceive this as an obstacle to an intimate father- 
son relationship. Juan is operating within that patriarchal model his son rejects as it 
equates maleness with toughness and the suppression of emotions and feelings. This 
is Juan’s version:
My father always worried about —and I have the same tendency -  treating men 
different than women. I’m more delicate with my daughters, with them I never 
swear, with my son I use the “son of a bitch”. I make that difference to give the 
man the responsibility of caring about things... I’m good at having fun, my son 
tells me, “You love me anyway,” and I reply “Why on earth would I love you 
if you are a man, women are for loving, not you” (2G Juan).
As a son, Andres is asking for an intimate relationship with his father, for this is a 
condition of the individualisation of the relationship. His father cannot be an 
anonymous stranger. For this the relationship with his father needs ‘communication, 
time, comprehension, respect, love, proximity and the expression of affection.’
For second-generation women, problems have less to do with showing physical 
affection than with establishing discursive intimacy with their children, perhaps 
because of their own gendering process. For granddaughter Paula, her mother’s 
obsession with cleanness and tidiness detracts from opportunities for a family chat. 
Paula has a different order of priorities:
I remember my mom always doing the cleaning, always... she cannot stand 
having the house untidy if a guest is coming, what would the guest say! She
huevo means egg and refers to the male genitals. In their informal conversations with friends, Chilean 
males intercalate the word ‘huevon’ almost like a comma and without implying any negative 
connotation (hi, huevon, how are you doing huevonl”), but a lot of masculinity. However with 
different intonation, the expression can be an insult; like Andres feels is the intent in his father’s 
utterance.
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could be dead tired but she would do the cleaning. Dad’s family is more 
relaxed [after lunch] they would keep talking, we could sit there forever in no 
hurry, but if you’re having lunch with mom’s family you would finish your 
meal, they would stand up and start tidying up immediately... Mom says dad’s 
family are dirty people... I say no, maybe they are more interested in seeing 
what’s going on with you than doing the tidying up, I was like mom at first but 
I’ve realised that clearing the table immediately is not the most important thing 
(3G Paula).
Discursive elaboration might prove difficult, but second-generation women identify 
their ability to organise family gatherings as an advantage in building family 
intimacy. The woman is the ‘centre’, ‘head’ and ‘pillar’ of the family; she has the 
power to convoke. But here, collective reunions are resignified as informal and 
horizontal spaces for voluntary timesharing:
The woman is the head of the family, as a mother you have to make sacrifices 
in the sense that you have to bring your children together, you have to bring the 
family together, you have to make family lunches work... my children love 
seeing their family, being all together, we used to go together on holidays, 
almost 40 people in an old house... To this very day we celebrate Christmas as 
a family with my husband’s family, with a Christmas show included... I found 
that very important, the family is the pillar of everything, and it is the woman 
that has to have that vision, you cannot give up, because I swear it’s something 
that goes from one generation to the next... I learnt this from my mother-in-law 
(2G Elena).
The generations also converge in identifying the introduction of humour and more 
informality in the family relationship as another sign of intimacy. A number of 
childhood stories from the first generation’s time (told by them and by their 
descendants) describe the family dinner as a ‘serious’ occasion. ‘You daren’t tell a 
joke at table,’ says Alvaro. ‘Still less would it occur to you to pull your father’s leg,’ 
Carlos adds. Little by little, jokes, humour and a bit of disorder made their way to the 
dining table, while the formality, respect for hierarchy and structured social manners 
that prevailed in the past begin to recede.
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These signs of more informal relationships indicate that intimacy presupposes a 
democratic relationship (Giddens 1991, 1992). But they are also connected with 
processes described elsewhere, like the increasing value placed on ordinary life and 
the privatisation of family life.
Love and the sharing of common interests and values are the reasons behind 
Matilde’s decision to marry Roberto. For the grandchildren, the intimacy of the self 
plays out in sharing activities, interests and values; all means of expression of their 
inner orientations and, thus, sources of proximity, confidence and mutual trust. This 
extends to the sharing of friends:
His friends are my friends, if one of them comes home, I could keep talking to 
him, even if Roberto decides to go to bed (1G Matilde).
Between the couple, intimacy is also enhanced by sharing household chores. In this 
respect, grandmother Laura’s ‘way’ of living her marriage differs not only from her 
daughter’s, as reviewed earlier, but also from her granddaughter’s:
Carmen’s elder daughter likes her comfort, she does everything together with 
her husband; they do the shopping, the cooking and the cleaning together (3G 
Laura).
What Laura’s doer character sees as contemptible ‘comfort’ is, in granddaughter 
Matilde’s mind, a ‘vital’ matter of ‘interchanging roles’, sharing responsibilities and 
power between a man and a woman who believe in equal rights and do not want to 
reproduce ascribed gender roles as their ‘submissive’ grandmothers did. Whereas 
grandfather Anselmo maintains that he married to fulfil the man’s household 
provider role, granddaughter Javiera explains that the basic reason for sharing one’s 
life with a partner is ‘to have fun together and enjoy the relationship’. The former 
speaks with the grammar of duties and has as a referent the ideal of the ‘exemplary 
life’. The latter speaks with the interiorised discourse of the experiential self.
Like the grandparents, granddaughter Julia also talks of proof of friendship by 
helping those who ‘have fallen’. But the falls she refers to are inner tribulations and
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interpersonal troubles (including those of love and sex), not ‘falling’ into prison, a 
period of unemployment or a financial economic crisis. For Julia, friends provide 
emotional support and help discern possible paths of conflict resolution. Julia is 
alluding to emotional disclosure, the kind of intimacy grandfather Joaquin is not 
willing to give to his friends.
With their friends, the grandchildren “are working out together who they are and 
what their emerging identities might be” (Pahl 2000:61). The grandchildren test out 
ideas of the right and good among their friends (see chapter five). Friendship is 
conceived as a space of self-expressiveness, authenticity and affection. It is 
associated with psychosocial well-being and quality of life. Unlike in the 
grandmothers’ narratives, statements such as ‘friendship is very important to me’ are 
common among the grandchildren.
Whereas the grandparents emphasise the importance of loyalty, intimacy in close 
relationships requires the development of trust. Trust is to believe in the other person 
“despite uncertainty [...] Trust always involves an element of risk resulting from our 
inability to monitor others’ behaviour” (Misztal in Pahl 2000:66). This kind of trust 
is what middle-generation men find difficult to establish. In fact, out of mistrust, they 
opt more for reserve and discretion. The thematisation and expression of the self are 
requirements for establishing and strengthening this trust. Federico’s sister is his best 
friend, ‘we are very close’, ‘she knows my whole life’. ‘At her place I open the 
fridge and eat whatever I want’. To the grandchildren, close friends are witnesses, 
counsellors and confessors. In this sense, it should be noted that the intimacy of the 
self grows as a value at a time that is also described by the grandchildren as highly 
‘individualistic’.
This chapter has looked at how the relationship between ideas of the good, ethics and 
technologies of the self has been transformed through the reformulation of the idea of 
childhood from a period for the inculcation of a character and the observance of 
duties to a time to foster moral interiority and the expression of subjectivity.
In terms of practices of the self, the transfer of moral authority to the interior of the 
person manifests in the need to develop a sense of inwardness. In the childhood
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narratives this is reflected, on the one hand, in the institutionalisation of the idea that 
the person has to develop a rewarding relationship with him or herself from an early 
age, for which a good self-image and a sense of self-esteem are paramount. On the 
other hand, it manifests in the recognition of children’s capacity for moral 
discernment, as opposed to the association between childhood and innocence (which 
implies they are morally immature or incapacitated) that prevailed in the 
grandparents’ narratives.
Through the generations, the idea of moral interiority elevates the notions of the 
‘individual’ and of a person’s originality, uniqueness or ‘essence’, to the status of 
values. The intergenerational narratives of childhood reflect this movement from a 
politics of equality to one of difference. They indicate how contemporary practices of 
parenting and schooling promote individual difference and the recognition of each 
child’s singularity to the detriment of the value of uniformity that prevailed in the 
grandparents’ upbringing.
The chapter has also examined the implications of the interiorisation of the moral 
sources of the self in personal relationships and, specifically, in the emergence of 
intimacy as a value. Contemporary scholarship has described the rise of intimacy as a 
main feature of the type of close relationships in which the self-reflective and 
individualised subject of late modernity engages. Most notably, Anthony Giddens 
(1991, 1992) refers to intimacy as the key organising principle of what he terms the 
“pure relationship”; the democratised, free-floating and self-referential relationship 
that comes into existence mainly in the domains of sexuality, marriage and friendship 
(parent/child relationships have, according to Giddens, a hierarchical component that 
prevents the development of all the elements of the pure relationship).
Giddens connects the rise of intimacy with the decline of external social and 
economic conditions in shaping the personal relationship agenda, with the 
democratisation of interpersonal relationships —especially as regards gender 
equality— and with the condition of inner reflexivity in the organisation of the pure 
relationship. “Intimacy is above all a matter of emotional communication with others 
and with the self, in a context of interpersonal equality” (1991:130).
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Some of these elements bear some significance in the intergenerational 
transformation of the notion of personal relationships discussed here. Intimacy comes 
to be the condition for the individualisation of personal relationships. It lays the 
foundations for knowing, understanding, loving and expressing the self, for being in 
touch with one’s feelings, emotions and thoughts and for establishing bonds of trust 
and commitment with particular others. But the point is that, in general, intimacy 
would not have emerged as a value without the interiorisation of the moral sources of 
the self. It is when there is the strong belief that moral power relies on interiority, 
that the need to share the inner troubles and realisations of the self crystallises. 
Intimacy is the expression —within the significant relationship between self and 
others— of the rise of the ideal of moral interiority. This also has a narrative 
component: the generational comparison suggests that intimacy also has to do with 
the ability to incorporate an interiorised discourse in the narrativisation of close 
relationships. We should also stress that the growing significance of intimacy in 
personal relationships is reinforced by the ongoing privatisation of family life and by 
the tendency to ground the search for happiness in the details of ordinary life.
Importantly, the fact that people two generations back did not use this interiorised 
discourse to speak of their personal relationships and did not expect the kind of 
intimacy personal relationships entail nowadays, does not preclude attachment to and 
fondness of significant others. Other types of principles sustained personal 
relationships in the past.
In part two, I argued that the prevailing view in the grandparents’ generation is of life 
as a factual reality to which to adapt. This extends to their approach to personal 
relationships. Being close to significant others has to do with the disposition to care 
for one another, in the sense of watching over, looking after or assisting the loved 
ones in practical ways. Being close is also associated with loyalty to and respect for 
the institutions that bind people together —family and marriage— rather than the 
particular son or wife. This respect and loyalty extends also to the hierarchy 
according to which roles are organised within these institutions, for example, by 
observing the rituals of formally organised family gatherings. Closeness in personal 
relationships is performed through frequent factual connections, not through the 
sharing of the inner self.
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CHAPTER NINE— SEXUALITY AND GENDER
This chapter uses male and female narratives to continue exploring the interiorisation 
of moral sources of the self, by looking at how emotions, cognition and bodily 
experiences intertwine in sexuality and gender, two highly constitutive dimensions of 
selfhood. In women’s stories, this process of interiorisation is expressed in the partial 
disentanglement of the equation of care of the self with sexual disembodiment, 
whereas in men’s, it manifests in the moralisation of sex, that is, increasing concern 
with doing good and being ethical with respect to one’s sexual practices. These 
processes are associated with a reformulation of the relation between sexuality and 
self across the generations, from been conceived as a self-referential male physical 
practice upon a female body to an interpersonal affective experience and a 
constitutive aspect of the identity of the self.
9.1 Female sexuality: an object to sacrifice, a constitutive part of the self
Grandmothers say that in their times, female sexuality was considered a threat, as it 
could bring disorder to the righteous life by jeopardising the imperative of ‘chastity’ 
that marked the line between decency and corruption. Sexually active women were 
‘loose’, indecent prostitutes. By being sexually open (to any man), the ‘loose 
woman’ not only revealed her moral faults, but also a lack of instinctual control and, 
therefore, little refinement. A ‘lady’, by contrast, had to ‘care for herself, remain 
unfamiliar with her own sexuality and be alert to correct baser instincts and desires. 
Being a good woman presupposed the dissociation of self and sexuality. 
Grandmothers ended up cultivating an intense relationship with themselves that, 
paradoxically, led towards the development of a disembodied sexual life.
According to the grandmothers’ narratives, experiences of sexuality were obstructed 
by a veil of silence and the punishment of sin and social marginalisation. The 
community’s gaze exerted a pervasive control upon women at a time when female 
sexuality symbolised family decency. First-generation women received no
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information in their adolescence and youth regarding the workings of sexuality or 
how it might feel:
You have a heart, bones, a liver, but to mention whether you had a vagina or a 
uterus? No, they skipped that part. I think that nuns at school didn’t know about 
it anyway (1G Clara).
Instead, grandmothers ‘internalised’ commands from teachers and family on how to 
behave and relate to sexual feelings and impulses: ‘If a man touches me that’s a sin’ 
(1G Margarita), ‘I couldn’t look at my body even when bathing’ (1G Margarita), ‘It 
was a sin to touch oneself (1G Clara), ‘Don’t be kissed, because one had to defend 
oneself, I punched boys’ (1G Clara).
Grandmothers say they grew up in sexual ‘ignorance’. Before marriage they behaved 
like sexless ‘poor innocent, little birds’. Once married, the relationship with their 
sexuality was mediated by their husbands, priests and doctors or by procreation. For 
example, it was the sexually active husband’s role to initiate and educate his wife 
sexually, signalling the end of her virginity and innocence alike:
He taught me everything. I didn’t know anything (1G Clara).
On my wedding night I knew nothing and had never seen a man before... So it 
was traumatic, terrible, shocking ... I almost wanted to run away ... He was so 
homy, I suffered (1G Ana).
This prohibition on sexual experience precluded the view of sexuality as an integral 
aspect of their sense of self. In fact, these women see sexuality as something they 
have had to sacrifice to their family’s decency, to their husbands or to the 
reproduction of their lineage.
In the narratives of these women’s marriages, sex is profoundly attached to the 
satisfaction of male urges. Rosa, for instance, classifies sex among her conjugal 
‘duties’, and defines sexual desire as a masculine prerogative. Sexual activity is also
239
strongly oriented towards procreative ends. The marriage redefines the relationship 
between female sexuality and a woman’s goodness. If a single woman’s moral worth 
depended on controlling sexuality’s baser instincts, once she was married, nature was 
expected to endow her with fertility to enhance her constitutive role as a mother. In 
fact, in a number of cases, only severe health risks justified, in the eyes of husbands, 
doctors and priests, the use of contraceptive methods and the end of the procreation 
period.
Little space is left for intimacy or emotions such as happiness, joy or pleasure. Only 
when evoking the experience of motherhood do feelings of self-fulfilment emerge. In 
Rosa’s rendering: ‘my heart is good, big and beautiful for my children, they mean 
everything to me’. However, although they indicate that sexuality was not a priority 
in life (Rosa, for example, defines herself ‘not as a woman but as a mother’), extreme 
situations such as infidelity allowed the ‘inner soul’ expression and prompted the 
enactment of the most resolute character:
She got into an affair with Gabriel [husband] ... I asked my neighbour. “Please 
get this girl away from here, I don’t care where.” ...I was quite furious ... I 
forgave him ... Some time passed, some years, and he got involved with another 
woman ... I did many things to make him tire of her ... One day he told me that 
he wanted to separate, he started the sentence, “Ehm, you know,” a bit 
confused. “What did you say?” I replied [loudly and sharply]. “No, nothing, I 
didn’t say anything,” and that was i t ... She is still alive the idiot old woman, she 
had maaaany men ... during her husband’s lifetime and after she was widowed 
... and he had to go for this old used woman, so we had a horrible time ... I had a 
huge depression (1G Ana).
Ana’s reactions —her fury and feelings of being emotionally overwhelmed by these 
episodes to the extent of suffering depression, her determination to keep her marriage 
and recover her husband, her attack on the other woman’s decency— all reveal the 
limits of the sexually disembodied self as well as of the figure of the emotionally 
‘restrained lady’.
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This rhetoric of the ‘good girl’ and the restrained ‘lady’ mastering instincts through 
will power also pervades second-generation women’s narratives. In their education, 
female sexual prowess is still associated with moral and social opprobrium. At home, 
the nude body ‘was not something to be shown’, even less so was sexuality ‘the 
subject of a conversation’. Instead, ‘visual signs’, ‘elusive metaphors’, and direct 
regulation of girls’ behaviour (e.g., controlling their dating), were the most common 
practices through which parents referred to the sexual body:
Are you crazy? My father could have never touched on the subject, the poor 
man would have gotten too confused. Whether they told me this happens for 
this reason or that? No, zero explanation ... I remember that it came [menarche] 
and that I left my stained undies a little bit on view so my mother would realise 
(2G Carmen).
In schools run by Catholic congregations, girls were expected to keep ‘clean and 
immaculate bodies’. Internally, this implies virginity and externally, ‘order’, 
‘cleanliness’ and ‘modesty’ in their personal presentation, language, manners and 
attitudes:
I remember that the nuns used to say to us, “Girls, you cannot be like the cake 
in the bakery surrounded by flies.” I think they wanted to say don’t be dating 
here and there, I imagine it had to do with not having sex (2G Paz).
It was overall:
a very pechofia34 education, everything was a sin ... If you wore red undies you 
were a whore, any conduct that was a bit garish, you were considered a loose 
girl (2G Elena).
34 Pechofia: (adj.) Chilean Catholic-rooted expression referring to excessive piety. Pecho is the breast 
and pechoho refers derogatively to those who beat their breast (three times) with a fist in sign of regret 
during mass, saying “for my fault, for my fault, for my holy fault”. Therefore, Chileans use the term 
pechoho/a to criticise those that have a very narrow-minded, conservative way o f being and seeing the 
world. In the quotation, Elena attached the adjective pechoha to the nuns at her school who believed 
that everything was sinful.
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This ethical nature of female sexuality reverberates in these women’s recollections 
about their first romantic and erotic feelings:
Everything was healthier, we used to meet [with boys] in a square and talk (2G
Ximena).
Sexual curiosity was seen as a moral threat, and therefore the relationship with boys 
had to be approached from a ‘healthy’ perspective so as to prevent contamination 
with ‘naughty thoughts’. Like their mothers, at the time of their sexual initiation 
these women were often in complete ‘theoretical and practical ignorance’.
In parallel to these continuities, new processes gradually take shape. On the one hand, 
by the second generation a gradual privatisation of women’s lives comes to 
reorganise the meaning of sexuality and its relationship to self-identity. The context 
in which sexuality is given value changes from the formal and public sphere to that of 
everyday life and elective personal relationships. Social control of girls’ life shifts 
from the authority of the community to that of the family. This process disentangled 
the pololeo, that is the pre-marital relationship between girlfriend and boyfriend, from 
its formal and public investiture, allowing it to enter the daily life of the family. 
Carmen’s relationship with Mario, for instance, was ‘rapidly accepted’ by both 
families and integrated into their routines. She went to dinner at his home and he 
joined Carmen’s family for holidays. In comparison with the previous generation, the 
pololeo also gained privacy in the anonymity of new places of youth encounter far 
from the family gaze, such as discotheques or trips to the beach. In the grandparent’s 
time, courtship was a form of stating the intention to marry, “not a process of testing 
out a relationship by getting to know each other’s inner self’ (Jamieson 1988: 23). In 
the second and third generations, the view of courtship and marriage is extended to 
encompass spaces of intimate relationships, elected by subjective affinity and based 
on affection and companionship.
On the other hand, in their late adulthood these women began to question the 
equation of women’s goodness with sexual disembodiment in which they had been 
socialised and to see it as a ‘distorted’ view in need of correction by practical
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experience. In their marriages, sexuality is progressively disclosed as an affective 
source of the self and dissociated from the idea that it is the source of woman’s 
goodness and a wife’s duty. Sex becomes a source of emotional expression within 
the couple. Whereas first-generation women learnt ‘from’ their husbands, second 
generation women learnt ‘together with’ their partners, and for this, women needed 
to be their bodies, expressing their feelings and sexual desires. As a source of the 
self, sexuality cannot be suppressed or dissociated but has to be disclosed for the 
sake of conjugal intimacy. ‘Tenderness’, ‘playing’, ‘caresses’, ‘pleasure’, 
‘eroticism’, ‘intimacy in the couple’ define the meaning of sexuality for this 
generation.
Thus, these women gradually began to discover their sexuality, to relate to it and to 
repatriate it to the bodies and selves where it belongs. This time, sexuality calls for an 
inward gaze, not to correct ‘loose’ intentions but to know oneself and to integrate that 
knowledge to one’s way of being. If sexuality is something human beings are 
‘naturally’ endowed with, if it is experienced in the right context, then nature is not 
the terrain of disorder and uncivilised urges, but where true self-experience can be 
found. This reflective process ‘has been very hard, it has taken my whole life’, with 
advances and setbacks:
I think that the whole generation has the same hang-ups, religion was too 
strong, everything was seen from the religious point of view, I have had to do 
away with many of those hang-ups, of what supposedly was a sin which is not, 
but a natural, normal thing (2G Elena).
A while ago, to try something new, Elena went to a motel with her husband. Once at 
the door she was unable to walk in. Her thoughts were in turmoil: ‘I was married, 
what was the problem if someone saw me there with my husband, it was absolutely 
legal, but those that go to motels are bataclanas35,’ those that expose their sexual 
desire publicly. Husband and wife had to wait until she felt ready to try this new 
experience again. Once they succeeded they ‘never stopped’ again.
35 (Noun) Pejorative term for prostitute, brothel fodder.
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In the granddaughters’ narratives and individualised discourse frame the talk of 
sexuality and self. These women employ a modem rationality of gender politics to 
deconstruct the inherited equation between female goodness and sexual 
disengagement and to argue for the liberation of female sexuality from the 
‘hypocritical’ veil that has, for decades, concealed women’s powerlessness with 
‘moralistic’ arguments and the efficiency of social control:
Revolution of the concept of gender; both genders are male and female at the 
same time, and have the same possibilities and the same benefits (3G Matilde).
For them sex is no longer a male prerogative; it is to be enjoyed by men and women 
equally, disregarding social conventions such as marriage and apart from procreative 
ends. In Julia’s mind, her sexual initiation depends on finding ‘the person who is 
worth it’ rather than on marriage, while according to those already sexually active a 
responsible sexual life depends on having ‘safe sex’ rather than on abstinence to 
guard against indecency.
In these readings, normal female sexuality is something to construct according to 
individual processes and family proyectos. Sexuality is a source of self-discovery 
and self-expression, a way of stating who I am:
Experiencing myself in a couple, discovering myself as a sexual person is 
something I still have to discover and that only began when I was 20, 21, 
before I was the best friend of my men friends, now I’m the lover of one (3G 
Matilde).
This calls for a relationship with oneself, not to suppress one’s feelings but to ‘care 
for oneself’ acting according to what one truly believes and being responsible 
towards one’s own stances.
The development of this discourse is supported by the ongoing process of 
privatisation of sexuality and by a new relationship between sexual knowledge and 
self that allowed these women to ‘care for themselves’ from childhood to 
adolescence by learning from  their sexuality. Parents begin to address physiological
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changes, such as breast growth or menarche, and ‘innocent’ approaches to romance 
like the first kiss or inquiries about procreation, so as to give adolescents the tools to 
learn from their sexuality as a physical and emotional domain. Among family and 
peers, the disentanglement of sexual topics and the body from the sphere of the extra- 
discursive and their incorporation into regular conversations and practices, meant the 
youngest generation experienced sexual development as part of a ‘normal’ or 
conventional relationship with oneself:
My mother walked naked about the house, she showed herself to us, it wasn’t 
like “Oops! Sorry” if you entered the bathroom and she was there... no, it was 
like “come in” ... For me it was not an issue to see my mother naked because 
I’ve always seen that... I don’t know if we were innocent, I don’t think so, we 
always knew everything (3G Javiera).
As a ‘natural’ part of classmates’ daily interaction, boys ‘laughed’ at girls and how 
ridiculous they looked wearing a bra with tiny breasts; while girls made fun of ‘acne- 
covered, smelly, hairy’ boys. Second-generation women’s testimonies of a ‘healthy’ 
interaction with boys without having ‘naughty thoughts’ echoes the still-pervasive 
sinful morality. Their daughters’ narratives reveal an awareness of the process of 
gender embodiment as they grew older as well as an empathic attitude between boys 
and girls in this awkward phase.
Within the school curriculum girls were taught about sexual development, 
procreation and safe sex. Here, sexuality was framed in terms of human 
physiological development rather than the moral constitution of womanhood, while 
education encouraged a responsible behaviour towards oneself instead of an 
‘innocent’ attitude:
I already knew what was it about, at school they taught us, I had a lot of friends 
that had menstruated already ... and we talked about it openly: what is 
happening? Have your breasts grown? Does it hurt? Where does it come from? 
And at school they didn’t avoid the topic; it was not taboo (3G Matilde).
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Compared to previous generations, spaces of privacy were enlarged, community 
surveillance and the equation of ‘being on the street’ with ‘being a loose woman’ 
receded, but the threat of becoming a ‘used’ woman and the risk of pregnancy 
remained:
[my mother used to say] “Daughter, if you go to a party, and you flirt with a 
boy, that’s ok, but if that boy leaves, and another one who you like arrives or 
flirts with you, don’t flirt back, because everybody will see you and who knows 
what names they will call you” (3G Paula).
Even now I check on my youngest daughter, when she has her period, when she 
goes out, when she comes back, I don’t want any surprises (2G Juan).
It is regarding pre-marital sex that granddaughters’ narratives evidence the limits of 
their individualised discourses. Firstly, even if the equation of female ‘dignity’ with 
‘chastity’ is an unwanted inheritance, the granddaughters’ narratives still reveal the 
weight of this morality of sexual purity. They consciously avoid evaluating and 
practising sexuality within the old moral framework, but they end up doing so 
anyway by granting their parents, partners or friends authority in the evaluation of 
their sexual life. Because they knew that for their parents a sexually active single 
woman was shameful; these young women choose to hide their pre-marital sex life, 
lie to their parents, betraying their own moral predicaments and compromising the 
value of authenticity:
I had to lie to my parents. I knew I had to lie to them and everything would be 
fantastic, that I had to play the good girl... I had to lie about something that I did 
not feel guilty about at all (3G Matilde).
Third-generation women practised pre-marital sexual activity in secret, hidden from 
their parents, ‘quick’, and not ‘naturally’ and ‘openly’ as the modem rationale would 
assume:
I did not feel that it was wrong, however I had to hide it and that was because it 
was something forbidden and I think that influenced me, you don’t have a place,
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you have to do it quickly, you don’t have anyone to talk about it with (3G 
Javiera).
In previous generations, the ‘good girl’ never thought to defy her parents’ rules. For 
the granddaughters, the ‘good girl’ is a role to play to conceal who they really are and 
what they stand for.
When Matilde’s father found out that she was sexually active, ‘his world fell apart; I 
changed from a daughter to a whore’ (the use of the term whore recalling the loose 
archetype). Matilde was devastated and felt she needed to regain her father’s respect. 
Her modem arguments and responsible approach were not sufficient to make him 
understand. Thus she tried explaining herself using her father’s moral framework:
I was in love, we had already announced that we wanted to marry, so it 
couldn’t be more idyllic. What more could he ask for? I was going to marry the 
man with whom I lost my virginity ... I lost confidence in dad... I felt 
humiliated (3G Matilde).
Moreover, the narratives of these modem feminists are populated with fears of losing 
their moral worth through being sexually active. In recalling her sexual history, 
Sofia’s narrative fluctuates between the right to experience her sexuality, the lack of 
self-care and value in mere self-explorative sex and the fear of acquiring too much 
experience for her boyfriends’ taste (echoing the loose archetype and women’s 
powerlessness to evaluate their own moral worth in the sexual sphere):
My boyfriend has been with a lot of girls. He told me, “One can tell that you 
have not been with many boys”. It is nice to be told that. For me it is important 
that he can notice that. But you also say: How can he tell? What is the 
difference in relation to other girls? (...) My girlfriends, for example, can have 
sex with three guys and they don’t care, they can do whatever they are asked to, 
for them the more they can explore the better (3G Sofia).
Secondly, the individualised discourse encounters its limits when new sexual 
experiences create the need to judge other people’s practices in order to articulate
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new interpretative frameworks and define normality. By establishing these moral 
criteria, this generation compromises the liberalism of neutrality it proclaims. Matilde 
argues that an ‘open-minded modem woman’ ought to respect each person’s moral 
autonomy. However, she uses other girls’ sexual behaviour to define her own 
parameters. Until university, Matilde’s social circle consisted of ‘girlfriends that were 
neither saints nor loose women’. Her university girlfriends made her question for the 
first time what she had held as normal:
It impacted me that some of my girlfriends were sleeping with a different guy 
every week, it was something difficult to digest and furthermore it was hard for 
me to feel affection for them. The majority of these girls had a lot of experience 
and had had their sexual initiation at the age of 12 which I found shocking (3G 
Matilde).
Matilde was not assessing the ethical worth of these over-experienced women from 
the point of view of the equation of sexual disembodiment with purity. Rather, she 
points to the lack of ‘self-care’ these girls were showing though their sexual 
practices. The point is not the content of the assessment, but that Matilde employed 
these women’s behaviour to evaluate her own: ‘it did not occur to me to do anything 
like what they were doing’. Through the comparison she reaffirms her position: ‘I 
never doubted my choice’.
9.2 Towards the moralisation of sex
In men’s intergenerational narratives, there is no question as to whether they have to 
be sexually active or not. Their stories, then, do not refer to moral injunctions and 
institutions such as marriage, but centre in the changing morphology of their 
practices as they grew older, from sexual self-exploration to caresses with a woman 
or direct sexual initiation to regular sexual activity with a partner:
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First you masturbate and thereafter it usually happens with ... women older than 
you...friends or acquaintances ... Then you begin to have friends but not 
pololeos.
O: Friends with bed rights?
Yes, friends with bed rights (1G Ricardo).
Close-by there was this girl ...I visited her daily, only to touch each other, we 
were very young, no communication, basically it was a carnal thing, although 
not that carnal anyway (3G Alejandro).
Yet, as the relationship between women’s goodness and chastity defines two 
categories of woman —the untouchable/decent and the approachable/loose— men 
have had to ‘solve’ this duality, the ‘sexual problem’, by respecting (and 
perpetuating) these conventions.
Men argue that in the exchange between a man and a woman, they have to fulfil the 
‘provider’ role, as women’s stratagem consists of ‘hunting well-off men’ for their 
future households. But, while over the generations the loose woman has provided sex 
but has been deceived by men in the promise of status; the decent ‘lady’ ‘has not 
been touched’ and has been married:
With girls of humble social condition whom one met in public places to hide out 
and have sex... They weren’t serious pololas ... Well they would go out with us 
with the illusion of getting to know us. We were students so we had, you might 
say, a certain appeal (1G Jose).
There comes a time when you go out just to get girls... it was mainly about 
getting girls, and goodbye, goodbye... I got a lot of women at that age... 
generally it consisted in going to underground discos to get easy women... they 
went through the whole story, they gave us their phone numbers but we never 
called them back (3G Federico).
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In the grandfathers’ stories there is little personal accountability when they comment 
on their sexual activities with prostitutes, the use of women of a lower social 
condition for sexual satisfaction, infidelities towards their wives or the physical or 
psychological aggression of their sexual partners:
She was a good wife, accepting things she should not have to ...I did things that 
I shouldn’t have.
O: Was she hurt?
I think so...
O: But you did not feel that you were hurting your wife?
I was enjoying myself in the moment... It’s not only my problem, it is a 
generalised men’s problem, and don’t come and pretend that is not, don’t come 
and throw the first stone.
O: Women aren ’t like that?
No, no, there are [some], but no (1G Anselmo).
For grandfathers, respect in sexual matters has nothing to do with sexual fidelity or 
with being a good person through one’s sexual behaviour. This, despite claiming 
that, as givers of life, women deserve ‘unconditional respect’ and ‘are sacred’.
The grandfathers give a biological argument for men’s need for sex: sexual desire is 
an innate potential that men have been endowed with. In Guillermo’s terms: ‘I need 
to be with a woman because I’m a man’. Thus, sexual desire cannot be suppressed — 
as in the grandmothers’ case— but must be satisfied through practical activity on a 
regular basis:
One either masturbates, makes love or the sheep escapes [nocturnal 
ejaculation].You cannot keep it for later (1G Ricardo).
I went down to the city every week and had normal sexual relations with my 
wife, I always had, therefore I wasn’t like those that like to go around rutting 
with women (1G Jose).
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Grandfathers use an elliptical argument. When it comes to sex —they say— they are 
governed by ‘weakness’ (inherent and exclusive to their gender). Being ‘weak’ — 
tripping up with a woman— enhances masculinity (being machos): they are doing 
‘those men’s things’. Thus, questions of morality can be bypassed. Ultimately, 
Ricardo contends, a man’s behaviour would never match his wife’s expectations for a 
good husband. ‘If he gets home bueno ’ (well and sober), he explains, his wife would 
think he had been with another woman. Women would never trust their men, thus, it 
is irrelevant whether men behave rightly or wrongly. Moreover, this argument 
relieves men of the need for any personal accountability; rather, they assign the 
prerogative of moral evaluation to women. Furthermore, a veil of silence covered 
men’s sexual life at a time when the prevailing idea was that a ‘gentleman should not 
tell about his sexual affairs’.
This physiological notion of sexuality is coupled with other traditional symbols of 
maleness, such as physical violence, anger, and alcohol abuse, which help to gender 
sexuality as a male activity and to place it at the level of other (male) instinct-driven 
practices. As instinctual tendencies, none of these ‘disorderly’ ‘vices’ are morally 
condemned per se. Moral reproof appears when ‘the man is spending the money that 
belongs to the household’.36
This lack of accountability is reinforced by the grandfathers’ sexual education. In 
their youth, prevalent discourses framed responsibility only in terms of avoiding the 
consequences of pregnancy and sexual diseases:
There were some public baths at the times, and in the basement there was a 
place where all the diseases were explained, you cannot imagine how 
instructive it was, there was for example an image of the member eaten by 
syphilis, so many diseases, gonorrhoea, all of that, how you get it, how it 
starts to spread, so we used to go to see the diseases there (1G Guillermo).
Neither this information about the devastating consequences of venereal diseases in a 
time when methods of prevention were scarce, nor the scientific theory of the epoch
36 It is interesting to note that while men refer to their womanising proclivities as ‘disorderly’ (open) 
behaviours, women refer to the social expectation of being ‘self-restrained’ (closed).
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about the limited stock of sperm nor the discourse of the Catholic Church promoting 
sexual abstinence on the grounds that sexual activity outside the love and 
commitment of marriage and dissociated from the value of procreation is an egotistic 
and wrong act, had any practical significance upon grandfathers’ sexual 
accountability:
Don’t you see that when I got married the priest asked me whether I had eaten 
my wife before the marriage?
O: Eaten? That’s how he put it?
Yeah, ha.
O: What was your reply?
I told him ‘none of your business’ .... If he is a priest he cannot ask those 
questions. What is his interest in that anyway? (1G Ricardo).
The subversive use of Catholic icons to name the two types of women; ‘the 
Cathedral and the chapels’ (the decent and the loose, respectively) illustrates men’s 
response to a discourse aiming at dissociating manhood and sexual prowess. Purity is 
not a male issue. The word ‘sin’ that populates women’s stories is absent in the 
grandfathers’ ones. Sexual abstinence was practiced by a minority of devoted men:
O: How did men begin their sex lives in your generation?
I think with prostitutes... but not in my group. I had two very close friends... 
Gabriel is an angel, I’m sure he didn’t sleep with anybody apart from his wife 
and he made her 10 babies... I’m also sure my other close friend never got 
involved with women. They had only one pololeo and married very young (1G 
Joaquin).
Yet ‘angels’ are far from being asexual. Gabriel ‘made’ his wife 10 babies.
In comparison with the grandfathers, those second-generation members that also root 
their sexual behaviour in their male physiological constitution developed a refined 
version, disguising the causes of their sexual voraciousness with an affective 
vocabulary: the problem is that ‘women are so lovable’. Additionally, more than 
justifying their ‘weakness’ in terms of their biological constitution, they blame it on
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women (mother and lover) and society at large for making them embody the macho 
stereotype:
My mother made us so machistas, to have made us want our wives to be 
virgins, pure, chaste, saints, while the man could be a complete fraud (2G 
Alvaro).
The lover, in turn, attracted by men’s sexual appeal, ‘constantly calls’ for a new 
encounter that the ‘macho’ ‘cannot refuse’ even if sometimes he ‘doesn’t want to’. 
This is society’s fault, ‘it makes men always available’ while it also asks human 
beings to ‘comply with monogamy’, which is no more than ‘a social convention 
society needs for its organisation and functioning’.
Whereas for the grandfathers, respect was practised by not approaching the decent 
woman (while ‘solving the sexual problem’ with the loose one) and by fulfilling their 
provider role in the household, subsequent generations begin to frame respect in 
terms of personal accountability. Instead of the story of the macho enhancing his 
masculinity through the sexual encounter, second-generation Pedro recounts how 
emotionally devastating it was for his classmates to comply with the norms of 
sexuality:
I think that the vast majority of my classmates were initiated with prostitutes, I 
don’t know if the vast majority, but half of them... I witnessed the experience of 
a friend, being at a party with his girlfriend, a blond girl, very pretty ...and 
leaving the party and getting into the car with some friends to buy cigarettes. A 
brothel in Mapocho Station. Then back to the party, completely destroyed of 
course, unable to touch his girlfriend, the poor girl without a clue. It was 
obviously the longest and strangest trip to buy cigarettes, because they came 
back transformed. To a certain extent that’s the thing, some carrying a lot of 
guilt and others not giving too much importance to the issue. But a huge divide 
between the girlfriends and this other thing, a huge repression surrounding the 
issue, girlfriends were very elusive and scared and you couldn’t touch them 
much (2G Pedro).
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The growth of the concern with being a good person through one’s sexual behaviour 
relates to the emergence of romantic love. Love was not a requisite for marriage for 
the first generation (see section on intimacy). Nor was it a requisite for the 
grandfathers’ sexual activity, with either their wives or ‘other women’. Sex did not 
presuppose or recreate romantic feelings. Now, romantic love —the affection and 
admiration for the person who is the other— was to draw the line between ‘just 
having sex’ and the sexual relationship with the partner:
I was mischievous ... Why should I be alone? ... Until one falls in love.... Then 
[with wife] I was bitten, haha. No, it’s like before one wanted girls only for the 
sex, then it was different... I liked her little eyes (2G Miguel).
With her [girlfriend] I felt it was something more special, I did not feel it was 
sex... it was like love, there was affection, the other thing was more for 
entertainment (3G Francisco).
Men seek a fulfilling sexual life with their partners. But for fathers and grandsons, it 
has more to do with the development of an emotional bond and the quality of the 
whole relationship than with the frequency of the sexual encounter for the sake of 
their satisfaction. It involves the development of a more reflexive sexual life in which 
communication and dialogue are key to the couple’s complementarity. This is a 
distant view from the prevailing conception in the grandfathers’ times, when (male) 
‘desire’ was supposed to command sex or when debates revolved around whether 
men should ‘mould’ women as they wished. Eroticism —as the expression of feelings 
through bodily experiences in a communicative context (Giddens 1994:202) — 
comes to separate the sexual experience from the terrain of the instinctual, bringing it 
closer to that of aesthetics. The giving and receiving of pleasure is transformed into a 
mechanism of emotional communication:
Sensuality interests me, and by this I mean the senses, it’s an issue in my 
paintings, in my music, and is also something that has to do with seduction... I 
feel that I’m well put together in this aspect, I’m not clumsy... I don’t think 
that I’m less able than a woman; on the contrary, I easily let myself flow into 
pleasure and enjoyment; trying to feel as much as I can (3G Cristobal).
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Second- and third-generation men talk about sexuality as an experience with the 
other, an other consisting of a body, a psyche and an emotional and historical 
subject. In this conception, women’s and men’s differences are a matter not so much 
of biology as of culture:
[In my youth]... the other sex was completely strange. Desirable, but unknown... 
A gradual process of enrichment of that dimension, and that enrichment having 
to do with a range of physical and symbolic possibilities. I think that a turning 
point is when you begin to talk about it, and that took us many years... A 
classic: different rhythms, and lack of sensitivity or understanding that the 
female sexuality has another configuration, and a gradual learning on my part 
(2G Pedro).
For this kind of sexual life, however, middle-generation men feel completely 
unprepared. There is little to learn when one is socialised in the idea that sexuality is a 
practical matter and the first encounter with sex is when ‘your father takes you to a 
brothel’ without no more explanation than ‘I’m taking you to become a man’, or 
when he gives you ‘the address and the money to pay for the services of prostitutes’ 
or when ‘he passes you a condom without further discussion. There is little to take on 
when you are made to believe that manhood depends on sexual prowess and that you 
‘come of age’ with your ‘sexual initiation’:
When my father came home my mother told him, “Your son is doing grown­
ups’ things,” and my father replied: “That’s alright, those are men’s things, he 
has to do them.” On the one hand, I felt relieved but now thinking back that’s 
the typical machista way of thinking, the machista father expecting his son to 
do these things... we never touched the sex issue again (3G Andres).
There is little to absorb when sexuality is relegated to the field of instincts and 
dissociated from emotions. The fathers feel the need to reconnect these fields, and 
also need their partners to explain how sex feels from this other ‘sexual 
configuration’ that historically has been so ‘strange’:
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Sex is a taboo for my wife. I have brought up the topic but she doesn’t like to 
talk about i t ... she makes love silently, and afterwards nothing, questions such 
as did you like this? Nothing, no comment, it was done because it was done, 
because it’s a marriage, it’s done with love obviously ... my wife has never 
taken the initiative for lovemaking ... I’ll give it 75% out of 100% and that’s 
very low for this marriage because we love each other ...
O: What would you like to talk about?
The problem of sex in depth, what she feels, if she’s happy with what I do (2G 
Juan).
In comparison, the grandsons feel better equipped, as Cristobal says, ‘I’m well put 
together’ in terms of his connection with and expression of the sensuous. Sex 
education, albeit partial and late, was part of their school curriculum and the 
relationship with their male peers became an important area for sharing sexual 
discoveries (they drew genitalia on the board, exchanged pornographic videos and 
magazines and shared experiences of masturbation). Their interactions with girls 
allowed for the development of emotions and feelings in a context of friendship and 
affection.
As the equation of women’s goodness with sexual disembodiment declines through 
the generations, so too does the figure of the prostitute in men’s sexual initiation and 
sexual activity. From the second generation onwards, first sexual intercourse began to 
occur in the context of the pololeo, which tended to bridge the dissociation between 
emotions and desire that marked some lives in the previous generation. The 
womanising issue so common in first-generation narratives appears little in the 
grandsons’ stories, at least thus far in their lives. And although some grandsons learnt 
to feel ‘guilt’ about masturbation, this generation no longer takes the commandments 
of the Catholic Church as a naturalised reality, but as one normative framework 
among others.
What matters to the grandsons is to build up a fair sexual life with their partners. For 
this, each one’s feelings are moral referents:
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As a man one is different, I don’t know, for the woman it’s more special... I 
wanted her to have a good memory of her first time, not like the memory I’ve 
got of mine ... We made a path with candles, and I turned on the music and 
arranged some flowers ... It was beautiful. What was traumatic for her was that 
she started to cry, it was hurting her, so I stopped, we didn’t go on, and she 
started crying. ‘Shit, I broke something,’ I thought. She was speechless. I just 
hugged her tightly and after a while we talked about what happened. She said it 
was the emotion of the moment, and that she was letting her father down... he is 
a man with a very closed mind (3G Francisco).
Sex is much more fulfilling as each partner learns to know the other. Intimacy is 
greater and (female) reserve is overcome. Sex is open to change, innovation, and 
improvement, so as to find better ways to express oneself. Sex presupposes and 
enhances affection, dialogue, intimacy and respect. Not the woman-mother, but the 
partner as a human being and men’s own sexuality as a source of the self are now 
termed ‘sacred’:
Between us is a very sacred thing, a couple thing... by now you know your girl, 
and you can get together to the same peak, and the rhythms, the things that one 
likes and dislikes, because at the beginning you really do a lot of things that are 
really out of place, but with time you realise what you should keep and what 
not... always with a lot of respect... there are times when it is great, others when 
it isn’t, but as we have been together for a long time, we have improved that 
aspect a lot, and we enjoy it a lot (3G Federico).
In sum, where the first generation speak of a self without subjectivity (or ‘inner 
soul’), the second generation describe the self as an entity they must learn to know 
once they come to see sexuality as an interpersonal experience nurturing a loving 
relationship. For the third generation, sexuality is a source of the self that has to be 
explored and inscribed with self-meaningful signs. For the grandmothers, acting 
morally required sexual disembodiment and ignorance; for the grandfathers sexual 
practices were disengaged from moral claims. For the third generation, knowledge of 
oneself as a sexual being is a requisite for acting morally. Unlike the morality of 
decency, the ethics of authenticity conveys value to one’s ‘inner self. In the
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grandparents’ times, personal accountability had little to do with emotions, although 
no grandmother could tolerate infidelity. In the subsequent generations, emotions 
gradually become moral referents.
The reformulations observed in male and female sexuality plot a process of de- 
gendering of sexuality. As the tendency to equate women’s goodness with sexual 
disembodiment and sexual prowess with biological differences recedes, gender 
becomes less important in differentiating between men’s and women’s experiences 
and conceptions of sexuality.
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CONCLUSIONS PART III 
ACCOUNTING PRACTICES
The chapters in section three map out the implications of the interiorisation of the 
moral sources of the self in different spheres of activity. In terms of the notion of the 
good life, the transfer of moral authority to the individual’s interior is associated with 
a questioning of the value of the culture of endurance on which the moral economy 
of the grandparents’ generation is based. The inward turn started by the middle 
generation relates to their scepticism regarding the possibilities that the good will 
prevail in the public domain. In the sphere of work, for instance, what their parents 
conceptualise as personal moral strength —a working trajectory travelled with much 
sacrifice— they see as subjection to a patronal system which, in conjunction with 
today’s cultural economy, threatens the emotional and moral integrity of the self. 
Through the generations, the association of the good with the ‘exemplary life’ will be 
superseded by the more experiential ‘pleasure-seeking’ type of life.
The chapters have also shown the emergence of the concern with finding happiness 
in the details of ordinary life, a life that undergoes a process of privatisation (from 
the second generation’s narratives onwards) and thereafter a process of 
deroutinisation of the mundane or destandardisation of everyday life (in the 
grandchildren’s account).
I claim that in these narratives, the development of a sense of inwardness is 
associated with a redefinition of the ethics of care of the self. The interiorisation of 
the idea of care of the self is illustrated by the shift in the conception of childhood 
from a period for the inculcation of character and the observance of duty to another 
that fosters the cultivation of moral interiority and the expression of subjectivity. 
This movement is also expressed in the importance given to the child’s self-esteem 
as a parameter with which to measure the relationship of self upon self, and in the 
rise of the values of singularity and uniqueness. In the sphere of work, in turn, the 
grandparents put the act of working at the service of the family; the grandchildren 
put the particular work they chose to do at the service of their inner development. 
One is a source of care for others, the other, a source of personal care. In the domain 
of female sexuality, this is exemplified by the deactivation of the equation between
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care of others and sexual disembodiment. In men’s intergenerational narratives, it 
manifests in the emergence of the notion that an ethical sexual life is led through care 
of self and others. The transformations in the regulations defining the good child and 
the sphere of sexual life also attest to the connections between the sense of 
inwardness and the demands of self-expressiveness, love for oneself and self- 
knowledge.
I also connect the inward turn to the new concern with being in touch with one’s 
feelings and emotions insofar as these are perceived as moral referents. The rise of 
the value of intimacy in the style of personal relationship and the concomitant 
requirement for emotional communication and visible display of affection, redefine 
ways of loving and sexual life, parenting style and the basis of friendship. In the 
sexual terrain, the centrality gained by romantic love and eroticism over time also 
illustrates this.
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CONCLUSIONS
In these concluding pages I embark firstly on a brief inquiry into the “ageing of 
generations” and its relation to the intergenerational transformations of the moral 
outlook of the self. This sets the basis for an appraisal of the literature on 
generations, time and historical change in the study of selfhood. Then, I explore 
some connections between moral and narrative theories in the context of the 
argument of the interiorisation of the moral sources of the self developed in this 
work, and from this viewpoint I assess a number of arguments regarding 
contemporary sociologies of selfhood and reflect upon some implications of this 
research for Chilean sociology.
10.1 Reassertion of past visions: narrative elasticity
I have systematically explored how members of three generations of Chilean families 
negotiate their understanding of who they are through the frameworks that orient 
them in situated spaces of questions about the good. But the intergenerational 
redefinition of these people’s moral intuitions, the retrospective character of the 
biographical narrative and its capacity to move back and forth along temporal spans, 
also allow narrators, especially those of older generations, to put their vital 
trajectories in perspective.
From the point of view of the narrative approach adopted here, a brief inquiry into 
the “ageing of generations” and how it relates to the intergenerational 
transformations of the moral outlook of the self leads into an appraisal of the 
literature on generations, time and historical change. This examination reveals how 
stories of social change mobilise time, articulate interpersonal relationships and bring 
to the surface different forms of negotiation over the nature of one’s self.
Alfred Schutz explored the idea that the problem of meaning is largely a problem of 
time. Meaning is articulated through the reflective glance. Bourdieu contended that 
“life memories are nested and enveloped in their habitus —their environment of
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assumptions and languages— through which they make sense and can be told” 
(Bourdieu 1984 in Tonkin 1992:106-7).
If we do not subscribe to those viewpoints that take the self as an immutable 
substance, the question seems to be: What happens to the biographical narratives of 
the older interviewees when that environment of assumptions and languages that 
propelled and nested them “recedes into the past” (Frisch 1998:33)? In other words, 
how do grandparents and parents react when the equipment they had imprinted in 
their bodies, minds and souls to make themselves subjects of a certain sort begins to 
clash with present ways of living? If they need to review this moral outlook, what 
forces drive them to this search? To what extent can older generations review their 
customised humanity in the light of the construction of an “acceptable identity” 
(Andrews 2000)?
For want of a better label, I call this a study on “narrative elasticity”. In the exercise 
of self-interpretation, this refers to the capacity of narratives to stretch the boundaries 
of the self, “going beyond the normal order of significance” (Pickering 2004). 
Narrative elasticity refers to the re-assessment of the standards that are deemed 
worth endorsing or opposing so as to make one’s trajectory cohere with the flow of 
change; a moral renewal that is sometimes accompanied by the incorporation of new 
practices of the self. But as the term suggests, narrative elasticity also tries to capture 
the limits of the possibilities of change. Elasticity is about boundaries too. It includes 
what renders the self resistant to change and all that is inadmissible when the 
coordinates that frame the good life have been modified over time.
Connecting moral and narrative theories, Taylor writes:
My perspective is defined by the moral intuitions I have, by what I am morally 
moved by. If I abstract from this, I become incapable of understanding any 
moral argument at all. You will only convince me by changing my reading of 
my moral experience, and in particular my reading of my life story, of the 
transitions I have lived through —or perhaps refused to live through (1989:73).
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One way in which older generations change their reading of their moral experience in 
the light of new qualitative frameworks is by using current vocabularies of motives 
to criticise some of the conventions that guided their judgement in the past. 
Narratives stretch the boundaries of the self when the moral grammar of a new 
generation makes it possible to unlock bits of stories that would otherwise have 
remained untold or un-assessed. Earlier, I argued that in their upbringing narratives 
the grandparents stick to the story of the ‘tamed’, ‘innocent’ kids, who never thought 
to ‘defy’ authority. But in comparison to subsequent generations, and endorsing the 
value their successors afford to moral autonomy, some grandparents reassess the lack 
of freedom and self-determination they endured in their childhood as ‘ridiculous’. In 
their view, this deficit made yesterday’s children ‘more innocent’, ‘dumb’ and 
‘ignorant’ than today’s kids, who are allowed to ‘say and do what they like’. The 
adjectives the grandparents choose suggest that they feel their lack of self­
expressiveness and self-knowledge made them less competent to be in the world than 
they take subsequent generations to be. But they also say that the difference in 
freedom made yesterday’s kids ‘healthier’ and more ‘serious’ —as opposed to the 
more ‘switched on’ and ‘roguish’ kids of today— which indicates that they also see 
the gain in self-determination as a potential source of moral corruption.
From the vantage point of the present, the grandmothers often produce a narrative of 
their times which depicts their lives as governed by an order that imprisoned them 
and from which it was almost unthinkable to deviate. Firstly, because it standardised 
vital trajectories and, secondly, because it restricted their “spaces of experience” by 
circumscribing their “horizon of expectation” (Koselleck (2004[1983]), that is, the 
possibility of even imagining alternative routes to the standardised one. Laura, for 
example, notes that back in her times ‘nobody asked her who she wanted to become’. 
The question was unnecessary. As a woman, her path was clear; she was ‘expected to 
marry a suitable husband and have a family’ at a time when ‘nobody did otherwise’. 
Clara wanted to find a job after leaving school. She asked her father for help, some 
of his friends might be interested in hiring a high-school graduate as a secretary. But 
her father did not deem it ‘necessary for her to work’. ‘And I didn’t find any job,’ she 
recalls, ‘I didn’t rebel against him, I simply conformed.’ In hindsight and using the 
vocabulary of motives currently available, these women qualify the interpretive
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frameworks of their youth as constraining their sense of self; as an impediment to 
full realisation of their potential. As Rosenwald (1992) puts it, the moral predicament 
of their times “narrowed” these women’s “vision”.
10.1.1 The appropriation of new subiectifiers
Despite the general disagreement the older interviewees express with the laxity of 
current moral standards (they generally conceive the change in moral sources as a 
moral and epistemic loss) and the practical ‘difficulties’ and ethical and ideological 
contradictions involved in incorporating new ideas and practices, in some cases the 
flow of change has timidly infiltrated their way of life. The following cases 
exemplify how older generations customise or appropriate new subjectifiers in 
specific ways and for particular purposes and how narratives work to reduce the 
temporal distance between past and present.
In a partial revision of the opposition between care of the self and care of others, 
below grandmother Ana explains and justifies how she has lately opened up to the 
idea that life can offer some fun after decades of ‘sacrifice’, ‘suffering’ and 
continuous devotion to her family’s welfare:
Up to now I had not thought that I was getting old, I had always tried to work, 
to make our land more profitable, but after my husband died, I said, “What’s 
the point of planting more pines if they would not even be of use for my 
children, but for my grandchildren?” No, now it’s time to enjoy life, what’s 
the point of inventing more stuff? (1G Ana).
The value this grandmother begins to attribute to personal enjoyment late in life is 
associated to a reassessment of the power of external voices in defining personal 
moral orientations and of the centrality of customary duties in the organisation of her 
daily life, typical of the first generation. Likewise, in the following quotes, 
grandmothers Ana and Clara present themselves as moral agents making some 
deliberations according to personal will and choice (‘what I want’), rather than the 
will of others and the commands of the ‘deber ser’ as it was the case in the past:
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At this stage in life one can say “I should invite Mary, but I don’t want to, she 
bores me, what a drag.”
O: So you don’t invite her?
No! This means that one does what one wants and is not worried about what 
others will say, or about what is right... now I live to enjoy life (1G Ana).
Now I say when I dislike something. In those times it didn’t matter whether I 
liked doing something or not, but at least it kept me entertained (1G Clara).
Ana and Clara say that they themselves have allowed this shift to occur, not giving 
‘too much importance’ to what will others think and contravening the deber ser, 
especially when it goes against their will. They now dare to avoid spending time with 
people they do not get along with and to not do what they dislike. At this stage in life 
Ana and Clara probably feel less obliged to prove anything to anybody. But 
probably, too, the general decline of the importance of conformity has done them a 
favour. Additionally, both seem to affirm that the self has always had deliberative 
powers, but that in the past these were concealed by external authoritative voices that 
kept it ‘tamed’ or ‘domesticated’. However, Ana and Clara remain rather ambivalent 
as to whether there is some value in this change in the form of moral reasoning. In 
Ana’s quote the right tends to lie on the side of the deber ser and not with the merits 
to her of following her inner voice and having an enjoyable life. Clara maintains that 
she has done a number of things in life regardless of her tastes and preferences, but 
instead of using this to further support her criticism, she affirms that this has kept her 
entertained, which is a good thing.
The cases that follow, of first and second generation women, attest not only to how 
the idea of acceptance of different moral orientations can have different meanings 
but also how it can be put to use for diverse purposes. In particular, the cases show 
how storytellers’ negotiation of their positions with respect to changing moral 
frameworks is done in the field of their relationship to others (their children, parents 
or partners).
265
Grandmother Clara and also second-generation Pilar speak of ‘acceptance’ of 
different ways of life. Even if she was brought up in the conviction that any 
alternative was, in principle, wrong, Clara argues that she has adapted to the new 
times, broadening her way of thinking: developing a more ‘open-minded’ approach 
in her moral evaluations and thus accepting positions that she used to reject. This 
flexibility contradicts the expected moral strength of character upon which first- 
generation identities were forged, and against which self-worth was measured in 
those times. But Clara associates the need for change with the demands of current 
times and not with personal conviction. In fact she closes the point by stressing her 
strong disagreement with today’s moral parameters:
I’ve changed, of course, I’ve had to mould myself to the times, it’s been very 
tough to change my mind, because I used to have a very different way of 
thinking to what I’ve got now, now I’m more open.
O: Open-minded?
Yes, now I accept more things.
O: What do you accept now that you didn ’t before?
For example, this daughter of mine who was living in France, I visited her three 
times while she was just living with him [they were not married].
O: He was her ‘partner37’?
Yes, her partner, not even married, nothing. And I feel a lot of affection for 
him. Once she told me that they were planning a simulated [symbolic] marriage 
because both are separated [so indissolubly married under the law of the time]. 
I had an aunt that under the same circumstances didn’t speak to her son until he 
got an annulment. It is very difficult to adapt.
O: Why do you accept this then?
Because they are my children, I cannot argue with them and stop seeing them. 
It would be dreadful.
O: And also now those situations aren’t that badly viewed.
That’s what makes the whole thing terrible! People have accepted, accepted, 
accepted, and that’s the ‘excessive tolerance’ that we have today, that people
37 ‘Partner’ is a word of my times, not of Clara’s. Conscientiously using it, I’m making apparent in our 
conversation recent changes in family and private life.
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wear less clothes each day, it’s a horrible thing, and the TV programmes 
showing tits! I found it terrible. It shocks me; it upsets me (1G Clara).
Clara ‘accepts’ alternative orientations not necessarily because she starts considering 
them to be right, but because of the more primordial need to keep her children in her 
life. In practical terms, Clara explains, the change has been difficult. The 
appropriation of new subjectifiers or vehicles of personhood has implied alterations 
in a life-long mental make-up and in a series of ingrained dispositions. Moreover, 
Clara does not approve of the way her daughter has conducted her personal life, with 
separations and informal unions. But she cannot bear to stop talking to her daughter, 
as her aunt did in similar circumstances. What this grandmother means by 
‘acceptance’ has, then, nothing to do with judging differently or with revising the 
coordinates that make up a good life.
In the next quote, second-generation Pilar also reflects on a Chilean society which is 
‘opening up’ to alternatives ways of life, such as homosexuality. But in contrast to 
Clara, ‘acceptance’ has another connotation here. It does not reflect the need to keep 
up interpersonal relationships with younger generations but rests upon the conviction 
that she should uphold the values of ‘respect’, ‘tolerance’ and ‘non-discrimination’ 
towards fellow human beings. Pilar describes it as a need to stand by the principles 
of equal treatment, and for this she is willing to learn how to eradicate the tendency 
to prejudge those that act differently:
Now everything is alio wed... there are still people with their prejudices...but 
spaces are much more open, there is less discrimination, I think that the 
discrimination you see nowadays is due to people from older generations who 
still find it difficult to accept things within their frameworks... In my case there 
are things that have been tough, but I’ve tried to be tolerant and respectful... 
homosexuality has been tough to accept as something normal (2G Pilar).
Most second-generation interviewees hold the view that what counts as ‘normal’ is 
historically contextual; thus, not natural, objective, absolute and unchanging, but 
subject to revision and alteration. This view parallels the historical dimension they
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attribute to the self and to the notion that people can learn about themselves from the 
experiences they undergo over time.
The way second-generation Elena explains her change of opinion about premarital 
sex is a significant example of how changes in discursive resources and strategies for 
telling the self alter the meaning attributed to life experiences over time. Elena 
explains that she was against premarital sexual relationships, not because she thought 
they were wrong per se but because she wanted to save her daughter from the social 
ostracism meted out to those who acted against prescriptions. In the prevailing 
mentality of her times, husbands used female premarital sexual experiences to 
denigrate non-virgin ‘loose’ wives. However, she explains:
I have talked to my daughters and it seems that nowadays men’s and women’s 
opinion about premarital sex is different, and that they consider that both [men 
and women]... have the right to enjoy their respective sexuality and this is no 
longer employed to reproach women. If this is the case, then it is ok, great (2G 
Elena).
Once female premarital sex is disentangled from the moral censure that equates 
sexually active single women with whores and therefore with dishonour, Elena can 
accept her daughters’ sexual behaviour. Elena is not defending virginity as a 
principle. The lifting of the social sanction that surrounds an injunction enables Elena 
to tolerate a practice she disapproves of in principle.
On the same topic, the reflection of second-generation Carmen, below, illustrates 
how the ‘normality’ with which younger generations do the self in certain fields 
helps older generations to affirm new ideas and practices of the self within their own 
moral make-up:
I was so shocked when my daughters were joking with each other saying, 
“Hey, Aunt Flo’s started visiting!”38 I mean I said, “Gosh,” but at the same 
time, “fine,” because it is a natural thing, logical (2G Carmen).
38 Approximate (in terms of register) English equivalent to a Spanish-language idiomatic term that is 
untranslatable because it contains a sort of trans-lingual onomatopoeic metaphor, i.e. an English word
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Carmen knows she could not have sounded that natural in talking to her sisters about 
menstruation back in the 60’s. Yet she considers it the right tone to use. As Plummer 
observes, many stories “can only be told once a social framework has emerged which 
helps organize them and make them more accessible” (2001:235). Thus, those goods 
that in the past —and in past narratives— remained in the background because they 
were considered “inconvenient” (Thevenot 2002) by the prevailing conventions can 
emerge and be told once a good grammar —an appropriate vocabulary of motives— 
gets established.
Living through certain subjectifiers enables people to do, know and imagine certain 
things and not others. People’s humanity is equipped with particular views, habits, 
practices, certain subjectifiers, through which they speak, think, move or relate. The 
possibility of doing, thinking or relating in a different way, of stretching the 
boundaries of the self through the adoption of new vehicles of personhood, often has 
to do with having the intellectual and emotional resources to enact a new practice. At 
83 years old, Clara, for example, tells the story of how after associating the naked 
female body with moral fault (sin and shame) all her life, two years ago she appeared 
naked in front of other women of different ages at a thermal bath for the first time. 
With a mixture of embarrassment and pride she ends the story commenting: ‘Such a 
pity that Tunick [the photographer famous for portraying naked groups] wasn’t 
there.’
But for the majority of the grandmothers the embracing of a ‘less ignorant’ view of 
female sexuality is severely limited by a lack of practical knowledge, that is, of a 
specific understanding and competence enabling them to perform another type of 
bodily practice than the one they are used to. The routinisation or institutionalisation 
of a way of understanding and relating to the female body and its sexuality thwarted 
some of the grandmothers’ wish to educate or at least orient their offspring in sexual 
matters. Although they sensed the necessity, the lack of practical knowledge 
prevented them from discursively thematising the sexual field:
(ruler) that is used in place of the Spanish word it sounds like (regia), and whose translation it is in a 
different context (since the meanings of regia include both ruler and period).
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I felt that I couldn’t, that I wasn’t prepared, that we were never prepared, how 
does one start? (1G Laura).
Changes in practices of self upon self often involve transformations that are too 
disruptive for the integrity of the self. Grandmother Margarita is a case in point. 
Even if she prefers how kids are brought up now, ‘because they talk about their 
bodies and name its organs’, and although she no longer thinks that touching, 
showing, talking, sensing or learning about the naked female body is sinful and even 
‘feels ashamed’ of these dispositions, these types of association are so deeply 
inscribed in the way she relates to her body that a change of attitude is unlikely. The 
ignorance and embarrassment her upbringing has left her with on this subject prevent 
Margarita from even naming the sexual organs. At the paediatrician she often felt 
uncomfortable when she had to take off her kid’s clothes for examination. During her 
marriage she did not allow her husband to see her naked; they had sex with the lights 
off and she only saw his naked body once he was so old and sick that Margarita had 
to bathe him. In recent years, she had suffered from a problem in her vagina. For 
medical reasons she should check it regularly, but she has not been able to look 
‘down there’. Her know-how tells her to do the opposite. The sanction ‘comes from 
too deep inside’. Margarita does not have a sexual vocabulary, she has not explored 
her body or developed a relationship with it, and it still represents a heavy moral 
burden. All of these block her attempts. Only once, when her husband threatened to 
find another woman if she kept concealing her body from him, she conceded ‘out of 
jealousy’:
Your see, with my husband, I was told at home not to.
O: So he never saw you [naked]?
No, once he told me that he didn’t love me anymore. Oh my lord! I start 
praying and praying.
O: Did you finally allow him?
Of course I did, but he asked only once (1G Margarita).
What stands out in these narratives is how a person’s make up gets stretched when 
confronted with other subjectifiers connecting sexuality, body and self and how past 
generations’ criteria of normality are updated through time. As Bochner says, these
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stories show “that the meanings and significance of the past are incomplete, tentative 
and revisable according to contingencies of our present life circumstances” 
(2000:745).Yet, the reluctance of first-generation men to revise their human interior 
in the light of changes in normative frameworks might lead us to consider that these 
attempts to rearrange personal narratives not solely depend on changing available 
resources for narrative construction, but are also inseparable from the subject of 
speech and his or her position with respect to prevailing narrative lines. This is to say 
that narrative elasticity is not only about the worthiness, goodness or dignity a given 
person might find in a certain good but also about positionality with respect to other 
subjects and other discourses.
These stories also show how the lack of practice in other modes of being sexual, 
together with the possible loss of coherence involved in adapting one’s modes to new 
subjectifiers, limits the intellectual attempt to go beyond what one is.
Finally, as in Clara’s case earlier, Margarita’s example signals the power of personal 
relationships —with one’s offspring or partner— and of emotions —fear of loss or 
jealousy— in stretching the boundaries of the self. These examples help to 
understand how moral orientations are negotiated over time in the relationship 
between self and others (Charmaz 1991, Ezzy 1998).
10.1.2 Stories of social change and negotiations over the nature of one’s self
In chapter two, I briefly argued that the body of conceptual work on the theory of 
generations has concentrated on defining the factors that form a generation, more 
than on developing analytical tools for grasping how the experience of generation is 
lived over time. In this particular research, the theory of generations has been 
methodologically useful but has served little to frame a conceptual organisation for 
the different temporalities that populate the lived experiences of time in the telling of 
personal narratives over generations.
To develop an adequate understanding of these processes, I suggested, the concept of 
generation should be broadened from a relationship with the world that frames my
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time (once-and-for-all and in the past), as opposed to that which frames other 
generations’, to encompass an idea of how people apprehend the past through time 
and take positions regarding the future. We might need to think in terms of a 
sociology of time (or should we say “temporalities”?).
It is intriguing that the sociology of time has not taken off, considering that, from its 
very inception, the discipline “sought to take social order out of timelessness and to 
insert it into time” (Mol and Law 2002:11). One reason for this, as Mol and Law 
state, is that “insofar as orders are put into time, the time that is mobilized is linear. It 
flows in one way only: on and on. It doesn’t chum or slop from low to high tide and 
back again” (op. c/r. 12). In its reflection on time, sociology has perhaps depended 
excessively on history and linear accounts. As Adam (1990) develops, for the most 
part social theory has worked with implicit notions of time, and thus, there is little 
systematic reflection on the implications of the uses of the category of time for the 
construction of social knowledge. But apart from the necessity of a reflexive stand 
towards the categories upon which theory building rests, we might also start 
considering how a narrative approach could enrich a sociology of temporalities when 
the question of how people frame and enact time becomes the core object of analysis.
This research connects with a number of reflections that have pointed out the “active, 
self-shaping quality of human thought” and the power of personal stories to 
refashion over time the identity of the self (Hinchnan & Hinchnan 1997: xiv in 
Riessman 2002:706). Carolyn Steedman’s Landscape fo r  a Good Woman (1987) is a 
compelling example of the reworking of self-interpretations through the course of 
life. It shows the power of personal stories to provide content for exercises of self- 
affirmation and also of self-criticism. Along these lines, we might reflect on the 
extent to which the sociology of temporalities calls for a “tidal time” (Mol and Law 
2002:13) more than a linear one, a vision of time that makes room for exploring how 
people place subjectifiers in time and mobilise time through subjectifiers: how they 
enact in the present possibilities that were not realised (or not storied) in the past, 
how they place the past to interfere with the future, or how they construct the future 
as a dislocation of the past or as liberating angles of the past, or how they make the 
present by contracting or stretching the passing of time.
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Taylor (1989) claims that the reassessment of a one’s moral experiences depends 
largely on changing the reading of one’s story. But this is not an individual process, 
it happens within a “web of interlocutors”. Paul Ricoeur ([1992] 1994) argues that 
personal stories are entangled in the life history of others: “my parents, my friends, 
my companions in work and in leisure”. Similarly, Taylor contends that our most 
significant relationships play a key role in the constitution of our identities. We 
define who we are, he says:
always in dialogue with, sometimes in struggle against, the identities our 
significant others want to recognise in us. And even when we outgrow some of 
the latter —our parents, for instance— and they disappear from our lives, the 
conversation with them continues within us as long as we live (1989:33).
Indeed, temporalities, as Scaff distinguishes, pertain to the space of the auditory, in 
the sense that they are enacted in “hearing and listening” —in contrast to spatiality 
which is addressed in “seeing and envisioning” (2005:7-8).
This research goes on to show that those others with whom my life and my narrative 
intersect play a part in fostering a new reading of my life and of my moral intuitions. 
This, as Schiitz once envisaged, opens up the way to the study of social change as a 
“we-relationship”. Hence, we might want to try to develop a perspective that allows 
us to trace the self both in temporalities and in relationships.
One important contribution achieved by supplementing Taylor’s conceptualisation 
with the analytical tools of Foucault —through the concepts of “ethics” and 
“technologies of the self’ (i.e. the relation between ethical ideas and the practices 
through which people constitute themselves as moral agents of certain sort)— was 
the proximity gained to the question of the practices of an ethical life. The ethical 
technologies of the self are not merely descriptive tools; they also allow access to the 
way the self is enacted. At this level, the research has shown that what counts as 
better or worse through time is not a matter of de-contextualised and disembodied 
moral discernment, but is inseparable from the possibility to “subscribe” to different 
subjectifiers or vehicles of personhood and adopt new know-how’s. It also makes 
evident that self-coherence is an attempt to order different regimes of worth to make
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them compatible with what one knows, is able to do, endure and transform. This is 
the kind of approach that asks, for example, what it means to learn about my body 
through a Catholic education? In this sense, a social story of selfhood repositioned in 
moral spaces and grounded in tidal-like temporalities and we-relationships might not 
lose sight of the question of the “living through subjectifiers”.
10.2 Reconnecting moral and sociological thought: doing the self in narrative 
form
Calhoun claims that “sociologists’ aversion to moral discourse (in the name of 
science) has greatly impoverished our understandings of identity and human agency” 
(1991:232). Based on the work of Taylor and supplemented with Foucauldian 
analytical tools, in this research I have attempted to reconnect moral and sociological 
thought through the question of the changing relationship between idea of the good 
and ethics and technologies of the self. To this end, the narrative approach has been 
used to examine the changing means of moral self constitution.
In line with the philosophy of Murdoch (1971) and MacIntyre (2006[1981]), Taylor 
grounds the idea of morality not in changing human needs but in the redefinition of 
the idea of the good, thus portraying a rich picture of the activity of being a moral 
agent among others. A reflection of this kind, as the research makes evident, cannot 
be separate from the thematisation of ideas of the bad, the wrong, the evil, the 
abnormal or the extraordinary.
In this research I have shown the operation of predominant moral views as 
“vocabularies of motives” (Mills 1963), or “regimes of justification” (Thevenot 
2002) that, acting as an “inventory of experience” (Mannheim 1952), articulate 
personal stories over the course of time, both at the level of social or historical time 
—the time of the generation— and that of the biographical trajectory —a life span.
In order to summarise communalities and differences, I have told a story that 
recounts what narratives say about the self across the generations. The plot of my
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story is that the redefinition of the self over time delineates a process of 
interiorisation of the moral sources of the self in which the measure of the good 
gradually and unevenly moves away from external sources, coming to rest in each 
human being’s interior.
This plot has worked as an overarching storyline around which the main arguments 
have been structured. In terms of the relationship between ethics and technologies of 
selfhood, I argue that interiorisation involves a shift from an ethics of respectability 
to one of authenticity and from a notion of self as character to the idea of the self as 
an experiential entity.
I have also claimed that interiorisation in the case of the Chilean people I interviewed 
involves the development of a sense of inwardness that redefines the person’s ethical 
practices, including the very organisation of the narrative of the self.
In the stories here analysed, the inward turn entails a shift from an ethics of care of 
the self based on self-renunciation and self-sacrifice to another based on self- 
knowledge, self-affirmation, self-expressiveness and love for the self. To this end, 
being in touch with one’s feelings and emotions comes to be something people have 
to attain to be true and full human beings (Taylor 1989). This changes the type of 
story the self constructs about him or herself, from one that answers the question of 
“what one has done in life” to one that delves into “how one feels about one’s life”.
The type of quest one should embark on to lead a good existence shifts from the 
‘exemplary life’ to the more experiential ‘pleasure-seeking’ type of life. This relates 
to a revision of the value of the “culture of endurance” at the basis of the 
grandparents’ lives and to the emergence of concern with finding happiness in the 
details of ordinary life. This is not to imply that the grandparents led a life detached 
from domesticity. In home-making, both work and family life coalesce. But theirs is 
a public domesticity, grounded in the values of respectability, decency and solidarity, 
in which the home and the street are subject to the public gaze. The narratives of the 
second generation attest to a process of privatisation of life —the gradual liberation 
of a space from the community’s pervasive control— whereas the grandchildren’s 
reveal a tendency to deroutinise the mundane and destandardise everyday life.
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Moreover, when the sense of the good is dependent on external sources, as is the case 
with the first generation, it calls for people to be equal. This is exemplified by the 
value attributed to a life lived in conformity with the norm. The grandchildren, 
instead, place value on creative, original and non-standard ways of life. The idea of 
moral interiority elevates the notions of the “individual” and of a person’s originality, 
uniqueness, or essence to the status of values. Consequently, a politics of equality 
gives way to a politics of difference.
The study also makes the case both conceptually and substantively for the inclusion 
of the shifting form of organisation of the biographical tale in the study of the self 
and its moral sources (genres, actors, scenes, main storylines). The cases studied 
have shown that interiorisation is also a way of narrating the self through a discourse 
that recognises and speaks from the interior. This is expressed in the transition from 
predominantly descriptive and over-realistic personal accounts towards more 
reflexive impressionistic and experimental styles in the subsequent generations. 
While the grandparents frame their personal stories as quests for material progress, 
their descendants’ stories take on a psychological and even an existential character. 
The emergence of the question of the meaning of life as an inner search places the 
problematisation of the relationship of self upon self at the centre of the narrative 
work. Personal identity is intimately linked to the hermeneutic effort of interpreting 
one’s life. The capacity to come to terms with one’s story and to integrate the events 
of life into a meaningful and comprehensible account become paramount. The 
grandparents do not expect their stories to answer the question of who they are. Their 
children and grandchildren feel the need to discover their fundamental orientations in 
life through inner exploration and experiential processes. The very practice of 
narrating the self grows in significance as a way of grasping the experience of being 
through time.
I have told a story about interiorisation of the moral sources of the self. And in telling 
it I have mapped out continuities, interruptions, resignifications, displacements, 
overlaps, interferences and new ways of doing the self. But I have tried to do more 
than this. The landscape in which I have travelled is much more complex. Narrators
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fashion, redescribe, omit, invent, exaggerate and mitigate their stories in relation to 
other people’s stories and in relation to the storylines that prevail in times and spaces.
An analysis of the way the self is done in narrative form has to deal with ambiguity 
and contradictions. The study of the self through its moral sources, Taylor warns, is 
an exercise in “articulation”. As an “attempt at ordering”, articulation is problematic. 
It does not assume a spontaneous fit between people’s beliefs, actions and choices 
and the way they account for them. All these tend to have a rather controversial 
relationship. As I said at the outset, doing the self in narrative form is not the illusory 
outcome of externally imposed forces a la Foucault, nor the almost autopoietic 
reflexive activity of a subject lacking substantive paradigms upon which to base his 
or her cognitive and isolated reflections a la Giddens, but an attempt at articulation 
by “making different orders of qualification compatible” (Thevenot 2002), according 
to what one knows and is able to do, endure and transform.
In this work I have mapped out different avenues through which articulation can be 
traced. One of these areas of tension occurs in the relation between prevailing 
discursive lines, practices of the self and modalities of self-enunciation. Here we 
detected a shift from narratives that tend to accentuate storytellers’ convergence with 
social predicaments (as a way of enacting an attitude of conformity with public 
morality) to narratives that tend to play down the influence of others in the definition 
of the person’s moral stances (a narrator who develops an interiorised discourse 
claims his or her inner judgment to be separate from public moral voices). 
Articulation may also prove problematic when that which a person holds to be right 
in one sphere of life enters into conflict with other values that might orient his or her 
conduct in a different context or at the level of the relationship between past and 
present qualitative stances or between the orientations of the self and those of his or 
her significant others.
The interiorisation story has also stressed that being a moral agent of a certain sort is 
not simply a matter of choice among alternatives; on the contrary, it is inseparable 
from the living through certain subjectifiers and not others. Being a moral agent has 
to do with what the individual is capable of saying, imagining, renouncing, holding 
or doing through time with a self of certain sort.
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Finally, the research has also attended to the consequences that these different ways 
of assembling the self have had for the storytellers’ sense of being: what they could 
not learn, relate to, think, do, aspire or change; what they have had to reclaim, fight 
for, negotiate, give up, forget or endure.
10.3 Assessing contemporary sociologies of selfhood
Taylor’s propositions help sociology to recover an “understanding of the self as a 
moral agent” (Calhoun 1991:232), making evident the limits of a restrictive notion of 
self-identity —from Mead’s to Giddens’ cognitive approaches. This research evinces 
the impossibility of answering the question of who I am with a notion of identity as 
mere pragmatic consciousness. Self-consciousness does not offer us a representation 
of the significances we live by. It also shows how deeply flawed any account that 
separates morality from the self is. We are not merely aware of ourselves; we matter 
to ourselves in particular ways. Thus, this work attempts to contribute to filling the 
gap created by neglect of the forms of moral reasoning men and women use in the 
practical attempt to explain themselves and their social worlds.
The problem that Giddens, Beck, Sennett or Gergen describe when analysing the 
modem self lies in choosing an identity and, especially, in “holding it” (Bauman 
1996:50). In this world of free choice, Bauman contends, choices lack weight and 
solidity, and can be revoked and changed without leaving any “lasting trace” or 
responsibilities. The analysis of the grandchildren’s and previous generations’ 
narratives alike shows, on the contrary, the problematic nature of moral articulation.
Moreover, as Taylor argues, there is little of moral ideal at work behind concepts like 
narcissism (Lasch’s word) or hedonism (Bell’s description) (1989:16). These 
approaches provide no categories to explore the modes of justification people use to 
account for their lives, with all the negotiations, contradictions and ambivalences this 
often entails. Nor do they frame an understanding of the moral force behind notions 
of the good, like autonomy or authenticity, or an examination of how, despite all
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uncertainties, in this allegedly individualised world, young people can accord 
common value to certain goods such as respect for life, defence of emotional and 
physical integrity and rejection of any form of abuse, harm and violence to fellow 
human beings.
According to reflexive modernity authors, the self-coherence of the modem subject 
lies ultimately in the imperative of “authenticity” or in the slogan “I am F’ with 
which Beck synthesises the basis of the ethics of the self under individualised 
conditions. The analysis of the grandchildren’s narratives shows that i) this is a 
dominant discourse and ii) this discourse finds its limits when used to substantiate 
the moral outlook of the self. Despite the grandchildren’s attempts to keep normative 
components out of their statements, their stories attest to their dependence upon 
external valuations for the definition of the normal, right, good and just. In this 
regard, the interiorisation argument is much closer to Nikolas Rose’s position when 
he argues that the “reflexive self searching for self-fulfilment of Giddens’ and Beck’s 
reflections” (1989:xviii) is the result of a certain discursive practice about what it 
means to be a human being in a specific time and place, since if unfolds as a new 
ontology with which to think and reflect upon human experience. Therein my 
understanding of personal narratives as ways of “doing” the self.
In addressing social change, I have tried to depart from approaches such as the 
detraditionalisation argument of reflexive modernity authors, and their insistence on 
placing transformations outside the subject, in some other realm of experience: “the 
social”. The interiorisation story tells, in contrast, that changes happen in families, in 
ways of working, parenting, loving and caring for oneself and others, and not in an 
“external” social structure. Culture is something people do.
Reflexive modernity is the type of analysis that tends to prevail in the Chilean 
literature on selfhood. A sociology focused on the type of person structurally 
produced by society, centres the analysis in the social and historical processes that 
make up the subject and in the consequences of these transformations for personal 
experience. In these approaches, “subjectivity” is the voice that speaks of the impact 
of (objective) forces upon the individual. As in a documentary, subjectivity amounts 
to the “human opinion” behind the operation of political, economic, historical or
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social structures. As if the self were constructed by forces that come from such a 
thing as the “social outside”. Following in Foucault’s footsteps, I hope this research 
has argued convincingly that the self is not a repository of the social but a productive 
agent. The subject constitutes him or herself in an active fashion through 
technologies or practices of self in order to attain to a certain idea of the good. 
Perhaps, this is where this research can contribute to domestic scholarship, insofar as 
it does not merely enlarge the body of stories produced by Chilean social scientists to 
account for the many effects of changing social structures upon the subject but rather 
treats change as something enacted, mobilised, justified and narrated by the person 
him or herself.
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APPENDIX 1. INTERVIEW GUIDES 
First Session
I. Preliminary information
First Session Second Session
•  Location
•  Date
•  Starting time
•  Ending time
•  Location
•  Date
•  Starting time
•  Ending time
Name Pseudonym
Family name Family Pseudonym
Year of birth Place of birth
Marital status Last year of 
schooling
Type of school Occupation
N° children & 
ages
Living with
Political position (Socio-economic
group)
II. Field notes
Interview and interviewee’s life situation
Interviewee-interviewer relationship: Openness 
and intimacy
Non-verbal aspects
Location and interview development
Narrative motif?
Others
III. Life Story
Today's conversation will be devoted to your life story. A life story is about all the 
events, experiences, situations, relations and decisions that have been important for  
you in defining who you are as a person, your way o f being; starting from your birth, 
going through your childhood, youth, adulthood, up to the present moment.
1. Birth and childhood
Let’s start with your birth and childhood. Why don ’t you tell me when and where 
were you bom?
Childhood
• What do you remember of your childhood?
• How would you describe yourself as a child? How was little ‘Oriana’ like?
• What did you play at? With whom?
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Home dynamic
• What was your family like?
• What was a typical day in your childhood like?
• What did you do at weekends?
• Were you allowed to propose weekend activities?
• How was discipline handled in your family? What were the rules, the 
punishments?
• Were there any differences between sons and daughters regarding the games 
you played, your education or your parents’ demands?
• What were celebrations (Christmas, birthdays, etc) and holidays like?
Family relationships
• What type of person was your mother?
• What was your relationship with your mother like at that time?
• What type of person was your father?
• What was your relationship with your father like at that time?
• What’s the story of your mother, where did she come from? And your father?
• How was affection shown in your family? (kisses, hugs, saying “I love you”)
• How would you describe the relationship with your siblings during your life?
Family values and legacy
• What values do you think your parents tried to teach you? (father, mother)
• Was it the same for your brothers/sisters?
• To what extent do you think your family upbringing has helped you in life? 
What is the most important thing your family has given you? What did you 
miss out on in the way your parents brought you up?
• What do you think your contribution to your family has been? What would 
have been different in your family had you not been there?
• What do you think you inherited from your father? And from your mother?
• What types of aspirations or expectations did your parents have for you?
Schooling
• Do you remember when you started school?
• What school was that?
• Why did you attend that school?
• What type of education did they try to give you in school?
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2. Adolescence
Let’s move on. What are the next memories you have?
Remembering adolescence
• When you were 12 or 13 years old, what did you play at? How did you have 
fun? With whom?
Sexual awakening
• What was the process of sexual awakening like? Do you remember when you 
first got your period, when your breasts started to grow/ when your beard or 
chest hair started to grow, when you had erotic dreams or first masturbated?
• Did you talk to anyone about all these issues?
• Did you know about the process experienced by the other sex?
Friendship and falling in love
• Let’s recall your first dance, party or date? And your first kiss?
• Did you make friends (girls and boys) easily as a teenager? Why?
Love stories
• How does your love story go on after that first kiss?
• Where did you meet your boy/girlfriends?
• What did you do with your boy/girlfriends? Where did you go? What kind of 
things did you talk about?
• Who used to take the initiative? Who would kiss whom? Who would take the 
other’s hand?
• What were you like in your youth?
Sexuality
• How did people begin their sex lives at that time? Men? Women?
• How was it in your case?
• Did you start with any contraceptive method?
• Did you talk about your sexuality with your partners?
• Who used to take the initiative to have a sexual relationship?
Professional, technical education
• Why did you decide to continue with further education (or not)?
• Why did you choose that University/Institute?
• What are your best memories of that time? What are the worst?
• What did you learn about yourself in those student days/that first job?
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Work trajectory
• What follows in your job trajectory?
• Why did you decide to work (not to work)?
• What would have been different in your life and in your way of being if you
had (had not) worked?
• What makes a good worker in your area?
• What does work mean in your life?
• How has being a .... influenced your life?
• Which of your own traits do you have to put into practice in your job?
• How would you describe your collegues?
• Do family and work fit together for you in your life? (if applicable)
3. Adulthood
Let's spend some time on your adult life,
Starting adulthood
• When you started your adult life, did you have any ideas or dream about what 
your future life would look like?
Being a husband/wife and parenting
• What was it about her or him that made you get married?/ Who are you 
looking for as a partner?
• How did the decision to get married come about?/ Is marriage a possibility 
for you in your future life? Why?
• What is the meaning of marriage for you?
• Are there situations in which you would separate from your wife/husband?
• What was the first year of marriage like?
• How would you describe your partner?
• How would you describe your relationship?
• Types of problems, crises.
• What do you think has kept you two together all these years?/ What do you 
think keeps a marriage together?
• What’s the meaning of sexuality in your relationship? Initiative, 
conversation.
• How did the decision to have children come about? / Would you like to have 
children? When, under what conditions?
• What was the experience of being pregnant like? (if applicable)
• What was your daily life like after the arrival of the children? (if applicable)
• How did you and your partner define the criteria for raising your children?
• How did you and your partner organise the domestic roles?
• What values or lessons do you try to impart to your kids?/ What kind of 
people would you like your children to be?
• Which period of your kids’ education was most difficult?
• What differences do you see between the way you were brought up by your 
parents and the way you brought up your kids?
296
• What differences do you see in the type of relationship you had with your 
parents and the relationship you have had with your kids?
• How was affection shown in your family of procreation?
• Friendship in adulthood: who, what do you share with them, when do you 
meet?
4. Maturity
Finally, tell me what these last years have been like.
Retirement experience (if applicable)
• What was the experience of retirement like for you?
• How do you feel about your life now that you are retired? What is the best 
part? And the worst?
• What was it like when your children started to leave home?
• How would you describe your children, what type of life have they made?
• What type of changes do you notice in your couple relationship?
Being grandfather/grandmother (if applicable!
• How would you describe your experience as grandfather/grandmother?
5. Spirituality
• Was religion important in your family? Why?
• Is religion important for you now?
• How would you define your God?
• What sort of relationship do you have with him?
• What role does God play in your life?
• Why do you think we are in this world?
• Do you think we have a spirit/soul?
• Do you think we have a destiny?
6. Evaluating life
Now that you have told me your life story, what conclusions can you draw? I f  you 
had to summarise your story or give it a title, you would say that this was the 
story of....?
• Does your life resemble what you once thought it would be?
• Why do you think your life has taken the path it has, why was it the way it 
was?
• Is there something that for any reason you couldn’t accomplish in life?
• What do you see as the purpose of life? What is life for?
I f  you bring to mind the things you have done, the relationships you have had, the
challenges you have confronted, your beliefs, your values, how would you 
describe yourself?
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• What do you like the most and the least in your way of being?
• What would you say are your strengths as a person? And what are your 
weaknesses?
• What are your fears, worries or anxieties in life?
• How would you describe your relationship with yourself?
7. Closure
• What do you see yourself doing in the coming years?
• Do you feel at peace with yourself? How did you achieve that peace?
• How do you feel now that you have shared your life story with me?
• What was that experience like?
• Are there any other comments or thoughts that you would like to share with 
me?
• Any questions?
Second Session
In the last session you shared your life story with me. Now I  would like to tell you my 
proposal fo r  today. But before going into that, I  would like to know whether there is 
anything you want to add to the conversation we had the other day or anything that 
you want to comment on? (If I  discover some untouched issues I  will suggest giving 
them some time).
This second session is organised in two parts. In the first part, we are going to talk 
about your lifestyle, about your body, about your aspirations and ethics, about those 
critical moments that all o f us have in life that make us reflect on who we are and 
where are we going. At the end, we are going to talk a while about Chilean society 
and the possibilities o f being that it allows us or doesn’t allow us. This first part will 
take around an hour and a half As this study is about three generations, in the 
second part, I  am going to ask some questions to compare your generation with your 
mother’s/father’s (name) and your son’s/daughter’s (name). We will spend about 
half an hour on this.
Finally, some reminders. As we agreed at the beginning, your identity will remain 
anonymous, and I  will use a pseudonym if I  quote anything o f what you have shared 
with me. I f  any question makes you feel uncomfortable, you can choose not to 
answer. This is not about good or bad answers, but about expressing what you really 
think and feel. Lastly, I  want to remind you of my commitment not to comment on 
anything you say with the other members o f your family being interviewed.
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I. Life trajectory and the self
1. Lifestyle
• Can you briefly describe a typical week of your life in the present, a summary 
of what you do on weekdays and weekends?
• In which of these situations, activities or moments of your normal routine do 
you feel most like yourself?
• (For the most frequent activity) In which sense has... marked your way of 
being, who you are?
• ► Which of your material/tangible things most reflect the person you are? 
Why?
2. Presentation of the self and body
• What kind of relationship have you had with your body during your life? In 
your adolescence, in your youth, in your relationships with others, with the 
opposite sex, with your partners, in your jobs, how have you felt about this 
body of yours? (appearance, size, proportions, colours, features)
• If you look at your body, what are the good and bad things about it?
• How do you take care of your body?
• What do your clothes say about you?
• If we look at your wardrobe, what other types of clothes we would find in it?
• What’s the image/attitude that you represent wearing those clothes?
3. Life stages
• How would you define the life stage in which you are?
• What are the opportunities and constraints of being in this life stage?
• How has the way you see yourself changed since you were in your 20', 40's, 
etc..?
• What is the difference in maturity/ageing between men and women?
4. Turning points
Let’s talk about situations you’ve confronted that have shaken you in some way or 
another and maybe led you to rethink the way you see yourself or to reorganise the 
priorities o f your life.
► Can you think and choose one or two moments in your life that turned out to be 
decisive for the kind of person you are? Tell me what happened and how they have 
impacted the way you see yourself.
• What would have happened if you had taken the other road?
• What did you learn from that experience?
► Can you recall a situation in which you have felt humiliated as a person? (That 
someone’s opinion, attitude or behaviour has not shown you respect in the way you 
think you deserve). Tell me what happened and how it impacted the way you see 
yourself.
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► If you were to choose one moment or situation of your life to be your eternal 
heaven after you die, what would you choose?
5. Aspirations, ethics and emotions
► Let’s suppose that you are allowed to write your own obituary. What would it 
say? (The announcement of your death in a written media, done by somebody close 
to you, including a brief description of who were you).
• Thinking back, what kind o f person were you inspired to be?
• What has helped you and what has hindered your intention to be that kind of
person?
• What expectations do you have for yourself in the future?
• What does the fulfillment of those aspirations depend on? What will help and 
what will hinder?
► What gives your life meaning?
I’m going to mention different areas of our personal life. In each case, please tell me 
what you think the most important values are:
• Friendship
• Family life
• Work
• Couple relationship/marriage
• Your relationship with yourself
What role have emotions played in your life?
• How do you relate to your emotions?
• Have you had spaces to express your emotions?
6. Surrounding discourses about the self
• Thinking now about your group of friends, what type of person do they 
admire? What type of person do they criticise? (what type of man, woman)
• How do we cope with failure in society?
II. Comparison between generations
• How would you define your generation?
—  In which Chile did your generation live?
—  What kind of life have people of your generation made?
—  What kind of person did people of your generation become?
• How would you define the generation of your father-mother/ son-daughter?
—  In which Chile did they live?
—  What kind of life did people of that generation make?
—  What kind of person did people of that generation become?
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How would you define the generation of your son-daughter/grandson- 
granddaughter/ grandfather-grandmother?
In which Chile did they live?
What kind of life did people of that generation make?
What kind of person did people of that generation become?
What kind of changes do you notice from one generation to the other? 
(explore values/morals, gender, family life, working life)
What has remained the same in the life of these three generations?
Thinking about the way each generation has lived life, what things that you 
(your father-mother/ your son-daughter/grandson-grandaughter) have done in 
life were prohibited or unthinkable in your (mother’ s-father’ s/grandmother’s- 
grandfather’s, son’s-daughter’s) generation?
What obstacles or challenges has each generation had to confront in order to 
progress in life? Let’s think first about your grandfather’s/grandmother’s 
generation,
Father’s/mother’s generation 
Your generation
What opportunities or resources has each generation had to progress in life? 
Let’s think first about your grandfather’s/grandmother’s generation, (skills, 
capacities, expertise, knowledge, values, and attitudes, networks, friends, 
relatives, colleagues, or communities they have belonged to)
Father’s/mother’s generation 
Your generation
You know, elderly people usually say, "in my time, things were different". 
Now, what does your grandfather-grandmother/father-mother think about the 
way people of your generation have lived their lives?
Is there anything that she/he likes better in your generation than in his/hers?
Is there anything that she/he likes better in his/her generation than in yours?
Now, thinking about your son-daughter/grandson-grandaughter, what is 
his/her opinion on the way people of your generation have lived life?
Is there anything that she/he likes better in your generation than in his/hers?
Is there anything that she/he likes better in his/her generation than in yours?
What do you think gives meaning to your grandmother’s- 
grandfather’ s/father’ s-mother’ s/son’ s-daughter’ s/grandson’ s-granddaugther’s 
life?
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• Thinking about your grandmother-grandfather/father-mother/son- 
daughter/grandson-granddaugther, what type of person do you think he/she 
has aspired to be? What ideal inspires her/him?
—  Which have been his/her priorities and beliefs in life?
• To what extent has he/she achieved that ideal? Why?
• What has helped him/her to become that type of person?
III. Closure
• Is there anything else you want to add, or comment on?
• How do you feel after these two interviews and all we have talked about?
• Do you have any questions?
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